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Bringing the literature on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and state capitalism in conversation with studies on offshore financial centers (OFCs), this paper dissects the post-2000 internationalization of Russian SOE Gazprom via the OFC of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Not adhering to the conventional financial logics of private firms, nor exclusively following political orders of the Kremlin, Gazprom is one of the exemplary state-capital hybrids of the new state capitalism. Where Gazprom steadily increased Russia's geopolitical leverage over Europe's energy needs prior to the 2022 military invasion of Ukraine, we stress that "it takes two to tango", as the internationalization of Gazprom could not have occurred without active and passive help of capitalist states elsewhere. We argue that the Netherlands functions as a transnational capitalist state in the service of foreign capital, including state capital, with Amsterdam's corporate services providers having long provided the legal stepping stones and corporate respectability enabling Gazprom to expand internationally. In this sense, the prevalent "othering" of SOEs and state capital neglects how the global ascent of state capitalism could not have happened without dedicated assistance orchestrated in leading Western OFCs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The proposed 'Vertical Gas Corridor' is a project that will directly challenge Russia's last remaining major gas pipeline Bratstvo - Brotherhood (Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod route) into the heart of Europe. Bringing non-Russian gas into southern and central Europe via the Southern Gas Corridor has been a long-standing aim of the EU, regional EU member states, Turkey and gas producers as far afield as Central Asia and the Middle East, albeit with significantly differing agendas. Many projects, often grandiose, have been proposed over the years, often falling foul of the complex political and economic interests which crisscross the region. Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 provided yet another twist to this Levantine Great Game, creating both new impetus for supply diversification and new infrastructure options as the Kremlin's control over the pipelines originally built to bring gas west and south from Russia weakened. Now, under plans hatched by southeast and central European states, the region's growing gas interconnectivity could take another significant step forward, further weakening Russian gas Monopoly JSC Gazprom. The natural gas has only recently, since the 70s of the last century, turned into one of the main types of fuel. At the beginning of this century, about 88-90% of natural gas was delivered by gas pipelines under long-term economic contracts directly from a specific supplier to a specific customer, the rest - by tankers, in the form of liquefied gas (LNG). In 2021, global LNG imports, according to the report of the International LNG Importers Group (GIIGNL), increased by 4.5% compared to the previous year and reached 513.7 billion cubic meters (372.3 million tons). The group's research notes that in 2021, the LNG already accounts for about 40% of the global gas market, with the rest coming through gas pipelines. In 2021, about 73% of the LNG (375 billion cubic meters, or 271.8 million tons) was imported by Asian countries. In addition, only 36.6% of the world's LNG volume was sold on the spot market, i.e. in small lots, - the rest was sold through long-term contracts, thereby neglecting the market mechanism of free price formation. Due to the Russia-Ukraine war, the European Union's gas supply from Gazprom's pipelines was interrupted and Brussels is desperately looking for alternative routes. For the first time, the idea of such an alternative in the form of the "Trans-Caspian gas pipeline" was put forward by then US President Bill Clinton in 1996. However, due to the uncertainty of the status of the Caspian Sea and the lack of delimitation of its shelf boundaries, due to the conflicting position of Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkmenistan, this project was not implemented yet. After the annexation of Crimea in 2014 by Russia, the construction of one of the components of the "Southern Gas Corridor" (SGC) supported by the European Union - the "White Stream" gas pipeline and the liquefied gas project AGRI(LNG) initiated in 2007 - "Azerbaijan-Georgia-Ukraine-Romania-Hungary Interconnector" was postopned for an indefinite time. It should be noted that these were the most promising projects for Georgia and Azerbaijan, since both of them turned aside not only Russia, but also Turkey and, accordingly, neutralized its transit hegemony. This gas, passing through the SCP, was sent through the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline and the Trans-Adriatic (TAP), from Turkey to Europe as one EU's South Gas Corridor (SGC). The Russia-Ukraine war has disrupted global supply chains and weakened the world economy, but it provides a new opportunity for Azerbaijan. In particular, as the US and Europe impose sanctions on Russian oil and natural gas, Azerbaijan has a chance to increase gas exports through 2022 and in the coming years via the 3,500-kilometer Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), which runs through seven countries and supplies gas to southern Turkey. Azerbaijan currently supplies 10 billion cubic meters of gas to Europe and 6 billion cubic meters - to Turkey, through the SGC. To meet the growing demand of Europe, Azerbaijan is also developing two new gas fields and is open to investment to expand the capacity of the SGC, in particular, by installing additional compressor stations, it will be possible to double the gas flow. However, according to the Azerbaijani Ministry of Economy, "reduced investment" from Europe may slow down the country's efforts to increase supply. Therefore: -The role of the "Southern Gas Corridor" in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war, and, consequently, the transit importance of Georgia for the EU energy security will increase even more; - The "corridor" will provide the Caspian countries with new, increased opportunities for the export of energy resources to the world market and will have a significant impact on the security and stability of the region; The Vice Prime Minister, Minister of Economy of Georgia, Mr. Levan Davitashvili, stated at a briefing held on November 21, 2022 that the Georgian government is working on a project to supply gas from the Caspian Sea shore of Azerbaijan to Europe through Georgia. According to Mr. L. Davitashvili the project, in which Azerbaijan, Romania and Hungary also participate, already have been started in 2015 and provides for a plan by which "... gas will be liquefied on the territory of Georgia, and then it will be re-gasified in Romania." Unfortunately, this project was stopped and had no further development", he said, adding that "... Europe is especially interested in alternative sources of gas supply, when everyone is talking about diversification of energy supply. This project has gained special relevance this year". Mr. L. Davitashvili noted that the evaluation of the project and the infrastructure in the territory of Georgia-Azerbaijan is underway. "It won't happen in a day or a year," he said, adding that "...first, we need to depict a complete picture...then we need to formulate a detailed action plan...and start implementing this plan step by step, including attracting investments." At the same time Azerbaijan's oil is in decline, but gas is growing. The future of Azerbaijan and Georgia energy cooperation is with natural gas EU's SGC and the Black Sea LNG terminals.Special attention should be paid to the prospects of supplying liquefied natural gas from Azerbaijan via Kulevi, Georgia to Romania from the SOCAR's BST Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Perm Krai and the socio-political processes taking place in it are in many ways typical of Russia, and therefore of interest to a wide audience of researchers and political analysts. Based on the theoretical constructions of international elites studies and the Perm School of Political Science and elitology, we study the political and business elites of the region, their political behavior, aspects of identity, as well as the most politically sensitive topics in the life of the region. Relying primarily on the literature analysis and subsequent own semi-standardized in-depth interviews (N10) with representatives of regional elites - the following results were obtained. The identity of the elites and everymen in Perm region is somewhat vague, associated with the neutral notion of geographical region of the Kama region. Liberalism in the economic sphere and a relatively stable inter-elite consensus in the political sphere, based on technocracy, are characteristic of the region’s policy for some decades. The region is characterized by a low socio-political dynamics compared to the benchmark regions of the Urals and Siberia, due to lack of regionally oriented elites and businesses and the predominance of various kinds of “Varangians” in the political class. The socio-political and cultural landscape of the region (the Perm Cultural Project) becomes a starting place and a source of supplies for the elites, receiving back very little. Thus, the region remains a promising project that cannot be realized in any way.

