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Just as Queensland commemorated the centenary anniversary of the abolition of the state’s Legislative Council, the Labor government under Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk, a ‘strong’ leader during the contemporaneous COVID-19 pandemic, found itself embroiled in the most serious integrity quagmire of its seven-year history. Given Queensland’s long history of ‘strong’ – even autocratic – political leadership and compromised government integrity, this article posits three arguments: that the abolition of the Legislative Council and a century of political excess in Queensland since 1922 are broadly related; that legislation in Queensland remains largely ‘executive-made’ and not ‘parliament-made’ law; and that the presence of a democratically elected Legislative Council after 1922 would have mitigated if not prevented much of Queensland’s political excess over the past one hundred years. The article also offers a model for a reintroduced Legislative Council that, given electoral distaste for ‘more politicians’, is unlikely to be approved at referendum.

Atmospheric turbulence causes the majority of weather-related aircraft accidents. Climate models project large increases in clear-air turbulence as the jet streams become more sheared in response to climate change. However, climate models have coarser resolutions than the numerical weather prediction models that are used to forecast clear-air turbulence operationally, raising questions about their suitability for this purpose. Here we provide the first rigorous demonstration that climate models are capable of successfully diagnosing clear-air turbulence and its response to climate change. We use an ensemble of seven clear-air turbulence diagnostics to compare 38 years of historic turbulence diagnosed from climate model simulations and high-resolution reanalysis data. We find that the differences in turbulence between the climate model and reanalysis data are much smaller than the spread between the diagnostics. When using a climate model to calculate the probabilities (and their temporal trends) of encountering clear-air turbulence of any strength, at any flight cruising level, and in any season, we find that most of the uncertainty stems from the turbulence diagnostics rather than the climate model. These results confirm the suitability of climate models for the task of producing future clear-air turbulence projections. The turbulence increases are generally larger when diagnosed from the reanalysis data than the climate model, suggesting that previous quantifications from climate models of the response of clear-air turbulence to climate change may be underestimates. Our results show that the key to reducing uncertainty in projections of future clear-air turbulence lies in improving the clear-air turbulence diagnostics rather than the climate models.

The stabilisation of the leapfrog time-stepping scheme provided by the Robert–Asselin filter has enabled decades of atmospheric and oceanic research and weather and climate predictions. The unfortunate concomitant reduction from second-order accuracy to first-order accuracy inflicted by the filter has recently ushered in a new generation of leapfrog time filters that preserve the second-order accuracy, including the Robert–Asselin–Williams (RAW) filter and its variants. These modern filtered leapfrog schemes have previously been shown to improve numerical simulations made using both simple conceptual models and comprehensive general circulation models. However, their performance in standard benchmark experiments has not previously been assessed. Here we evaluate these filtered leapfrog schemes in four classic benchmark experiments: linear scalar advection; a nonlinear density current in the quasi-compressible equations; a nonlinear rising warm bubble in the fully compressible equations; and the linked behaviour of nonlinear twin tropical cyclones in the rotating shallow-water equations. For a given time-step size, the filtered leapfrog schemes are found to compare favourably with the third-order Runge–Kutta (RK3) scheme. They are also less computationally expensive than RK3, at roughly one-third to one-half the cost per time step. For a given computational expenditure, the filtered leapfrog schemes are found to produce smaller errors with respect to the analytical solution (where available) than RK3. Furthermore, the filtered leapfrog schemes are found to be numerically stable, even when the discretisation method splits the slow advection and diffusion modes from the fast acoustic and gravity-wave modes. Given that implementing filter upgrades requires only minimally invasive changes to an existing computer code, our results provide support for the continued use of filtered leapfrog schemes in atmosphere and ocean models.

