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In an era when lies and misrepresentations about historical events easily become firmly rooted, Michael Sells's discussion illustrates the importance of careful historical research as a moral enterprise. In addition to the skills of the historian, however, there is also room in this enterprise for those of the ethicist. In particular, I warn against confusing the truth or falsity of claims about one narrow historical period with larger questions about the moral meaning and significance of those claims. Illustrating this, I argue one cannot assess the legitimacy of competing nationhood claims solely on the basis of the deeds of specific actors. Nor should the actions of a single individual like the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem be converted into a totalizing claim about the rights of the Palestinian people.

Although we need the good witness of others to form our best selves, an argument can be made that we need to study the dark side of the equation as well. The understanding and analysis of bad leaders/misleaders is an important component of leadership studies. However, we argue that bad leaders should never be defined as leaders. Leadership aims at the good of its communities, while misleaders do not. Ethics, therefore, is not only essential to the practice of leadership but to the very meaning of the term.

In mid-June 2009, the Obama administration dissolved the President's Council on Bioethics (PCBE), a group established by President George W. Bush in August 2001 and whose nearly eight-year life was marked from beginning to end by controversy. While some will regret the PCBE's passing, others will regard the Council as a failed experiment in doing public bioethics.

Although the first human embryonic stem cells (hESCs) were produced in 1998, the direction of U.S. policy on stem cell research was set nearly 20 years earlier when the recommendations of a congressionally established Ethics Advisory Board were ignored by the Reagan administration. Thus began an unprecedented and unparalleled 30-year-long history of political intrusions in an area of scientific and biomedical research that has measurable impacts on the health of Americans. Driving these intrusions were religiously informed public policy positions that have usually escaped critical ethical analysis. Here I record my own encounters with this history of intrusions and the thinking behind them.My most abrupt encounter with the politics of stem cell research occurred on September 6, 2006, at a hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services and Related Agencies, chaired by Senator Arlen Specter. Just a week before, scientists at Advanced Cell Technology (ACT), a small Massachusetts biotech company, had published a paper in the journal Nature in which they described a method for extracting stem cells from early human embryos while leaving the embryos intact and viable. As head of ACT’s Ethics Advisory Board, I had supported this research.

Science fiction is fast becoming reality as scientists and engineers seek to develop new ways of directly accessing and controlling our brains through brain-computer and even brain-to-brain interfaces. If such research is to receive continuing public approval and support—and not invite opposition—it must anticipate the special ethical challenges it creates. By pointing to some of the acute concerns raised by neural engineering technologies—around issues of identity, normality, authority, responsibility, privacy, and justice—Eran Klein and colleagues model and stimulate the kind of reflection that will be needed as new brain technologies are developed. And yet, as I read their informative discussion, I find myself asking even more questions. One concerns the ethical novelty of these technologies. For example, in terms of questions of identity, normality, responsibility, and authority, how different is deep brain stimulation from the potent psychiatric drugs that have been administered for decades? How different in terms of issues of liability associated with malfunction or misuse are brain-computer interfaces from other complex devices now routinely in use? Neither ethics nor law will have to rethink things from scratch as new neural devices and capabilities are introduced: the groundwork for answering some of these questions has already been laid in a variety of fields from bioethics, to health and product liability law. Nevertheless, I conclude that there are new questions here. It is not simply the fact that neural technologies pose questions of identity, privacy, and the like but that they do so with a degree of intensity that creates qualitatively new challenges.

The core issues explored by transhumanism raise profound questions about the goods and evils that define human existence and about the nature and meaning of human life. Christian faith, too, has long provided answers to questions about the directionality and meaning of human life. In a world brought into being by a loving God, what were we meant to be in our original created nature? Which features of our current experience are the result of the distortions of human sinfulness, and which remain part of our created goodness? What will life be like if our self-created distortions are removed and our eschatological hopes of salvation are realized? In Transhumanism and Transcendence: Christian Hope in an Age of Technological Enhancement, thirteen essays by Christian theologians and ethicists indicate that there are points of convergence and divergence for Christianity and the more ambitious transhumanist visions.

