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Abstract: The failures of traditional target-species management have led many to propose an ecosystem approach to fisheries to promote sustainability. The ecosystem approach is necessary, especially to account for fishery-ecosystem [...]

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2004.11.002 Byline: Colin W. Clark (a), Gordon R. Munro (b), Ussif Rashid Sumaila (c) Keywords: Fisheries; Subsidies; Overcapacity; Buyback programs; Non-malleable capital; Human capital Abstract: Most fisheries subsidies, which on a worldwide scale are immense, are probably detrimental to resource conservation. However, payments used to buy out excess fishing capacity are often represented as useful subsidies, on the grounds that overcapacity encourages overfishing and causes economic waste. Some commentators, on the other hand, assert that most buyback subsidies are ineffective because additional capacity tends to seep back into the fishery over time. In this paper we take the latter argument further, and demonstrate that buyback subsidies, if they come to be anticipated by fishermen, will generally have a negative effect on economic performance and resource conservation. Consequently, buyback subsidies are perhaps over-rated as a management tool. Author Affiliation: (a) Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, 1984 Mathematics Road, Vancouver, B.C., Canada V6T 1Z2 (b) Department of Economics, and Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia, 2259 Lower Mall, Vancouver, B.C., Canada V6T 1Z4 (c) Fisheries Economics Research Unit, Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia, 6660 NW Marine Drive, Vancouver, B.C., Canada V6T 1Z4 Article History: Received 28 July 2003

I. INTRODUCTION When Canada and the United States signed the Pacific Salmon Agreement on June 30, 1999, they hoped that it would put an end to the pattern of bickering, [...]

Introduction The widespread implementation of Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction (EFJ) has confronted coastal states with several resource management problems. One of these consists of the economic relations, if any, that the [...]

Marine biological resources are likely to come under increasing stress over the course of the 21st century as global climate change and ocean acidification interact with other stresses, including heavy fishing pressures and marine pollution, to create far reaching and difficult-to-predict changes in species abundance, spatial distribution, and trophic interactions. The governance systems in place for marine fisheries and for the marine environment, more broadly, will be critical in determining the extent to which these resources can be managed for sustainability. The paper focuses on the governance of internationally shared fisheries, and draws on a body of game-theoretic research to discuss present-day governance problems and to evaluate the implications of global environmental change for future efforts to maintain cooperative and effective governance of shared fishery resources. In particular, the increased likelihood of abrupt and unpredictable changes in the productive potential and migratory behavior of exploited fish stocks may threaten to disrupt cooperative management arrangements. The paper discusses the value of contingency planning based on anticipation of the possibility of such events and concludes with a discussion of future directions for both research and policy development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• More transboundary fish stocks are expected under climate change, complicating fisheries management. • Linked game theory—ecosystem models test ecosystem-based co-management strategies. • Cooperative, ecosystem-based management of Pacific sardine improves profitability over all fisheries. • Managers must account for the key role of forage fish for ecosystems as well as other fisheries. Transboundary fish stocks complicate sustainable fishing strategies, particularly when stakeholders have diverse objectives and regulatory and governance frameworks. Pacific sardine (Sardinops sagax) in the California Current is shared by up to three fishing nations— Canada, the United States, and Mexico—and climate-driven abundance and distribution dynamics can complicate cooperative fisheries, leading to overfishing. This study builds on previous analyses by integrating ecosystem linkages into a game theory model of transboundary sardine fisheries under various climate scenarios. Cooperative fishing strategies that account for the ecosystem-wide value of sardine as forage for other species result in increased economic benefits compared to strategies that only account for the single-species value of sardine fisheries to a given fishing country. Total ecosystem landed value is maximized at a sardine fishing rate only somewhat lower than sardine F MSY , which is more precautionary but still allows the fishery to operate. Incorporating ecosystem dynamics into management-applicable models can highlight ways in which ecosystem-based fisheries management can improve both sustainability and profitability and help managers prioritize wider ecological research. Ecosystem-based management will be increasingly required to understand and adapt to the observed rapid shifts in species distributions due to climate change, and to design strategies to achieve sustainable and profitable fisheries amidst changing ecosystems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]