The purpose of the study was to assess the status of emerging therapeutic drug monitoring (TDM) of anti-infective agents in Australian hospitals. A nationwide cross-sectional survey of all Australian hospitals operating in the public and private health sector was conducted between August and September 2019. The survey consisted of questions regarding institutional TDM practice for anti-infective agents and clinical vignettes specific to β-lactam antibiotics. Responses were received from 82 unique institutions, representing all Australian states and territories. All 29 (100%) of principal referral (major) hospitals in Australia participated. Five surveys were partially complete. Only 25% (20/80) of hospitals had TDM testing available on-site for any of the eight emerging TDM candidates considered: β-lactam antibiotics, anti-tuberculous agents, flucytosine, fluoroquinolones, ganciclovir, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) drugs, linezolid and teicoplanin. A considerable time lag was noted between TDM sampling and reporting of results. With respect to β-lactam antibiotic TDM, variable indications, pharmacodynamic targets and sampling times were identified. The three greatest barriers to local TDM performance were found to be (1) lack of timely assays/results, (2) lack of institutional-wide expertise and/or training and (3) lack of guidelines to inform ordering of TDM and interpretation of results. The majority of respondents favoured establishing national TDM guidelines and increasing access to dose prediction software, at rates of 89% and 96%, respectively. Translating emerging TDM evidence into daily clinical practice is slow. Concerted efforts are required to address the barriers identified and facilitate the implementation of standardised practice.

Pregnancy in cattle is the outcome of the complex process of initiation of cycling, fertilization, maternal recognition of pregnancy and foeto-placental development. Though much is known about initiation of cycling and associated risk factors, there are virtually no data on pregnancy rate per cycle for naturally mated cattle, especially for extensively managed, tropically adapted genotypes, which this study aimed to determine. Tropical composite (Bos indicus and African Sanga crosses with Bos taurus) and Brahman cattle (n = 2,181) of known pedigree in four-year groups at four sites were mated annually for 84 days. Body condition, ovarian function, pregnancies, calving and lactation were monitored through six full reproductive cycles using 4-8 weekly ultrasound of the reproductive tract outside the calving period and daily monitoring during calving. From this, dates of commencement of cycling and conception in each year were estimated for each animal, enabling calculation of established pregnancy for consecutive 21-day periods while cycling and of pregnancies within four months of calving while lactating (P4M). Pregnancy per 21-day period (cycle) during mating for cycling animals averaged 63%, 71%, 41% and 28% in four consecutive cycles. Pregnant per cycle was 2%-11% higher in tropical composites than in Brahmans. The only other consistently significant risk to becoming pregnant was if cycling commenced later than three weeks before mating commenced. P4M averaged 62% and was lower for cows in sub-optimal body condition and in first-parity and later-calving cows. Pregnant per cycle was moderately heritable (~20%), while heritability was moderate to high (33%) for P4M. Selection for pregnant per cycle could be achieved indirectly by selection for P4M, a trait that is readily measured.

Background: Bioprosthetic valve fracture (BVF) improves the hemodynamic results of valve-in-valve transcatheter aortic valve replacement (VIV TAVR) by facilitating optimal expansion of the transcat...

Peace operations are a highly resilient international institution for managing armed conflict. Their resilience derives from what constructivists in International Relations theory call collective i...

Background/Aims Patients undergoing transcatheter aortic valve intervention are commonly admitted the day before their procedure. Same-day admission offers a potential approach to reduce length of stay and procedural costs but there are little data on the feasibility and safety of this approach. This study aimed to explore the feasibility and safety of a same-day admission programme facilitated by a specialist nurse for patients undergoing elective transfemoral transcatheter aortic valve implantation. Methods Consecutive patients undergoing transcatheter aortic valve implantation through a standard care pathway (admission to hospital before the day of procedure) from July 2015 to July 2016 were retrospectively compared to those going through a same-day admission pathway from April 2017 to December 2018 at the James Cook University Hospital. Baseline and procedural characteristics, length of stay and clinical outcomes were analysed using chi square, Student's t-test and Mann–Whitney U tests. Results Overall, 121 of 135 (90%) patients were eligible for same-day admission and all underwent successful same-day transcatheter aortic valve implantation. There were 77 patients in the standard care group. Average length of stay in the same-day group was lower than the standard care group (1.5 vs 3.9 days; PConclusions Routine same-day admission for transfemoral transcatheter aortic valve implantation facilitated by a specialist nurse can be safely implemented, leading to a shorter length of stay with no detrimental effect on clinical outcomes. This represents a highly effective method of reducing the procedural cost of transcatheter aortic valve implantation.

