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Questions and analyses centered on race have become more prominent in philosophy. By employing a ‘critical philosophy of race’, thinkers become enabled to address how race and racism continue to operate in subtle and unintended ways, including within concepts, theories, principles, practices, and methodologies otherwise purported to be race-neutral. Yet, North American sports philosophy provides few examples of work that grapples with race, racism, or theories of race. In this essay, I ask why and conclude that the shortage of discussions that include explicit references to race or ethnicity in North American sport philosophy is due to the dominance and normalization of white epistemologies – white ways of experiencing, seeing, and knowing the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 2020 Yale Law Journal article, "Commonsense Consent," Roseanna Sommers argues that deception is compatible with the layperson's intuitive sense of consent. That is, unlike the canonical understanding of consent defended by legal scholars and philosophers, the notion of consent defended by the folk is not invalidated by deception. In this study, I find that while respondents do appear to attribute consent to victims of deception, they do so in a limited number of contexts – i.e., they attribute de re consent to victims of de dicto deception and attribute de dicto consent to victims of de re deception. When the two varieties of consent and deception are properly disambiguated and matched type for type however, we see the reverse phenomenon – i.e., participants refrain from attributing de dicto consent to de dicto deception and refrain from attributing de re consent to de re deception. If this is right, rather than saying, as Sommers does, that deception generally fails to invalidate commonsense consent, we should refine our understanding of commonsense consent to include two varieties of consent, each of which is in fact invalidated by its own variety of deception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Post-traumatic growth (PTG) has been a key topic of research by psychologists over the last 25 years. But the idea that a person can benefit from adversity has been around for much longer, and is a stable in many mainstream cultures, and in theological and recent philosophical thinking. However, there has been, to date, little overlap between psychological research into PTG, and philosophical thinking about similar ideas. This is unfortunate, both because philosophers are not taking up potential sources of empirical support, and because psychological research into PTG is subject to a range of criticisms and concerns. In this paper, we aim to show how philosophical thinking can address some of these, and as a result put psychological research into PTG on a firmer theoretical footing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discussions about the role of universities have long been framed in terms of questions of what is good for the public, as well as how and whether higher education serves that good. Today, the language of 'societal impact' has become an accepted way for policymakers to frame the matter, but just who is included in the underlying definition of society that this formulation presupposes? In this paper, we consider how 'society' has been constructed in discussions of the societal impact of humanities research in Denmark, through an engagement with legislation, national political commentary, and institutional policy. We draw on the work of Martin Heidegger and Simone Weil to analyse, through an ontology of policy approach, the vision of society these policies construct. We conclude with proposals for alternative societies and forms of policy that these philosophers make possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political liberals claim that liberal polities may legitimately dismiss the objections of 'unreasonable' citizens who resist political liberals' favored principles of justice and political justification. A growing number of other political philosophers, including post-colonialist theorists, have objected to the resulting insularity of political liberalism. However, political liberals' insularity also often presents them from being sensitive or responsive to these critics' complaints. In this article, I develop a more efficacious internal critique of political liberalism: I show that political liberals' own core principles of liberal legitimacy sometimes require liberal polities to engage with the objections of those who hold 'unreasonable', and even illiberal, views. First, I draw on the work of Sayyid Qutb, an illiberal Islamic political thinker, to argue that – contrary to what political liberals often imply – even 'unreasonable', illiberal citizens may be fair-minded : that is, they may be actively concerned to cooperate with others on fair and mutually endorsable terms. Second, I contend that a liberal state's own core commitment to treating citizens as free and equal requires it to offer fair-minded illiberal citizens like Qutb deep reasons – that don't presuppose agreement on liberal principles of justice and so can speak to them in the dialectical position they start from – for why they should accept the liberal laws with which the state coerces them to comply. By showing how political liberals' own commitments oblige them to address even 'unreasonable' political perspectives, I open the door to their more robust engagement with their critics, including not only comparative political theorists but also the growing number of