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Four studies involving 2552 White American participants were conducted to investigate bias based on the race-based phenotype of hair texture. Specifically, we probed the existence and magnitude of bias in favor of Eurocentric (straight) over Afrocentric (curly) hair and its specificity in predicting responses to a legal decision involving the phenotype. Study 1 revealed an implicit preference, measured by an Implicit Association Test (IAT), favoring Eurocentric over Afrocentric hair texture among White Americans. This effect was not reducible to a Black/White implicit race attitude nor to mere perceptual preference favoring straight over curly hair. In Study 2, the phenotype (hair) IAT significantly and uniquely predicted expressions of support in response to an actual legal case that involved discrimination on the basis of Afrocentric hair texture. Beyond replicating this result, Studies 3 and 4 (the latter preregistered) provided further, and even more stringent, evidence for incremental predictive validity: in both studies, the phenotype IAT was associated with support for a Black plaintiff above and beyond the effects of two parallel explicit scales and, additionally, a race attitude IAT. Overall, these studies support the idea that race bias may be uniquely detected by examining implicit attitudes elicited by group-based phenotypicality, such as hair texture. Moreover, the present results inform theoretical investigations of the correspondence principle in the context of implicit social cognition: they suggest that tailoring IATs to index specific aspects of an attitude object (e.g., by decomposition of phenotypes) can improve prediction of intergroup behavior.

Five studies examined implicit (IAT) attitudes toward the slurs n***er and n***a among Black and White Americans (total N = 3,226). Both groups showed strong implicit negativity toward n***er/a combined relative to socially acceptable contrast terms such as Black or African American. Controlling for baseline Black-White race attitudes, Black Americans who engaged in conscious reappropriation exhibited similar implicit negativity toward n***er/a as White Americans. When the rhotic and non-rhotic forms were directly contrasted, n***er was more implicitly negative than n***a, with Black Americans distinguishing the two more strongly than did White Americans. However, even Black American reappropriators showed implicit negativity toward n***a relative to Black. In sum, both n***er and n***a evoke automatic negative meaning in a broad sample of Americans today. At the same time, the relatively more positive meaning of n***a over n***er demonstrates the power of reappropriation to wrest control of word meaning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001) demonstrated that exposure to positive Black exemplars (e.g., Colin Powell) and negative White exemplars (e.g., Jeffrey Dahmer) can reduce implicit pro-White/anti-Black evaluations, as measured by an Implicit Association Test. Here, we report seven preregistered online experiments conducted with volunteer U.S. participants (N = 6,953) that sought to replicate and probe the boundary conditions of this finding. Contrary to expectations, we found no shift in implicit racial evaluations in two close replication attempts (Experiments 1–2). Experiments 3–4 ruled out the possibility of insufficiently strong exemplar valence and subtyping as explanations for the failures to replicate. In Experiment 5, implicit racial evaluations did exhibit malleability in response to two different procedures relying on repeated evaluative pairings and evaluative statements, suggesting that they are capable of change. With insight from these studies, Experiments 6–7 were mounted with modifications to the Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001) procedure. Significant reductions in implicit pro-White/anti-Black evaluations were now observed when race, valence, and the contingency between the two were highlighted. In addition, across all experiments, the magnitude of shift in implicit racial evaluations was significantly predicted by participants' ability to recall the Black–positive and White–negative contingencies experienced during the exemplar exposure task. Together, these data suggest that exposure to counterattitudinal exemplars can shift implicit racial evaluations toward neutrality, but such malleability strongly depends on contingency awareness. We discuss implications for social cognitive theory, theoretically informed debiasing interventions, and different paths toward resolving initial replication failures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People can predict their scores on the Implicit Association Test with remarkable accuracy, challenging the traditional notion that implicit attitudes are inaccessible to introspection and suggesting that people might be aware of these attitudes. Yet, major open questions about the mechanism and scope of these predictions remain, making their implications unclear. Notably, people may be inferring their attitudes from externally observable cues (e.g., in the simplest case, their demographic information) rather than accessing them directly. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that, in past work, predictions have been obtained only for a small set of targets, attitudes toward which are demonstrably possible to infer. Here, in an adversarial collaboration with eight preregistered studies (N = 8,011), we interrogate implicit attitude awareness using more stringent tests. We demonstrate that people can predict their implicit attitudes (a) across a broad range of targets (many of which are plausibly difficult to infer without introspection), (b) far more accurately than third-party observers can based on demographic information, and (c) with similar accuracy across two different widely used implicit measures. On the other hand, predictive accuracy (a) varied widely across individuals and attitude targets and (b) was partially explained by inference over nonintrospective cues such as demographic variables and explicit attitudes; moreover, (c) explicit attitudes explained considerably larger portions of variance in predictions than implicit attitudes did. Taken together, these findings suggest that successful predictions of one's implicit attitudes may emerge from multiple mechanisms, including inference over nonintrospective cues and genuine introspective access. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Across seven preregistered studies in online adult volunteer samples (N = 5,323), we measured implicit evaluations of social groups following exposure to historical narratives about their oppression. Although the valence of such information is highly negative and its interpretation was left up to participants, implicit evaluations of oppressed groups shifted toward positivity, including in designs involving fictitious, well-known, and even self-relevant targets. The sole deviation from this pattern was observed in an experiment using a vignette about slavery in the United States, in response to which neither White nor Black Americans exhibited any change in implicit race attitudes. In line with propositional perspectives, these findings suggest that implicit evaluations (including, notably, implicit evaluations of well-known and self-relevant social groups) tend to change toward positivity in response to extremely negative information involving past oppression. However, macro-level phenomena, such as public awareness of histories of oppression, can modulate such updating processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on 660 effect sizes obtained from 23,255 adult participants across 51 reports of experimental studies, this meta-analysis investigates whether and when explicit (self-reported) and implicit (indirectly revealed) evaluations reflect relational information (how stimuli are related to each other) over and above co-occurrence information (the fact that stimuli have been paired with each other). Using a mixed-effects metaregression, relational information was found to dominate over contradictory co-occurrence information in shifting both explicit (mean Hedges' g = 0.97, 95% CI [0.89, 1.05], 95% PI [0.24, 1.70]) and implicit evaluations (g = 0.27, 95% CI [0.19, 0.35], 95% PI [−0.46, 1.00]). However, considerable heterogeneity in relational effects on implicit evaluation made moderator analyses necessary. Implicit evaluations were particularly sensitive to relational information (a) in between-participant (rather than within-participant) designs; when (b) co-occurrence information was held constant (rather than manipulated); (c) targets were novel (rather than known); implicit evaluations were measured (d) first (rather than last) and (e) using an affect misattribution procedure (rather than an Implicit Association Test or evaluative priming task); and (f) relational and co-occurrence information were presented in temporal proximity (rather than far apart in time). Overall, the present findings suggest that both implicit and explicit evaluations emerge from a combination of co-occurrence information and relational information, with relational information usually playing the dominant role. Critically, variability in these effects highlights a need to refocus attention from existence proof demonstrations toward theoretical and empirical work on the determinants and boundary conditions of the influences of co-occurrence and relational information on explicit and implicit evaluations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"What is the structure of thought?" is as central a question as any in cognitive science. A classic answer to this question has appealed to a Language of Thought (LoT). We point to emerging research from disparate branches of the field that supports the LoT hypothesis, but also uncovers diversity in LoTs across cognitive systems, stages of development, and species. Our letter formulates open research questions for cognitive science concerning the varieties of rules and representations that underwrite various LoT‐based systems and how these variations can help researchers taxonomize cognitive systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Gawronski, Ledgerwood, and Eastwick (this issue; GLE) bring much needed attention to the limitations of currently available implicit measures as tools for studying unconscious bias. 46 Kurdi, B., Seitchik, A. E., Axt, J. R., Carroll, T. J., Karapetyan, A., Kaushik, N., ... Banaji, M. R. (2019). Here too, today's theoretical landscape would seem all but unrecognizable to the pioneering social cognition researchers of the early 1980s (for more on the history of implicit social cognition, see Kurdi & Banaji, [39]). Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 45, e80. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X21000595 44 Kurdi, B., Mann, T. C., Charlesworth, T. E. S., & Banaji, M. R. (2019). [Extracted from the article]

Moran et al. (2021) report a multi-lab registered replication of Olson and Fazio’s (2001) surveillance task. The surveillance task is an incidental learning procedure over the course of which participants observe pairings of conditioned stimuli (CSs) and unconditioned stimuli (USs) while engaging in a distracting secondary task. Unaware evaluative conditioning (EC) effects are inferred if participants who fail to report the CS– US contingencies on a post-hoc measure show preference for the CSpos over the CSneg. Moran et al. claimed to establish such effects relying on the criteria used by Olson and Fazio to exclude contingency aware participants from analyses. Here we reexamine Moran et al.’s data using more fine-grained analytic strategies. We show that the contingency awareness measures used by Olson and Fazio and, by extension, Moran et al. lack adequate reliability and validity. Moreover, even assuming valid awareness measures, Bayesian analyses did not provide unambiguous evidence for unaware EC effects under any exclusion criterion and provided decisive evidence against such effects in most models. Finally, a separate analysis that distinguished between fully aware, partially aware, and fully unaware participants shows that evidence for unaware EC is due to the inclusion of partially aware participants in the purportedly unaware subsample. These reanalyses suggest that unaware EC as indexed by the surveillance task has yet to be convincingly demonstrated. We discuss the conceptual, theoretical, and applied implications of these findings with regard to the potential for unaware attitude formation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much of human thought, feeling, and behavior unfolds automatically. Indirect measures of cognition capture such processes by observing responding under corresponding conditions (e.g., lack of intention or control). The Implicit Association Test (IAT) is one such measure. The IAT indexes the strength of association between categories such as "planes" and "trains" and attributes such as "fast" and "slow" by comparing response latencies across two sorting tasks (planes–fast/trains–slow vs. trains–fast/planes–slow). Relying on a reanalysis of multitrait–multimethod (MTMM) studies, Schimmack (this issue, p. 396) argues that the IAT and direct measures of cognition, for example, Likert scales, can serve as indicators of the same latent construct, thereby purportedly undermining the validity of the IAT as a measure of individual differences in automatic cognition. Here we note the compatibility of Schimmack's empirical findings with