Parent–child interactions shape children’s internal working models (IWMs) i.e., their understanding of themselves, others, and close relationships, including with the Divine. Positive IWM a...

Peacekeepers in cities face particular challenges because cities are densely populated and heterogeneous, encompass multiple terrains and fluid features, and host key assets of political, economic and strategic importance. Attacks targeting peacekeepers in cities constitute a recurrent problem, but how do they affect a peace operation’s activities? We theorise the effects of such violence on three outcomes: patrolling and outreach, use of force, and the establishment of new bases. We explore these dynamics by analysing intra-city dynamics of violence and operational activity following attacks on African Union (AU) peacekeepers in Mogadishu, Somalia, from initial deployment in 2007 through 2009. We use the geo-referenced UCDP Peacemakers at Risk (PAR) dataset and extend it by coding specific city sub-locations for incidences of violence, allowing us to analyse the spatiality of violence involving peacekeepers in Mogadishu. The evidence suggests that during its first three years, attacks on AMISOM significantly hampered its ability to spread out in the city and operate effectively, but did not evidently alter wider patterns of violence in the city. Despite these challenges, AMISOM managed to fulfil the core element of its mandate: preventing the overthrow of the Somali Transitional Federal Government.

Electric aircraft offer the potential for emissions savings towards decarbonising air transport and reducing its contribution to climate change. However, the characteristics of these novel technologies pose questions about how they can be integrated with existing airport infrastructure. Key considerations relate to the time needed to recharge electric aircraft whilst on the ground without adversely affecting operational capacities, and the requirement for airport operators to install electric charging capabilities. The paper applies queuing theory and simulation modelling techniques to help identify potential battery charging regimes for electric aircraft based on potential forecasts of the future electric aircraft fleet. An initial prototype discrete event simulation model was developed to simulate impacts of short-haul electric aircraft on airport capacity to help determine future infrastructural requirements. Computational optimisation techniques were used to determine optimal configurations of single purpose and converted dual purpose aircraft parking stands under different scenarios and charging regimes. The model demonstrated that a future increase in electric aircraft equating to 25% of the global aircraft fleet required the conversion of only 13% of existing parking stands, while maintaining airside capacity and operational efficiency. The findings have important implications for air transport planners and decision makers in the transition to zero emissions and flight.

In December 2015, the African Union (AU) took the unprecedented step of threatening to use military force against the government of Burundi's wishes in order to protect civilians caught up in the country's intensifying domestic crisis. This article traces the background to this decision and analyses the effectiveness and credibility of the AU's use of coercive diplomacy as a tool of conflict management. After its usual range of conflict management tools failed to stem the Burundian crisis, the AU Commission and Peace and Security Council tried a new type of military compellence by invoking Article 4(h) of the Union's Constitutive Act. We argue that the threatened intervention never materialised because of (1) the Burundian government's astute diplomacy and (2) several African autocrats’ resistance to setting a precedent for future interventions where concerns about civilian protection might override state sovereignty.

Deployed to Mogadishu, Somalia in March 2007, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) became the Union’s longest running, largest, most costly, and most deadly operation. Yet, of the 54 AU me...

The last decade has seen the success of stochastic parameterizations in short-term, medium-range and seasonal forecasts: operational weather centers now routinely use stochastic parameterization schemes to better represent model inadequacy and improve the quantification of forecast uncertainty. Developed initially for numerical weather prediction, the inclusion of stochastic parameterizations not only provides better estimates of uncertainty, but it is also extremely promising for reducing longstanding climate biases and relevant for determining the climate response to external forcing. This article highlights recent developments from different research groups which show that the stochastic representation of unresolved processes in the atmosphere, oceans, land surface and cryosphere of comprehensive weather and climate models (a) gives rise to more reliable probabilistic forecasts of weather and climate and (b) reduces systematic model bias. We make a case that the use of mathematically stringent methods for the derivation of stochastic dynamic equations will lead to substantial improvements in our ability to accurately simulate weather and climate at all scales. Recent work in mathematics, statistical mechanics and turbulence is reviewed, its relevance for the climate problem demonstrated, and future research directions outlined., Comment: 26 pages, 15 figures. Final published version