Observers tend to interpret the contemporary Sino-Russian relationship in terms of strategic, purposeful cooperation driven by national interests and power-political considerations. The search for power and security, as well as balancing against the United States, have increasingly been pushing China and Russia closer together. The energy realm offers a distinct picture of the Sino-Russian relationship. The pace of cooperation has varied and depended on key domestic players in particular sectors. As a consequence, success stories have been accompanied by major setbacks. Energy cooperation encompasses both a meteoric rise of oil cooperation and the muddling through of gas cooperation. The foundations for close ties in the energy realm were laid well before the post-Crimean acceleration of Sino-Russian cooperation. More often than not, however, parochial interests of dominant state-owned and private enterprises rather than strategic considerations have driven this cooperation. Looking through the prism of energy cooperation, I emphasize the complexity of Russia and China as actors in international politics instead of approaching them as rational and unitary players. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prices of natural gas, coal, and electricity have risen to the highest level of the last ten years in the last quarter of 2021. It's possible to express that energy prices in 2021 were much higher, compared to the crisis of 2020's Covid-19 breakout's historical descent in the first few months. There are a few factors to this rally. The epidemic caused structural fractions on a global scale. But in general, there is no doubt that crisis factors, which mainly concern Europe, are not limited (with) recovery process in the economy. With this notion, the main structure of this work's subject aims to analyze the lead-up to the energy crisis that became apparent in 2021. Also, in the work, the energy crisis that's been occurring will be analyzed thoroughly, with the help of its dynamics and causes. Within the scope of the study, the Hatemi-J (2012) asymmetric causality test was run using the weekly stock closing data of EU natural gas prices (EUGP), Gazprom (XGASPR), and Equinor (XEQUNR) for the period 05.11.2017-28.11.2021. As a result of the analysis, a causal relationship between the variables was determined. However, the work will positively contribute to the literature, being a guide to the current situations and overcoming the similar crisis that might occur in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We explore a major European competition decision, the 2012-18 Gazprom case, using a global gas market simulation model. We find that access to LNG markets alone is insufficient to counterbalance Gazprom's strategic behaviour; central and eastern Europe (CEE) needs to be well interconnected with bidirectional flow capability. 'Swap deals' created by the decision facilitate CEE market integration, while limiting Gazprom's potential market power. Such deals may increase the diversity of contracted gas and number of market players, but do not improve physical supply diversity. In the next five years, swap deals could marginally impact negatively the utilization of strategic assets in CEE, but since Gazprom's commitments expire by mid-2026, utilization of these strategic assets may fall considerably, especially if Gazprom withholds supplies. As an unintended consequence, CEE markets may disintegrate from the rest of Europe. Avoiding such outcomes will require further gas market reforms, particularly, market design for gas transportation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In early September 2021, the construction of the Northern stream – 2 рroject (NS-2) was completed. Its operator, Nord Stream 2 AG, has submitted documents for certification of the gas pipeline. The Federal Network Agency of Germany (BNetzA) is responsible for this process, which refused to grant the SP-2 operator an independent status. In November 2021, the German regulator agreed with him on the need to create a subsidiary in the Federal Republic of Germany. It must meet the requirements of German legislation and the Third Energy Package of the European Union. Contrary to the optimistic forecasts of experts and the expectations of Gazprom, the start of commercial operation of the project was postponed to 2022. BNetzA’s decision coincided with the adoption of the next US sanctions against the SP-2 participants and the creation of a new government coalition in Germany. Opponents of the project from the Union 90 / Greens party entered the new cabinet of ministers. The SP-2 is not mentioned in the coalition agreement that defines the future relations of Germany with the Russian Federation. The author, based on the analysis of original sources, examines the reasons for the delay in project certification; its role and place in the strategy of the new German cabinet of ministers; assesses the prospects for the start of commercial operation of the NS-2 in the context of continued opposition from Poland and Ukraine, as well as American sanctions mechanisms and confrontation in this matter from the US Congress and the President.

