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This article proposes a decision-theoretic model to explain how cabinets help presidents implement their policy-making strategies. Presidents are assumed to have two policy-making strategies: a strategy based on the use of statutes or a strategy based on executive prerogatives. If the president's preferences and the institutional incentives and economic conditions faced favor a statutory strategy, the president is more likely to appoint a majority cabinet, select more partisan ministers, and distribute portfolios to parties on a proportional basis. Econometric analysis of 106 cabinets appointed in 13 countries of the Americas demonstrates that the determinants of cabinet legislative status are the size of the president's party, extremist presidents, and economic crises. The share of partisan ministers and proportionality in portfolio allocation are affected by the size of the president's party, extremist presidents holding decree powers, the extension of the president's veto powers, and the elapsing of the president's term. Keywords: presidentialism; decrees; statutes; cabinets; coalitions

The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil by Barry Ames. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2001. 331 pp. $59.50. Barry Ames has produced an outstanding piece of scholarship. Theoretically inspired [...]

The politics of intergovernmental transfers in Brazil. This article examines the political economy of public resources distribution in Brazil's federal system in 1985-2004. We propose an empirical exercise to analyze how the country's federal governments deal with the tradeoff between the provision of material wellbeing to sub-national governments (the states in our study) and the pursuit of political support from the latter. To identify the determinants of the transfer of resources from the federal government to the states, a set of economic, political, and institutional variables is econometrically tested. Based upon instrumental variables estimation for panel-data models, our estimates indicate that in Brazil the pursuit of political goals prevails over social equity and economic efficiency criteria: higher levels of per capita transfers are associated with the political makeup of governing coalitions, while larger investments in infrastructure and development by the states are associated with a lower amount of per capita resources transferred to sub-national governments. Our findings also suggest a trend toward the freezing of interregional inequalities in Brazil, and show the relevance of fiscal discipline laws in discouraging the use of the administrative apparatus for electioneering. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article presents a proposal for an incremental reform of the electoral system of the Chamber of Deputies. The incremental nature of the proposal rests on the assumption that this political system is a complex and delicate architecture, and therefore, abrupt and ambitious changes are more likely to make it worse than to improve it. The proposal advocated here maintains the current system of open-list proportional representation, but it changes two key variables of this electoral system, since it reduces its average district magnitude and establishes a proportional distribution of seats among parties that form electoral coalitions. The way the reform is operationalized leads to a redesign of the electoral map of the country, with smaller districts within 12 states. The article also presents the results of a simulation exercise based on data from the 2006 elections, whereby the party makeup of the Chamber of Deputies is recalculated according to the rules proposed here. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the policy-making role of Portugal's heads of state in the period 1976–2006. Not only is Portugal rarely studied in the English language comparative literature, but there is no consensus concerning the proper definition of the country's system of government, whether it is semi-presidential or parliamentary. This article presents new data on the Portuguese president's role in the following areas: cabinet appointment and dismissal; parliamentary dissolution; ministerial appointments; referral of legislative bills to judicial review; veto powers; and agenda-setting through going-public tactics. It is concluded that the president's role in the policy process has never been irrelevant. While the 1982 constitutional reform did eliminate the possibility of undisguised presidential government, presidents have continued to be important in policy making, particularly due to use of their veto and dissolution powers. Therefore, the article argues that Portugal has remained solidly semi-presidential. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

2007 was marked by a mismatch. On the one hand, Lula maintained high approval ratings and the economy went well. On the other, however, the president faced growing political difficulties with the parties and Congress. From an economic standpoint, fair winds from the global market brought many benefits to the country, which witnessed improvements in several indicators. Politically, a series of problems haunted the Legislative Branch, most of them associated with corruption scandals, paving the way to greater judicial activism. The national government proved to be ineffective in terms of political management, which was evidenced by the rejection of the renewal of a tax on financial transactions by the Senate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides the reader with a synthetic perspective of what was 2006 for Brazil, in terms of its economic, social and political aspects. Initially, the piece offers preliminary information on what has resonated in Brazil in the aforesaid year. Growing urban violence was one of the hallmarks of 2006. Detailed statistics on the general elections held by the end of the year are the backdrop to the analysis of Lula's re-election. The latter was to a great extent a consequence of his macroeconomic management and targeted social policies. Such policies also resulted in a shifting of the candidate's electoral base to the poorer parts of the country. The political crisis endured by Brazil in 2006 is explained by Lula's governing style, which produced a highly fragmented and poorly monitored executive coalition. Data on legislative output demonstrates the executive branch's control over the policy process. Finally, the ideology of political parties, and the organization and workings of the judicial branch and the federation are briefly described. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comparative theories of legislatures have generally focused on the impact of electoral system-generated incentives on party discipline. While hypotheses advanced by this literature can explain cross-national variation in discipline, they fail to explain variation within one and the same country. This work explains the impressive cross-party and within-party variation in discipline observed in Brazil's first democracy (1946-64). We argue that party discipline was above all a function of presidents' legislative coalition-building strategies based on the dispensation of patronage to parties. One main consequence of these strategies was the creation of two factions within each party: one pro-presidential, the other anti-presidential. The relative size of each faction is assumed to affect discipline. Econometric analysis of 982 roll calls demonstrates that the key determinants of the discipline of the largest parties were the extent of budgetary resources channeled to them by presidents and the lapsing of the president's term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]