Some time during late 2018, Queensland will become home to exactly five million people. That milestone alone is enough for any state to take stock, but when faced with both fiscal opportunity and economic challenges — and a recent state election that exposed a deeply divided electorate — it is clear that Queensland in 2018 finds itself at crossroads. Do we, in our economic and social policy, embrace risk and look forward to an optimistic future, or does a fearful Queensland turn inwards to seek a golden past that may never truly have existed? Do we continue to build a globalised and multicultural Queensland, or do we return to parochialism, protectionism and populism?

Never before has it been so important for policymakers to balance regional and global forms of peacekeeping. Although the United Nations Security Council retains primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security and is the single largest source of peacekeepers, some regional organizations, particularly in Africa and Europe, are playing increasingly important roles. This article analyzes the relationship between UN peace operations and those conducted by regional organizations. After summarizing recent trends in regional-global collaboration it analyzes the opportunities and risks of increasing the regionalization of peace operations. Current policy challenges are daunting, not least because better-resourced missions alone will not bring peace to contemporary warzones. Rather, policymakers should clarify the nature and limits of UN peace operations; ensure partnerships between the UN and regional organizations can deliver effective peace operations in the field; and embed peace operations within a viable conflict resolution strategy to end the war or crisis in question.

This article analyses the United Kingdom’s (UK) approach to United Nations (UN) peace operations and whether Britain is prepared politically, bureaucratically, financially, and militarily to increase its contributions to them. The article begins with an overview of UK engagement with UN peacekeeping since 1956 before discussing the political issues that govern British decisions about peacekeeping. The third section then assesses several challenges that would need to be addressed in order for the UK’s increased participation in UN missions to be effective. Finally, the article outlines the main factors pushing the UK towards greater engagement with UN peace operations, including opinions voiced by select domestic, international, and institutional audiences.

Objectives To evaluate the feasibility and safety of direct transcatheter aortic valve implantation (TAVI) by the transfemoral approach without balloon pre-dilatation using the Edwards SapienXT valve. Background TAVI is established in selected high-risk patients with severe aortic stenosis. Balloon aortic valvuloplasty (BAV) is recommended prior to valve implantation, but may contribute to procedural risk. It is unknown whether this is necessary for successful passage and deployment of the device. Methods 81 patients (mean age 84 [95%CI:82–85.8], 62% male, median EuroScore 22.8% [95%CI:20.5–27]) undergoing transfemoral TAVI (35 by direct implantation [direct group]; 46 with balloon pre-dilatation [balloon group]) between 2010 and 2013 were analyzed for efficacy and safety endpoints. Results Procedural success was 100%. Pre and post-procedural peak gradients in the direct group were 66mmHg (95%CI:59–72.8) and 14mmHg (95%CI:12–17.8)(P

Since mid-2013 AMISOM has undergone a series of strategic reviews aimed at strengthening the mission, and since early 2014 it has conducted four major operations aimed at taking the fight to Al-Shabaab. Although these operations have enjoyed some successes, AMISOM continued to confront four major challenges that badly hindered its ability to achieve its mandated tasks. Paul D Williams explores these challenges – both internal and external to AMISOM – and argues that AMISOM cannot be expected to implement a successful exit strategy unless these issues are addressed.

