Search

The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) not only caused the COVID-19 pandemic but also had a major impact on farmed mink production in several European countries. In Denmark, the entire population of farmed mink (over 15 million animals) was culled in late 2020. During the period of June to November 2020, mink on 290 farms (out of about 1100 in the country) were shown to be infected with SARS-CoV-2. Genome sequencing identified changes in the virus within the mink and it is estimated that about 4000 people in Denmark became infected with these mink virus variants. However, the routes of transmission of the virus to, and from, the mink have been unclear. Phylogenetic analysis revealed the generation of multiple clusters of the virus within the mink. Detailed analysis of changes in the virus during replication in mink and, in parallel, in the human population in Denmark, during the same time period, has been performed here. The majority of cases in mink involved variants with the Y453F substitution and the H69/V70 deletion within the Spike (S) protein; these changes emerged early in the outbreak. However, further introductions of the virus, by variants lacking these changes, from the human population into mink also occurred. Based on phylogenetic analysis of viral genome data, we estimate, using a conservative approach, that about 17 separate examples of mink to human transmission occurred in Denmark but up to 59 such events (90% credible interval: (39–77)) were identified using parsimony to count cross-species jumps on transmission trees inferred using Bayesian methods. Using the latter approach, 136 jumps (90% credible interval: (117–164)) from humans to mink were found, which may underlie the farm-to-farm spread. Thus, transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from humans to mink, mink to mink, from mink to humans and between humans were all observed. Author summary: In addition to causing a pandemic in the human population, SARS-CoV-2 also infected farmed mink. In Denmark, after the first identification of infection in mink during June 2020, a decision was made in November 2020 to cull all the farmed mink. Within this outbreak, mink on 290 farms (out of about 1100 in the country) were found to have been infected. We showed, by analysis of the viruses from the mink, that the viruses on the farms were mainly of three different, but closely related, types (termed Clusters 2, 3 and 4) that shared certain distinctive features. Thus, we found that many outbreaks in mink resulted from transmission of the virus between mink farms. However, we identified that new introductions of other virus variants, presumably from infected humans, also occurred. Furthermore, we showed that spread of the virus from infected mink to humans also happened on multiple occasions. Thus, transmission of these viruses from humans to mink, mink to mink, from mink to humans and between humans were all observed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract This report provides an update of the epidemiology of African swine fever (ASF) in the European Union during the period November 2018 to October 2019. In this period, ASF has been confirmed in Slovakia, whereas Czechia became officially ASF‐free in March 2019, bringing the number of affected countries in the EU to nine. The report provides a narrative update of the situation in the different countries and an analysis of the temporal and spatial patterns of the disease. There has been no increase in the proportion of seropositive hunted wild boar in the affected areas. In hunted animals, the proportions of wild boar testing polymerase chain reaction‐positive and enzyme‐linked immunosorbent assay‐positive has remained low (

African swine fever virus (ASFV) is the causative agent of African swine fever, an economically important disease of pigs, often with a high case fatality rate. ASFV has demonstrated low genetic diversity among isolates collected within Eurasia. To explore the influence of viral variants on clinical outcomes and infection dynamics in pigs experimentally infected with ASFV, we have designed a deep sequencing strategy. The variant analysis revealed unique SNPs at <10% frequency in several infected pigs as well as some SNPs that were found in more than one pig. In addition, a deletion of 10,487 bp (resulting in the complete loss of 21 genes) was present at a nearly 100% frequency in the ASFV DNA from one pig at position 6362-16849. This deletion was also found to be present at low levels in the virus inoculum and in two other infected pigs. The current methodology can be used for the currently circulating Eurasian ASFVs and also adapted to other ASFV strains and genotypes. Comprehensive deep sequencing is critical for following ASFV molecular evolution, especially for the identification of modifications that affect virus virulence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Knowledge about African swine fever virus (ASFV) transmission and its survival in the environment is mandatory to develop rational control strategies and combat this serious disease in pigs. In this study, the risk that environmental contamination poses for infection of naïve pigs was investigated. Naïve pigs were introduced as sentinels into contaminated pens kept at ambient temperature (about 18–22˚C) either on the same day or up to 3 days after ASFV-infected pigs were removed. Three experiments were carried out in which four to six pigs per pen were inoculated with virulent ASFV isolates OURT88/1 (genotype I), Georgia 2007/1, or POL/2015/Podlaskie (genotype II), respectively. The majority of the inoculated pigs developed acute disease but with no evident haemorrhagic lesions or haemorrhagic diarrhoea and were culled at the predefined humane endpoint. The levels of ASFV DNA detected in the blood of the infected animals reached 107−9 genome copies/ml before euthanasia. Environmental swabs were taken from different surfaces in the animal rooms, as well as from faeces and urine, close to the time of introduction of the naïve animals. Relatively low quantities of virus DNA were detected in the environmental samples, in the range of 103−7 genome copies per swab or per gram and ml of faeces and urine. No infectious virus was recovered from these environmental samples. Neither clinical signs nor virus genomes were detected in the blood of any of the sentinel pigs over a period of 2 to 3 weeks after exposure, indicating that transmission from the ASFV-contaminated environment did not occur. Interestingly, viral DNA was detected in nasal and oral swabs from some of the sentinel animals at early days of exposure (ranging between 103.7−5.8 genome copies per swab), though none of them developed ASF. The results indicate a relatively low risk of ASFV transmission from a contaminated environment under the conditions provided in these experimental studies and in the absence of bloodshed from infected animals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

