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Retirement is an eagerly awaited life transition for many older workers, but some may anticipate their exit from the workforce will result in loss of meaningful work-based activities and social interactions. For older workers more committed to their organization, retirement might represent a threat to maintaining a consistent, positive identity. Across three pre-registered studies of US adults aged 49 to 75, we investigated the relationship between organizational commitment and anticipated identity changes in retirement. Studies 1 and 2 (N = 1059) found that older workers largely anticipated positive changes to their identity in retirement. In Study 2, we divided older workers into two conditions and used a framing manipulation to present retirement as either a 'role exit' or a 'role entry'. In the 'role exit' condition, older workers less committed to their organization anticipated more positive changes when they held more group memberships compared to those with fewer group memberships. Those in the 'role entry' condition anticipated significantly more positive changes to their identity in retirement than those in the 'role exit' condition, but did not anticipate more positive changes based on organizational commitment or group memberships. More group memberships, but not lower organizational commitment, was associated with more positive anticipation of identity changes in retirement. Study 3 (N = 215) surveyed older adults after they had retired, finding that identity changes experienced post-retirement were less positive than those anticipated by older workers. We discuss the theoretical and applied implications of these findings for older workers' retirement decisions and wellbeing., Author(s): Daniel Jolles [sup.1] , Veronica M. Lamarche [sup.1] , Jonathan J. Rolison [sup.1] , Marie Juanchich [sup.1] Author Affiliations: (1) grid.8356.8, 0000 0001 0942 6946, Department of Psychology, University [...]

Past research has shown that people are more likely to make the decision to hire candidates whose gender would increase group diversity when making multiple hiring choices in a bundle (i.e., when selecting multiple team members simultaneously) compared to making choices in isolation (i.e., when selecting a single team member). However, it is unclear if this bundling effect extends to age diversity and the selection of older candidates, as older workers are often the target of socially acceptable negative stereotypes and bias in recruitment, leaving them unemployed for longer than their younger counterparts. Across five preregistered experiments (total N = 4,096), we tested if the positive effect of bundling on diversity of selections extends to older candidates in hiring decisions. We found evidence of bias against older job candidates in hiring decisions but found inconsistent effects of choice bundling on the selection of older candidates across experiments. An effect of bundling was found in two of five experiments, with no meta-analytic effect found across the five studies. Making older candidates more competitive and introducing a diversity statement aimed at increasing their selection both significantly increased older candidate selections, but failed to activate the bundling effect. We discuss the theoretical implications for choice bundling interventions and for age as a diversity characteristic to support the design of interventions that meet the challenges of an aging workforce. Public Significance Statement: This research demonstrates that a theoretically driven behavioral intervention proposed to increase diversity largely failed to increase age diversity via the selection of older candidates. In the context of hiring, explicit diversity statements that make clear the company aim to increase age diversity via the representation of older workers are effective in increasing selections, but these statements do not activate the diversity benefits of bundling decisions, and may even overpower them. More generally, behavioral interventions aimed at increasing choice diversity may depend on the target characteristic being neither too undesirable nor desirable to the selector. Overall, this highlights the contextual nature of behavioral choice interventions, and suggests that interventions designed to increase diversity cannot be expected to work uniformly across different diversity characteristics or in combination with other interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Trypophobia is the condition in which individuals report a range of negative emotions when viewing clusters of small holes. Since the phenomenon was first described in the peer-reviewed literature a decade ago, 49 papers have appeared together with hundreds of news articles. There has also been much discussion on various Internet forums, including medical and health-related websites. In the present article, we examine the degree to which the phenomenon is caused by a form of social learning, specifically, its ubiquitous social media presence. We also examined its prevalence among the broad population. In Experiment 1 (n = 2,558), we assessed whether younger people and females (i.e., greater social media users) are more sensitive to trypophobic stimuli, as predicted by the social media hypothesis. In Experiment 2 (n = 283), we examined whether sensitivity to trypophobic stimuli and rates of trypophobia is greater in people who are aware of the condition's existence, as opposed to those who have never heard of the phenomenon. In line with the social media theory, results showed that younger people and females are indeed more susceptible to trypophobia. However, 24% of trypophobic individuals have never heard of the condition. Overall, these data suggest that both social learning and non-social learning contribute to trypophobia. We also find that the prevalence of trypophobia is approximately 10%. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Family physicians can communicate to patients the risk of adverse drug reactions using words or numbers, and this format has important implications for patients' ability to make informed decisions. The present study (a) assessed which formats family physicians preferred to communicate the risk of a given side effect, (b) tested whether the severity of this adverse drug reaction affected this preference, and (c) investigated the type of quantifiers physicians preferred to use in general (e.g., ratios, percentages). In a format selection task, a sample of 131 family physicians reported that they mostly use words to communicate to patients the risk of mild and severe adverse drug reactions, but the verbal preference was weaker for severe adverse drug reactions. The quantifier selection task showed that the most common quantifiers were verbal frequencies and verbal probabilities. Family physicians and patients should be aware of the implications of this preference.

The psychological consequences of prosocial behavior depend on people's perceptions of their own volition. Building on this, we hypothesized that people who donate increase their volition and the benefits of donations by judging donation requests as polite (non‐coercive), whereas non‐donors reduce their volition and the drawback of refusing to donate by judging the request as less polite (too coercive). Three weeks after providing baseline politeness judgments about a fundraising request, participants re‐evaluated the same request as potential donors (experimental group) or observers (control group) and reported how they felt (Ntime1 = 605, Ntime2 = 294). Relative to past perceptions, donors judged the request as more polite than control participants. Non‐donors redefined the request as less polite than donors, but not less than control participants. Both donors and non‐donors benefited from redefining the request as more polite. We discuss how altering one's perception of a request is a multi‐purpose self‐serving cognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Past work showed a tendency to associate verbal probabilities (e.g., possible, unlikely) with extreme quantitative outcomes, and to over-estimate the outcomes' probability of occurrence. In the first four experiments (Experiment 1, Experiments 2a–c), we tested whether this "extremity effect" reflects a general preference for extreme (vs central or less extreme) values of a distribution. Participants made predictions based on a frequency distribution in two scenarios. We did not find a preference for extreme outcomes. Instead, most of the participants made a prediction about the middle, most frequent outcome of the distribution (i.e., the modal outcome), but still over-estimated the outcomes' probabilities. In Experiment 3, we tested whether the over-estimation could be better explained by an "at least"/"at most" reading of the predictions. We found that only a minority of participants interpreted predictions as the lower/upper bounds of an open interval and that these interpretations were not associated with heightened probability estimates. In the final three experiments (Experiments 4a–c), we tested whether participants perceived extreme outcome predictions as more correct, useful and interesting than modal outcome predictions. We found that extreme and modal predictions were considered equally correct, but modal predictions were judged most useful, whereas extreme predictions were judged to be more interesting. Overall, our results indicate that the preference for extreme outcomes is limited to specific verbal probability expressions, whereas the over-estimation of the probability of quantitative outcomes may be more general than anticipated and applies to non-extreme values as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: How health workers frame their communication about vaccines' probability of adverse side effects could play an important role in people's intentions to be vaccinated (e.g., positive frame: side effects are unlikely v. negative frame: there is a chance of side effects). Based on the pragmatic account of framing as implicit advice, we expected that participants would report greater vaccination intentions when a trustworthy physician framed the risks positively (v. negatively), but we expected this effect would be reduced or reversed when the physician was untrustworthy. Design: In 4 online experiments (n = 191, snowball sampling and n = 453, 451, and 464 UK residents via Prolific; Mage≈ 34 y, 70% women, 84% White British), we manipulated the trustworthiness of a physician and how they framed the risk of adverse side effects in a scenario (i.e., a chance v. unlikely adverse side