Penile squamous cell carcinoma (PeSCCA) is a rare malignancy for which there are limited treatment options due to a poor understanding of the molecular alterations underlying disease development and progression. Therefore, we performed comprehensive, targeted next-generation sequencing to identify relevant somatic genomic alterations in a retrospective cohort of 60 fixed tumor samples from 43 PeSCCA cases (including 14 matched primary/metastasis pairs). We identified a median of two relevant somatic mutations and one high-level copy-number alteration per sample (range, 0–5 and 0–6, respectively). Expression of HPV and p16 was detectable in 12% and 28% of patients, respectively. Furthermore, advanced clinical stage, lack of p16 expression, and MYC and CCND1 amplifications were significantly associated with shorter time to progression or PeSCCA-specific survival. Notably, four cases harbored EGFR amplifications and one demonstrated CDK4 amplification, genes for which approved and investigational targeted therapies are available. Importantly, although paired primary tumors and lymph node metastases were largely homogeneous for relevant somatic mutations, we identified heterogeneous EGFR amplification in primary tumor/lymph node metastases in 4 of 14 cases, despite uniform EGFR protein overexpression. Likewise, activating HRAS mutations occurred in 8 of 43 cases. Taken together, we provide the first comprehensive molecular PeSCCA analysis, which offers new insight into potential precision medicine approaches for this disease, including strategies targeting EGFR. Cancer Res; 75(24); 5219–27. ©2015 AACR.

Background There is conflicting evidence regarding the incidence of longitudinal stent deformation (LSD) in contemporary practice. Methods and results To assess the incidence and mechanism of LSD across commonly used DES platforms, we performed a case-by-case review of 1,800 PCI cases involving 450 consecutive procedures using Biomatrix Flex, Resolute Integrity, Promus Element and Xience V stents respectively, between Jan 2009-December 2011. LSD was detected in a higher proportion with Promus Element [15 (3.1%)] compared to other platforms (Xience V [4(0.9%)], Biomatrix [3 (0.7%)], Resolute [3 (0.7%)];p=0.002). LSD was characterised as guide catheter / guide extension induced, or as impact from secondary devices such as post-dilatation balloons or IVUS catheters. The incidence of guide catheter/guide extension LSD was similar across platforms; (Promus Element [5 (1.1%)], Xience V [4 (0.9%)], Biomatrix [3(0.7%)], Resolute [3 (0.7%)]; p=0.85). Secondary device LSD occurred exclusively with Promus Element (9/450 cases [2%] (p

Despite widespread agreement that effective strategic communications are a necessary part of complex peace operations, many missions struggle to generate relevant capabilities and implement effective campaigns. This article analyzes the experiences of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) as a case study of this problem. Specifically, it examines how the United Nations (UN) tried to fill the gap by hiring a consortium of private firms known as the AU-UN Information Support Team (IST) to wage a strategic communications campaign against al-Shabaab. The IST’s goal was to drive, as well as communicate, AMISOM’s success, improve the mission’s media presence, and develop a communications strategy. The IST played an innovative and important function for AMISOM but suffered from several significant challenges that reduced its effectiveness. The conclusion therefore identifies four main lessons from AMISOM’s experiences that could improve strategic communications for peace operations.

In the twenty-first century, African states and a wide range of partners have made considerable progress in constructing the African Peace and Security Architecture––a complex set of interrelated and overlapping institutions with mandates spanning the entire conflict management spectrum from preventive diplomacy to postwar reconstruction. Specifically, as used here, the African Peace and Security Architecture refers to the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, the African Standby Force, the Continental Early Warning System, the Peace Fund, the Panel of the Wise, and the relevant Regional Economic Communities, regional mechanisms, and parts of the African Union Commission involved in these institutions. This article reflects on the evolution of these institutions and highlights some of the main areas of progress as well as the challenges encountered along the way.

The attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, in September 2013 intensified international scrutiny of the war against Harakat Al-Shabaab Mujahideen (Movement of the Warrior Youth). This article analyses the current state of affairs with reference to the three principal sets of actors in this war: Al-Shabaab, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and its international partners, and the various actors currently involved in building the Somali Federal Government's security forces. It argues that although the newly reconfigured Al-Shabaab poses a major tactical threat in Somalia and across the wider Horn of Africa, the movement is becoming a less important actor in Somalia's national politics. As Al-Shabaab loses territory and its popularity among Somalis continues to dwindle, other clan- and region-based actors will become more salient as national debates over federalism, the decentralization of governance mechanisms beyond Mogadishu and the place of clannism will occupy centre stage. As a consequence, AMISOM's principal roles should gradually shift from degrading Al-Shabaab towards a broader stabilization agenda: encouraging a national consensus over how to build effective governance structures; developing an effective set of Somali National Security Forces; and ensuring that the Federal Government delivers services and effective governance to its citizens, especially beyond Mogadishu in the settlements recently captured from Al-Shabaab. As it stands, however, AMISOM is not prepared to carry out these activities. More worryingly, nor is the Somali Federal Government.