a range of existing theoretical perspectives and the importance of considering evidence beyond MTMM approaches to establishing construct validity. Depending on the nature of the study, different standards of validity may apply to each use of the IAT; however, the evidence presented by Schimmack is easily reconcilable with the potential of the IAT to serve as a valid measure of automatic processes in human cognition, including in individual-difference contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Associative accounts suggest that implicit (indirectly measured) evaluations are sensitive primarily to co-occurrence information (e.g., pairings of gorges with positive experiences) and are represented associatively (e.g., GorGe-Nice). By contrast, recent propositional accounts have argued that implicit evaluations are also responsive to relational information (e.g., gorges causing vs. preventing ennui) and are represented propositionally (e.g., "I find gorges fascinating"). In a review of 30 empirical papers involving exposure to contradictory co-occurrence information and relational information, we found overwhelming evidence for the latter dominating the updating of implicit evaluations, supporting the propositional perspective. However, unlike explicit evaluations, implicit evaluations seem recalcitrant in the face of relational information that requires retrospective revaluation of already encoded co-occurrence information. These findings may be jointly explained by a "common currency" hypothesis under which implicit evaluations emerge from compressed summary representations, which are sensitive to relational information but are not fully propositional. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Implicit evaluations (attitudes) are often described as resistant to change, especially when they were initially formed in a seemingly associative manner, such as via repeated evaluative pairings (REP), and new learning is created via propositional material, such as evaluative statements (ES). The present research (total N = 2,124) tested the responsiveness of implicit evaluations instantiated via REP to updating via different types of ES. In Experiment 1, initial learning was created via repeatedly pairing a novel target with strongly negative stimuli (screams) in an aversive REP (A-REP) task. Subsequent ES of opposing valence providing diagnostic information about the target's behavior substantially updated implicit (IAT) evaluations. In Experiment 2, behavioral ES resulted in successful updating after A-REP whether or not they provided an explanation for the initial A-REP learning. A previously unobtained result emerged in Experiment 3 showing that updating was durable even after 1 day. Finally, in Experiment 4, implicit evaluations were updated via diagnostic behavioral ES, but not via an ES instruction to suppose that different pairings had occurred during A-REP. Taken together, these experiments challenge associative theories of implicit evaluation by demonstrating that diagnostic behavioral statements can durably override the effects of initial learning on implicit evaluations, even if such initial learning is aversive and involves direct experience with stimulus pairings. Moreover, by showing that verbal manipulations based on diagnostic behavior but not a mere supposition instruction had impact, the present project advances theory by starting to identify the nature of learning that can adaptively update social impressions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From the earliest ages tested, children and adults show similar overall magnitudes of implicit attitudes toward various social groups. However, such consistency in attitude magnitude may obscure meaningful age‐related change in the ways that children (vs. adults) acquire implicit attitudes. This experiment investigated children's implicit attitude acquisition by comparing the separate and joint effects of two learning interventions, previously shown to form implicit attitudes in adults. Children (N = 280, ages 7–11 years) were taught about novel social groups through either evaluative statements (ES; auditorily presented verbal statements such as 'Longfaces are bad, Squarefaces are good'), repeated evaluative pairings (REP; visual pairings of Longface/Squareface group members with valenced images such as a puppy or snake), or a combination of ES+REP. Results showed that children acquired implicit attitudes following ES and ES+REP, with REP providing no additional learning beyond ES alone. Moreover, children did not acquire implicit attitudes in four variations of REP, each designed to facilitate learning by systematically increasing verbal scaffolding to specify (a) the learning goal, (b) the valence of the unconditioned stimuli, and (c) the group categories of the conditioned stimuli. These findings underscore the early‐emerging role of verbal statements in children's implicit attitude acquisition, as well as a possible age‐related limit in children's acquisition of novel implicit attitudes from repeated pairings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We highlight several sets of findings from the past decade elucidating the relationship between implicit social cognition and real-world inequality: Studies focusing on practical ramifications of implicit social cognition in applied contexts, the relationship between implicit social cognition and consequential real-world outcomes at the level of individuals and geographic units, and convergence between individual-level and corpus-based measures of implicit bias. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stereotypes are associations between social groups and semantic attributes that are widely shared within societies. The spoken and written language of a society affords a unique way to measure the magnitude and prevalence of these widely shared collective representations. Here, we used word embeddings to systematically quantify gender stereotypes in language corpora that are unprecedented in size (65+ million words) and scope (child and adult conversations, books, movies, TV). Across corpora, gender stereotypes emerged consistently and robustly for both theoretically selected stereotypes (e.g., work–home) and comprehensive lists of more than 600 personality traits and more than 300 occupations. Despite underlying differences across language corpora (e.g., time periods, formats, age groups), results revealed the pervasiveness of gender stereotypes in every corpus. Using gender stereotypes as the focal issue, we unite 19th-century theories of collective representations and 21st-century evidence on implicit social cognition to understand the subtle yet persistent presence of collective representations in language. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]