effects). Participants reported their vaccination intention, their level of distrust in health care systems, and COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs. Results: Physicians who were trustworthy (v. untrustworthy) consistently led to an increase in vaccination intention, but the way they described adverse side effects mattered too. A positive framing of the risks given by a trustworthy physician consistently led to increased vaccination intention relative to a negative framing, but framing had no effect or the opposite effect when given by an untrustworthy physician. The exception to this trend occurred in unvaccinated individuals in experiment 3, following serious concerns about one of the COVID vaccines. In that study, unvaccinated participants responded more favorably to the negative framing of the trustworthy physician. Conclusions: Trusted sources should use positive framing to foster vaccination acceptance. However, in a situation of heightened fears, a negative framing—attracting more attention to the risks—might be more effective. Highlights: How health workers frame their communication about a vaccine's probability of adverse side effects plays an important role in people's intentions to be vaccinated. In 4 experiments, we manipulated the trustworthiness of a physician and how the physician framed the risk of adverse side effects of a COVID vaccine. Positive framing given by a trustworthy physician promoted vaccination intention but had null effect or did backfire when given by an untrustworthy physician. The effect occurred over and above participants' attitude toward the health care system, risk perceptions, and beliefs in COVID misinformation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on verbal probabilities has shown that "unlikely" or "improbable" events are believed to correspond to numerical probability values between 10% and 30%. However, building on a pragmatic approach of verbal probabilities and a new methodology, the present paper shows that unlikely outcomes are most often associated with outcomes that have a 0% frequency of occurrence. Five studies provide evidence that when people complete or evaluate statements describing "improbable" outcomes, based on outcome distributions or expected ranges, they favor extraordinary outcomes that have not occurred in the original sample. For quantitative outcomes that can be ordered on a unipolar dimension, an improbable outcome is typically perceived as having a "higher" outcome value than those observed. Thus when battery life for a sample of laptop batteries is shown to range from 2.5 to 4.5 h, 5 or 6 h are considered better examples of "improbable" duration times than those that actually occur in 10% of the cases. Similarly, an "improbable" exam grade is one that has not yet been observed, rather than one that has been obtained by a small percentage of students. And when climate experts claim that a 100 cm increase in sea level by the year 2100 is "improbable", participants believe that the same experts' maximum estimates will be much lower. We conclude that judgments of what is improbable suggest outcomes beyond the expected range, rather than simply low frequency outcomes. These results are compatible with a causal (propensity) interpretation rather than a statistical (frequency) interpretation of probabilities. (Contains 2 tables and 3 figures.)

Why is it that sometimes people do not correct their reasoning errors? The dominating dual-process theories of reasoning detail how people (fail to) detect their reasoning errors but underspecify how people decide to correct these errors once they are detected. We have unpacked the motivational aspects of the correction process here, leveraging the research on cognitive control. Specifically, we argue that when people detect an error, they decide whether or not to correct it based on the overall expected value associated with the correction--combining perceived efficacy and the reward associated with the correction while considering the cost of effort. Using a modified two-response paradigm, participants solved cognitive reflection problems twice while we manipulated the factors defining the expected value associated with correction at the second stage. In five experiments (N = 5,908), we found that answer feedback and reward increased the probability of correction while cost decreased it, relative to the control groups. These cognitive control critical factors affected the decisions to correct reasoning errors (Experiments 2 and 3) and the corrective reasoning itself (Experiments 1, 4 and 5) across a range of problems, feedbacks, types of errors (reflective or intuitive), and cost and reward manipulations pre-tested and checked in five separate studies (N= 951). Thus, some people did not correct their epistemically irrational reasoning errors because they followed the instrumentally rational principle of the expected value maximization: They were rationally irrational. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research has shown that when people combine verbal probabilistic forecasts from two sources, they are not simply averaged but can reinforce each other; so when two advisors both said an event was "rather likely," some listeners concluded that the event was "quite likely". Conversely, when both said the event was "rather unlikely," people concluded that it was "quite unlikely." The present studies demonstrate that the direction of this effect is not evoked by high versus low probabilities, but by the directionality of verbal probability expressions. Some phrases are affirmative, directed towards occurrences ("there is a chance"), whereas others are negations, pointing to the possibility that the event might not occur ("it is not certain"). Two positive phrases are perceived to reinforce each other, even when they convey low probabilities, resulting in a higher combined probability estimate, whereas two negative phrases do the opposite, regardless of the probabilities they convey. We show that this effect occurs both for equal and unequal verbal phrases, regardless of the probability equivalents of the expressions. We also found a positive, but weaker, reinforcement effect of numerical probabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inspired by similar methods shown to be effective in reducing online racist harassment, we designed two tweets aimed at reducing online gender harassment. Our interventions were based on the principles of social re-norming and appealing to harassers' empathy. In a sample of 666 Twitter users engaging in sexist or misogynist tweeting, we found that our intervention tweets did not reduce the number of sexist slurs or sexist users, either 7 days or 31 days after being sent. Our attempts also affected neither the valence nor the arousal of subsequent tweets posted by our sample of Twitter users. We discuss the conceptual, methodological, and ethical challenges associated with activist research aimed at reducing online gender harassment and discuss some of the implications of our attempts to do so. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To tackle antibiotic resistance, an unfolding global public health threat, we need to better understand why people expect antibiotics for self-limiting infections because this drives unnecessary consumption of antibiotics. Here, we used a utility-based signal detection theory to explain how people form these expectations by considering their diagnostic uncertainty (e.g., "Is this a bacterial infection?") and the expected utility they associate with their decisions (e.g., "What are the costs of taking antibiotics?"). To test the explanation, we created two types of interventions--focusing on reducing diagnostic uncertainty and increasing the saliency of costs of overuse (to self and others)--to lower inappropriate expectations of antibiotics. In two preregistered vignette-based experiments (N = 1,773; general U.K. adult population), both types of interventions decreased expectations and intentions to request antibiotics compared with a baseline group. We discuss how the theory can inform public health campaigns and stimulate further research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The attribute framing effect, where people judge a quantity of an item more positively with a positively described attribute (e.g., "75% lean") than its negative, albeit normatively equivalent description (e.g., "25% fat"), is a robust phenomenon, which may be moderated under certain conditions. In this paper, we investigated the moderating effect of the characteristics of the quantifier term: its format (verbal, e.g., "high," or numerical, e.g., "75%") and magnitude (i.e., if it is a small or large quantity) using positive or negative synonyms of attributes (e.g., energy vs. calories). Over five pre‐registered studies using a 2 (synonym, between‐subjects: positive or negative) × 2 (quantifier format, between‐subjects: verbal or numerical) × 2 (quantifier magnitude, within‐subjects: small or large) mixed design, we manipulated quantifier format and magnitude orthogonally for synonyms with differing valence. We also tested two mechanisms for the framing effect: whether the effect was mediated by the affect associated with the frame and whether participants inferred the speaker to be positive about the target. We found a framing effect with synonyms that was reversed in direction for the small (vs. large) quantifiers, but not significantly moderated by quantifier format. Both the affect associated with the frame and the inferred level of speaker positivity partially mediated the framing effect, and the level of mediation varied with quantifier magnitude. These results suggest that the magnitude of the quantifier modifies one's evaluation of the frame, and the mechanism for people's evaluations in a framing situation may differ for small and large quantifiers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We tested the link between COVID‐19 conspiracy theories and health protective behaviours in three studies: one at the onset of the pandemic in the United Kingdom (UK), a second just before the first national lockdown, and a third during that lockdown (N = 302, 404 and 399). We focused on conspiracy theories that did not deny the existence of COVID‐19 and evaluated the extent to which they predicted a range of health protective behaviours, before and after controlling for psychological and sociodemographic characteristics associated with conspiracy theory belief. COVID‐19 conspiracy beliefs were positively correlated with beliefs in other unrelated conspiracies and a general conspiracy mind‐set, and