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Article 23 of the Common European Sales Law requires sellers to make plain the basic attributes of what they are selling. The seller of goods has a duty to disclose "any information concerning the main characteristics of the goods . . . which [she] has or can be expected to have and which it would be contrary to good faith and fair dealing not to disclose to the other party." The largest effect of the rule may lie not in the value of the information that is communicated, but rather the legal consequences that attach to the information that is disclosed. Article 23 works in conjunction with Articles 69 and 100. These provisions require any description of the goods to serve as a warranty. Thus, the scope of the description that Article 23 requires is coextensive with the warranty that the seller must give with respect to the goods that she is selling. Because legal consequences attach to the description, sellers have reason to say less than they might otherwise. Ironically, CESL might lead to disclosure of less information and less useful information than a regime of caveat emptor.

In both Chrysler and General Motors, the government was, among other things, a large creditor exercising control over its debtor and pushing for a speedy sale of the assets. Together the two cases capture the issues central to large Chapter 11 cases today. The debate over speedy sales of businesses in Chapter 11 is over. Sales are now the norm in large reorganizations. Instead of asking whether there should be sales in bankruptcy, we need to ask how to police various forms of abuse. Three years after the fact, we can begin to draw some conclusions about the reorganizations of Chrysler and General Motors. The government’s use of the bankruptcy laws to inject tens of billions into two of the country’s largest automobile companies had its intended effect. At the start of 2009, General Motors and Chrysler were bleeding to death. 2 Maintaining either business as a going concern required a massive infusion of capital no one in the private market was willing to provide. As a result of the government’s intervention, the basic structure of the American automobile industry was preserved.

Fraudulent transfer law in the United States provides a safety net for corporate creditors. It prohibits insolvent debtors from making transfers or incurring obligations for less than reasonably equivalent value. Moreover, it reaches any transaction that lacks economic substance and that is designed merely to make it hard for creditors to monitor the debtor. The distinctive shape of fraudulent transfer law in the United States is not replicated in the other common law or in civil law jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the functions it performs are likely to be part of any legal regime that protects the rights of creditors and other investors.

When a firm encounters financial distress, there is a significant possibility that, at some point, the firm itself should be shut down and its assets put to better use. But Chapter 11 and indeed all market-mimicking reorganization regimes other than a speedy auction entrust the shutdown decision to a bankruptcy judge who lacks information and expertise, as well as the ability to control the timing of her decisions. Understanding the costs of entrusting the shutdown decision to a bankruptcy judge is central to assessing any law of corporate reorganizations. This article models the shutdown decision as the exercise of a real option. The model suggests that the shutdown decision may loom so large in the early parts of the bankruptcy case that it erases any significant difference between Chapter 11 and many alternative market-mimicking regimes. All these regimes take more time than mandatory auctions and thus increase the cost of taking the shutdown decision away from a market actor. Moreover, the real option itself gives parties an incentive to withhold information. Only a system of mandatory auctions both limits the amount of time the shutdown option resides with an inexpert decision maker and forces insiders to give that decision maker sufficient information to value the option

Section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code gives each class of unsecured claims the right to insist that a reorganization plan be "fair and equitable" and to prevent those junior to them from receiving "property" on account of their old interests. The Bankruptcy Code is often said to embrace a rule of absolute priority, but if it does so, it is only through these restrictions. Hence, the meaning of the words "fair and equitable" and "property" is the terrain on which priority battles are contested. One must choose among different methods of statutory interpretation. One can derive priority rules by examining the judicial evolution of the words "fair and equitable" before they were incorporated into the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act. Alternatively, one can look to the word "property," and derive priority rules by trying to define this word. Opinions in the most recent Supreme Court case on this issue, 203 N. LaSalle, exemplify these competing approaches. Using these opinions as its starting point, this paper explores the way in which priority rules in bankruptcy have evolved over time and shows how the absolute priority rule is harder to derive from the statute and hence more contingent, positively and normatively, than commonly supposed.

Traditional approaches to corporate governance focus exclusively on shareholders and neglect the large and growing role of creditors. Today’s creditors craft elaborate covenants that give them a large role in the affairs of the corporation. While they do not exercise their rights in sunny times when things are going well, these are not the times that matter most. When a business stumbles, creditors typically enjoy powers that public shareholders never have, such as the ability to replace the managers and install those more to their liking. Creditors exercise these powers even when the business is far from being insolvent and continues to pay its debts. Bankruptcy provides no sanctuary, as senior lenders ensure that their powers either go unchecked or are enhanced. The powers that modern lenders wield rival in importance the hostile takeover in disciplining poor or underperforming managers. This Essay explores these powers and begins the task of integrating this lever of corporate governance into the modern account of corporate law.