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The central question addressed is: How should scientific research be conducted so as to ensure that nature is respected and the well being of everyone everywhere enhanced? After pointing to the importance of methodological pluralism for an acceptable answer and to obstacles posed by characterizing scientific methodology too narrowly, which are reinforced by the 'commercial-scientific ethos', two additional questions are considered: How might research, conducted in this way, have impact on-and depend on-strengthening democratic values and practices? And: What is thereby implied for the responsibilities of scientists today?, Author(s): Hugh Lacey[sup.1] [sup.2] [sup.3] Author Affiliations: Hugh Lacey is Scheuer Family of Philosophy Emeritus, Swarthmore College (PA, USA) and Research Associate, Institute of Advanced Studies, University of São Paulo [...]

Scientific activity tends to reflect particular worldviews and their associated value outlooks; and scientific results sometimes have implications for worldviews and the presuppositions of value outlooks. Even so, scientific activity per se neither presupposes nor provides sound rational grounds to accept any worldview or value outlook. Moreover, in virtue of reflecting a suitable variety of worldviews and value outlooks, perhaps including some religious ones, science is better able to further its aim. An extended argument is made that, although the materialist worldview has de facto been widely associated with the development of modern science, the scope of scientific inquiry is improperly limited when constraints, derived from materialism, are generally placed upon admissible scientific theories. Some implications for science education are sketched in the conclusion.

Responds to criticisms of the previous article, "Scientific Understanding and the Control of Nature." Clarifies themes in the first article and reaffirms the significance of distinguishing between cognitive and social values to gain a better grasp of scientific understanding. (Author/WRM)

Suggests that modern science adopts materialist strategies toward relationships between empirical data and theory because of an elective affinity between such strategies and a certain outlook on the control of nature. Claims that, when the roles of social values and cognitive values are kept distinct, sound theory acceptance can still be considered impartial. Contains 34 references. (Author/WRM)

Technoscientific objects are penetrating ever more profoundly into the socio-ecological systems that shape the contemporary lifeworld in ways that have brought about widely celebrated benefits, and also many kinds of risks for human health, the environment and society. There are many kinds of technoscientific objects, such as physical, chemical or biological objects that are outcomes of technical/experimental/instrumental interventions made in the course of research conducted in such areas as computer science, biotechnology, nanotechnology, neurosciences, geo-engineering, synthetic biology and artificial intelligence. Moreover, every technoscientific object is itself an object of many kinds, not only an object whose genesis, functioning and effective use are well understood in areas like these, but also a social, economic, ecological and cultural object; and, for each kind that the object is, there are associated specific causal mechanisms whose operations, when triggered in the course of using it in the lifeworld, may lead to effects on and risks for human lives, social arrangements and the environment (Section 1). I will illustrate these claims as they apply to the exemplary technoscientific objects, transgenics (GMOs) used in agriculture (Section 2). Then (Section 3), generalizing the discussion about transgenics, I will argue that appraising the value and legitimacy of introducing and using technoscientific objects adequately requires being informed by the results of scientific investigation that take into account all the kinds of things that they are, and (to the extent possible) all the causal mechanisms from which the effects and risks of using them may arise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Rachlin shows that experiments about social cooperation may fruitfully be grouped with experiments on self-control, and that this suggests interesting possibilities for practical behavioral controls. The concepts of selfishness and altruism, however, that inform his theorizing about these experiments, do not serve to provide understanding of the behavior that commonly is referred to, derogatorily, as selfish.

Teleological behaviorism, unlike Skinnerian behaviorism, recognizes that 'mental terms' are needed to account adequately for human behavior, but it rejects the essential role in behavioral explanations of the subjective perspective of the agent. I argue that teleological behaviorism fails because of this rejection.

It has been proposed that the policies and practices of food sovereignty, unlike those of today's hegemonic food/agricultural system, provide the means for satisfying and safeguarding the right to food security for everyone everywhere. My principal objective in this article, which gains its significance in the light of an explanatory critique of the current system, is to explore how scientific research - using what kinds of methodologies, and building on experiences of what and of whom? - can constructively inform these practices and policies, and contribute towards appraising this proposal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the meaning of social inclusion and examines the distinctive characteristics of technology that promotes social inclusion. According to the author, social inclusion has become an objective practically unopposed by Brazilian political groups. The author adds that two opposing ideals underlie the interpretations of Brazilian social inclusion, the individualist ideal and the social ideal. The individualist ideal implies that everyone has the opportunity to live in a manner that incorporates the values of hegemonic society while the social ideal implies that people lead lives in which they can express values that they reflectively hold.

Whether or not there are alternatives to using transgenics, that would be able to satisfy the world's food and nutrition needs, remains open to further scientific investigation. The necessity for using transgenics is not currently well based on available scientific knowledge, in part because the achievements and potential of agroecology have received insufficient scientific attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the book "Life Liberty and the Defense of Dignity: The Challenge for Bioethics," by Leon R. Kass. Views of the author on the moral implications of human cloning and stem cell research; Style of writing used by Kass; Views of Kass on modern technology.

Examines the development of transgenic (TG) seeds in the United States. Presence of genes from various species in TG seeds; Objectives on the development of TG seeds; Claims of the Food and Drug Administration on the scientific evidence of the risk of TG products.

Responds to the editorial comments made by Takis Fotopoulos on the authors' articles about democracy and nature. Essence of an inclusive democracy and a libertian confederation of local communities; Role of authentic development in some popular movements in impoverished country; Alternative conceptions of science and technology and the values embodied in their practices.

Scientific research is value laden. In particular, the constraints it normally puts upon acceptable theories and the criteria it deploys for selection of significant data both derive from background assumptions whose intelligibility is dialectically connected with the adoption of certain social values (in particular that of 'control'). I explore a conception of development that expresses an integrated vision of social justice and material development. The social values of this conception include those of cooperation, widespread participation, commitment to social/economic/cultural (as well as civil/political) rights, self-reliance and respect for nature. The implementation of this conception will require that suitable research be conducted and that alternative research institutions be developed which institutionalize the interplay between science and 'authentic development'. This paper will articulate the background assumptions and illustrate the forms of research that are made intelligible through dialectical links with these values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to draw detailed parallels between the characterization and control of behavior in terms of the principles of psychology developed by B.F. Skinner, known as operant psychology or behavior analysis, and the characterization and control of behavior in the modern, factory work place. The authors argue that while behavior in the workplace now seems to conform to Skinnerian or operant principles, it did not in an earlier time, prior to the development of industrial capitalism.