When does benefiting from others' wrongdoing effectively make one a moral accomplice in their evil deeds? If stem cell research lives up to its therapeutic promise, this question (which has previously cropped up in debates over fetal tissue research or the use of Nazi research data) is likely to become a central one for opponents of embryo destruction. I argue that benefiting from wrongdoing is prima facie morally wrong under any of three conditions: (1) when the wrongdoing is one's agent; (2) when acceptance of benefit directly encourages the repetition of the wrongful deed (even though no agency relationship is involved); and (3) when acceptance of a benefit legitimates a wrongful practice. I conclude by showing that, because of the ways in which most embryonic stem cell lines come into being, people who oppose embryo destruction may use human embryonic stem cells without incurring moral blame.

Human embryonic stem cell research offers great promise for the treatment of many serious disease conditions in a variety of medical areas, including wound healing. Before this promise can be realized, society and individual researchers, clinicians, and patients will have to answer four ethical questions: 1) Can we ever intentionally destroy a human embryo? 2) Can we benefit from others' destruction of embryos? 3) Can we create an embryo to destroy it? 4) Can we clone human embryos? After outlining the issues raised by each question, the author concludes by indicating his own affirmative answer to each of these questions.

Debates about commodification in bioethics frequently appeal to Kant's famous second formulation of the categorical imperative, the formula requiring us to treat the rational (human) being as "an end in itself" and "never as a means only." In the course of her own treatment of commodification, Margaret Jane Radin observes that Kant's application of this formula "does not generate noncontroversial particular consequences." This is so, I argue, because Kant offers three different--and largely incompatible--interpretations of the formula. One focuses on the obligation to preserve rational willing; the second stresses respect for human (physical) dignity and integrity; the third views respect for others as "ends in themselves" as primarily involving a willingness to govern one's conduct by a procedure of impartial co-legislation. Only the third of these interpretations, I conclude, offers a reasonable and coherent approach to moral judgment about the limits of commodification.

As a “case” in business ethics, the conduct of the firearms industry is hardly dilemmatic. The responsible choices before firearm manufacturers have long been clear, if largely neglected. The great interest here for business ethicists lies in understanding how civil law and ethics can work together to bring a rogue industry under control. Business ethicists have a role to play in shaping the formation of legal standards in this area. In turn, emerging concepts of manufacturers’ liability can make a contribution to the teaching of business ethics.

This case is another in a series intended to highlight the new questions emerging from advances in mapping the human genome and the application of genetic findings to clinical practice. The National Human Genome Research Institute, a component of the National Institutes of Health, by law is directed to designate a portion of its annual budget to furthering understanding of the ethical, legal, and social questions emerging from research on the human genome. As part of the effort, the Institute supports research by scientists and scholars around the nation with the aim of clarifying and resolving the tough ethical and research choices facing this endeavor. But recently it has launched an intramural program, which is expected to take a catalytic role in grappling with the array of issues the researchers face in carrying out investigations in human genetics.

On the morning of December 2, 1994, after a preceding afternoon of discussion, the Advisory Committee to the Director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) unanimously voted to approve the recommendations of the Report of the Human Embryo Research Panel. Panel members like myself who were present were elated. The vote marked the culmination of nearly a year of work. Approval of the report also represented a decisive step forward in bringing an end to a 15-year long moratorium on federally funded research on the preimplantation human embryo and techniques ofin vitrofertilization.

For nearly a generation, Derek Parfit's arguments in his 1984 book Reasons and Persons have shaped debates about our moral responsibilities to future people. Struggling to accommodate Parfit's insights, philosophers and bioethicists have minimized or accentuated obligations to the future in ways that defy ordinary moral intuitions. In this issue, Robert Sparrow develops the troubling implications of the views of two leading theorists whose work favoring human genetic enhancement is influenced by Parfit. Sparrow believes they return us to the horrors of early twentieth-century eugenics. But the real problem may be a purely theoretical one: the unfortunate influence of Parfit. This is no place to review all of Parfit's complex and brilliantly developed arguments. I can, however, present his core insights. One is that in certain decisions that affect which person is born--what he calls "person-affecting decisions"--there may be no one harmed by the decision, even if its outcome is terrible. For example, imagine a woman who has contracted rubella and wants to become pregnant. Her doctor warns her to delay conception because the child runs the risk of birth defects, but the woman ignores the advice, and her child is born blind, deaf, and with severe heart disorders. Many of us think that the mother has acted irresponsibly. But Parfit points out that the impaired child cannot say that he has been harmed. Normally, one is harmed if one is made worse off than one would have been. But if the mother had taken the doctor's advice, a different child would have been born at a later date. One can perhaps argue that the impaired child would be better off if it had not been born rather than being born with severe impairments, but most people prefer being alive to being dead, no matter how bad their condition. Faced with these counterintuitive conclusions, Parfit moved to an "impersonal" account of moral judgment. On this account, the moral goal is to increase welfare in the world and reduce suffering. The mother acts irresponsibly if she refuses to defer conception, as her decision decreases the net sum of well-being in the world. Parfit's presence haunts Sparrow's discussion in two crucial ways. First, Parfit's argument for an impersonal account of obligations to the future helps support the consequentialist or utilitarian approaches adopted by the two theorists Sparrow examines, Julian Savulescu and John Harris. Sparrow correctly identifies a number of problems in their views. …

