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Abstract Determining one’s confidence in a decision is a vital part of decision-making. Traditionally, psychological experiments have assessed a person’s confidence by eliciting confidence judgments. The notion that such judgments can be elicited without impacting the accuracy of the decision has recently been challenged by several studies which have shown reactivity effects—either an increase or decrease in decision accuracy when confidence judgments are elicited. Evidence for the direction of reactivity effects has, however, been decidedly mixed. Here, we report three studies designed to specifically make reactivity effects more prominent by eliciting confidence judgment contemporaneously with perceptual decisions. We show that confidence judgments elicited contemporaneously produce an impairment in decision accuracy, this suggests that confidence judgments may rely on a partially distinct set of cues/evidence than the primary perceptual decision and, additionally, challenges the continued use of confidence ratings as an unobtrusive measure of metacognition.

Abstract Prior research has established that people use reappraisal to regulate others’ emotions in higher-emotional intensities but use distraction in lower-emotional intensities. However, research has not compared different reappraisal subtypes, such as reconstrual versus minimizing. In three pre-registered studies, participants completed a novel advice-giving task where they selected regulation strategies (distraction, reconstrual, or minimizing) to help a ‘partner’ who was ostensibly experiencing stimuli of differing emotional intensities and types (the partner was, in fact, non-existent). In Experiment 1, participants selected reconstrual over distraction significantly more for low versus high intensity stimuli. In Experiment 2, participants showed no significant preference for minimizing over distraction on low versus high intensity stimuli. In Experiment 3, participants selected reconstrual over minimizing significantly more on low versus high intensity stimuli. Results indicate that previous findings regarding the effect of emotional intensity on ‘reappraisal’ preference are limited to reconstrual and may not generalize to other reappraisal subtypes (i.e., minimizing) which require lower cognitive costs and emotional engagement with the stimuli.

Judgments of learning (JOL) are one of the most commonly used measures of metamemory. There is mixed evidence that eliciting JOLs while participants are studying word pairs influences their subsequent recall, a phenomenon known as reactivity. The majority of studies have found that positive reactivity occurs when word pairs are related. This finding suggests that when the final test is sensitive to the cues used to make a JOL (e.g., pair relatedness), a benefit to recall is observed. Here, in three experiments, JOL reactivity is examined in the presence of a salient, yet non-diagnostic cue—font size. The results show that when study time is limited and font size is made salient, eliciting JOLs impairs future recall. It is argued that JOLs prompt participants to evaluate salient cues in the learning environment to evaluate whether they will affect future recall. This increased processing of salient cues can impair recall if it comes at the expense of processing less salient but more informative cues. These findings suggest that the relevance to the test of the cues processed when JOLs are performed determines the direction of reactivity effects, with both positive and negative reactivity being possible depending on how diagnostic the salient metacognitive cues are for recall.

Emotional intelligence (EI) abilities relate to desirable outcomes such as better well-being, academic performance, and job performance. Previous research shows that coping strategies mediate the effects of ability EI on such outcomes. Across two cross-sectional studies, we show that coping strategies mediate the relationships of ability EI with both well-being (life satisfaction, psychological well-being) and ill-being (depression, anxiety, stress). Study 1 (N = 105 first-year university students, 78% female) assessed EI with the Situational Test of Emotion Understanding (STEU) and Situation Test of Emotion Management (STEM). Avoidant coping significantly mediated the relationship of both the STEU and STEM with depression, anxiety, stress, and psychological well-being. EI was associated with lower avoidant coping, higher well-being and lower ill-being. Study 2 (N = 115 first-year university students, 67% female) assessed EI with the Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT). Avoidant coping mediated the relationship between EI and ill-being, but not the relationship between EI and well-being. These effects were significant for three of the four EI branches—emotion perception, understanding, and management. We discuss possible reasons why avoidant coping may be an active ingredient by which lower EI relates to lower well-being. We also discuss a possible application of our findings—that EI training programs might benefit from including content aimed at reducing avoidant coping.

Abstract Teachers sometimes believe in the efficacy of instructional practices that have little empirical support. These beliefs have proven difficult to efface despite strong challenges to their evidentiary basis. Teachers typically develop causal beliefs about the efficacy of instructional practices by inferring their effect on students’ academic performance. Here, we evaluate whether causal inferences about instructional practices are susceptible to an outcome density effect using a contingency learning task. In a series of six experiments, participants were ostensibly presented with students’ assessment outcomes, some of whom had supposedly received teaching via a novel technique and some of whom supposedly received ordinary instruction. The distributions of the assessment outcomes was manipulated to either have frequent positive outcomes (high outcome density condition) or infrequent positive outcomes (low outcome density condition). For both continuous and categorical assessment outcomes, participants in the high outcome density condition rated the novel instructional technique as effective, despite the fact that it either had no effect or had a negative effect on outcomes, while the participants in the low outcome density condition did not. These results suggest that when base rates of performance are high, participants may be particularly susceptible to drawing inaccurate inferences about the efficacy of instructional practices.

Metacognition is typically measured by collecting self-reported information from participants while they complete a cognitive task. Recent evidence suggests that eliciting such metacognitive information from participants can impact both their metacognitive processes and their cognitive performance. Although there are contradictory findings regarding the magnitude and even the direction of this effect, recent evidence has converged to provide a clearer picture of the mechanisms that determine reactivity. Here, we provide a review of the evidence that measures of metacognition, namely think-aloud protocols, judgments of learning, and confidence ratings, are reactive. We argue that reactivity has important implications not just for the measurement of metacognition, but for metacognition theorizing because reactivity can provide insights into the cues participants use to monitor their performance. Drawing from this synthesis of evidence, we propose a tentative framework for studying reactivity that integrates cue processing accounts of reactivity with existing models of metacognition. We conclude the review by addressing some of the pertinent questions yet to be comprehensively addressed by reactivity research, including how researchers should best address issues of reactivity when using experimental designs.