negatively correlated with trust in government and a tendency towards analytical thinking (vs. intuitive thinking). Unexpectedly, COVID‐19 conspiracy believers adhered to basic health guidelines and advanced health protective measures as strictly as non‐believers. Conspiracy believers were, however, less willing to install the contact‐tracing app, get tested for and vaccinated against COVID‐19, and were more likely to share COVID‐19 misinformation—all of which might undermine public health initiatives. Study 3 showed conspiracy theory believers were less willing to undertake health protective behaviours that were outside of their personal control, perceiving these as having a negative balance of risks and benefits. We discuss models explaining conspiracy beliefs and health protective behaviours, and suggest practical recommendations for public health initiatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People often expect antibiotics when they are clinically inappropriate (e.g., for viral infections). This contributes significantly to physicians' decisions to prescribe antibiotics when they are clinically inappropriate, causing harm to the individual and to society. In two pre‐registered studies employing UK general population samples (n1 = 402; n2 = 190), we evaluated the relationship between knowledge and beliefs with antibiotic expectations, and the effects of information provision on such expectations. We conducted a correlational study (study 1), in which we examined the role of antibiotic knowledge and beliefs and an experiment (study 2) in which we assessed the causal effect of information provision on antibiotic expectations. In study 1, we found that both knowledge and beliefs about antibiotics predicted antibiotic expectations. In study 2, a 2 (viral information: present vs. absent) × 2 (antibiotic information: present vs. absent) experimental between‐subjects design, information about antibiotic efficacy significantly reduced expectations for antibiotics, but viral aetiology information did not. Providing antibiotic information substantially diminishes inappropriate expectations of antibiotics. Health campaigns might also aim to change social attitudes and normative beliefs, since more complex sociocognitive processes underpin inappropriate expectations for antibiotics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When people are given quantified information (e.g., 'there is a 60% chance of rain'), the format of quantifiers (i.e., numerical: 'a 60% chance' vs. verbal: 'it is likely') might affect their decisions. Previous studies with indirect cues of judgements and decisions (e.g., response times, decision outcomes) give inconsistent findings that could support either a more intuitive process for verbal than numerical quantifiers or a greater focus on the context (e.g., rain) for verbal than numerical quantifiers. We used two pre-registered eye-tracking experiments (n(1) = 148, n(2) = 133) to investigate decision-making processes with verbal and numerical quantifiers. Participants evaluated multiple verbally or numerically quantified nutrition labels (Experiment 1) and weather forecasts (Experiment 2) with different context valence (positive or negative), and quantities ('low', 'medium', or 'high' in Experiment 1 and 'possible', 'likely', or 'very likely' in Experiment 2) presented in a fully within-subjects design. Participants looked longer at verbal than numerical quantifiers, and longer at the contextual information with verbal quantifiers. Quantifier format also affected judgements and decisions: in Experiment 1, participants judged positive labels to be better in the verbal compared to the equivalent numerical condition (and to be worse for negative labels). In Experiment 2, participants decided on rain protection more for a verbal forecast of rain than the equivalent numerical forecast. The results fit the explanation that verbal quantifiers put more focus on the informational context than do numerical quantifiers, rather than prompting more intuitive decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mothers who work and identify as feminists have been thrust into a new ”COVID‐19 normal,” finding themselves taking on roles that are “at odds” with their feminist identity (i.e., the bulk of more “traditional” stay‐at‐home parenting, homeschooling, and domestic chores), while simultaneously navigating the expectations of neoliberal careerism embedded within female emancipation discourses that have been so hard‐won. In this piece, we draw on critical femininities to highlight how these identities are embedded in several push–pull discourses that simultaneously resonate and discord, and show that these understandings are difficult to detangle from neoliberal social constructions and expectations that have women selfpolicing even their inner psyche lest we become “bad” feminists. Furthermore, we acknowledge how our sensemaking in this paper and our experiences are rooted in (and limited by) the socioeconomic privileges of being western white middle‐class cis‐gender women in predominantly non‐precarious positions—indeed, mothers who work are not a homogenous group and the many different voices reflect different levels of job security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The cognitive reflection test (CRT) became