The author reviews a series of deep affinities between the Catholic social teaching embodied in Pope John Paul II's recent encyclical,Centesimus Annus, and traditional Jewish teachings about economic justice. At the same time, the author maintains that from a Jewish perspective there is a “disquieting” feature to this recent papal letter. It presents twentieth century history in ways that mute or conceal the role some earlier papal teaching played in the rise of corporatist states, with their authoritarian regimes and xenophobic nationalism.Centesimus annus thus obscures the complex contribution Catholic social teaching made to the events leading up to the Holocaust of European Jewry.

This paper contends that work in business ethics participates in two key aspects of the broad philosophical and aesthetic movement known as postmodernism. First, like postmodernists generally, business ethicists reject the “grand narratives” of historical and conceptual justification, especially the narratives embodied in Marxism and Milton Friedman’s vision of unfettered capitalism. Second, both in the methods and content of their work, business ethicists share postmodernism’s “de-centering” of perspective and discovery of “otherness,” “difference” and marginality as valid modes of approach to experience and moral decision.

A short while ago, I participated in a class discussion of a case whose focus was on the auditor's report for a company about to launch an initial public stock offering.l The report showed that the company had taken many liberties with the discretions normally afforded by generally accepted accounting practices (GAAP). The company immediately booked franchises it sold as revenue, while cancelled sales (described as srepurchases" of franchises) were handled as depreciable capital expenditures. What seemed to be interest-bearing loans from corporate officers to the company were booked unambiguously as franchise sales to these officers. The resulting balance sheet made the company seem in far better financial health than it was. Accounting experts present for the case discussion pointed out that at the time they occurred these practices did not violate GAAP, although they i'pushed the envelope" of accepted conduct. During our case discussion, several persons present with experience in investment banking repeatedly sought to defend the company's practices. They pointed out that most firms make efforts to see that audits for IPOs cast the most favorable light on the firm's financial condition. Because so many companies do this, they added, one that didn't skew its audit in a favorable direction would disadvantage itself in the capital markets. As the discussion proceeded, I counted at least ten instances where one or another participant used some variant of the phrase i'Everyone does it." I mention this discussion not because I believe these practices were morally justified. Indeed, they were apparently regarded as so flagrant that they subsequently led to a tightening of FASB standards. Rather, I raise this case to show how prevalent the Everyone's doing it'§ claim is in moral arguments, especially in the field of business ethics. In his response to my paper, Richard DeGeorge repeatedly suggests that the ZEveryone's doing it" claim is either morally irrelevant or mis

The claim that “Everyone's doing it” is frequently offered as a reason for engaging in behavior that is widespread but less-than-ideal. This is particularly true in business, where competitors’ conduct often forces hard choices on managers. When is the claim “Everyone's doing it” a morally valid reason for following others’ lead? This discussion proposes and develops five prima facie conditions to identify when the existence of prevalent but otherwise undesirable behavior provides a moral justification for our engaging in such behavior ourselves. The balance of the discussion focuses on testing these conditions by applying them to a series of representative cases in business ethics.

Our film Dreams and Dilemmas: Parents and the Practice of Neonatal Care is on its way to meeting its goal of furthering the "Principles for Family Centered Neonatal Care" (Harrison H. Pediatrics 1993;92:643-50) through cinéma vérité depiction of parental involvement in decision-making. Reality-based filmmaking can provide valuable and successful educational material that advances care and understanding. However, there are real practical and ethical concerns such as privacy, consent, and uncertain or unknown future impact on participants. Successful reality-based filmmaking in a complex medical environment such as a neonatal intensive care unit requires careful attention to ways of ensuring full communication between all those involved and efforts to allay participants' anxiety about being portrayed unfavorably. The most important ingredient, however, is the skill and ability of the filmmaker to engender trust.

