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PurposeThe article examines the impact of policy change on enterprise unit subsidies that took place in 2009 on the quantity demanded for crop insurance.Design/methodology/approachThe analysis covers corn, soybeans, and wheat that are grown in six economic regions and uses various measures of purchasing such as acres insured, unit structure, coverage levels, as well as crop hail use as proxies for the quantity demanded.The analysis first employs time series econometric tools to analyze whether the time path of the share of enterprise units within buyup acres is influenced by the policy change in enterprise unit subsidies. It then comparatively examines the insurance experience between 2008 (right before the change) and 2015 (well after the change).FindingsFor corn, soybean, and wheat, the analysis establishes that the time path of the share of enterprise units within buyup coverage acres is statistically and economically influenced by the intervention. The analysis further quantifies the intervention's immediate and long-term impacts and finds that farmers' unit choices are highly responsive (elastic) to subsidy rates in those units.Between 2008 and 2015, the insurance experience generally indicates that the share of enterprise units within buyup coverage surged, the share of acres under catastrophic coverage declined, and the share acres in high coverage levels increased. Meanwhile, growers have increasingly utilized crop-hail policies.Originality/valueThis appears to be the first study (1) quantifying the sensitivity of farmers' unit choices with respect to subsidy rates in those units and finding that such choices are actually highly responsive (elastic), and (2) pointing out the interaction between MPCI and crop-hail products and offering insights as to their combined use. The findings should be of considerable value to policymakers, academics, bankers, and producers in regards to the design and use of risk management tools.

Bu calismanin amaci, kamu kurumlarinda gosterilen liderlik tarzlarinin calisan ses verme davranisina etkisini arastirmaktir. Lider davranisinin calisanlar uzerindeki etkisinden yola cikilarak, liderlik tarzlarinin, calisan sesliligi uzerindeki etkisi arastirilmistir. Liderlik tarzlari; degisim odakli, iliski odakli ve gorev odakli liderlik tarzlari olarak, calisan sesliligi de kurumun gelisimi konusunda duygu, dusunce ve fikirlerin sozlu olarak dile getirilmesi olarak ifade edilmektedir. Arastirma iliskisel tarama modelindedir. Bir kamu kurumunun Ankara bolgesindeki birimlerinde gorevli 341 kamu calisanindan veri toplanmistir. Analiz sonucunda, calisan sesliligi ile gorev odakli liderlik tarzi arasinda pozitif yonde anlamli iliski bulunmus; degisim odakli ve iliski odakli liderlik tarzlari ile anlamli bir iliski bulunamamistir. Elde edilen bulgular sonuc bolumunde tartisilmistir.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to use simulation analysis to assess farmer choice between crop insurance and supplemental revenue options as proposed during development of the Agricultural Act of 2014. Design/methodology/approach – The certainty equivalent of wealth is used to rank farm choices and assess the effects of supplemental revenue options on the crop insurance plan and coverage level chosen by the producer under a range of farm attributes. The risk-reducing effectiveness of the select programs is also examined through their impact on the farm revenue distribution. The dependence structure of yield and prices is modeled by applying copula techniques on historical data. Findings – Farm program supplemental revenue programs generally have no effect on crop insurance choices. Crop insurance supplemental revenue programs typically reduce crop insurance coverage at high coverage levels. An individual plan of crop insurance combined with a supplemental revenue insurance plan may substitute for incumbent area crop insurance plans. Originality/value – The analysis provides insights into farmers’ possible choices by focussing on alternative crops and farm attributes and extensive scenarios, using current data, crop insurance plans and programs contained in the 2014 Farm Bill and related bills. The results should be of value to policy officials and producers in regards to the design and use of risk management tools.

We theoretically examine a farmer's optimal use of area and individual crop insurance when area and individual losses are positively but imperfectly correlated. If premium rates for both plans are actuarially fair,the farmer will demand full individual insurance and no area insurance. If area insurance is free and individual insurance is offered at an actuarially fair rate, area insurance replaces a portion of individual insurance demand. If individual insurance is offered as a wrap around the area plan at an actuarially fair rate and area insurance is free, the farmer will demand excess individual insurance and some area insurance. Copyright 2012, Oxford University Press.

Consistent with the rights and incentives provided by the Bayh–Dole Act of 1980, US universities have increased their involvement in patenting and licensing activities through their own technology transfer offices. Only a few US universities are obtaining large returns, however, whereas others are continuing with these activities despite negligible or negative returns. We assess the US universities’ potential to generate returns from licensing activities by modeling and estimating quantiles of the distribution of net licensing returns conditional on some of their structural characteristics. We find limited prospects for public universities without a medical school everywhere in their distribution. Other groups of universities (private, and public with a medical school) can expect better but still fairly modest returns. These findings call into question the appropriateness of the revenue-generating motive for the aggressive rate of patenting and licensing by US universities.

In patent race models, firms' noncooperatively chosen research projects typically display too much correlation. But when there are multiple intellectual property rights protection instruments, we find that the paths chosen in an R&D race can move towards the social optimum.