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The serotonin transporter 5-HTTLPR polymorphism moderates response to SSRIs and side-effect burden. The aim of this study is to quantify the cost-utility of incorporating 5-HTTLPR genotyping in drug treatment of major depressive disorder (MDD). We previously reported a theoretical model to simulate antidepressant treatment with citalopram or bupropion for 12weeks. The drugs were alternatively selected according to an 'as usual' algorithm or based on response and tolerability predicted by 5-HTTLPR profile. Here we apply this model to conduct a cost-utility analysis in three European regions with high GDP (Euro A), middle GDP (Euro B) and middle-high GDP (Euro C).. In addition we test a verification scenario in which citalopram+bupropion augmentation is administered to individuals with the least favorable 5-HTTLPR genotype. Treatment outcomes are remission and Quality Adjusted-Life Weeks (QALW). Cost data (international $, year 2009) are retrieved from the World Health Organization (WHO) and national official sources. In base-case scenario incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) values are $1147 (Euro A), $ 1185 (Euro B) and $1178 (Euro C). From cost-effectiveness acceptability curve (CEAC), the probability of having an ICER value below WHO recommended cost-utility threshold (3 GDP per capita=$1926) is >90% in high-income countries (Euro A). In middle- income regions, these probabilities are

The high separation of ownership from control achieved through the concurrent use of non-voting shares and stock pyramiding could favor acquisitions made to increase private benefits of the controlling shareholders rather than all shareholders’ wealth. A standard event study methodology is carried out on three different samples of Italian acquisitions during the 1989-1996 period in order to test this hypothesis. We find evidence that a worst market reaction characterizes acquiring firms with a higher separation of ownership from control, while more value-enhancing transactions are undertaken by those smaller in size and with higher prior-performance. An entrenchment effect seems to determine a significant U-shaped relationship between the market reaction and the ultimate shareholder ownership. When the sample is restricted to acquiring firms with a dual class equity structure we find that non-voting shares report significantly negative excess returns in contrast to significantly higher positive returns for voting shares. Such evidence seems to indicate that the average acquisition has been overpaid, as suggested by the negative market reaction of the non-voting shares, while it was expected to lead to higher private benefits to the majority shareholders, as suggested by the revaluation of the voting shares. Finally, the market reaction to acquisitions made within pyramidal groups seems to indicate that the price is set so as to transfer wealth towards the companies located at the upper levels, where majority shareholders own greater fractions of the companies’ cash flows.