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In this article, I rely on religious existential philosophy to make sense of the moral restoration expressed by combat veterans who engage in reconciliation with former enemies after suffering from moral injury. Moral injury is the persistent feeling of having betrayed one's deepest moral values. Anthropological research and analyses of combat veterans' testimony suggest that moral injury may be associated with reconciliation, which is considered here as a manifestation of an inner transformation akin to existential philosophies of striving for moral authenticity. Specifically, it is argued that Thomas Merton's defense of living a morally authentic life, which constitutes a process of moving from spiritual woundedness to social engagement with the other, parallels the transition of combat veterans involved in postconflict reconciliation efforts. Given this correspondence, existential moral transformation is considered alongside the anthropology of peace for explaining moral injury as a precondition for reconciliation, notably after armed conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Glowacki's account overlooks the role of religion in the regulation of cooperation, tolerance, and peace values. We interrogate three premises of Glowacki's argument and suggest that approaching religion as an adaptive system reveals how religious commitments and practices likely had a more substantial impact on the evolution of peace and conflict than currently presumed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Legal narratives about collective violence have given an outsized explanatory role to propaganda in conflicts such as the Rwandan genocide and the Yugoslav Wars. While post-conflict ethnographies have examined what Rwandans remember about propaganda and collective violence, similar studies have not been undertaken in territories of the former Yugoslavia. The present ethnographic study fills this gap. After introducing the theoretical and empirical problems that have stemmed from recent speech crime trials in international criminal law, I examine the causes of collective violence in the Yugoslav Wars as remembered by former combatants, survivors, and the greater populations of post-conflict regions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia. I show that remembered causes, including the role of propaganda, vary significantly between former combatants and the greater populations. Nevertheless, local perspectives, especially among former combatants and survivors, converge on the effects of populist movements following Yugoslavia's economic crisis and the rise of ethnic, religious, and nationalist leaders who engaged in inflammatory rhetoric and misinformation to mobilize war efforts. This article thus corroborates key findings from other post-conflict ethnographies which show that propaganda plays a secondary but significant role in the cultural manufacturing of state-sponsored ethnicity and cultural logics of violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Religious hate propaganda, which is sustained communication by an authority that attempts to guide an audience towards persecuting others based on religion, is a speech crime. Yet, it is one of the least understood and most difficult speech crimes to prosecute. This is due to misunderstandings and epistemic gaps regarding how persecutory language, which would otherwise have little significance for prosocial religious adherents, becomes meaningful for a religious community. Drawing from the cognitive science of religion (CSR), this article develops and explores the hypothesis that for some religious communities, discursive attacks on others become meaningful when they center on dangerous accusations. Dangerous accusations portray the other as capable of mystical harm and, when made by cultural authorities, become socially accepted truths if repeated during rituals of veridiction. This article shows that dangerous accusations are at the heart of religious hate propaganda and exploit cognitive biases for threat perception, coalitional psychology, and costly signaling. Moreover, dangerous accusations can reinforce the social order and maintain social cohesion. Together, an analysis of speech crimes and dangerous accusations shed light on how religious hate propaganda works, how it can offer meaning to religious communities, and how it can justify persecution in certain environments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dehumanization is routinely invoked in social science and law as the primary factor in explaining how propaganda encourages support for, or participation in, violence against targeted outgroups. Yet the primacy of dehumanization is increasingly challenged by the apparent influence of revenge on collective violence. This study examines critically how various propaganda influence audiences. Although previous research stresses the dangers of dehumanizing propaganda, a recently published study found that only revenge propaganda significantly lowered outgroup empathy. Given the importance of these findings for law and the behavioral sciences, this research augments that recent study with two additional samples that were culturally distinct from the prior findings, showing again that only revenge propaganda was significant. To explore this effect further, we also conducted a facial electromyography (fEMG) among a small set of participants, finding that revenge triggered significantly stronger negative emotions against outgroups than dehumanization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Meaning-making has been one of the primary domains of religion throughout history, and some have claimed that this is religion's central function. Yet, the modern era has seen a proliferation of other social institutions that generate meaning for people. Here we reflect on what religious meaning-making can tell us about meaning-making in secular institutions, with a particular focus on sport. Sport as a meaning-making institution is puzzling since sports are generally considered leisure activities, not serious enough to provide meaningful structure and purpose to human lives. Nonetheless, people do derive meaning from sport and we argue that because sport shares many features with religion, it offers a unique opportunity to examine a secular meaning-making