popular for its impressive power to predict how well people reason and make decisions. Despite the popularity of the CRT, a major issue complicates its interpretation: The numerical nature of the CRT confounds reflection ability with mathematical ability. We have addressed this issue by developing the verbal CRT (CRT‐V), a novel 10‐item measure of cognitive reflection (https://osf.io/xehbv/), using nonmathematical problems with good statistical and psychometric properties and with low familiarity. First, we selected suitable items with relatively low familiarity and optimal difficulty as identified in two different populations (Studies 1 and 2) and with high content validity as judged by an expert panel (Study 3). Second, we demonstrated good criterion and construct validity for the test in different populations with a wide range of variables (Studies 4–6, 8) and a good internal consistency (Studies 4–8) and test–retest reliability (Study 7). The CRT‐V was less associated with math anxiety, objective and subjective numeracy than the original CRT, and it was test equivalent across gender, age groups and administration setting. In contrast with the original CRT (Hedge's g = 0.29, 95% confidence interval [CI] [0.17, 0.40]), the CRT‐V showed no gender differences (Hedge's g = −0.06, 95% CI [−0.18, 0.06]). The CRT‐V can complement existing, numerical, tests of cognitive reflection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Past research suggests that people process verbal quantifiers differently from numerical ones, but this suggestion has yet to be formally tested. Drawing from traditional correlates of dual-process theories, we investigated whether people process verbal quantifiers faster, less accurately, and with less subjective effort than numerical quantifiers. In two pre-registered experiments, participants decided whether a quantity (either verbal or numerical) of a nutrient, summed with a pictorial quantity, exceeded a recommended total. The verbal quantifiers were matched to average numerical translations (Experiment 1) as well as translations from participants themselves (Experiment 2). Across experiments, participants did not answer faster or find verbal quantifiers less effortful than numerical ones, but they made less accurate decisions on average with verbal quantifiers because they used more context-based decision shortcuts (e.g., 'minerals are healthy'). Our findings suggest that it is how much people rely on context that distinguishes their decisions with verbal and numerical quantifiers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior research has suggested that perceptual disfluency activates analytical processing and increases the solution rate of mathematical problems with appealing but incorrect answers (i.e., the Cognitive Reflection Test, hereafter CRT). However, a recent meta-analysis does not support such a conclusion. We tested here whether insufficient numerical ability can account for this discrepancy. We found strong evidence against the disfluency effect on the problem-solving rate for the Numerical CRT problems regardless of participants' numeracy and for the Verbal CRT non-math problems (n = 310, Exp. 1) even though simple instructions to pay attention to and reflect upon the Verbal CRT problems substantially increased their solution rate (n = 311, Exp. 2). The updated meta-analysis (k = 18) yielded close-to-zero effect, Hedge's g = −0.01, 95% CI[-0.05, 0.03] and decisive evidence against the disfluency effect on math problems, BF0+ = 151.6. Thus, perceptual disfluency does not activate analytical processing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Exposure to the natural environment is increasingly considered to benefit psychological health. Recent reports in the literature also suggest that outdoor exposure that includes recreational pursuits such as surfing or fishing coupled with opportunities for social interaction with peers may be beneficial to Armed Forces Veterans experiencing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Two studies were conducted to evaluate this possibility. In particular, these studies aimed to test the hypothesis that a brief group outdoor activity would decrease participants' symptoms as assessed by established measures of PTSD, depression, anxiety and perceived stress, and increase participants' sense of general social functioning and psychological growth. Experiment one employed a repeated measures design in which UK men and women military veterans with PTSD (N = 30) participated in a group outdoor activity (angling, equine care, or archery and falconry combined). Psychological measures were taken at 2 weeks prior, 2 weeks post, and at 4 month follow up. We obtained a significant within participant main effect indicating significant reduction in PTSD symptoms. Experiment two was a waitlist controlled randomised experiment employing an angling experience (N = 18) and 2 week follow up. In experiment 2 the predicted interaction of Group (Experimental vs. Waitlist Control) X Time (2 weeks pre vs. 2 weeks post) was obtained indicating that the experience resulted in significant reduction in PTSD symptoms relative to waitlist controls. The effect size was large. Additional analyses confirmed that the observed effects might also be considered clinically significant and