Our human embryonic stem cell debates are not simply about good or bad ethical arguments. The fetus and the embryo have instead become symbols for a larger set of value conflicts occasioned by social and cultural changes. Beneath our stem cell debates lie conflicts between those who would privilege scientific progress and individual choice and others who favour the sanctity of family life and traditional family roles. Also at work, on both the national and international levels, is the use of the embryo by newly emergent social groups to express resentment against cultural elites. The organisational needs of religious groups have also played a role, with the issue of protection of the embryo and fetus serving as a useful means of rallying organisational allegiance in the Roman Catholic and evangelical communities. Because the epiphenomenal moral positions on the status and use of the embryo are driven by the powerful social, cultural or economic forces beneath them, they will most likely change only with shifts in the underlying forces that sustain them.

This paper examines the ethical issues of conflict of interest raised by the burgeoning development of physician involvement in for-profit entrepreneurial activities outside their practice. After documenting the nature and extent of these activities, and their potential for conflicts of interest, the paper assesses the major arguments for and against physicians' referral of patients to facilities they own or in which they invest. The paper concludes that an outright ban on such activity seems ethically warranted.

Human embryonic stem-cell (hESC) research faces opposition from those who object to the destruction of human embryos. Over the past few years, a series of new approaches have been proposed for deriving hESC lines without injuring a living embryo. Each of these presents scientific challenges and raises ethical and political questions. Do any of these methods have the potential to provide a source of hESCs that will be acceptable to those who oppose the current approaches?

There is much that I like in this essay. I share the conclusion that on this issue (as many others) the President's Council on Bioethics (PCB) has not really delivered the “fair and accurate” accou...

H. G. Wells warned, in 1895, not to allow economic injustices to become to so acute that they ultimately transform human biology. Wells's warn- ing is all the more pertinent today as society contemplates the use of biotechnolo- gies to manipulate or "enhance" the human genome. I n his 1895 novel The Time Machine, H. G. Wells has the reader fol- low a Time Traveller to a remote future world where the human race has become divided into two separate species. The Eloi are a gentle, herbivorous people who inhabit the park-like surface of the planet. Dwell- ing beneath them, in a dark subterranean world, are the Morlocks, a grotesque, mole-like species, who appear to maintain the planet's me- chanical life support systems and who, as their price for this service, occa- sionally capture and devour an Eloi. Wells's two species are not the result of genetic engineering. They seem to have evolved naturally over time—it is not clear whether by Lamarck- ian or Darwinian mechanisms—from the extreme class divisions of nine- teenth century British society. But Wells's warning to his contemporaries is clear: Do not allow economic injustices to become to so acute that they ultimately transform human biology. It is a warning that remains appli- cable in the present era of genetic engineering. Ronald Lindsay (2005) tells us not to worry. Among other things, he argues that if the human species were to divide into Eloi and Morlocks, the circumstances of justice, as described by Hume and Rawls, might no longer apply. This could be true if the unenhanced are possessed of a "marked inferiority" of body and mind. In that case, the two species would be as human beings are to animals. Although duties of compassion or kindness might apply—we think it desirable to prevent animal suffering—

In this chapter, I review some of the background thinking concerning matters of moral status that I had developed in previous years and that I would now bring to the work of the Human Embryo Research Panel. Two ideas were at the forefront of my thinking. First, that biology usually offers not decisive "events" but only continuous processes of development. Second, in making status determinations we do not so much "identify" a point on a developmental continuum where moral respect should be accorded as "choose" that point. These choices are "balancing decisions" in which the community of moral agents weighs its interests in protecting an entity against the burdens of doing so. After illustrating these two contentions, I consider some of the reasons why thinkers on the "right" and "left" of our bioethics debates have resisted or missed this basic insight.

Advanced Cell Technology's Ethics Advisory Board has been called window dressing for a corporate marketing plan. But the scientists and managers have paid attention, and the lawyers have gone along.

(2001). Access to Healthcare: Going Beyond Fair Equality of Opportunity. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 22-23.

Advanced Cell Technology's Ethics Advisory Board has been called window dressing for a corporate marketing plan. But the scientists and managers have paid attention, and the lawyers have gone along.

