Search

Infants start to use a spoon for self-feeding at the end of the first year of life, but usually do not use unfamiliar tools to solve problems before the age of 2 years. We investigated to what extent 18-month-old infants who are familiar with using a spoon for self-feeding are able to generalize this tool-use ability to retrieve a distant object. We tested 46 infants with different retrieval tasks, varying the tool (rake or spoon) and the target (toy or food). The tasks were presented in a priori descending order of difficulty: rake-toy condition, then either spoon-toy or rake-food, and finally spoon-food. Then, the same conditions were presented in reverse order to assess the transfer abilities from the easiest condition to the most difficult retrieval task. Spontaneously, 18-month-old infants performed the retrieval tasks better with the familiar tool, the easiest task being when the spoon was associated with food. Moreover, the transfer results show that being able to use a familiar tool in an unusual context seems necessary and sufficient for subsequent transfer to an unfamiliar tool in the unusual context, and that early and repetitive training of self-feeding with a spoon plays a positive role in later tool use.

To benefit from the exploration of their bodies and their physical and social environments, infants need to detect sensorimotor contingencies linking their actions to sensory feedback. This ability, which seems to be present in babies from birth and even in utero, has been widely used by researchers in their study of early development. However, a careful review of the literature, particularly the recent literature, suggests that babies may not be uniformly sensitive to all sensorimotor contingencies. This literature review examines in detail sensorimotor contingency detection in infants before the age of 1 year. Four aspects of sensorimotor contingency detection are considered: characteristics of action and feedback, contingency parameters, exposure conditions, and interindividual differences. For each topic, we highlight what favors and what hinders the detection of sensorimotor contingencies in infants. Our review also demonstrates the limitations of our knowledge about sensorimotor contingency detection. We emphasize the importance of making progress in this field at a time when sensorimotor contingency detection is of major interest in developmental robotics and artificial intelligence.

Despite a growing interest in the question of tool-use development in infants, no study so far has systematically investigated how learning to use a tool to retrieve an out-of-reach object progresses with age. This was the first aim of this study, in which 60 infants, aged 14, 16, 18, 20, and 22 months, were presented with an attractive toy and a rake-like tool. There were five conditions of spatial relationships between the toy and the tool, going from the toy and tool being connected to there being a large spatial gap between them. A second aim of the study was to evaluate at what age infants who spontaneously fail the task can learn this complex skill by being given a demonstration from an adult. Results show that even some of the youngest infants could spontaneously retrieve the toy when it was presented inside and touching the top part of the tool. In contrast, in conditions with a spatial gap, the first spontaneous successes were observed at 18 months, suggesting that a true understanding of the use of the tool has not been fully acquired before that age. Interestingly, it is also at 18 months that infants began to benefit from the demonstration in the conditions with a spatial gap. The developmental steps for tool use observed here are discussed in terms of changes in infants' ability to attend to more than one item in the environment. The work provides insight into the progressive understanding of tool use during infancy and into how observational learning improves with age. (Contains 2 figures.)

This longitudinal study investigated the effect of experience with tactile stimulation on infants' ability to reach to targets on the body, an important adaptive skill. Infants were provided weekly tactile stimulation on eight body locations from 4 to 8 months of age (N = 11), comparing their ability to reach to the body to infants in a control group who did not receive stimulation (N = 10). Infants who received stimulation were more likely to successfully reach targets on the body than controls by 7 months of age. These findings indicate that tactile stimulation facilitates the development of reaching to the body by allowing infants to explore the sensorimotor correlations emerging from the stimulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two very fundamental aspects of phenomenal experiences underline the fact that they seem to have “something it’s like.” One aspect is the fact that experiences have a locus: they Can seem “external” (perceptual), “internal” (interoceptive, bodily or emotional) or “mental.” A second fundamental aspect is the imposingness of experiences. They can seem “present” to us in different ways, sometimes seeming displayed before us with “spatiotemporal presence.” Both these aspects of “what it’s like” can be identified with the degree to which we can voluntarily control what we are doing when we engage in an experience. The external/internal/mental dimension is determined by how our voluntary bodily actions can influence the sensorimotor flow of information. The degree of imposingness of experiences and their “spatio-temporal presence” Is determined by how our voluntary actions are impeded or assisted by innate, attention-grabbing mechanisms. By elucidating these two most fundamental aspects of “what it’s like,” and taken together with prior work on inter- and intra-modal differences in experiences, this article suggests a path toward a scientific theory of the “hard problem” of phenomenal consciousness, explaining why experiences feel like something rather than feeling like nothing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recognition of multimorphemic French words was investigated using a procedure that allowed the position of first fixation of the eye to be manipulated and gaze durations to be recorded. (37 references) (Author/LB)