African swine fever virus (ASFV) causes severe hemorrhagic disease in domestic pigs and wild boar, often with high case fatality rates. The virus replicates in the circulating cells of the monocyte–macrophage lineage and within lymphoid tissues. The infection leads to high fever and a variety of clinical signs. In this study, it was observed that ASFV infection in pigs resulted in a >1000-fold increase in the level of circulating cell-free DNA (cfDNA), derived from the nuclei of host cells in the serum. This change occurred in parallel with the increase in circulating ASFV DNA. In addition, elevated levels (about 30-fold higher) of host mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) were detected in the serum from ASFV-infected pigs. For comparison, the release of the cellular enzyme, lactate dehydrogenase (LDH), a commonly used marker of cellular damage, was also found to be elevated during ASFV infection, but later and less consistently. The sera from pigs infected with classical swine fever virus (CSFV), which causes a clinically similar disease to ASFV, were also tested but, surprisingly, this infection did not result in the release of cfDNA, mtDNA, or LDH. It was concluded that the level of cfDNA in the serum is a sensitive host marker of virulent ASFV infection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is important to be able to detect and differentiate between distinct porcine enteric coronaviruses that can cause similar diseases. However, the existence of naturally occurring recombinant coronaviruses such as swine enteric coronavirus (SeCoV) can give misleading results with currently used diagnostic methods. Therefore, we have developed and validated three duplex real-time quantitative RT-PCR assays for the simultaneous detection of, and differentiation between, porcine epidemic diarrhea virus (PEDV) and SeCoV. Transmissible gastroenteritis virus (TGEV) is also detected by two out of these three assays. In addition, a novel triplex assay was set up that was able to detect and differentiate between these alphacoronaviruses and the porcine deltacoronavirus (PDCoV). The validated assays have low limits of detection, close to 100% efficiency, and were able to correctly identify the presence of PEDV and SeCoV in 55 field samples, whereas 20 samples of other pathogens did not give a positive result. Implementing one or more of these multiplex assays into the routine diagnostic surveillance for PEDV will ensure that the presence of SeCoV, TGEV, and PDCoV will not go unnoticed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A seasonal trend of African swine fever (ASF) outbreaks in domestic pig farms has been observed in affected regions of Eastern Europe. Most outbreaks have been observed during the warmer summer months, coinciding with the seasonal activity pattern of blood-feeding insects. These insects may offer a route for introduction of the ASF virus (ASFV) into domestic pig herds. In this study, insects (hematophagous flies) collected outside the buildings of a domestic pig farm, without ASFV-infected pigs, were analyzed for the presence of the virus. Using qPCR, ASFV DNA was detected in six insect pools; in four of these pools, DNA from suid blood was also identified. This detection coincided with ASFV being reported in the wild boar population within a 10 km radius of the pig farm. These findings show that blood from ASFV-infected suids was present within hematophagous flies on the premises of a pig farm without infected animals and support the hypothesis that blood-feeding insects can potentially transport the virus from wild boars into domestic pig farms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background. DNA of African swine fever virus (ASFV) has previously been detected in hematophagous insects on ASF outbreak farms. However, it remains unclear whether the viral DNA derived from blood meals that originated from pigs on the outbreak farm or was introduced from infected domestic pigs or wild boar sources located outside of the outbreak farm. Methods. We caught 644 hematophagous insects on the windows at two non-outbreak high-biosecurity pig farms (i.e., without ASFV-infected pigs) using plastic meshes coated with sticky glue, as well as 3576 hematophagous insects using H-traps on or around the farms. Using PCR analyses, we identified which insects were present, whether these hematophagous insects carried blood from an external (exogenous) source and if the blood contained ASFV DNA. Results. We found blood meals with ASFV DNA in one pool of five Haematopota spp. in the H-traps. From the window traps, we found 0–2.7% of Haematopota spp., Stomoxys calcitrans, and Aedes spp. carrying blood meals from exogenous sources into the farms. Some insects carried bovine blood; the closest registered source for this was 2500m from the pig farm. Conclusion. Hematophagous insects carrying ASFV-positive blood meals or blood meals from exogenous sources seem to be attracted to high-biosecurity pig farms and attempt to enter them through their windows. Despite the small percentage of insects carrying blood and the small amounts carried by each insect, the large numbers of insects result in a sufficient volume of exogenous blood, potentially containing ASFV, to constitute a non-negligible risk for ASFV-introduction into unprotected pig stables. This study is the first to provide quantitative data on the number of hematophagous insects trying to enter high-biosecurity pig farms. It is also the first to provide information about the origin of their blood meals, indicating that insect-borne introduction of blood containing ASFV into high-biosecurity pig farms is possible and, therefore, could potentially be responsible for some of the outbreaks observed during the summer peaks of infection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Insect production offers a sustainable source of nutrients for livestock. This comes with a risk for transmission of pathogens from the insects into the livestock sector, including viruses causing serious diseases, such as African swine fever virus (ASFV), classical swine fever virus and foot-and-mouth disease virus. ASFV is known to survive for a long time within animal meat and byproducts. Therefore, we conducted experimental exposure studies of insects to ASFV using larvae of two key insect species produced for food and feed, the mealworm; Tenebrio molitor, and the black soldier fly, Hermetia illucens. The larvae were exposed to ASFV POL/2015/Podlaskie, via oral uptake of serum or spleen material from ASFV-infected pigs. Using qPCR, the amounts of viral DNA present immediately after exposure varied from ~104.7 to 107.2 genome copies per insect. ASFV DNA was detectable in the larvae of H. illucens for up to 3 days post exposure and in T. molitor larvae for up to 9 days post exposure. To assess the presence of infectious virus within the larvae and with this, the risk of virus transmission via oral consumption, pigs were fed cakes containing larvae exposed to ASFV. Pigs that consumed 50 T. molitor or 50 H. illucens virus-exposed larvae did not become infected with ASFV. Thus, it appears, that in our experimental setting, the risk of ASFV transmission via consumption of unprocessed insect larvae, used as feed, is low. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Porcine epidemic diarrhea virus (PEDV), belonging to the genus Alphacoronavirus, can cause serious disease in pigs of all ages, especially in suckling pigs. Differences in virulence have been observed between various strains of this virus. In this study, four pigs were inoculated with PEDV from Germany (intestine/intestinal content collected from pigs in 2016) and four pigs with PEDV from Italy (intestine/intestinal material collected from pigs in 2016). The pigs were re-inoculated with the same virus on multiple occasions to create a more robust infection and enhance the antibody responses. The clinical signs and pathological changes observed were generally mild. Two distinct peaks of virus excretion were seen in the group of pigs inoculated with the PEDV from Germany, while only one strong peak was seen for the group of pigs that received the virus from Italy. Seroconversion was seen by days 18 and 10 post-inoculation with PEDV in all surviving pigs from the groups that received the inoculums from Germany and Italy, respectively. Attempts to infect pigs with a swine enteric coronavirus (SeCoV) from Slovakia were unsuccessful, and no signs of infection were observed in the inoculated animals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