Human embryonic stem (hES) cells are unique in their demonstrated potential to differentiate into all cell lineages. Reports by T. Wakayama et al. (“Differentiation of embryonic stem cell lines generated from adult somatic cells by nuclear transfer,” 27 Apr., p. [740][1]) and N. Lumelsky et al. (“Differentiation of embryonic stem cells to insulin-secreting structures similar to pancreatic islets, “ScienceExpress, [26 Apr., 10.1126][2]) testify to the enormous promise of ES cell research. The editorial “Disappearing stem cells, disappearing science,” by Irving L. Weissman and David Baltimore (27 Apr., p. [601][3]) emphasizes the implications of this research for human health. Weissman and Baltimore point out that hES cells are currently the most promising source of cells for tissue regeneration research. They also note that this area has enormous potential for shedding light on some of the greatest mysteries of early human development. During this same week, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services suddenly asked the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to cancel a planned first meeting of a committee that was to review applications from scientists seeking federal funds for hES cell research. This announcement heightens concerns that the Bush administration may eventually block implementation of the NIH's guidelines supporting this research. We hope that these fears are groundless and that the Bush administration will use this additional time to move toward support of the guidelines. Whatever the outcome, however, these delays have a real cost in terms of human suffering. According to data from the Centers for Disease Control's National Center for Health Statistics, approximately 3,000 Americans die every day from diseases that in the future may be treatable with ES-derived cells and tissues. We believe that these urgent health needs provide strong moral grounds for pursuing ES cell research. In addition, at least three ethical considerations recommend federal funding for this research. First, withdrawal of support will slow this research, but not stop it from going forward. Private organizations and overseas researchers will fill the void. In some cases, they will do so without the kinds of comprehensive ethical oversight provided by U.S. human subjects regulations. Second, prohibiting such funding will not prevent the destruction of embryos. Each year, thousands of spare embryos created in infertility procedures are routinely destroyed at the request of their progenitors. A very small number of these embryos could be used to produce immortal stem cell lines that could be grown and used for research without ever using more embryos. The relevant ethical question is whether these spare embryos will simply be thrown away or used for human benefit. Third, and finally, we note that the United States is a religiously and ethically pluralistic nation. Many of those who oppose ES cell research base their position on religious views not shared by other citizens. As much as possible, the government should try to avoid taking sides in these debates and confine itself to policies that promote public health and welfare. ES cell research within the framework of the NIH guidelines is such a policy. [1]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.1059399 [2]: http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/short/1058866v1 [3]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.292.5517.601

Joint ventures by physician entrepreneurs may introduce an intolerable conflict of interest into the heart of patient care, eroding patient trust and professional esteem. In 1986 a national chain opened a new radiological facility in Philadelphia near the office of Dr. Robert Hochberg, a private radiologist. Within several months, Hochberg noticed a decline in his business. Two and a half years later, less than half as many patients were using his office. Some of this was attributable to the superior technology at the competing facility, which boasted a state-of-the-art magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) machine. But Hochberg also blames the decline on what he believes are the chain's unfair business practices. When the new center opened, Hochberg notes, it recruited local doctors as limited partners, many of whom previously referred patients to him. According to Hochberg, "A few of the guys just turned off the spot."(1) A year earlier, Dr. William Birnbaum, a radiologist in Irvine, California, was approached by a colleague demanding a share of his profit. Birnbaum says he was told that if he didn't comply with the request, this colleague and the other physicians would stop referring patients to Birnbaum. "He said he wanted a piece of the action," Birnbaum later commented. "He said since it was their patients, they deserved some of the income.(2) Implicit in this request was the threat that the others might open a competing facility, which they eventually did. These stories suggest that medicine is no longer immune to the hardball tactics and hostile takeovers reported in the business pages of the newspapers. Behind these anecdotes, however, lies a development with potentially major impact on the quality of health care in this country and the future of the medical profession: the enormous growth in the number of medical facilities owned in "limited partnerships" by physicians who refer their own patients to them. Radiological offices, with their expensive CAT-scan and MRI technologies, are probably at the forefront of this development, but physician-ownership also plays a major role in the growth of many new outpatient, nonhospital medical facilities. These include women's health centers, alcohol and drug abuse treatment facilities, home health care services, freestanding urgent/primary care offices, same-day surgery centers, cardiopulmonary testing services, sports medicine clinics, parenteral nutrition services, and diagnostic medical laboratories.(3) In some cases, new hospital-based facilities have been opened in collaboration with groups of physician-investors or existing facilities have been "privatized" to stimulate physician referral to them.(4) Although accurate figures are hard to come by, congressional analysts have estimated that tens of thousands of doctors already invest in limited partnerships,(5) and one independent health care analyst believes that physicians hold shares or are partners in medical facilities that generate tens of billions of dollars a year in medical services.(6) A 1988 survey by the American Medical Association indicated that 7 percent of physicians polled had an ownership interest in a health care facility to which they refer patients,(7) while a 1989 report by the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) indicates that physicians own or invest in at least 25 percent of the independent clinical labs to which they refer patients, 27 percent of independent physiological labs, including radiology and MRI centers, and 8 percent of durable medical equipment businesses.(8) Legal Controversies Much of this activity involves what is called "joint-venturing" physicians and their financial backers. Typically, a group of investors guided by a consulting firm will recruit physician-investors in a proposed facility. As "limited partnerships" these arrangements do not have to include other nonphysician investors and may exclude doctors who use or own competing facilities. …