institution. We offer a theoretical framework for the study of meaning-making that derives from our conceptual approach to religion as an adaptive system. We use this approach, and other anthropological research, to delineate seven general characteristics of human meaning-making systems: collective, constructed, subjective, narrative, relational, transcendent, and growth-oriented. These features of meaning-making systems highlight why sport has been so successful at offering meaning to sport enthusiasts, both fans and athletes alike. We conclude with a brief speculative evolutionary scenario that may explain our proclivity for seeking meaning, and why secular institutions will continue to fill that role when religious worldviews are not compelling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent scholarship on mass mobilization and totalism has approached propaganda as a solution to political cooperation, whereby inflammatory speeches, mis- or dis-information, and rumorsfunction not to persuade audiences butratherto coordinate coalitions. Propaganda, it has been argued, aligns the attention of individuals already disposed to conflict. However, propaganda does not operate in a vacuum. Herewe argue that movements and regimes that contend for total political power do so by employing a combination of propaganda and ritual. Ritualsfunction to sanctify, connect individuals, and signal commitments. Further, rituals bind individuals into emerging social orders that enable the very communication of propaganda as a means of coordinating coalitions and instantiating methods for coercing behaviors. By examining historical case studies of totalism, we provide an exploration ofritual in totalistregimes and thereby argue that totalism is a quasi-religious system that employs elements of religion in an attempt to regulate social behavior. In describing totalism as a quasi-religious system, we outline five phases in the life course of totalist movements: preformation, cadre formation, coalitional building, collective power, and breakdown. Totalism ultimately results in considerable negative effects on the population,such asloss of health, materialresources, and social trust, and closes important channels for socioecological feedback, which are essential for the proper functioning of any system. Accordingly, unlike most religious systems, totalism over-sanctifies power, overregulates meanings, and fails to achieve cooperation and coordination beyond cadres or coalitions of enthusiasts. Consequently, totalist movements are relatively short-lived compared to successful religions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the relationship between war propaganda and nationalism, and what are the effects of each on support for, or participation in, violent acts? This is an important question for international criminal law and ongoing speech crime trials, where prosecutors and judges continue to assert that there is a clear causal link between war propaganda, nationalism, and mass violence. Although most legal judgments hinge on the criminal intent of propagandists, the question of whether and to what extent propaganda and nationalism interact to cause support for violence or participation remains unanswered. Our goal here is to contribute to research on propaganda and nationalism by bridging international criminal law and the behavioral and brain sciences. We develop an experiment conducted with Serbian participants that examines the effects of propaganda as identified in the latest international speech crime trial as causing mass violence, and thereby test hypotheses of expert witness Anthony Oberschall's theory of mass manipulation. Using principal components analysis and Bayesian regression, we examine the effects of propaganda exposure and prior levels of nationalism as well as other demographics on support for violence, ingroup empathy, and outgroup empathy. Results show that while exposure to war propaganda does not increase justifications of violence, specific types of war propaganda increase ingroup empathy and decrease outgroup empathy. Further, although nationalism by itself is not significant for justifying violence, the interaction of increased nationalism and exposure to violent media is significant for altering group empathies. The implications of these findings are discussed with respect to international criminal law and the cognitive science of nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What universal features of the mind interact with specific ecologies to produce expressions of violent religious nationalism? To shed light on this question, we focus on a case study of the Yugoslav Wars, asking: How did different religious groups in the Balkans move from cooperative relationships to violent ones? We argue that the most prevalent theories invoked to answer this question fail to adequately explain the change, namely, both the rise and fall of violent religious nationalism in the Balkans. To that end, we employ a systemic framework of religious change to examine historical data and ethnographic interview excerpts from ex-fighters and survivors of the Yugoslav Wars. This framework takes religion as it is practiced by communities to be a complex adaptive system, and models how religions adapt to local socioecologies. In employing this framework, three questions are addressed: (1) What features of cognition contributed to religiously motivated mass violence; (2) Which constituents of the religious system triggered those features; and (3) What socioecological factors were those constituents responding to? We argue that popular support for religious violence--and eventually its rejection--involved a set of higher-order functions, which McNamara calls the centralized executive self. This decision-making system was decentered by religious specialists who raised social pressures; group rituals that sustained community engagement; and identity-markers that signaled group commitments. While support for violence was a response to community threats during state-level succession, the eventual rejection of violence by religious leaders and communities was due to socioecological factors, such as rising health threats and declining birth rates brought about by the wars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various issues on topics including forgiveness, ethics and reconciliation.