In tune with rapidly increasing environmental awareness, terms like sustainability and eco-friendly frequently occur and are exploited in discourse domains from supermarket advertising to corporate communication. In contrast to these discursive simulations of concern, Greenpeace (GP) activists have consistently used peaceful protests as a means to protect our planet. GP’s campaigns are designed to raise questions, to make people rethink the way they live and (ab)use the Earth’s environment, and, ultimately, to engage volunteers and raise funds. In a different vein, Gazprom (GZM) also attempts to advertise its corporate image and its mission to distribute gas through powerful technology, connecting entire continents through a grid of pipelines and ships, ‘energising’ anything from industrial plants to gas stoves in apartments and small cottages. The aim of this study is to analyse aspects of both GZM’s and GP’s modes of advertising their goals, particularly the multi-layered composition of their online videos, using a multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis approach from an ecolinguistic perspective. Both GZM and GP exemplify a tendency to“promotionalisation,” sharing the same codes and rhetoric strategies in a variety of advertising campaigns. Unpredictably enough, both utilise ‘green speaking’ multimodally. The implications of these striking similarities are discussed.

Many commentators have blamed Gazprom, Europe's largest gas supplier, for contributing to the 2021–2 European natural gas price crisis through market manipulation and withholding the necessary gas supply volumes from the European market. Is there any substance to such claims? Is Gazprom really involved in manipulating the European gas market and prompting the record-breaking surge in European natural gas prices? The current article analyses the official figures on Gazprom's production capabilities, and supply and demand, and offers some insights as to why exactly claims of market manipulation by Gazprom should be taken seriously. It argues that Gazprom did indeed have the ability to ease the pressure on the European gas market in 2021, but did not use it as one would expect of a company acting in good faith. Figures shown in the article lay out a detailed case that the EU authorities should open an investigation into Gazprom's market manipulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides an assessment of the level of gasification in the country at the moment; according to various methods, it is 66–70%. The need for gasification was also assessed. The current potential was 76%, and the forecast for the period up to 2030 for different scenarios of housing construction is 66–71%. At the same time, there will be an increase in the consumption of natural gas by the population due to gasification by 17–23 billion cubic meters. The costs required to complete the gasification were estimated at the order of one trillion rubles. This is much higher than Gazprom's current investment costs. Proposals have been made to increase funding for gasification and speed up this process. It is also concluded that gasification of the eastern regions, especially in places with difficult terrain and climate, should be carried out in a different way than in the western regions of the country, where the gas transportation infrastructure is already developed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the article is to outline the prospects for the Russian natural gas market in the future and to present the Russian gas sector in comparison with the strategic “players” of the global market. The author examines the issues related to the production, transmission and sale of Russian natural gas. The main problem concerns the possibilities and limitations, that influence the power of the Russian “blue fuel” sector. The article presents briefly the results of the research, which were obtained mainly through the method of case study. The verification of the main hypothesis will be made from the top–down perspective, considering analysis of the actions of state decision-making centres. Less explicit impact, including the interaction of non-public actors (such as economic items), will be skipped, because their more precise consideration would provide to the interesting, but different direction of analysis of the sectoral groups of interest.