The author suggests three ''axions'' of intergenerational responsibility; basic quides to the thinking about obligations to the future. They are: present generation is bound by ties of justice to real future persons; (2) the lives of future persons ought ideally to be ''better'' than those of the present and certainly no worse; and (3) sacrifices on behalf of the future must be distributed equitably in the present, with special regard for those presently least advantaged. He warns against taking long-term risks that might jeopardize many times the number of generations that would profit from such ventures; he discusses a plutonium economy as an example.

It has long been recognized that Soren Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling is a cryptogram. Encoded within a series of reflections and commentaries on Genesis 22 is a deeper message directed at a reader or readers presumably capable of deciphering the hidden meaning. That this is true is suggested by the book's epigraph: ‘What Tarquinius Superbus said in the garden by means of the poppies, the son understood but the messenger did not.’

How is ethical theory used in contemporary teaching in business ethics? To answer this question, we undertook a survey of twenty-five of the leading business ethics texts. Our purpose was to examine the ways in which normative moral theory is introduced and applied to cases and issues. We focused especially on the authors' views of the conflicts and tensions posed by basic theoretical debates. How can these theories be made useful if fundamental tensions are acknowledged? Our analysis resulted in a typology, presented here, of the ways in which normative theory, and the difficulties within it, are handled in business ethics texts. We conclude that there is a serious lack of clarity about how to apply the theories to cases and a persistent unwillingness to grapple with tensions between theories of ethical reasoning. These deficiencies hamper teaching and ethical decision-making.

KIE: The economic recession, the mounting costs of medical technology, and the weakening of public support for welfare state ideals have led to philosophical qualification of the right of equal access to health care by writers like Norman Daniels and Lawrence Stern. Green rejects their arguments and reiterates the claim that a Rawlsian theory of justice provides an appropriate way of thinking about the right to health care, which should be treated on a par with basic civil liberties.

THE life and thought of Reinhold Niebuhr are characterized by a running debate with rationalism. As a Christian, Niebuhr saw it as his task to defend the Biblical view of man against corruption by an opposing view found in the rationalist tradition of Hellenic philosophy. As a modern Christian, Niebuhr felt even more compelled to resist the incursion of rationalism into Christianity represented in theology by liberal Protestantism and in ethics by the Social Gospel movement. Niebuhr's polemic against rationalism makes it easy to rank him among those Christian thinkers who have refused to give reason a place in the religious or moral life. Yet, as a cursory reading of Niebuhr's work reveals, he was deeply indebted to the rationalist tradition. In an early work like Moral Man and Immoral Society, for example, Niebuhr draws heavily on the Kantian moral tradition, even as he criticizes Kant.' In his later work, The Nature and Destiny of Man, Niebuhr more than once affirms the essential role of reason in theological reflection.2 In view of this, it is valid to suggest that Niebuhr used reason as an important tool in his eventual attack on rationalism. In the remarks that follow, we seek to provide some limited evidence to support this suggestion. It should be noted, however, that we shall not attempt to trace the development of Niebuhr's own attack on rationalism. As important as it may be, a survey of Niebuhr's intellectual development is not our concern here. Rather, we seek to offer a limited and independent rational vali