illiberal citizens who challenge democratic regimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many philosophers suppose that sometimes we think we are saying or thinking something meaningful when we're not saying or thinking anything at all: we are producing nonsense. But what is nonsense? An account of nonsense must, I argue, meet two constraints. The first constraint requires that nonsense can be rationally engaged with, not just mentioned. In particular, we can reason with nonsense and use it within that-clauses. An account which fails to meet this constraint cannot explain why nonsense appears meaningful. The second constraint requires that nonsense does not express thoughts. An account which fails to meet this constraint undercuts the critical force of the concept of nonsense. I offer an account which meets both constraints. The central idea is that to be under the illusion that some nonsense makes sense is to enter a pretence that the nonsense is meaningful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It may be true that we are epistemically in the dark about various things. Does this fact ground the truth of fallibilism? No. Still, even the most zealous skeptic will probably grant that it is not clear that one can be incognizant of their own occurrent phenomenal conscious mental goings-on. Even so, this does not entail infallibilism. Philosophers who argue that occurrent conscious experiences play an important epistemic role in the justification of introspective knowledge assume that there are occurrent beliefs. But this assumption is false. This paper argues that there are no occurrent beliefs. And it considers the epistemic consequences this result has for views that attempt to show that at least some phenomenal beliefs are infallible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The method of cases (MOC), as standardly construed, involves an evidential appeal to intuitions. Philosophers, however, often argue for their case verdicts, they offer reasons for accepting their truth. According to Max Deutsch and Herman Cappelen – whose ground-breaking case studies first drew attention to this underappreciated phenomenon – their reason-giving would constitute compelling evidence that, contrary to the received view, philosophers relying on MOC regard arguments, not intuitions, as their main justificatory source. This explanatory hypothesis has met with substantial resistance among metaphilosophers. The main goal of this paper is to broaden the theoretical playing field by considering a yet unexplored alternative hypothesis. I argue that said phenomenon in fact admits of an alternative, intuition-friendly explanation in light of a fundamental distinction in justification theory which has been entirely overlooked by the current debate – i.e. the one between justifying a belief and being justified in holding it. This distinction, I suggest, allows one to naturally construe philosophers' justifying activity as a dialectically motivated kind of proactive reasoning geared toward the goal of maximizing consensus over their verdicts. Once thus construed, it remains compatible with philosophers thinking of intuitions as the main source of their justification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this brief paper, I examine a specific section of Martin Heidegger's Letter on Humanism, where the German philosopher attempts to define the foundational relationship between ontology and ethics. More precisely, I aim to offer an interpretation of this passage that emphasizes the role of disciplines somewhat removed from the core of ontological theory - ranging from sociology of knowledge and depth psychology to the philosophy of science. My study does not shy away from presenting "heretical" ideas, which have yet to be considered by others, and I am willing to take responsibility for the potential criticism this may incur. The argument includes the theory of the unconscious as proposed by Freud, as well as aspects of deconstructionism, which later achieved prominence in the postmodern era. In the final section of the paper, I devote special attention to a startling conclusion: an anecdote about Heraclitus, as discussed by Heidegger, leads me to infer that "das Man", granted total anonymity by Being and Time, can, in certain historical contexts, become identifiable with specific individuals or powers. While I explore these interdisciplinary connections, I remain anchored in the primary issue: how does Heidegger, in his later works, envision the grounding of ethics through ontology?. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the face of the growing interest in Agamben's work by planning scholars, this article suggests reframing such an interest by examining the theoretical controversy between Agamben and another Italian philosopher, Roberto Esposito, with special attention to their common roots within the philosophical realm of political ontology. Their different conceptualizations of biopolitics and norms can lead to opposite conceptualizations of the relationship between people and institutions leading to very different planning theoretical possibilities. Like Agamben, Esposito's theory helps recognise the intrinsic violence of planning discourses. However, unlike Agamben, Esposito provides a constructive way out of it through the disentanglement of the exclusionary level of norms from the potentially inclusive affirmative biopolitics (not politics over life but politics of life) of what he calls the instituting thought. Esposito's conceptualization of institutions can further support the ongoing