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Many of the benefits anticipated from technology in the 1960s remain unrealized today. Alongside the optimism that drives technological development, more sceptical views that regard the promises of technology with reflection, mistrust, and even hostility, have emerged within Western societies. One such group is the Degrowth community, a heterogenous group of researchers and activists who question technological advancements that contribute to environmentally and socially harmful economic growth. In this vein, the movement critically observes the current hype surrounding digital technology, which seems to reflect a mantra of “the more digital technology, the better”. This paper presents perspectives that emerged from a dialogue among members of the Degrowth community, who were asked to imagine wise and unwise futures of digitalisation in 2068. Key concerns of unwise futures include increasing disconnection of humans from the natural environment and from one another as individuals, the use of digital technology for optimising the allocation of scarce resources to the benefit of the wealthy few, and authoritarian governance of technologies and life itself. Wise technological futures, in turn, allow people to freely access digital technologies that are convivial, just, environmentally sustainable, and guided by democratic deliberation. It remains controversial how far digital technologies and the interests and skills surrounding them can facilitate the principles of Degrowth, and the extent to which the harmful effects of digital technologies are already shaping social, ecological and technological futures. However, the dialogue clearly emphasised the need to develop more detailed socio-technological imaginaries that provide practically feasible alternatives.

Peak Oil, which refers to the maximum possible global oil production rate, is increasingly gaining attention in both science and policy discourses. However, little is known about how this phenomenon will impact economies, despite its apparent imminence and potential dangers. In this paper, we construct a vulnerability map of the U.S. economy, combining two approaches for analyzing economic systems, i.e. input–output analysis and social network analysis (applied to economic data). Our approach reveals the relative importance of individual economic sectors, and how vulnerable they are to oil price shocks. As such, our dual-analysis helps identify which sectors, due to their strategic position, could put the entire U.S. economy at risk from Peak Oil. For the U.S., such sectors would include Iron Mills, Fertilizer Production and Transport by Air. Our findings thus provide early warnings to downstream companies about potential ‘trouble’ in their supply chain, and inform policy action for Peak Oil. Although our analysis is embedded in a Peak Oil narrative, it is just as valid and useful in the context of developing a climate roadmap toward a low carbon economy.

Given recent developments on energy markets and skyrocketing oil prices, we argue for an urgent need to study the potential effects of world oil production reaching a maximum (Peak Oil) in order to facilitate the development of adaptation policies. We consider input–output (IO) modelling as a powerful tool for this purpose. However, the standard Leontief type model implicitly assumes that all necessary inputs to satisfy a given demand can and will be supplied. This is problematic if the availability of certain key inputs becomes restricted and it is therefore only of limited usefulness for the study of the phenomenon of Peak Oil. Hence this paper firstly reviews two alternative modelling tools within the IO framework: supply-driven and mixed models. The former has been severely criticised for its problematic assumption of perfect factor substitution and perfect elasticity of demand as revealed by Oosterhaven [Oosterhaven J. On the plausibility of the supply-driven IO model. J Reg Sci 1988; 28:203–17. [1] ]. The supply-constrained model on the other hand proved well suited to analyse the quantity dimension of Peak Oil and is therefore applied empirically in the second part of the paper, using data for the UK, Japanese and Chilean economy. Results show how differences in net-oil exporting and net-oil importing countries are clearly visible in terms of final demand. Industries, most affected in all countries, include transportation, electricity production and financial and trade services.