In the last period, the energy issue and the concept of “energy security” has been firmly consolidated in the political and public discussions in Chisinau and Tiraspol, however, often used against economic opportunities. The geo-energy significance of the Republic of Moldova is determined by its position. However, since the independence of the Republic of Moldova, the energy security of the republic continues to be threatened by the Transnistrian conflict. For the Republic of Moldova, which does not have primary energy resources and depends on their import, the issue of energy supply remains critical for the functioning and development of the state. In the context of the political negotiations between Chisinau and Tiraspol, the energy problem remains difficult to solve. At the same time, the energy infrastructure of the Republic of Moldova is characterized by the high dependence of the right bank of the Dniester on the electricity production on the left bank of the Dniester and on the transit gas pipelines that cross the Transnistrian region. In this sense, energy, which is “essential for economic and social development and improving the quality of people's lives”, as stated by the UN in Agenda 21 from 1992, becomes an additional problem of the Transnistrian case. Taking into account the connection between human security and its energy component, the article proposes a research into the origin and evolution of the energy issue of the Transnistrian case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The analysis in this paper was performed before the disastrous and unsolicited invasion of Russia to Ukraine. The paper aims to identify if the biggest Russian gas exporter Gazprom used market power to decouple its gas prices from European gas hub benchmarks. The empirical analysis is based on pairwise price convergence between the Russian pipeline and European gas hubs. The main finding shows that Gazprom takes advantage of its market position. The proposed model does not support the company's claims of pipeline price tightness to liquid European gas hubs, and rather proves fluctuating and unstable price convergence between pipelines and hubs from 2016 to March 2020, right before the COVID-19 pandemic. Notably, a robust and trendy-stable price convergence is observed between the Russian pipeline gas and Brent benchmark. Methodologically, the paper contributes with a modified convergence model compliant with gas market fundamentals and suggests a time-expanding concept missed in previous studies. Ongoing political and European gas market developments of 2022 (during the paper review) support the conclusions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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INTRODUCTION. The article examines the extent to which the Union’s internal market can be said to have been externalised, given the extraterritorial implications of the Union’s internal energy market rules and regulations. In this respect, the article investigates the exercise and control of EU regulatory power beyond EU borders by examining the crossborder reach of the Union’s regulatory power beyond its boundaries given its implications for Gazprom and Russia’s interests on the European market. MATERIALS AND METHODS. The article pursues a doctrinal approach to the research methodology which includes the internal dimension of the Union’s energy policy and the extent to which the Union’s internal market regulation has been externalised and imposed on its external energy relations with Russia – this includes a detailed analysis of: (i) the Third Energy Package (TEP)’s ownership unbundling rules; (ii) the Third Country Clause; and (iii) the Union’s Competition law (given the recent decision of the EU Competition investigation of Gazprom’s sales in Central and Eastern Europe). RESEARCH RESULTS. A fundamental aspect of the EU’s rule-based market approach, is the perception that a fully liberalised and competitive EU market can facilitate energy security by way of enhancing diversification of suppliers. As such, the TEPs’ ownership unbundling; the Third Country Clause; and the EU’s Competition law have become significant mechanisms in the Union’s toolbox of instruments to further its rule- based approach and market-based agenda for the purpose of ensuring European energy security. The article illustrates the Union’s sectoral application of the acquis beyond its borders in its efforts to export its liberalization model and Europeanise its energy corridors in pursuit of European security of energy supply. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. The article reveals a fascinating dimension to the Union’s role as a global actor by analysing the Union’s normative agenda which it pursues through the export of its acquis and rule-based market approach which it imposes on third countries and its strategic energy partner, Russia. In undertaking this analysis, the article shows that the EU’s efforts to reform Russia’s energy markets through its liberalization movement and European model, suggest an external dimension to its internal market rules given the implications for Russia and Gazprom.

This paper presents and has predicted events after 11 years since the last European gas crisis. The aim of the work is the projection and events taking place and that is indicating the possibility of facing Europe with shortages or with less supply of this strategically important energy source that could lead to natural-gas reductions and influence the prices of this energy-generating product and therefore to the economy of Europe and the world. The countries of Europe actively implement measures to reduce the risk of short-ages of gas as an energy source. The annexation of the Crimean peninsula, the complex relationship between Russia and Ukraine, the European Union and sanctions to Russia, the state of interdependence for distribution and continuous disputes are operatively specific individual factors in this paper. The risk of shortage or less gas supply is threatened if Gazprom halts delivery to Naftogaz (Ukraine), and the basis of the forecast is the expiration of the ten-year gas supply and distribution agreement that ends on December 31, 2019. Negotiations on a new contract are being carried out with the mediator -the European Commission. Gazprom diversifies distribution by construction and completion of North Stream 2 in the North of Europe and the Turkish stream in the south of Europe. The research methods used by the author are: with the methods of analysis and synthesis of the observed processes and phenomena in connection with the wider problems that occur in the region the aim is to use the proven hypotheses from the personal doctoral dissertation, the usual statistical methods, the abstraction and concretization method and the description of all relevant events. The result of the research can be the basis for a great knowledge in this area, contributing to the understanding of the gas industry as well as its further development and strategy in the region. The conclusion is that the diversification of gas supply is necessary for the integrity and security of the European Union and for the further development and growth of the GDP.

Doğal gaz ve elektrik enerjisinin iletim hatlarından transit geçişine yönelik hukuki rejimlerin kurulması, ilgili devletler nezdinde enerji tedariğinin güvenliği ve rekabetçi enerji piyasalarının kurulması açısından büyük önem arz etmektedir. Uluslararası hukuk nezdinde enerji transitinin bir çözüme kavuşturulamamış olması, uluslararası hukukun temel aktörleri devletlerin ikili ve çoklu anlaşmalar yoluyla bu soruna eğilmesi neticesini doğurmuş olsa da, bu tür alternatif yolların, uyuşmazlıkların giderilmesi konusundaki başarısızlıkları, tecrübe edilen uluslararası krizler bağlamında açık bir şekilde görünmektedir. 1994 Enerji Şartı Anlaşması, özellikle enerji transitine yönelik olarak bünyesinde bulundurduğu 7. Madde uyarısınca, bu tür sorunların uluslararası boyutta ilk olarak ele alındığı bir hukuki rejim ön görmüştür. Fakat 2000’li yıllarda ard arda gerçekleşen enerji krizleri ve enerji şartının bu krizlerin önüne geçme konusundaki başarısızlığı, akademik camiada ve üye devletler nezdinde Şartın etkinliği ve gerekliliği konusunda çok ciddi eleştirilerin ortaya çıkmasına neden olmuştur. İş bu çalışma, bu eleştirilerin ortaya çıkmasının nedenleri ve Enerji Şartının enerji alanında ortaya çıkan uyuşmazlıklara ilişkin önceliklerini YUKOS davası ve 2009 doğal gaz krizi nezdinde detaylı bir şekilde incelemektedir.