new-institutionalist developments of planning scholarship, showing a way to conceptualize the planning relevance of civic organizing, insurgent practices, and social uprisings without undermining the primacy of institutions in planning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I respond to some questions raised by Frances Kamm with respect to my book Rights and Demands (2018). The book focuses on demand-rights and asks how we accrue them. In other words, how does one accrue the standing to demand an action of someone or rebuke them for non-performance? My response to Kamm emphasizes how I understand "directed duties" in this context. Contrary to the standard practice of rights theorists, I do not start from the assumption that directed duties are constituted by "plain" duties in the context of other factors (about which rights theorists disagree). Rather, I understand my duty to you as the correlative and equivalent of your standing to demand the action in question. I offer a number of further clarifications and conclude by distinguishing the targets of my discussion from other phenomena of interest to moral philosophers, such as complaining and blaming. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper puts forward a new formulation of the experimentalist challenge to the method of cases. Unlike previous attempts to articulate the challenge, the one proposed is based on a clear characterization of the targeted philosophical methodology. The method of cases is explicated as a form of thought experimentation aimed at testing philosophical hypotheses with a distinctive modal force. Given this explication, the empirical evidence gathered by experimental philosophers concerning the instability of case judgments is shown to constitute a stumbling block for the validation of the method as a rational form of hypothesis testing. The experimental challenge is presented as the challenge to compellingly indicate how this stumbling block can be removed, and the method of cases validated as a form of thought experimentation suitable for rationally testing philosophical hypotheses. The challenge, as presented in the text, is shown to be free from all the main criticisms leveled at previous versions of it and as one not yet met. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the role of British translators of European philosophers from 1907 to 1915 in addressing Edwardian political crises. In an age of fragmentation between the main parties as well as crises within political groups, cultural and political magazines were a ‘counter public sphere’ in which intellectuals could discuss the conflicts of public life. This article will show how translators of Friedrich Nietzsche, Georges Sorel, and Henri Bergson opened up debate between intellectuals across the political spectrum in the avant-garde magazine The New Age through the worship of intellectual heroes not bound to any tradition. The translators Oscar Levy, Millicent Murby, and T. E. Hulme all sought to create cultural icons to overcome splits in their different political projects. Whilst Edwardian intellectuals played with tropes of British insularity and philistinism, scholarship has neglected how the geographical concept of insularity was projected onto a reality that was ideological disintegration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to experimental philosophers, the diversity and sensitivity of intuitions have posed a severe threat to the traditional philosophical methodology, which relies extensively on intuitions triggered by thought experiments. However, defenders of traditional armchair philosophical methodology argue that experimental philosophers misunderstand the importance of intuitions for philosophy. What philosophers genuinely rely on are arguments, which provide a reliable foundation for their judgments on thought experiments. However, a recent cross-cultural experiment conducted by Wysocki (2017) indicates that arguments do not affect the judgments about Gettier cases as philosophers once expected. That poses a challenge to those philosophers who contend that judgments are based on arguments. In this paper, we expand the experimental investigation of the effect of arguments on judgments about thought experiments. We report the result of three experiments in which eleven thought experiments drawn from multiple philosophical subdisciplines were used. It turns out that arguments have significant impacts on Chinese participants’ judgments in response to most of these thought experiments. These results present new resources for defending the traditional methodology but also bring new challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many natural languages include plural terms, i.e. terms which denote many individuals at once. Are there also superplural terms, i.e. terms which denote many pluralities of individuals at once? Some philosophers say ‘Yes’, citing a range of sentence types which apparently can't be analyzed in a first-order plural logic, but which can be analyzed in a superplural one. We argue that all the data presented in favor of the superplural can, in fact, be analyzed using only first-order resources. The key is to add to ordinary plural logic a new notion of a generalized cover. A generalized cover reflects how interlocutors in a conversation may divide a salient plurality into many subpluralities, which can then be involved in reference and predication. With generalized covers in place, all the apparently troublesome sentences can be easily handled. Our approach can also be extended to account, not only for linguistic data which seem to favor the superplural but also for other phenomena involving plurals. The result is a unified approach to natural language plurals on which superplurals are analyzed away. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Plato and Aristotle, as Pascal illustrates in fragment Sellier 457 of Pensées, possess insight into the flaws of human social interactions and adeptly navigate them through intelligent dissimulation similar to Socratic irony and the pedagogy of play when dealing with authority. As honnêtes hommes, avant la lettre, they are virtuous individuals ahead of their time, recognizing the limitations of philosophy and not taking philosophical discourse too seriously in their pensée de derrière. Besides emphasizing the futility of social life as part of the human condition, not so much interested in Plato and Aristotle as historical role models, Pascal portrays the two philosophers’ character traits as consisting of a miscellaneous mixture of Socrates, Pyrrhonians, and honnêtes hommes, and claims the inadequacy and inefficacy of pagan philosophy without God wholesale in altering human behaviours. For Pascal, Plato and Aristotle, like honnêtes hommes and philosophers of other schools, are susceptible to criticism for indulging in self-love inherent to human nature, a flaw only Christianity can fully explain through the doctrine of the Fall and offer a meaningful remedy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

J.R.R. Tolkien's legendarium resonates with contemporary environmental debates, highlighting the balance between technology and ecology, especially within Elven societies. Using Rosi Braidotti's sense of posthumanism, this paper analyses the technologic natures of the three Elven communities in Middle-earth: the Sindar, Nandor, and Noldor. Contrary to prevailing ecocritical beliefs that Elves depict a simplistic relationship with nature, this research posits that their profound bond stems from advanced technology, understood as either craftmanship or magic, promoting symbiotic Earth interactions in line with techno-optimistic yet symbiotic views of environmentalism. Challenging the idea that all Elven communities share a uniform relationship with Arda, the study also emphasises distinctions in their technological and environmental alignments within Tolkien's earlier works, especially The Silmarillion. Drawing on Chinese philosopher Yuk Hui's concept of “cosmotechnics”, the paper suggests the Sindar and Nandor adopt an eco-centric posthumanist approach, creating cities synergized with controlled forests, while the Noldor prioritise a harmonious relationship between innovative technology and nature. The study culminates by analysing the convergence of these varied cosmotechnics in Caras Galadhon, Lothlórien's capital. This research provides a fresh perspective on Tolkien's portrayal of technology and ecology, emphasising the intricate and multifaceted nature of his Elven societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I consider diffractive approaches to participant debriefing. In other words, I consider how the feminist relational materialist philosopher Karen Barad's concept of diffraction can be utilised as an innovative approach to participant debriefing. I start this article by explaining how feminist relational materialist philosophers have troubled the philosophical assumptions underpinning traditional approaches to participant debriefing. I then consider how feminist relational materialism has contributed to post-qualitative approaches to research which involve utilising philosophical concepts as methods. Adopting a post-qualitative approach, I go on to present Karen Barad's concept of diffraction as a participant debriefing method that involves participants, researchers and non-humans contributing to research projects becoming different. As part of this, I consider diffractive debriefing in the context of a research project with 21 school pupils in the Southwest of England that involved young people telling stories about menstruation in their everyday lives. In doing so, I describe the diffractive debriefing workshops that were part of such a project. I then draw on such workshops to describe three general principles that I followed when developing a diffractive approach to participant debriefing. The general principles I discuss are: (1) Researchers should avoid instructing participants about what happened in a research project (2) Diffractive debriefing should not finalise what a research project can become and (3) Diffractive debriefing involves an approach to ethics that foregrounds response-ability. I finish the article by considering how diffractive debriefing could be part of research projects beyond my research project which focused on young people and their menstruation stories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay introduces, develops, and appraises the mitonuclear compatibility species concept (MCSC), identifying advantages and limitations with respect to alternative species concepts. While the consensus amongst most philosophers of biology is that (kind) essentialism about species is mistaken, and that species at most have relational essences, we appeal to the MCSC to defend thoroughgoing intrinsic essentialism. Namely, the doctrine that species have fully intrinsic essences and, thus, are natural kinds (of sorts), while allowing that species aren't categorically distinct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article "On the problem of divine reality. A philosophical approach to the mystery of God" addresses the importance of the wisdom proposed by Joseph Ratzinger/ Benedict XVI in the ethical interpretation of religion. Jesús Sáez, in his work, delves into key philosophical issues about divine reality, engaging in dialogue with philosophers throughout history. The author offers a serious and well-founded reflection, highlighting the need to continue reflecting in dialogue with various philosophical and religious perspectives. [Extracted from the article]

