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Copyright of Public Administration Review is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Moderne Staat is the property of Verlag Barbara Budrich GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Research on policy advisory systems has rapidly proliferated over the last decade and now focuses on advisory system change dynamics. Yet, empirical studies predominantly focus on the study of policy advisory systems in Westminster systems and it is those studies upon which theorization relies. This paper argues that this Westminster-prevalence resulted in a Westminster-bias of our understanding of policy advisory systems and directs attention to more abstract or general analytical dimensions that may be relevant for the comparative study of policy advisory systems and research on advice systems in transitional and developing countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This article studies the perception of the EU Commission's Secretariat General in policy‐making. Recently, research on EU institutions devotes increasing attention to analyzing structures and procedures of decision‐making in EU institutions, most notably the EU Commission. Conventionally, the EU Commission is portrayed as a fragmented organization, divided along the lines of staff nationality, sectoral responsibilities and cabinets and General Directorates (DGs). The Secretariat General has long been viewed a weak actor that is hardly able or motivated to steer internal decision‐making. However, recent research indicates a changing role of the Secretariat General as a pro‐active broker and last arbiter. This article studies how the Secretariat General is perceived by the DGs in policy coordination and argues that this perception depends on the pattern of political authority, bureaucratic roles and the relevance and the alternatives prevailing in the policy field. The article is based on data from a survey among Commission officials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By investigating two German inter-departmental committees, this article shows that the policy output of these coordination bodies depends on the specific institutional logic evoked throughout the coordination process. While in one of the groups a policy logic prevailed and a joint coordination output was achieved, the other was dominated by a political logic and proved unable to achieve agreement. The article contributes to research on government coordination by showing that actor orientations are crucial for explaining inter-organizational coordination. The results direct attention to the behavioural implications of coordination structures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ministerial advisers are said to strengthen the political control of bureaucracy. Using a comparative case design, this article investigates this claim by studying the roles of ministerial advisers in government coordination in Denmark and Sweden. The article demonstrates how the roles of advisers differ in coordination: Swedish advisers directly control government coordination through hierarchical authority. The roles of advisers and bureaucrats are functionally differentiated in coordination. In contrast, Danish advisers play a more indirect role in coordination. Rather than controlling coordination, they serve to reproduce the functional politicization of the permanent bureaucracy in government coordination. The findings underline the relevance of including advisers in the future study of government coordination. The analysis is based on 48 interviews with advisers and top civil servants in Denmark and Sweden. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ministers increasingly rely on advisers for support and advice. In many countries, these political aides are labelled differently. Generally, they serve as close confidants to their political masters and operate in the 'shadowland' between politics and bureaucracy. Scholarship has dragged the ministerial advisers out of the dark and described their background and functions. Still, the field of scholarship has a Westminster bias, is characterized by single case studies, and remains under-theorized. The lack of comparative focus and theoretical underpinnings can be explained by the complex nature of ministerial advisers. This introductory article suggests a definition for ministerial advisers and reviews the extant literature on these important actors. The main argument is that the extent and relevance of ministerial advisers in executive government merits integration into mainstream public administration and political science theory and research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Moderne Staat is the property of Verlag Barbara Budrich GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Through an analysis of climate policy-making in the European Commission (EU), this article argues that co-ordination in the Commission displays the same characteristics as the co-ordination across ministries in central governments, i.e., the properties of negative co-ordination. The article is based on a survey among Commission officials. Overall, the article reveals that a public administration perspective on the Commission proves invaluable to gain insights on how decisions are made at the European Union level. The article contributes to the emerging literature viewing the Commission as an ordinary bureaucracy – as opposed to a unique supranational organization. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Although politicization is a perennial research topic in public administration to investigate relationships between ministers and civil servants, the concept still lacks clarification. This article contributes to this literature by systematically identifying different conceptualizations of politicization and suggests a typology including three politicization mechanisms to strengthen the political responsiveness of the ministerial bureaucracy: formal, functional and administrative politicization. The typology is empirically validated through a comparative case analysis of politicization mechanisms in Germany, Belgium, the UK and Denmark. The empirical analysis further refines the general idea of Western democracies becoming ‘simply’ more politicized, by illustrating how some politicization mechanisms do not continue to increase, but stabilize – at least for the time being. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Research in public administration and public policy is remarkably split between institutional approaches and policy analytical approaches. Whereas institutional approaches, most often in (comparative) public administration, identify features of politico-administrative systems to account for policy-making such as politicization or the role of the centre, policy perspectives explain policy-making by factors related to the respective policy domain, e.g. frames or agenda-setting. This divide becomes crucial in the analysis of policy advice. On the one hand, advisory systems are affected by features of politico-administrative systems because bureaucrats represent important sources of advice to ministers. On the other hand, advisory systems also vary across policy domains. The paper aims to reconcile the two approaches by analyzing the constitution of policy advisory systems as affected by both institutional and policy factors. The article argues that the composition and role of advisory systems and their components basically depend upon how the problem structure of a given policy domain prompts the involved actors to use the institutional context to impose their specific problem perception, and hence to determine the relevant knowledge in policy advice. Hence, the paper focuses on the question which institutional and policy-level factors affect the constitution of the policy advisory system in climate policy-making in German federal government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]