The implementation of the Nord Stream-2 project (from the point of view of Russia, it contributes to the strengthening of domestic and European energy security) is threatened. Poland and some other EU countries are its strong opponents. The USA (in accordance with the CAATSA law of August 2, 2017) promises to do everything to prevent the implementation of the project. The American administration threatens the European companies involved in the project with extraterritorial sanctions. The main arguments: Nord Stream-2 poses a threat to the energy sovereignty of Europe and Ukraine. The article analyzes the main advantages of the project, the chances and risks, as well as the prospects for its implementation.

How does the history of Russia's complex energy politics influence perceptions of its recent natural gas pipeline policies? The goal of this paper is to examine how Russia's gas route diversification is being impacted by broader geopolitical questions. A case study of two massive Russian-backed energy megaprojects, Nord Stream 2 and the Power of Siberia pipelines, aimed at delivering natural gas to the heart of Europe and China respectively. As Nord Stream is technically designed to bypass a number of transit countries coupled with an EU divided on the project, the Power of Siberia project presents an alternative track for extending Russia's commercial partnership with Asia. This paper asserts that while critics are concerned about the implications of Russia's diversification objectives, the differences in strategic thinking aside, the pipelines will actually have no discernable impact on Moscow's foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Sustainable development of the large-scale oil and gas industry is necessary to preserve the environment in Russia. Today, when growing volumes of the global production increase the demand for raw materials, rapid expanding production rates often can be achieved through outdated technological processes which negatively affects the ecosystem and society. Oil and gas corporations take responsibility for implementing sustainable development strategies. The implementation of key performance indicators (KPIs) is one of the management tools to monitor socially responsible activities. The authors studied Gazprom and Zarubezhneft's environmental trends from the perspective of these indicators based on innovation development programs (IDPs), publications and corporate annual reports. Major challenges were related to changing corporate methods of metrics calculation, the lack of generally accepted methodology of environmental KPIs implementation, which complicated the study. Based on the previous research, this study enhances the current view on the role of IDPs in shaping Russian oil and gas corporations' environmental performance. Comparative analysis of environmental performance of global oil and gas corporations was conducted in order to assess the functioning of the selected Russian corporations according to the general practice. The study has shown that Gazprom might fail to achieve its current environmental benchmarks which corresponds the overall global trends as energy companies have lately been facing challenges in improving their sustainability performance. The important aspect of Gazprom innovation strategy has been identified: while most major greenhouse gas emitters are also the key investors in research and development (R&D), the leading Russian company has fixed one of the lowest R&D expenditures/ revenues ratios in the industry. This practice is not considered to be typical for other Russian oil and gas companies with IDPs. Since innovations are the key drivers of sustainable development, it is suggested that a legally fixed R&D budget in state-owned companies might be introduced in order to stimulate environmental performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Russian gas export scenarios to Europe, considering infrastructure, long-term contracts (LTC), and the new geopolitical landscape in Europe. Short-term expectations preclude export growth, while Ukraine transit risks stem from military actions, sanctions, or termination of the transit contract. Export volume may recover in a benign post-conflict resolution, though not to pre-war levels. Available export infrastructure options include the Ukraine transit and the TurkStream pipeline, with a combined capacity of 75 billion cubic meters per annum (bcma), about 50% of Russia's exports in 2021. Gazprom's LTC position will also dictate possible export volume to Europe. Pre-Ukraine war, Gazprom held 135bcma of LTCs with EU buyers. Currently, only 25bcma is active, with the rest terminated or under legal review. Of the remaining LTC, 12bcma faces risk if the Ukraine transit ends in 2025. Considering these issues, we model baseline and counterfactual scenarios with flows from Russia from 0 to 75bcma. Results suggest gas price differences are prominent until 2026 due to a tight global gas market. Beyond 2026, LNG expansion and Europe's decarbonisation commitments lessen the price impact, making Russian gas economically irrelevant. In the context of the war in Ukraine, the divisive issue of Russian gas becomes economically insignificant by mid-decade. • Russian gas supply scenarios to Europe considering geopolitics, contracts, economics, and infrastructure. • Short-term expectations suggest no supply growth, while disruption of flows through Ukraine remains high. • Until 2026, European buyers would benefit from any increased availability of Russian gas. • Buying more Russian gas before 2026 is politically infeasible or morally unacceptable. • The potential economic impact of Russian pipeline gas is set to decline sharply from the mid-decade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses a neglected question about the effects of dispersed authority in the European Union (EU) on the EU's ability to manage external contestations. It investigates authority challenges from two major external actors in the energy, and specifically the gas sector, and scrutinizes the management of authority conflicts at local sites in different EU states in the Baltic Sea region. The second Russian transboundary submarine gas infrastructure project Nord Stream 2 (NS2), owned and managed by a whole-owned subsidiary of the Russian state-controlled energy giant Gazprom, serves as an illustrative case study. It reveals how multiple authority conflicts at different sites and levels, and the challenges from both the Russian Federation (Russia) and the United States of America (USA), played out, and why formal adjudication has been a primary tool for the EU and several of its member states to assert their authority and manage contestations at the local, national and EU level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The continuous increase of gas prices in Moldova, and the current inability to deter this rise, has become a problem that greatly affects consumers increasingly weakens the country's vulnerable economy. Every price increase is seen in careful terms by the consumer as a dispute between the demand and the regulator, which gets exaggerated attention whereas the possibility to limit the final price are very limited. The effects are each time the same, so are the causes the essentially generate the chain price increase. At the same time, the directions where the efforts should be focused to mitigate the consequences brought about by higher natural gas tariffs are superficially explored. Given that Moldova is dependent on imported energy products, which are monopolized by natural gas purchased from a single gas provider, the need to take real action to redress the situation is imperative.

