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The article discusses the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and its impact on international political discourse. While R2P has been hailed as revolutionary by some and criticized as a tool of Western imperialism by others, the author argues that it has had little effect on state behavior. Despite this, R2P has gained traction in international debates and has been supported by various organizations. However, the author contends that the support for R2P is largely symbolic and lacks consensus among governments. The article also examines specific cases, such as the violence against the Rohingya in Myanmar, to highlight the gap between affirmations of R2P and actual action taken. Overall, the author suggests that R2P is a superficial slogan rather than a meaningful concept. [Extracted from the article]

'Imperial overstretch' and the role played by related ideational issues derived from particular liberal tenets and the United States' belief in its 'manifest destiny' to lead the world have been regularly cited as explanations for why the United States' ambitious project to transform the world in the post–Cold War era failed. In this article, I argue that these analyses have overlooked a crucial causal factor that also impelled the United States to undertake its ultimately doomed project: hope. I demonstrate that analyses of hope's influence have found that while hope can exert a positive influence, it can also – if irrational – induce self-destructive behaviour. During the period of unipolarity, the United States repeatedly advanced teleological visions of a bright future for humanity routinely infused with the language of hope. I demonstrate that hope was, however, more than just a discursive device; it was itself a catalyst for the United States' actions. I argue that a confluence of factors at the end of the Cold War aligned to impel the rapid emergence of a particular variant of hope – defined as 'wilful hope' – which inspired the United States to act as it did. I demonstrate how this disposition was evident in the rhetoric employed by both Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush but also – more importantly – in the strategies they each implemented. Ultimately, this disposition played a crucial – though not exclusive – role in undermining international support for US leadership and precipitating the end of 'the unipolar moment'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we advance a framework that highlights the relational nature of rivalry emergence and its ongoing manifestations, before illustrating this framework in practice through an analysis of the rivalry between Serbs and Albanians over the issue of Kosovo. We argue that the locus of rivalry lies in the inherently social character of human desire and the destructive reciprocity elicited by human mimetic behaviour. The manner in which rivals portray their plight, and legitimise their cause, is, we argue, a function of their desire to acquire that which they imagine the other has. As such, rather than adhering to the conventional view that rivalries are characterised by difference, we argue that rivals share a set of common goals/desires. Thus, though rivalries are characterised by mutual antipathy – and the attendant devotion to constructing self-serving myths – this is but a superficial manifestation of an underlying mimetic dynamic. To focus only on how myths are constructed and instrumentally employed, is not sufficient when seeking to explain the persistence of rivalries. Rather, we must understand the underlying desires the respective rivals seek to fulfill through the proliferation of these myths if we are to truly understand the nature of the rivalry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

MOBILIZING THE WILL TO INTERVENE Leadership to Prevent Mass Atrocities Franck Chalk, Romeo Dallaire, Kyle Matthews, Carla Barqueiro and Simon Doyle Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010. 191pp, $14.99 [...]

Since 1999 international actors have presented Kosovo's problems as stemming exclusively from endogenous factors that locals cannot solve. International oversight is thus as essential and benign; the KSC is the latest initiative premised on this assumption. I argue, however, that the idea that international oversight is more efficient than local control is questionable given that since 1999 international judicial mechanisms have endured corruption, witness intimidation, and political interference. Additionally, the fact that the KSC's creation was driven by external actors has had a negative impact on its legitimacy amongst the general public within Kosovo; this will influence their response to its proceedings. Finally, I argue that those who supported the establishment of the KSC advanced a narrative that implies they were in no way culpable for the crimes committed between 1998–2000; in fact, both UNMIK and KFOR manifestly failed in their duty to provide security in Kosovo. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introduction to the special section argues that Kosovo is important to the West because it is considered to symbolise Western power and efficacy. The intervention, and subsequent statebuilding project, were less about Kosovo, and more about a determination to project a particular image of the West as both benevolent and powerful. Over the past twenty years, the clash between the motivations of the external actors and the aspirations of Kosovo's citizens have become more apparent catalysing a tension between the official Western narrative which presents Kosovo as a "success" and the reality on the ground. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The significance of Kosovo can only be understood by first situating the intervention in 1999 and the subsequent statebuilding process in a historical context. While there is a profound difference between 1999 and today, we should not conclude that this means the practice of humanitarian intervention has gone into decline as a result of waning western power. Decisions on intervention at that juncture, as indeed they are today. I conclude by arguing, however, that the theory and practice of statebuilding, has changed markedly since 1999; expectations as to the capacity of international administrations to transform post-conflict societies have declined markedly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The optimism that initially surrounded the "Arab Spring" has largely dissipated; the egregious violence in Syria, the post-intervention collapse in Libya, the humanitarian crisis in Yemen and the return of authoritarianism throughout the region have negated all the earlier talk of imminent "progress". These events have also cast a shadow over the purported efficacy of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm as originally recognised by the UN in 2005. Though often effusively heralded as both transformative and irresistible, the concept has proved unable to dissuade governments from committing atrocities against their own people, and impotent in the face of the Security Council's geopolitical machinations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article argues that the claims made about the success of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) to date and about its future cohere with international relations theorists E. H. Carr and Ken Booth's characterizations of utopianism.

