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The article focuses on the debate surrounding the classification of medical adaptive machine learning systems (MAMLS) as research tools versus clinical tools. It arguing against the stringent regulatory burdens proposed by Sparrow and colleagues; the ethical implications of generalizable data in healthcare; the role of continuous learning in improving patient care and the need for a balanced approach to regulatory oversight that prioritizes safety and efficacy over overly cautious restrictions.

The article presents the discussion on personhood has long figured prominently in discussions of entities' moral status and attendant rights. Topics include personhood, however, might invite difficulties because of the word ‘person,' which has particular emotional resonance and is associated with ‘human being'; and moral standing that an entity can achieve, at which point an entity's interests, rights, and duties.

The author comments on the article "Epistemic rights and responsibilities of digital simulacra for biomedicine" by Professors Mildred Cho and Nicole Martinez-Martin which analyzes how, as medicine deploys digital twins data, data science approaches to problems and cases might supplant medical approaches. Topics discussed include how the use of digital twins for health care in adversarial medical-legal proceedings could influence clinical behavior and the use of digital twins across industries.

Professor Thompson also sees modern genetic and neuroscientific research aimed at explaining criminal conduct as "participating in and perpetuating a phrenological framework" by pursuing "a biological, "natural" sign, written on the body or brain or genetic code, that could render the criminal a problem of the unenlightened past" (pp. 161, 162). Professor Thompson illuminates how phrenological theories and methods were "predicated on findings from within the prison" and how the "criminal brain" emerged and endured as "the heart of phrenology" (pp. 13, 36). Ubiquitous concern for crime made phrenological explanations for criminality critical to the discipline's allure and transatlantic virality as it spread from continental Europe to the United Kingdom to the United States, receiving increasingly warm receptions. Yet Professor Thompson further recounts how, given phrenology's fairly ephemeral acceptance as legitimate science, the period in which "phrenology I qua i phrenology" was meaningfully invoked in criminal legal settings was brief (only a couple of decades or so) (p. 68). [Extracted from the article]

Conducted electrical weapons (CEWs)--the most famous and widely used of which are offered under the TASER brand--are ubiquitous tools of law enforcement, carried by the vast majority of law enforcement officers and routinely deployed. These devices subdue targets by coursing electric current through their bodies, thereby causing individuals to collapse as their muscles involuntarily contract. Yet this method of operation has raised concerns--voiced by researchers, advocates, and criminal defendants alike--that CEWs influence cognitive capacity in addition to muscle function as electric current potentially transits through the brain via the central nervous system. In the context of an arrest, this implicates criminal suspects' ability to understand Miranda warnings given by officers and to competently waive their constitutional rights against self-incrimination and to counsel. Some have gone so far as to recommend a mandated delay between when suspects are tased and when officers may administer Miranda warnings in order to protect individuals' rights. Intimate understandings of the law of Miranda v. Arizona and the true effects of CEWs on cognitive capacity are critical for determining the prudence of this recommendation, and have broader implications for the criminal justice system. This Article is the first to conduct a thorough survey and analysis of the law of Miranda with regard to how courts determine whether individuals' waivers of their constitutional rights following Miranda warnings are knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Ultimately, cognitive capacity is an important factor, but, in examining this faculty, courts generally rely most heavily on subjective indicia of mental acuity manifested at the time Miranda warnings were administered--e.g., reasoning ability, tone, bodily movements, and temperament. Objective indicia of mental acuity--i.e., those shown through empirical research to signal cognitive ability, such as age, education, intelligence, and blood alcohol content--are routinely treated as less valuable than subjective indicia, particularly when the two are in opposition. This presents a high bar for empirical research on the cognitive effects of CEWs to scale in order to meaningfully influence court determinations of the legitimacy of rights waivers. This Article is also the first to conduct a comprehensive survey and examination of the literature addressing the cognitive effects of CEWs and compare these effects to those of other forceful arrest methods. Studies reveal that, rather than having a unique effect on cognition through some interaction between electric current and the brain, CEWs actually appear to impact mental faculties through a general stress effect, which other forceful methods of arrest have as well--e.g., physical altercation, police dog attack, and pepper spray. Therefore, an exceptional rule requiring a delay in administering Miranda warnings to suspects subject to CEWs does not seem appropriate. Nevertheless, the literature does show forceful arrest methods meaningfully affecting individual mental acuity. While more research is necessary to more finely deduce the extent of these impacts, they appear to be such that courts should consider a forceful arrest close enough in time to the administration of a Miranda warning to be a negative factor in assessing defendants' competence to waive their rights, similar to evidence indicating low intelligence or intoxication at the time of waiver. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on changes to the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) and Rules for Courts-Martial (RCM) and contrary interpretations of how to implement contingent confinement. It mentions language of Rule 1003(b)(3), which was first published in the 1984 edition of the MCM, remained unchanged by Executive Order 13825 and govern the imposition of military contingent confinement. It also mentions how the military appellate courts have addressed contingent confinement under Rule 1003(b)(3)/.

The article discusses the research which shows that the transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) device is not approved in the U.S. by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) as a medical treatment for any indication.

The article examines on the government-mandated licensing terms arrangement for fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND). An overview on the potential approach for patented technology to manage serious unmet or urgent medical need, is provided. Prevention on the delay in the development of sequential innovations, is also mentioned.

The article explores the main Arctic imaginaries to counteract the sensationalism that has come to infect mainstream Arctic discourse and reports international laws and governance concerning the issue.

There are fifty-twobodies of criminal lawintheUSA. Each stakes out oftendiversepositions ona range of issues. This articledefines the "Americanrule" for eachof the issues relatingto general defenses, a first contribution toward creating an "American Criminal Code". The article is the result of a several-year research project examining every issue relating to justification, excuse, and nonexculpatory defenses. It determines the majority American position among the fifty-two jurisdictions, and formulates statutory language for each defense that reflects that majority rule. The article also compares and contrasts the majority position to significant minority positions, to the Model Penal Code, and to the National Commission's proposed code. Using these results, in focusing on the most controversial justification defense, Defense of Persons, the article then compares patterns among the states on legal issues with a wide range of other variables--such as state population, racial characteristics, violent crime rates, and gun ownership--highlighting many interesting correlations. Applying this kind of doctrinal correlation analysis to all of the project's existing data would be a major undertaking. The goal here is to show how such analysis can be done, and how interesting the revealed patterns can be. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors comment on an article arguing for the regulation of cognitive enhancement devices (CED) in the European market. The researchers presented risk analyses of certain CED that interact with the brain, proposed additions to existing European medical device regulation with regard to CED and suggested a framework for categorizing such devices. The definition of CED and proposed classifications for certain CED are questioned.