The paper seeks to develop an analysis of the South Stream project in view of the Ukrainian crisis. We cannot put aside the internal factor as Ukraine is facing serious internal issues such as corruption and instability, therefore Russia’s invasion of Ukraine can not be simply ignored in this pipeline project. The article uses mostly facts that happened throughout last years, as well as for and against declarations in the case of the South Stream project and its mother Russia. When we hear about South Stream, we think of Russia and since 2007, this pipeline has encouraged Putin’s faith in energy superpower. A good point to start with was to gather all declarations since then and cover all actions that regard the South Stream game. In Russian foreign policy for the South Stream race, Soft Power was used more than enough and it has recently made room for Hard Power, which is the Ukraine never ending episode. Insights of the South Stream story have been lately related both softly and hardly, this is the reason why I have chosen to analyse both sides in order to complete the energy landscape.

Reform of the Russian domestic natural gas sector has been discussed for several decades but has not been carried out. The state-controlled energy company Gazprom holds a dominant position in the domestic market, supplying the population with gas, carrying out societal functions, and in return getting privileges from the state. Recently, however, independent gas producers have increased their market shares and are lobbying for liberalization. While Gazprom might gain from reform, it continues to warn against the dangers of altering the gas market structure too abruptly. Analyzing Gazprom’s reasoning through an ideational analytical lens, this article finds that Gazprom’s reluctance to change can be explained not only by its interests but also by norms and beliefs. Reform studies should take note of Gazprom’s idea of “keeping the country together,” not least because the company has a sounding board in the President, who makes the final decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents the results of evidence-based research into the behaviour of Gazprom and the relevant behaviour of the Russian government in selected countries of Central, Eastern, and South-Eastern Europe (the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Moldova, and Belarus). The authors’ aim was to determine the scope of involvement by the Russian government in problems that have arisen in supplying these states, and the degree to which these issues have been linked with Gazprom’s conduct and Russia’s foreign policy toward the countries. Another interest was to seek out the key factors that may determine this behaviour in particular environments. To address these goals, the authors monitored specific indicators defined by the strategic approach to energy security (indicators that uncover governmental support, the linking of foreign policy to gas supplies, and misuse of a dominant market position). The core of the research underlying the paper was organized as a set of individual idiographic, theory-guided case studies. Data were gathered from official documents, statistics, articles, analytical studies, and from semi-structured interviews with experts. The exploration revealed that Gazprom has behaved in such a way as to indicate that it is being used as a tool of foreign policy, but the primary factor controlling its behaviour remains the environment in which the company is operating. Two points were crucial: implementation of the IEM rules and—above all—the diversification of sources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the early 2000s, developing liquefied natural gas (LNG) was declared a priority by the Russian state-controlled energy company Gazprom. As Gazprom had limited experience of LNG production, a logical solution was to establish partnerships with foreign companies. Despite ambitious goals, no major Gazprom-led LNG projects have emerged so far. While this can mainly be explained by market fall-out, scholars have also pointed to weaknesses in Gazprom’s approach to foreign partners. This article analyses the partnership dynamics between Gazprom, Total, and Statoil in Russia’s most ambitious LNG production project, the Shtokman field in the Barents Sea. The three companies established a partnership to develop the field in 2008, but only four years later the project was shelved. In addition to objective parameters, this paper finds that some of the challenges to the partnership resulted from differing norms, ideas, and world-views. These difficulties might, however, have been overcome had the field been commercially viable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is to show the importance of the Nord Stream 2 project for Russia's external energy policy, for Gazprom's strategy and other Russian economic entities. The analysis of the potential consequences of the implementation of this project for Russia and the Russian entities involved in it is based on theoretical assumptions of neoclassical realism. For Moscow, the construction of new gas pipelines is to enable the resignation from dependence on gas transit through Ukraine. Nord Stream 2 is also an important political tool for Russia in its relations with the European Union. It allows Moscow, on the one hand, to strengthen political influence in selected countries of the Union (mainly in Germany, but also in France and the Netherlands), and on the other to strengthen the divisions between EU Member States (some EU states are opposed to implementing new infrastructure projects with Russia). For Gazprom, the new gas pipeline increases the possibilities of flexible response to changes taking place on the European market. Finally, the implementation of costly infrastructure projects is extremely important for economic interests of Russian construction companies, which, thanks to state procurement, gain significant financial profits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nord Stream 2 is a topic debated in the European Union (EU) with the participation of the Polish government. The article analyses arguments presented in this discussion from the point of view of the EU and NATO's interests. It ends with conclusions and recommendations for the government of Poland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nord Stream 2 (NS2) is one of the most controversial international projects in the gas industry. The construction of the gas pipeline began in the period of serious tensions between Russia and the West. Gazprom's European partners ignore the legitimate concerns of their allies regarding the implications of the investment for politics and security. The dispute is somewhat reminiscent of the Cold War period when Germany and Austria established gas cooperation with the USSR. The article presents the current political context of the gas relations of the European countries and the USSR/Russia and the implications of building NS2 for politics and security in Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The central argument which is advanced by this article is that, whilst there is no outright obligation in Brussels I which prevents parallel proceedings between a court action and arbitration between the same parties and concerning a similar cause of action, the revisions in the recast Brussels I, along with the Gazprom interpretation of key non-revised parts of Brussels I, do certainly provide improved support for international commercial arbitration. These do so by giving more scope to national courts to restrict Parallel Proceedings; through anti-suit injunctions issued by an arbitral tribunal; through finding parties taking parallel court action to be in breach of the arbitration agreement; and by giving primacy to the arbitral award where it is irreconcilable with a parallel court judgment. The authors particularly demonstrate that this is made possible because of a changed (diminished) role which is given to the principle of effectiveness of EU law (effet utile) post Gazprom and Brussels I. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the economical interests of Qatar’s Middle East policy. «Arab Spring» has brought to Qatar substantial dividends, which have allowed the world media to see in this country of a new regional leader. Further development of the Qatar’s economy is largely dependents on the development of the situation in the countries that have experienced the revolutions.