The relationship between the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) has at times been characterized by considerable conflict, mistrust, and tension, often hindering the predictability and conduct of effective peace operations. This article analyses the challenges facing UN–AU cooperation on peace and security issues and examines their partnerships in various peace operations. Specific attention is paid to the crucial cases of Somalia and Mali, which exemplify some of the positive and negative aspects of this relationship. We argue that while great power politics and the international normative context have played important roles in structuring debates about peace operations in contemporary Africa, so too have two more bottom-up factors: the specific operational and financial challenges generated by the AU’s big missions in Darfur, Somalia, and Mali, and the organizational cultures and bureaucratic constraints within which both institutions have had to work. Greater focus on these bottom-up factors could bring significant improvements to the decision-making processes in Addis Ababa and New York, to operational responses, and to the conduct of peace operations.

From late 2012, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) had adopted a largely defensive posture, citing limited resources as the principal reason for this. However, increasing numbers of Al-Shabaab attacks both inside and outside Somalia have forced AMISOM and its partners to open a new phase in the war against the group. To that end, in November 2013 the UN Security Council called for AMISOM to be enhanced in several areas and in January 2014 the mission adopted a new Concept of Operations. These developments facilitated a new wave of offensive operations conducted in tandem with the Somali National Security Forces. Nevertheless, AMISOM still confronts some familiar – and fundamental – challenges in its efforts to stabilise Somalia.

This article analyzes seven strategic challenges which faced the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) between March 2007, when it first deployed to Mogadishu, and August 2012, when Somalis selected a new Federal Government to replace the existing transitional institutions. The seven strategic challenges were the initial international political context in which the mission deployed; problems of internal coordination between the mission’s component parts; the lack of a reliable local partner with which to wage a counter-insurgency campaign; problems of strategic coordination among external partners; the nature of the enemy forces facing AMISOM, principally al-Shabaab; AMISOM’s lack of relevant capabilities and resources to perform its mandated tasks; and the challenges of facilitating legitimate and effective governance structures, especially as AMISOM began to deploy outside Mogadishu from late 2011.

10.1080/03071847.2012.733104-F0001 10.1080/03071847.2012.733104-F0002 An AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia) soldier on duty at the front line at Maslah after a night of heavy fighting agains...

