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We analyze how demand conditions faced by a firm in its export markets affect its innovation decisions. We exploit exogenous firm-level export demand shocks and find that firms respond by patenting more; furthermore, this response is driven by the subset of initially more productive firms. The patent response arises two to five years after the shock, highlighting the time required to innovate. In contrast, the demand shock raises contemporaneous sales and employment for all firms regardless of their productivity. This skewed innovation response to common demand shocks arises naturally from a model of endogenous innovation and competition with firm heterogeneity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Growth has fallen in the U.S. amid a rise in firm concentration. Market share has shifted to low labour share firms, while within-firm labour shares have actually risen. We propose a theory linking these trends in which the driving force is falling overhead costs of spanning multiple products or a rising efficiency advantage of large firms. In response, the most efficient firms (with higher markups) spread into new product lines, thereby increasing concentration and generating a temporary burst of growth. Eventually, due to greater competition from efficient firms, within-firm markups and incentives to innovate fall. Thus our simple model can generate qualitative patterns in line with the observed trends. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present a framework that can be used to assess the equilibrium impact of regulation on endogenous innovation with heterogeneous firms. We implement this model using French firm-level panel data, where there is a sharp increase in the burden of labor regulations on companies with 50 or more employees. Consistent with the model's qualitative predictions, we find a fall in the fraction of innovating firms just to the left of the regulatory threshold. Furthermore, we find a reduction in the innovation response of firms to demand shocks just below the threshold. Regulation reduces aggregate innovation by 5.7 percent. (JEL D22, K31, L11, L25, L51, O31, O34) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use the data from a Banque de France survey, carried out among French companies about their use of telework in 2019 and during the first lockdown in the spring of 2020. Combining this with detailed information regarding their balance sheets and profit and loss accounts, we show that those that made more use of telework in 2019 were more productive on average and better withstood the crisis overall. They are also larger and relatively less capitalintensive, although they have relatively high fixed assets in the form of IT equipment and intangible assets when compared with other companies. The estimations show that a significant global increase in the use of telework in the long term could increase productivity by around 10%. The results also reveal the non-linear effects of telework on productivity. Companies that were already practising telework in 2019 were more likely than others to want to increase this in the future and those that were looking to do so were more likely to be planning an increase in their IT investment, as well as a change of premises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses a survey conducted in 2019 among companies in the manufacturing sector on the recruitment difficulties they may encounter. By linking this information with the companies' income statements, we show that those facing these difficulties are, on average and other things equal, more productive than others. This suggests a potential misallocation of production factors, which would not be attracted by the most efficient companies. A very simplified estimation suggests that these inefficiencies could reduce the average productivity in the manufacturing industry by around 0.10% to 0.15%, which is low. The survey also enables us to analyse the causes of these difficulties. In addition to the problems of matching supply and demand in terms of skill levels in the labour force, the wages offered and the competition with other companies also appear to be key factors behind recruitment problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study corporate real estate frictions and their effect on firm dynamics and labour demand. We build and simulate a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms that predicts the response of firms to a productivity shock in the presence of fixed adjustment costs on real estate. Using a large firm-level database merged with local real estate prices, we then exploit variations in the tax on capital gains to document a causal effect of adjustment costs on firms' labour demand and derive new results on the causes and implications of firms' local relocation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We identify two counteracting effects of credit access on productivity growth: on the one hand, better access to credit makes it easier for entrepreneurs to innovate; on the other hand, better credit access allows less efficient incumbent firms to remain longer on the market, thereby discouraging entry of new and potentially more efficient innovators. We first develop a simple model of firm dynamics and innovation‐based growth with credit constraints, where the above two counteracting effects generate an inverted‐U relationship between credit access and productivity growth. Then we test our theory on a comprehensive French manufacturing firm‐level dataset. We first show evidence of an inverted‐U relationship between credit constraints and productivity growth when we aggregate our data at the sectoral level. We then move to firm‐level analysis, and show that incumbent firms with easier access to credit experience higher productivity growth, but that they also experience lower exit rates, particularly the least productive firms among them. To support these findings, we exploit the 2012 Eurosystem's Additional Credit Claims programme as a quasi‐experiment that generated an exogenous extra supply of credits for a subset of incumbent firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The twentieth century was a period of exceptional growth, driven mainly by the increase in total factor productivity (TFP). Using a database of 17 OECD countries over the 1890-2013 period, this paper integrates production factor quality into the measure of TFP, namely by factoring the level of education of the working-age population into the measure of labor and the age of equipment in the measure of capital stock. We then estimate how the diffusion of technology impacts the growth of this newly measured TFP through two emblematic general purpose technologies, electricity and information and communication technologies (ICT). Using growth decomposition methodology from instrumental variable estimates, this paper finds that education levels contribute most significantly to growth, while the age of capital makes a limited, although significant, contribution. Quality-adjusted production factors explain less than half of labor productivity growth in the largest countries except for Japan, where capital deepening posted a very large contribution. As a consequence, the 'one big wave' of productivity growth (Gordon in Am Econ Rev 89(2):123-128, 1999), as well as the ICT productivity wave for the countries which experienced it, remains only partially explained by quality-adjusted factors, although education and technology diffusion contribute to explain the earlier wave in the USA in the 1930s-1940s. Finally, technology diffusion, as captured through our two general purpose technologies, leaves unexplained between 0.6 and 1 percentage point of yearly growth, as well as a large proportion of the two twentieth-century technology waves. These results both support a significant lag in the diffusion of general purpose technologies and raise further questions on a wider view on growth factors, including changes in the production process, management techniques and financing practices. Measurement problems may also contribute to the unexplained share of growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we extend some usual techniques of classification resulting from a large-scale data-mining and network approach. This new technology, which in particular is designed to be suitable to big data, is used to construct an open consolidated database from raw data on 4 million patents taken from the US patent office from 1976 onward. To build the pattern network, not only do we look at each patent title, but we also examine their full abstract and extract the relevant keywords accordingly. We refer to this classification as semantic approach in contrast with the more common technological approach which consists in taking the topology when considering US Patent office technological classes. Moreover, we document that both approaches have highly different topological measures and strong statistical evidence that they feature a different model. This suggests that our method is a useful tool to extract endogenous information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In order to examine productivity waves and convergence processes, we study productivity trends, trend breaks, and levels for 13 advanced countries between 1890 and 2012. We highlight two productivity waves, a big one following the second industrial revolution and a smaller one following the ICT revolution. The convergence process has been erratic, halted by inappropriate institutions, technology shocks, financial crises, and above all wars, which led to major productivity level leaps, downwards for countries experiencing war on their soil, and upwards for other countries. Productivity trend breaks have been identified following wars, global financial crises, global supply shocks, and major policy changes. The upward trend break for the U. S. in the mid-1990s has been confirmed, as has the downward trend break for the euro area in the same period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]