Many philosophers claim that we have a duty to know our motives. However, prominent theories of the mind suggest that we can't. Such scepticism about knowledge of one's motives is based on psychological evidence. I show that this evidence only mandates scepticism about knowledge of one's motives if we rely on a mistaken assumption which I call 'the myth of the one true motive'. If we reject this myth, we see that there is space to plausibly interpret the empirical data such that knowledge of one's motives is difficult, but not impossible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Maine de Biran (1766–1824) was one of the most influential philosophers in France during the nineteenth century, being the principal inspiration for French spiritualism and French reflexive philosophy. He was also a significant Freemason. This article offers a translation of Biran's two surviving Freemasonry Speeches , delivered c. 1810, and an introduction to Biran's Freemasonry from the perspective of his philosophical work. The introduction gives a timeline of Biran's Freemasonry and an overview of the text of the Speeches. It then considers some principal themes in francophone Freemasonic culture of the Restoration, especially the practice of ritualized introspection, before moving onto compare, briefly, the content of the Speeches to the main philosophical essay by Biran with which the Speeches is contemporaneous. Based on this evidence, the introduction makes suggestions regarding the role played by Freemasonry in the development of French spiritualism, and indicates trajectories for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of this work is to observe the role of the romantic fragment in the conception of the essay presented by Theodor Adorno in his text produced between 1954 and 1958, published as a preface to Notes on Literature: "The Essay as Form". We will do this by bringing to light the context in which Adorno's notion of the essay is developed and then examining the moment when the relationship between the essay and the fragment is textually established by the philosopher, that is, when the critiques of the rules that comprise Descartes' method, especially the third and fourth rules, are presented. We will also consider Adorno's dialogue with Walter Benjamin. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Gerald Cohen has made a genuinely egalitarian imprint on the debates on justice, which demands to be analysed in order to properly understand the challenges facing social justice in the world. From his critical acuity and the framework of analytical Marxism that have made him one of the most brilliant contemporary philosophers, he has defended a particular egalitarianism of luck that shields the demand to compensate for the impacts of brute luck and reinforces arguments about the reconsideration of responsibility and choice that define optional luck -at first, non-compensable-. Moreover, from the conditioning unequal in which people develop their lives and make their life choices and how these impact on how free and responsible (or not) they turn out to be. Cohen offers his proposal of equality in access to social advantages from a complex theoretical and analytical framework on incentives, market conditioning, and the consideration of expensive tastes, the impact of inequalities, and the demands of equal opportunities. Therefore, he warns that poverty implies, from his acute criticism of the contemporary political and economic system, deprivations to the way in which we exercise our freedoms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I will argue for two interrelated theses. First, if we take phenomenological psychopathology seriously, and want to understand what it is like to undergo various psychopathological experiences, we cannot treat madpeople's testimony as mere data for sane clinicians, philosophers, and other scholars to analyze and interpret. Madpeople must be involved with analysis an interpretation too. Second, sane clinicians and scholars must open their minds to the possibility that there may be experiences that other people have, which they nevertheless cannot conceive of. I look at influential texts in which philosophers attempt to analyze and understand depersonalization and thought insertion. They go astray because they keep using their own powers of conceivability as a guide to what is or is not humanly possible to experience. Several experiences labeled inconceivable and therefore impossible by these philosophers, are experiences I have had myself. Philosophers and others would be less likely to make this mistake if they would converse and collaborate more with the madpeople concerned. When this is not feasible, they should nevertheless strive to keep an open mind. Fantastical fiction may have a role to play here, by showing how bizarre experiences may nevertheless be prima facie conceivable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the non-human turn in justice theory remains in its infancy, several projects have emerged, including Earth system justice, multispecies justice, and planetary justice. Crucially, candidate theories must provide convincing responses to the who, what, and how of justice. The question of who can prove particularly challenging, as philosophers continue to debate the moral relevance of properties of entities or the relations between them. Scholars of environmental politics seeking to develop more-than-human justice theories must carefully attend to issues inherent in this debate, including conceptual inconsistencies. Recent work by Winter and Schlosberg advancing a materialist perspective on multispecies and planetary justice demonstrates the difficult task of participating in this conversation, as evidenced by their application of the term 'subjects of justice.' In this brief essay, I identify three flaws in their use of this phrase and explain why the treatment of subjects matters to justice theory in the Anthropocene. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT In this article, we discuss the role that ‘true preferences’ can and should play in discussions on the possibility and desirability of paternalist nudges. Critics have claimed that such preferences do not exist, cannot be known reliably by third parties, and cannot justify whether and how to nudge people. In this article, we argue that these objections undermine the extent to which philosophers and laypeople can make sense of autonomy and authenticity. We aim to identify what kinds of preferences can plausibly be labelled ‘true’ and how that impacts discussions on the ethics of paternalist nudging. We analyse what ‘true preferences’ can mean, not for Econs, but for Humans, and argue, more specifically, that some of our existing preferences have special status. In addition, we argue that satisfying them is good for individuals and that nudgers should seek to overcome the epistemic challenges of discovering their content. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past few decades, various philosophers of music have appealed to the notion of recognizability in their theories of the performance of works of Western classical music. In this paper, I attempt to clarify that notion and examine whether it can actually do the jobs it is called upon to execute. I begin with a discussion of Jerrold Levinson's appeal to (something like) work-recognizability as a criterion of successful work-performance and its influential uptake by Stephen Davies. I then attempt to clarify the notion of work-recognizability. I argue that the concept cannot do the task it is asked to in theories of work-performance, and that we should instead appeal to a robust notion of the intention to perform a work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For many years Simone Weil and Ludwig Wittgenstein have been placed side by side. Little of that work has tried to explicitly compare the two. Direct comparisons can, however, be made between Weil and Wittgenstein, which can show that the ways they approached philosophy shared numerous traits and ideas. Both thinkers rejected philosophical systems, both admitted that serious philosophical work did not try to reject all contradictions internal to it, and, in fact, both sought to make facing contradictions and seeming contradictions central to their method. Both wrote of the world with a sense of mystery that surrounds human life, a sense of transcendent good. Both engaged the problems with talking about such a good that cannot be neatly fit into language. Both also saw the task of philosophy as one concerned with meaning. Both also saw philosophy as a matter of "work on oneself." This essay will examine what it means to say that philosophy is a matter of work on oneself. To do so, I want to examine primarily two essays, one from each philosopher, essays which bear remarkable similarity to each other in the sort of problem they deal with.They are section xi of Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment, and Weil's "Essay on the Concept of Reading." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper traces the concept of happiness in the work of Julien Offray de La Mettrie Anti-Seneca or Discourse on Happiness (2010). Before exploring the term happiness, it is essential to answer the question: what does the French philosopher understand by being human? To fulfill this purpose, in the first chapter, the idea of the human body, understood as an organic machine, will be analyzed. In the second chapter, we will investigate the physical damage or diseases that can affect the machine or human body. In the third part, we will explore the concept of happiness, understood as carnal pleasure, voluptuousness and organic or arterial happiness. In the fourth chapter, the different ways to achieve a happy life will be examined. As a conclusion, it can be affirmed that happiness is, according to La Mettrie, the result of the organization or composition of the human body; therefore, the individual, when acting according to his nature, must be exempt from recrimination or ethical judgments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to present a way to foster moral growth through Søren Kierkegaard's work The Sickness Unto Death as a tool capable of developing moral sensitivity and judgment. After discussing the need for this topic in the education of today's youth, the thought of Martha Nussbaum will be introduced as the foundation for my proposal, justifying the ethical potential inherent in narrative. This potential is abundantly reflected in Kierkegaard's work. From his unique existential style, the Danish philosopher addresses the authenticity of the self and of one's own existence to achieve the true constitution of oneself. The various forms of despair that the author explores are analyzed, with excerpts from the work highlighting his mastery and subtlety in reflecting the complexity and dynamism inherent in human interiority. This provides the reader with the opportunity to reflect on their ethical and existential state from a Kierkegaardian perspective, recognizing in it the universal aspects of the human condition that great authors throughout history have conveyed through their works. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many philosophers hold there are genuine cases of culpable ignorance. This paper argues that there are conditions that can render knowledge epistemically culpable too. First, we contrast culpable ignorance with morally culpable knowledge. Second, we examine the nature of epistemically culpable knowledge using a key example. We then highlight empirical support for the claim that there are real-world conditions that make epistemically culpable knowledge possible. Next, we survey three kinds of epistemic culpability fostered by culpable knowledge. Finally, we address the benefits objection and argue that it fails. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although virtues and vices are typically thought of as individual qualities, a growing body of philosophical inquiry suggests that they can comprise collective qualities as well. In this paper, I expand upon the work of philosopher Miranda Fricker to question whether arts organizations can be considered institutionally virtuous and/or vicious. I begin with a discussion of collective epistemology, as offered by Margaret Gilbert, which lays the foundation for how collectives can function as "plural subjects" in pursuit of a common belief or goal. From here, I offer a brief overview of virtue/vice epistemology, which I then connect to Fricker's model of collective, and by extension, institutional virtue. Throughout, I provide illustrations of arts organizations who might themselves be said to possess institutional virtue and/or vice. I conclude by elaborating on the accountability of individuals working on behalf of, and sometimes in opposition to, the inner ethos of arts organizations—particularly when those organizations might fall into the harmful realm of institutional vice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We are all used to drawing straight lines to represent time, and above them, we plot historical events or physical or economic data. What to us is a self-evident convention, is however of an astonishingly recent date: it emerged only in the second half of the eighteenth century. To us, this late date seems paradoxical and cries out for an explanation. How else did earlier periods measure change, if not as a function of time? it will be argued that since Antiquity, time was taken to measure change, and change to occur in space. 'Our' idea of representing time as an independent dimension would have seemed aberrant. But then, a second issue arises. Did not medieval natural philosophers employ timelines, Oresme's diagram of the mean speed theorem being the most famous case? However, as will be shown, our interpretation of his diagram is probably wrong. This insight, in turn, takes care of a third paradox, namely Galileo's initial inability to represent the law of free fall correctly. This article will document that the timeline first emerged in the late sixteenth century in works on chronology, made its first appearance in physics in Galileo's diagrams, and had its general breakthrough in the eighteenth century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In the 1950s, the growing importance of Bayesian inference attracted both supporters and critics. In 1958, the philosopher Karl Popper published what he called a paradox that purported to show the foolishness of subjectivist Bayesian inference. In correspondence, Jimmie Savage pointed out what he considered an error in his reasoning, but Popper was unmoved and did not change his example when he reprinted it. It is argued that Popper did not acknowledge that the new subjectivists reasoned with distributions, not simply expected values. Excerpts from Jimmie Savage's correspondence at the time with Popper and with Allen Wallis highlight the issues involved at this time when Bayesian statisticians were seeking general acceptance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper follows the implications of Gadamer's hermeneutics after Truth and Method in which the forming of social life, and with it the idea of worldly understanding, receives greater attention. I argue that the emphasis in his later writings on worldly understanding draws less on the idea of the hermeneutic circle and problematic of the Geisteswissenschaften in which the concept of tradition is prominent than on the movement in language and the encounter with the other. As in the example of translation, I argue that this movement has the character of passage from one place to another that holds within it an element of opacity. The development of this issue draws on a comparative analysis with the work of the Caribbean philosopher Édouard Glissant. From this analysis I show how Gadamer's hermeneutics addresses the issue of understanding across cultures and in mixed cultures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Tabayyun is the property of Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Tabayyun is the property of Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The purpose of this paper is to analyze how legal principles make legal and sub-legal regulation in society. And more specifically how the