Corporate governance has been well known in the last two decades for making the attraction of investors its main objective. During communism, corporate governance was absent from economical life and thus quick steps were taken by former communist countries to adopt corporate governance, Romania and the Russian Federation are two countries that realized the strategy. Eventually after the collapse of the communist bloc both countries have moved in different directions based on internal and external factors. Romania has moved toward the European Union Model, while Russia experimented with building a different model by borrowing parts from Western values and at the same time using traditional values. These perspectives are clearly differentiated in Romanian Petrom OMV and Russia’s Gazprom.

O contexto geopolítico contemporâneo vive uma fase de profunda mutação. Novos países questionam profundamente a configuração unipolar que se criou após a fim da assim chamada “Guerra Fria”. A emersão de novas potencias econômicas e de estados que procuram um desenvolvimento autonomo é hoje um facto evidente. A fortalecer esta tendência está a criação de aliançais inter-estatais tanto regionais como a nível global (BRICS). Neste quadro a Federação Russa tem um papel central, e depois da década dos 90, que a viu ocupar um papel mundial de segundo ordem, volta a ser uma potencia reconhecida em nível planetário. Os instrumentos desta subida são: separação entre negócios privados e interesses estatais e fortalecimento do papel das empresas publicas; consolidação da própria presença na região; utilização dos próprios recursos energéticos (tirado das mãos dos privados) para financiar a própria economia e fortalecimento de aliançais com vários países e potencias econômicas nas varias regiões do mundo