reliable. In sum, peer outdoor experiences are beneficial and offer potential to complement existing provision for military veterans with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. Trial registration: The authors confirm that all ongoing and related trials for this intervention are registered. The studies reported in this manuscript are registered as clinical trials at ISRCTN: Pilot ID– ISRCTN15325073 RCT ID– ISRCTN59395217 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is among the most common and well‐known instruments for measuring the propensity to engage reflective processing, in the context of the dual‐process theory of high‐level cognition. There is robust evidence that men perform better than women on this test—but we should be wary to conclude that men are more likely to engage in reflective processing than women. We consider several possible loci for the gender difference in CRT performance, and use mathematical modeling to show, across two studies, that the gender difference in CRT performance is more likely due to women making more mathematical mistakes (partially explained by their greater mathematics anxiety) than due to women being less likely to engage reflective processing. As a result, we argue that we need to use gender‐equivalent variants of the CRT, both to improve the quality of our instruments and to fulfill our social responsibility as scientists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectives To reduce overprescribing, health campaigns urge physicians to provide people with information regarding appropriate antibiotic use and encourage the public to trust their physicians' prescribing decisions. We test (1) whether providing individuals with complete information about the viral aetiology of an illness and the ineffectiveness of antibiotics will reduce inappropriate antibiotic expectations, (2) whether individuals with greater trust in their physician will have lower expectations, and (3) whether individuals with greater trust in their physician will benefit more from the complete information provision and have lower expectations. Design Experiment 1 features a between-subjects design (information provision: baseline vs. complete information) with a general measure of participants' trust in their physician. Experiment 2 features a 2 (physician trustworthiness: low vs. high) × 2 (information provision: baseline vs. complete information) between-subjects design. Methods In Experiment 1, participants (n = 366) reported their trust in their physician, read a vignette describing a hypothetical consultation with a physician for a viral cold and then expressed their expectations for antibiotics. In Experiment 2, participants (n = 380) read a vignette of a consultation with a physician for a viral ear infection then expressed their expectations for antibiotics. Results In both experiments, the provision of complete information significantly reduced inappropriate expectations for antibiotics. Greater trust in physicians was associated with higher antibiotic expectations in Experiment 1, but lower expectations in Experiment 2. In both experiments, trust in physicians appeared to facilitate the effect of information provision, but this effect was weak and inconsistent. Conclusion Providing information about viral aetiology and the ineffectiveness and side effects of antibiotics reduces inappropriate antibiotic expectations. Further research into the effect of trust in physicians as a moderator of the effect information provision is required, particularly given the recent increase in trust-based antibiotic campaigns. Statement of contribution What is already known Inappropriate expectations for antibiotics encourage overprescribing in primary care. To reduce inappropriate expectations, interventions often aim to educate people about antibiotics and encourage them to trust their physician. What does this study add Causal evidence that clinical information provision reduces but does not eliminate inappropriate antibiotic expectations. We find that increased trust in physicians is not always associated with lower expectations for antibiotics. Although increased trust seemed to boost the effect of information provision, this effect was weak and inconsistent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Verbal and numerical formats (e.g., verbal: "low fat," or numerical: "20% fat") are used interchangeably to communicate nutritional information. However, prior research implies that verbal quantifiers are processed more intuitively than numerical ones. We tested this hypothesis in two pre-registered experiments measuring four indicators of processing style: (a) response time, (b) decision performance, (c) reliance on irrelevant contextual information, which we inferred from participants' decision patterns, and (d) the level of interference from a concurrent memory task. Participants imagined they had consumed a given amount of a nutrient (represented in a pie chart) and decided whether a new quantity (either verbal or numerical) could be eaten within their guideline daily amount (GDA). The experiments used a mixed design varying format (verbal or numerical), concurrent memory load (no load, easy, and hard load in Experiment 1; no load and hard load in Experiment 2), nutrient (fat and minerals), quantity (low, medium, and