principles of equality intervene to protect the interests of members of society. Legal principles are an inseparable and essential part of law and justice. When dealing with cases of changing the structures of rights, in other words, a restructuring of their scheme, it must be borne in mind that if we want to increase the expectations of a certain group, we cannot lower the expectations of another group. This entire process is done in accordance with legal principles, and in particular with the principles of equality. As is known, philosophy and the philosophy of law as its branch, are sciences that deal with the ontological and epistemological interpretation and understanding of legal principles and the principle of equality. During the paper, we will focus on the analysis that legal philosophers such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin make of legal principles and the principle of equality seen in several different elements. The approach they have to the principle of equality will be examined, where their positions are united and where they are divided. Both philosophers make a categorization of the principle of equality based on different reference criteria. How are the positions of Rawls and Dworkin viewed by other researchers? Do their ideas match today's society or can we say that they have built "universal principles", where we all refer to. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since Donald Davidson issued his challenge to anticausalism in 1963, most philosophers have espoused the view that our actions are causally explained by the reasons why we do them. This Davidsonian consensus, however, rests on a faulty argument. Davidson’s challenge has been met, in more than one way, by anticausalists such as C. Ginet, G. Wilson, and S. Sehon. Hence I endeavor to support causalism with a stronger argument. Our actions are correlated with our motivating reasons; to wit, we often do what we have reason to do. In yet other words, we are often rational. Our frequent rationality is easily explained if causalism is correct, but looks like a staggering coincidence otherwise. Anticausalism thus appears to be ill-equipped to account for the very existence of rational behavior, and so far no attempts in this direction have succeeded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the relationship between trust and inquiry to argue for the view that A trusts B to act in some way only if A believes, in a way that she cannot distinguish from knowledge, for reasons of trust, that B will (or has) act(ed) in this way. Call such beliefs ‘outright trusting beliefs’. To support this view, I shall argue, by way of various examples, that the conditions under which inquiry erodes trust are the same as the conditions under which inquiry erodes outright trusting belief. This congruence is easily explained abductively if we take trust to involve such a belief constitutively. While philosophers have sometimes thought that the relationship between trust and inquiry threatens or complicates the doxastic account of trust, the argument presented here suggests, surprisingly, that this relationship supports and even strengthens this account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the prevalence of dementia rises, it is increasingly important to determine how to best respect incapable individuals' autonomy during end‐of‐life decisions. Many philosophers advocate for the use of advance directives in these situations to allow capable individuals to outline preferences for their future incapable selves. In this paper, however, I consider whether advance directives lack moral authority in instances of dementia. First, I introduce several scholars who have argued that changes in peoplewith dementia's values throughout disease progression reduce the validity of their advanced wishes. I then outline Karin Jongsma's rejection of this claim, which she calls the “losing and choosing” distinction. Jongsma argues that changes in people with dementia's values should not be respected, because they are unchosen and dictated by the disease. I critique her claim that the process of value change is morally relevant when determining which values we respect. I argue that if individuals with dementia are capable of valuing, their contemporary values should be respected, even when they conflict with past preferences outlined in an advance directive. As such, situations of value change diminish the moral authority of advance directives for individuals with dementia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractThis article focuses on a method of moral self-cultivation advocated by the Chinese Neo-Confucian Zhu Xi: deep reading. To Zhu Xi, reading is not only an intellectual activity of learning knowledge, but also a spiritual exercise. Through meticulous, thorough, and unbiased reading, people can gradually cultivate their minds to have three virtues, carefulness (xixin), patience (naixin), and modesty (xuxin). I argue that these three virtues are like the three civic virtues (attentiveness, seriousness and humility) recently proposed by political philosopher Mary Scudder, who argues that these virtues can help people become ‘listening citizens’. Listening citizens are more eager to actively listen to others’ viewpoints and engage in democratic deliberation, which in turn can create a healthy public culture. In sum, while the goal of becoming a sage through deep reading may not be relevant today, Zhu Xi’s teachings highlight the value of deep reading in fostering good citizenship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]