The article describes a dispute over contracts for supplies and transmission of natural gas through Ukraine from March 2018. The concept of energy Prometheism in relation to bilateral relations between Russia and Ukraine and the historical context of the crisis are also presented. The author analyses the consequences of the crisis for Ukraine and predicts further development of the situation. He also assesses the impact of the European Union's involvement in the dispute. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Confronted with an increasingly competitive market in the European Union and the credible threat of a new entrant in the form of liquefied natural gas imports from the United States, Gazprom’s traditional export strategy is open to question. The company must decide whether it should launch a price war in order passively to adapt to impending competition and its role as a ‘residual supplier’ to the EU gas market, or whether it should take advantage of the current price uncertainty. This article explores the scope for long-term strategic action by Gazprom other than simply engaging in a price war. It is argued that Gazprom could forge a position as a key player in the EU gas market capable of playing the same role as Saudi Arabia does in the global oil market. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Although officially Russian state-owned energy companies operate as independent entities, their actions often lead to suspicion that they are acting as a tool of Russian state foreign policy. Countries on the southeastern borders of Europe – Bulgaria and Greece – are prime examples of where this might be the case, since they not only have a central position in Russia’s plans to penetrate European markets through new transport infrastructure but are also part of competing plans for routing non-Russian gas to Western markets. The main focus of the present research is on the natural gas and oil sectors, as these are the traditional foundation of Russian energy exports to Europe. The aim of this paper is thus to provide an objective, evidence-based analysis of Russian activities in the natural gas and oil sectors of Greece and Bulgaria in order to establish whether its actions have been implicitly or explicitly politicized and have served to strengthen Russian influence in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The growth strategies of the two largest so-called independent Russian gas producers – Novatek and Rosneft – as well as developments in international markets and changing domestic energy needs have put pressure on the present Russian gas sector model dominated by Gazprom. The three companies are involved in a struggle over export liberalization as well as the conditions in the domestic market. Liquefied natural gas is top priority for Novatek and Rosneft’s main gas focus is on eastern Russia and Asia, but there is still room for considerable tension with Gazprom. The government wants to both improve Russia’s position in export markets and maintain stable domestic supplies, including to socially disadvantaged regions and institutions. Gazprom is insisting that if further access to export markets is granted to the Independents, then they must take greater responsibility for domestic market obligations. On the other hand, the key Independents seem intent on stopping or slowing down their expansion in the domestic market in order to prioritize export sales, and will certainly not take broader domestic supply responsibilities without better access to export markets. The balancing of policies involves strong players on the Russian economic and political scene, all with ties to the Kremlin. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this article we focus on the interconnection of the natural gas infrastructure in Eastern Europe. We identify three distinct factors that together deeply influenced the contemporary trends at the regional gas market: the gas crises at the security level, the European energy policy at the policy level, and the unconventional revolution at the economics level. Within this framework, we analyze the contemporary infrastructure development and its contribution to the change in the market design from bilateral long-term arrangements toward hub-based short-term trading. Finally, we elaborate on the additional obstacles that slow down this market transformation as well as identify its “winners” and “losers”. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article deals with privatization in Russia’s energy sector with a special focus on a recent purchase of the private TNK-BP by the state-owned Rosneft. The author analyses the past, present and future privatization deals related to the Russian oil, gas and power generation industry as compared to accumulated international experience. For instance, the article displays the ways the Norwegian, Brazilian, French and British authorities privatized national strategic energy assets. The study presented in the article also aims to find out key advantages and disadvantages of state or private ownership in the Russian and global energy industry. For example, it sheds light on some considerable achievements of the Russian state-controlled companies in oil production amid a widespread belief that more than a decade-long growth in the Russian oil industry is due only to private firms that were created in the 1990s. Additionally, the state-controlled Norwegian oil and gas firm Statoil that shows strong operational and financial results on the Norwegian Continental Shelf and abroad is also in the spotlight of the current study. In line with the mentioned takeover of TNK-BP the author examines outcomes of the reorganization of RAO UES of Russia (the dismantled Russian electric power monopoly) that was seen as a massive privatization of the national power industry. Moreover, the study presents two groups of interests prevailing in the Russian government and energy business to give an outlook on the Russian energy industry.

Our paper provides an insight into the universe of Russian multinationals and their influence upon the Romanian economy. Even if statistical data on foreign direct investment stock by country of origin do not prove the existence of Russian capital in Romania, it is a fact that the high values of foreign direct investment stock from the Netherlands, Austria, Germany or Switzerland are largely due to the investment projects undertaken in Romania by Russian multinationals. Despite the lack of relevant statistical data, we can say that the impact of Russian MNC’s on the Romanian economy is huge. Among positive influences we can mention: global employment opportunities for highly qualified workforce in the region; the transfer of advanced technologies to Romanian enterprises and the local markets; the awareness of business partners and public opinion on social responsibility; the insert of higher performance standards, competitiveness and managerial ethics.

The author continues the analysis of the security scenarios concerning the main actors in the Wider Black Sea Area (WBSA) as well as of the nature of the relations between them, starting from Russian interests and policy in the region. Thus, for Russia, the energy geopolitics is closely related, in its relations with the EU, NATO, and especially the states in the WBSA, to the pursuit of some goals associated with its affirmation and confirmation as a great power. One of the scenarios mentioned by the author is that related to the Russians taking control over the entire southern coast of Ukraine to connect the Russian Federation and its security forces in the area of the self-proclaimed Republic of Transdniestria with Crimea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I scrutinise a crucial tension in understanding the debate over shale gas production in Europe. On the one hand, analyses predominantly grasp the debate in terms of pro-and-con dialectics, as if the pro-shale gas camp faced the anti-shale gas camp in a dyadic clash of opposing voices. On the other hand, it is commonly recognised that this debate is driven by multi-party and multi-position argumentative dynamics. In this broader context, I focus on one pivotal contribution to the debate – Gazprom’s press release from October 2013 outlining Russia’s energy giant’s strategy of dealing with unconventional gas production. I employ concepts and methods of argumentative discourse analysis to contend that an arguer to a multi-party debate – argumentative polylogue – faces a number of constraints and opportunities that cannot be adequately grasped in terms of dyadic pro-and-con dialectics. The analysis reveals how Gazprom needs to simultaneously design its discourse to address a number of other parties who might also disagree among themselves: from Greenpeace to European Union governments to shale gas companies. I show why and how a stakeholder analysis used in organisational communication might lead to a better understanding of this form of multi-party public argumentation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]