RESOLUTION 1973 (17 MARCH 2011) WAS THE FIRST TIME THE UNITED NATIONS Security Council authorized the use of military force for human protection purposes against a functioning de jure government. As such, it represents a significant development in the international politics of military force. But what are its likely consequences and how did it come about? We submit that Resolution 1973 and the subsequent enforcement operations, Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector, were partly facilitated by the developing principle and practice of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Despite an increasing number of rhetorical commitments made by international institutions and many governments to prevent mass atrocities in the post--Cold War era, the use of force for human protection purposes remained severely constrained by principled objections rooted in international law and moral differences, the low political payoffs and potentially grave risks associated with humanitarian war, and the combination of difficult operational dilemmas and an absence of clear guidance about the strategies and tactics most likely to have positive effects in different circumstances. (1) Historically, these obstacles coalesced to produce a default policy environment that was strongly averse to the use of force to prevent or end the commission of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity (hereafter, genocide and mass atrocities). We submit that R2P has helped mitigate these three types of constraints, albeit unevenly, making UN-authorized humanitarian military intervention both politically possible in Libya and more likely in other similar cases. (2) First, R2P has largely resolved principled debate about whether international society should become engaged in such crises and replaced it with debates about how to best protect populations from grave abuses. Within international society, this principle is underscored by a widely shared understanding of the need for Security Council authorization for any use of military force. Second, R2P has helped to change international political calculations by establishing shared expectations and common interests, though of course national interests and domestic politics continue to shape decisions about using force. Third, it has provided a catalyst for more creative thinking about operational issues, most notably supporting moves toward using a broader range of measures to coerce and induce behavioral change and deepening understanding of the range of potential military measures and associated pitfalls. Nevertheless, while agreement on principles is important, reaching consensus on how to consistently apply those principles in response to specific cases is far more difficult, as the case of Syria in 2012 demonstrates only too well. (3) Moreover, while the use of force to protect populations from genocide and mass atrocities has become more likely, it is still rare and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. (4) To substantiate these claims, we begin this article by summarizing the road to the use of force in Libya, focusing on the forging of international consensus around Resolution 1973. Next, we contextualize Resolution 1973 by outlining the main principled, political, and prudential obstacles to using force for human protection purposes. In the final section, we revisit these obstacles and explore R2P's role in reshaping the way they are conceptualized and, in turn, the politics of using force to protect populations from genocide and mass atrocities. Libya: The Road to Humanitarian War On 19 March 2011, military forces from France, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States struck the air defenses and soldiers of Muammar Gaddafi's regime in Libya. These countries led a coalition of states with the expressed aim of enforcing the objectives set out by UN Security Council Resolution 1973, principally the operation of a no-fly zone over Libya, imposition of an arms embargo, and the protection of civilians on the ground. …

This article examines the UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) by applying the framework set out by Paul Diehl and Dan Druckman. It does so in two main parts. The first describes the course and direction of UNOCI until the end of 2011. The second applies elements of the Diehl-Druckman framework to evaluate UNOCI. It argues that two particular issues stand out from the UNOCI case, and are reflected in the title of this essay. First, that in considering the evaluation of peacekeeping missions, the mandate itself needs to be front and centre and more thought needs to be given to the attribution of responsibility when the mandate calls for peacekeepers to ‘assist’ others. Second, peace processes involve multiple foreign actors and UN peace operations are only one part of the puzzle. Overlapping mandates and complex partnerships are becoming a more common feature of UN peace operations. Accounting for these in the evaluation of missions is one of the key challenges for the future.

C Couch, T Franxman, M Greenhawt. Ann Allergy Asthma Immunol. 2017;118(5):591–596.e3 To show characteristics and outcomes of oral food challenges (OFCs) in patients with tree nut (TN) sensitization with or without documented tree nut allergy and to help understand the relation between tree nut sensitization (by skin prick testing [SPT] and specific immunoglobulin E [sIgE]) and OFC outcomes. All open TN OFCs conducted at the University of Michigan Allergy and Immunology clinics between 2007 and 2015. Patients included in the study had a mean age of 4.5 years. Patients who had TN SPT and or …

In March 2011, the UN Security Council authorized the use of force to protect civilians in Libya. This was the first time that the Council has ever authorized the invasion of a functioning state for such purposes. International society's relatively decisive responses to recent crises in Cote d'Ivoire and Libya has provoked significant commentary, suggesting that something has changed about the way the world responds to violence against civilians. Focusing on these two cases, this article examines the changing practice of the UN Security Council. It argues that we are seeing the emergence of a new politics of protection, but that this new politics has been developing over the past decade. Four things are new about this politics of protection: protecting civilians from harm has become a focus for international engagement; the UN Security Council has proved itself willing to authorize the use of force for protection purposes; regional organizations have begun to play the role of ‘gatekeeper’; and major powers have exhibited a determination to work through the Security Council where possible. However, the cases of Cote d'Ivoire and Libya also help to highlight some key challenges that might halt or reverse progress. Notably, states differ in the way they interpret mandates; questions are being asked about the UN's authority to act independently of specific Security Council authorizations; the overlap of regional organizations sometimes sends conflicting messages to the Security Council; and there remains a range of difficult operational questions about how to implement protection mandates. With these in mind, this article concludes with some suggestions about how the future challenges might be navigated in order to maintain the progress that has been made in the past decade.