Strictly clinical perspectives on intimate partner abuse focus on the psychological well-being of the victim and the structural factors of victimization, resulting in several unresolved questions regarding the role of public intervention. Because public intervention is the main predictor for preventing future assaults, the practical aim of this study is to increase public intervention by drawing from evolutionary psychology to identify and explain the central factors that minimize intervention. Our data show that most people express significant ambivalence and make anomalous decisions when confronted with various forms of intimate partner violence. We analyse a number of significant factors that decrease intervention behaviours and show how they are consistent with evolutionary theories of forgiveness-seeking and revenge-avoidance behaviours and cognitive mechanisms designed to avoid revenge-seeking scenarios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent international criminal trials of incitement have brought about a novel precedent for prosecuting war propagandists that not only moves incitement from being inchoate to causally proven but also neglects the voices of perpetrators. Following recent ethnographic research in Rwanda, this article examines the new precedent and suggests that incitement should return to being inchoate. The discussion centres on interview data collected among Serbian veterans of the Yugoslav Wars about the degree to which wartime media motivated them during the breakup of Yugoslavia and interview data collected among Serbian prosecutors about the alleged influence of Serbian wartime media. Serbian veterans report that they were not motivated by wartime media but rather former conflicts, peer-to-peer stories on the frontline and evident threats to Serbs. Moreover, prosecutors’ assumptions about the influence of war propaganda and the unwillingness to interview ‘perpetrators’ about their motivations illuminate the complexities of post-conflict justice in Serbia. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Abstract Do human rights have religious foundations? Among philosophers and theologians, the question tends to invite two standard replies. Some accept the boundary between the secular and the religious, and say that the universal protection of freedoms, possessions, and duties associated with human rights extend beyond any religious system. Others are impressed by arguments suggesting that the moral standards within human rights are inherently religious. In this paper I propose a third position. By taking the perspective of relative universalism, I draw a distinction between the conceptualization and implementation of human rights. The former is a historical process that is arguably bereft of religion, while the latter is a dynamic process that often embraces it. This distinction motivates my central thesis: although religion is absent from the normative and historical foundations of human rights, the realization of human rights in some regions of the world today often requires it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophers have argued that stakes affect knowledge: a given amount of evidence may suffice for knowledge if the stakes are low, but not if the stakes are high. By contrast, empirical work on the influence of stakes on ordinary knowledge ascriptions has been divided along methodological lines: “evidence‐fixed” prompts rarely find stakes effects, while “evidence‐seeking” prompts consistently find them. We present a cross‐cultural study using both evidence‐fixed and evidence‐seeking prompts with a diverse sample of 17 populations in 11 countries, speaking 14 languages. Our study is the first to use an evidence‐seeking prompt cross‐culturally, and includes several previously untested populations (including indigenous populations). Across cultures, we do not find evidence of a stakes effect with our evidence‐fixed prompt, but do with our evidence‐seeking prompt. We argue that the divergent results reveal a tension within folk epistemology: people's beliefs about when it is appropriate to ascribe knowledge differ significantly from their actual practice in ascribing knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although religions, as Smaldino demonstrates, provide informative examples of culturally evolved group-level traits, they are more accurately analyzed as complex adaptive systems than as norm-enforcing institutions. An adaptive systems approach to religion not only avoids various shortcomings of institutional approaches, but also offers additional explanatory advantages regarding the cultural evolution of group-level traits that emerge from religion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, the author discusses the importance of anthropology in cognitive science. Topics discussed include criticism of the Cognitive Science Society which considers anthropology as a missing discipline, role of anthropology in the cognitive science of religion (CSR) and application of cross-disciplinary cognitive anthropology (CA) to study social cognition. Importance of consensus analysis and culture models theory for cultural psychology is discussed.