The most important clarification we bring in our reply to commentators concerns the problem of the 'explanatory gap': that is, the gulf that separates physical processes in the brain from the experienced quality of sensations. By adding two concepts (bodiliness and grabbiness) that were not stressed in the target article, we strengthen our claim and clarify why we think we have solved the explanatory gap problem,--not by dismissing qualia, but, on the contrary, by explaining why sensations have a 'feel' and why 'feels' feel the way they do. We additionally clarify our views on: internal representations (we claim internal representations cannot explain why sensation has a feel), on behaviorism (we are not behaviorists), on perception and action (we believe there can be perception without action), and on the brain (we believe the brain does do something important in perception).

Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Several lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual 'filling in,' visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception. Keywords: action; change blindness; consciousness; experience; perception; qualia; sensation; sensorimotor

Visual science is currently a highly active domain, with much progress being made in fields such as colour vision, stereo vision, perception of brightness and contrast, visual illusions, etc. But the 'real' mystery of visual perception remains comparatively unfathomed, or at least relegated to philosophical status: Why it is that we can see so well with what is apparently such a badly constructed visual apparatus? In this paper I will discuss several defects of vision and the classical theories of how they are overcome. I will criticize these theories and suggest an alternative approach, in which the outside world is considered as a kind of external memory store which can be accessed instantaneously by casting one's eyes (or one's attention) to some location. The feeling of the presence and extreme richness of the visual world is, under this view, a kind of illusion, created by the immediate availability of the information in this external store.

Infants' ability to monitor "sensorimotor contingencies," i.e., the sensory effects of their own actions, is an important mechanism underlying learning. One method that has been used to investigate this is the "mobile paradigm," in which a mobile above an infant's crib is activated by motion of one of the infant's limbs. Although successfully used in numerous experiments performed in infants' homes to investigate memory and other types of learning, the paradigm seems less robust for demonstrating sensitivity to sensorimotor contingencies when used in the laboratory. One purpose of the present work was to show that certain changes to the mobile paradigm would make it easier for infants to show their sensitivity to the contingency in the lab. In particular, we used proximal stimulation on infants' wrists instead of the usual mobile, and our stimulation was coincident with the limbs that caused it. Our stimulation was either on or off, i.e., not modulated by the amount the infant moved. Finally, we used a "shaping" procedure to help the infant discover the contingency. In addition to these changes in the paradigm, by analyzing infants' limb activity at 10-s resolution instead of the usual 1-min resolution, we were able to show that infants' sensitivity to the contingency became apparent already within the first minute of establishment of the contingency. Finally, we showed how two alternate measures of sensitivity to contingency based on probability of repeated movements and on "stop and go" motion strategies may be of interest for future work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rayner and Slowiaczek have a different conception of the issues our experiments address than we do. These differences are discussed. Our main point, is that the extent to which the preview produces a benefit depends on the subject's expectations. (Author/RD)

Two experiments demonstrated that a priori expectations and context increase the benefit gained from a preview of a word in parafoveal vision. Subjects named visually presented words preceded by a "preview" stimulus with and without constraints. Subjects combine two sources of information so as to derive a benefit. (Author/RD)