high in Experiment 1; low and high in Experiment 2), and the assigned correct response for a trial (within and exceeding limits). Participants were faster and made fewer correct decisions with verbal quantifiers, and they relied more on contextual information (i.e., the identity of the nutrient involved). However, memory load did not impair decisions with verbal or numerical quantifiers. Altogether, these results suggest that verbal quantifiers are processed intuitively, slightly more so than numerical quantifiers, but that numerical quantifiers do not require much analytical processing to reach simple decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We extend research on charity donations by exploring an everyday tactic for increasing compliance: asking politely. We consider three possible effects of politeness on charity donations: a positive effect, a negative effect, and a wiggle‐room effect where the perception of the request is adjusted to decline donating without feeling selfish. Results from six experiments systematically supported the polite wiggle‐room effect. In hypothetical donations contexts, indirect requests were judged more polite. In real donation contexts, though, indirect requests were not judged as more polite and had no consistent effect on donation decision. Rather, the decision to donate predicted the perceived politeness of the request, independently of its phrasing. Experiment 4 provided causal evidence that participants justified their donation decisions by adjusting their perception of the request. The polite wiggle‐room effect has important implications for organizations that seek to increase compliance while maintaining a positive image. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior research found that "1-in-X" ratios led to higher and less accurate subjective probability than "N-in-X*N" ratios or other formats, even though they featured the same mathematical information. It is unclear, however, whether the effect transfers into health decisions, and the practical significance of the effect is undetermined. Based on previous findings and risk communication theories, we hypothesized that the 1-in-X effect would occur and transfer into relevant decisions. We also tested whether age, gender, and education differences would moderate the 1-in-X effect on decision making. We conducted 3 well-powered experiments (n = 1912) using a sample from the general adult UK population to test our hypotheses, estimated the effect, and excluded a possible methodological explanation for such a transfer. In hypothetical scenarios, participants decided whether to travel to Kenya given the chance of contracting malaria (experiment 1) and whether to take recommended steroids given the side effects (experiments 2 and 3). Across the experiments, we replicated a small to medium 1-in-X effect on the perceived probability (Hedge's g = −0.36; 95% confidence interval [CI], −0.47 to −0.24; z = −6.18; P < 0.001) and found a small effect on subsequent decisions (odds ratio = 1.32; 95% CI, 1.10−1.59; z = 2.99; P = 0.003). The perceived probability fully mediated the effect of the ratio format on decision. Age, gender, and education did not moderate the 1-in-X effect on decision. We argue that a high prevalence of 1-in-X ratios in medical communication makes these small changes clinically relevant. Therefore, to communicate information accurately, 1-in-X ratios should not be used or at least used cautiously in medical communication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: The study examined two components of consumer understanding of food energy information: understanding the concept of energy and its quantity. Using this new framework, we investigated whether activity-equivalent labels facilitated interpretations of food energy compared with calorie labels and whether an image format would strengthen this facilitative effect compared with text.Design: We assessed the effect of energy representation and format in a 2 (activity v. calories)×2 (image v. text) between-subjects design. Conceptual understanding of energy was measured in terms of level of understanding and personal engagement. Quantitative understanding was measured in terms of participants' estimations of a food's contribution to their recommended daily intake and perceptions of energy values as precise or single-bound interval estimates.Setting: The experiment was conducted online through Qualtrics.Subjects: Eight hundred and twelve participants (55 % female, age range 18-74 years) were recruited through a national survey panel in the UK.Results: Participants were twice more likely to have a stronger conceptual understanding of energy and four times more likely to personally engage with activity labels v. calorie labels. Participants did not differ across labels in their estimations of energy quantities; however, they inferred quantities to mean exactly the stated number of calories, but at least the stated activity duration. There were no added benefits in presenting an image over the text format.Conclusions: Activity labels can facilitate conceptual understanding of energy, but may be subject to quantitative misinterpretations. Nutrition communication should consider what people infer from quantities represented on labels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]