The ‘Arab Spring' has catalysed an intense debate about the efficacy of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). These debates have primarily focused on Libya and Syria; in this article I argue that the international community’s engagement with Bahrain, though generally overlooked, also has major implications for assessments of the contemporary efficacy of R2P. This article provides a brief overview of the 2011 uprising in Bahrain and events since before assessing whether Bahrain constitutes an ‘R2P situation'. Having concluded that Bahrain does meet the ‘R2P situation' criteria I detail how key actors integral to the implementation of R2P have engaged with Bahrain. In analysing this engagement I argue that Bahrain demonstrates that the permanent five members of the Security Council continue to prioritise national interests over the protection of human rights; that NGOs specifically focused on R2P apply the concept selectively; that R2P has not become a ‘lens' through which intra-state humanitarian crises are viewed; and that states can avoid international censure by undertaking certain policies which enable them to violate R2P’s principles without incurring significant costs. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The efficacy of the Responsibility to Prevent suffers from two key problems; causal indeterminacy, and a dependence on the political will of states, particularly the permanent five members of the Security Council. The vast array of factors which can be cited as potentially contributing to the outbreak of conflict and atrocity crimes mitigates against the determination of definite "conflict triggers". This does not mean prevention is impossible but does limit the efficacy of "early warning systems". The dynamics of the "four crimes" within R2P's purview further limits the efficacy of prevention as the decision to engage in mass atrocities is taken in response to a perceived existential crisis. This significantly limits the scope for leveraging the "internal" aspect of R2P as the decision to commit these acts is invariably born from a belief that no other option is available to the potential aggressors. Thus the specifics of atrocity crime prevention places great emphasis on the operationalisation of the external dimension of R2P, namely the role of the international community. So long as the response of the "international community" is predicated on the political will of states, however, the efficacy of prevention in these areas will be limited, as the "international" response is prey to narrowly defined national interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I argue that the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has sanitized much of the revolutionary potential of human security. While R2P has not subsumed human security—the latter arguably involves a broader array of issues and themes which continue to be discussed—it has come to dominate the debate on the protection of human rights and, specifically, preventing and responding to mass atrocities. Whereas human security, in its early inception, constituted a challenge to the state-centric nature of the international system, R2P maintains the systemic status quo and treats states—and the state-based nature of the United Nations (UN)—as unalterable constants. While R2P is propelled largely by non-states actors, the strategic calculus focuses on altering the behaviour of states—a strategy I consider naïve and/or hubristic—rather than reforming the state-based system in a way which coheres with the original human security approach of empowering individuals at the expense of states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I challenge the argument presented by Tim Dunne and Katherine Gelber in 'Arguing Matters: The Responsibility to Protect and the Case of Libya' (Global Responsibility to Protect vol. 6, iss. 3, 2014). I argue that the evidence supplied by Dunne and Gelber to support their argument that the Responsibility to Protect played a role in the debate on the international response to the crisis in Libya is based on an unsustainable expansion of what constitutes RtoP language, fails to acknowledge the historical evolution of human rights-orientated discourse, and exaggerates the extent to which references were made to RtoP during the debates preceding Resolution 1973. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]