Much current work in robotics focuses on the development of robots capable of autonomous unsupervised learning. An essential prerequisite for such learning to be possible is that the agent should be sensitive to the link between its actions and the consequences of its actions, called sensorimotor contingencies. This sensitivity, and more particularly its role as a key drive of development, has been widely studied by developmental psychologists. However, the results of these studies may not necessarily be accessible or intelligible to roboticians. In this paper, we review the main experimental data demonstrating the role of sensitivity to sensorimotor contingencies in infants' acquisition of four fundamental motor and cognitive abilities: body knowledge, memory, generalization, and goal-directedness. We relate this data from developmental psychology to work in robotics, highlighting the links between these two domains of research. In the last part of the article we present a blueprint architecture demonstrating how exploitation of sensitivity to sensorimotor contingencies, combined with the notion of "goal," allows an agent to develop new sensorimotor skills. This architecture can be used to guide the design of specific computational models, and also to possibly envisage new empirical experiments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study focuses on how the body schema develops during the first months of life, by investigating infants’ motor responses to localized vibrotactile stimulation on their limbs. Vibrotactile stimulation was provided by small buzzers that were attached to the infants’ four limbs one at a time. Four age groups were compared cross‐sectionally (3‐, 4‐, 5‐, and 6‐month‐olds). We show that before they actually reach for the buzzer, which, according to previous studies, occurs around 7–8 months of age, infants demonstrate emerging knowledge about their body's configuration by producing specific movement patterns associated with the stimulated body area. At 3 months, infants responded with an increase in general activity when the buzzer was placed on the body, independently of the vibrator's location. Differentiated topographical awareness of the body seemed to appear around 5 months, with specific responses resulting from stimulation of the hands emerging first, followed by the differentiation of movement patterns associated with the stimulation of the feet. Qualitative analyses revealed specific movement types reliably associated with each stimulated location by 6 months of age, possibly preparing infants’ ability to actually reach for the vibrating target. We discuss this result in relation to newborns’ ability to learn specific movement patterns through intersensory contingency. Statement of contribution what is already known on infants’ sensorimotor knowledge about their own bodies 3‐month‐olds readily learn to produce specific limb movements to obtain a desired effect (movement of a mobile). infants detect temporal and spatial correspondences between events involving their own body and visual events. what the present study adds until 4–5 months of age, infants mostly produce general motor responses to localized touch. this is because in the present study, infants could not rely on immediate contingent feedback. we propose a cephalocaudal developmental trend of topographic differentiation of body areas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates systematic individual differences in the way observers perceive different kinds of surface properties and their relationship to the dress, which shows striking individual differences in colour perception. We tested whether these individual differences have a common source, namely differences in perceptual strategies according to which observers attribute features in two-dimensional images to surfaces or to their illumination. First, we reanalysed data from two previous experiments on the dress and colour constancy. The comparison of the two experiments revealed that the colour perception of the dress is strongly related to individual differences in colour constancy. Second, two online surveys measured individual differences in the perception of colour-ambiguous images including the dress, in colour constancy, in gloss perception, in the subjective grey-point, in colour naming, and in the perception of an image with ambiguous shading. The results of the surveys replicated and extended previous findings according to which individual differences in the colour perception of the dress are due to implicit assumptions about the illumination. However, results also showed that the individual differences for other phenomena were independent of the dress and of each other. Overall, these results suggest that the striking individual differences in dress colour perception are due to individual differences in the interpretation of illumination cues to achieve colour constancy. At the same time, they undermine the idea of an overall perceptual strategy that encompasses other phenomena more generally related to the interpretation of illumination and surface properties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

doi: 10.1017/S0140525X07003007 The target article appends to recent empirical data to support the idea that there is more to phenomenality than is available to access consciousness. However, this claim is based on an unwarranted assumption, namely, that some kind of cortical processing must be phenomenal. The article also considerably weakens Block's original distinction between a truly nonfunctional phenomenal consciousness and a functional access consciousness. The new form of phenomenal consciousness seems to be a poor-man's cognitive access.