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Against the background of post-war economic difficulties in the German Democratic Republic, the article reveals the growth of socio-political tension in East German society during the so-called Berlin crisis, culminating in the strengthening of the sectoral border in Berlin. The author explains the decision to build the Berlin Wfoll not only by the deep contradictions in the German-German relations, aggravated after the formation of the two German states, but also by the tightening of the cold ideological confrontation between the Vest and the East. Former allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, primarily the United States and the USSR, who divided Europe into zones of influence, sought not only to strengthen their positions in the states controlled by them, but also, using political and diplomatic mechanisms, to create bridgeheads for future battles on the fronts of the Cold War. Because of this, they could not make a compromise decision to stabilize the situation in East Berlin and determine the status of the western part of the city, and the GDR authorities quickly took advantage of the disagreements in the camp of the former allies to radically solve the problem of the flight of East Germans across the sectoral border to the Vest through the construction of a concrete wall around the West Berlin

This article examines the rather poor emotional relationship between the White House and the State Department during 1961, the first-year of the presidency of John F. Kennedy. The article argues that both sides had expectations of the relationship that turned into disappointments and that both sides felt that their approach and work was superior to the other. During the Berlin Crisis, this clash of emotions gained political significance concerning the case of the American response to a Sovietformal diplomatic note (an aide-memoire) following the June 1961 Vienna Summit between Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. The White House and the State Department had different priorities and because of the poor emotional relationship they failed to find common ground. The end result was that the State Department won the battle by having its preferred version of the response sent to the Soviets. But the Department lost the war, because the White House used the opportunity to take control of Berlinpolicy at the expense of the State Department. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the scholarly and popular literature, the view on former National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy has often been exclusively focused on his role in the expansion of the Vietnam War, where he helped presidents Kennedy and Johnson escalate the conflict at the expense of negotiation and disengagement. The present article attempts to nuance our view of Bundy by analysing his role in US foreign policy-making during the 1961 Berlin crisis, because while Bundy was clearly a Vietnam hawk, this was not the case in other policy areas of more immediate importance in the early 1960s. Here, the article argues, Bundy persistently sought a negotiated settlement to the crisis and was ultimately successful in crafting an action-oriented negotiating platform. And while the ensuing negotiations eventually proved fruitless, the American willingness to negotiate helped relieve the tension in Berlin and prepare the two superpowers for the Limited Test Ban Treaty and to conclude the European phase of the Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Historians of Canadian foreign affairs have argued that Canada played an important role in influencing allied policy during the Berlin Crisis of 1961-1962. Newly declassified documents reveal the opposite. Canada opposed much of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) contingency planning during the crisis, especially plans calling for the demonstrative use of nuclear weapons. Despite Canada's efforts to modify NATO's Berlin Contingency plans (BERCONs), Canadian diplomats found themselves isolated in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and accepted plans they considered to be dangerous. Canada had no significant influence on NATO military planning during one of the most serious crises of the Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

John Osborne's early plays, "A Subject of Scandal and Concern" and "Luther," emerged out of the author's anti-nuclear activism and his anger regarding the role of Britain's political leaders in the escalation of Cold-War tensions that led to the Berlin Crisis of 1961. An effort to examine and redefine blasphemy in personal terms led Osborne to dramatize the trials of two historical figures—George Holyoake and Luther—whose conscientious objections against orthodox belief led to their being put on trial for blasphemy. These plays suggest that Osborne came to view blasphemy as a form of hurtful speech ("blasphemia") used by Church and State to silence and punish those who speak out conscientiously against orthodox religious belief. The manner in which Osborne dramatizes the unhappy domestic lives of Holyoake and Luther, read in the context of the playwright's own troubled relationships, suggests that he recognized that the crime of blasphemy also resulted when personal conviction or conscientious action brought suffering upon friends and family. Despite electing to dramatize historical cases of blasphemy, Osborne wanted his audiences to recognize that both the charge and offence of blasphemy and submission to orthodox viewpoints had very dangerous consequences in the Cold-War era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the Berlin crisis of 1948, US bombers were once again based in Britain, signalling to the Soviet government the American resolution to stand fast in defence of western Europe. Contemporary commentators and many historians readily assumed that the act of deployment represented the rattling of a nuclear sabre. But did the USA have the capability to deliver an atomic attack on the Soviet Union from English bases at that time? The answer is not obvious. A series of confusions obscures what the term ‘atomic capability’ really signified in the late 1940s and early 1950s. First, contrary views persist even in the recent literature as to whether the particular B-29s deployed to Britain in 1948 were capable of delivering an atomic attack on Russia. They were not, but were equipped, armed and prepared to fight a conventional air campaign. Second, nuclear capability is mistakenly seen as an attribute solely of the delivery vehicle rather than of the logistical capability of the bases themselves and their supply lines. Work on converting and equipping the East Anglian airbases for atomic operations, begun as early as 1946, had not been completed by the time of the Berlin crisis. Third, the date when US nuclear weapons were actually deployed to Britain is concealed by tactically convenient definitions of what constitutes a ‘weapon’. The article argues that USAF forces in England gained a nuclear capability only in 1949, and that the purpose of the deployment at the time of the Berlin blockade was not nuclear diplomacy but to secure the forward airbases required by contemporary US war plans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Features John F. Kennedy and his leadership ability on the existence of a crisis through rhetorical juxtaposition in the Berlin crisis. Kennedy's message to the nation regarding Berlin; Kennedy's rhetorical choices; Kennedy's use of four variations of juxtaposition; More.