African swine fever virus (ASFV) continues to spread across the world, and currently, there are no treatments or vaccines available to combat this virus. Reliable estimates of transmission parameters for ASFV are therefore needed to establish effective contingency plans. This study used data from controlled ASFV inoculations of pigs to assess the transmission parameters. Three models were developed with (binary, piecewise‐linear and exponential) time‐dependent levels of infectiousness based on latency periods of 3–5 days derived from the analysis of 294 ethylenediamine tetraacetic acid–stabilized blood samples originating from 16 pigs with direct and 10 pigs with indirect contact to 8 inoculated pigs. The models were evaluated for three different discrete latency periods of infection. The likelihood ratio test showed that a binary model had an equally good fit for a latency period of 4 or 5 days as the piecewise‐linear and exponential model. However, for a latency period of 3 days, the piecewise‐linear and exponential models had the best fit. The modelling was done in discrete time as testing was conducted on specific days. The main contribution of this study is the estimation of ASFV genotype II transmission through the air in a confined space. The estimated transmission parameters via air are not much lower than for direct contact between pigs. The estimated parameters should be useful for future simulations of control measures against ASFV. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

African swine fever virus (ASFV) has become a global threat to the pig production industry and has caused enormous economic losses in many countries in recent years. Peripheral blood mononuclear cells (PBMCs) from pigs infected with ASFV not only express ASFV genes (almost 200 in number) but have altered patterns of host gene expression as well. Both up- and down-regulation of host cell gene expression can be followed using RNAseq on poly(A)+ mRNAs harvested from the PBMCs of pigs collected at different times post-infection. Consistent with the time course of changes in viral gene expression, only few and limited changes in host gene expression were detected at 3 days post-infection (dpi), but by 6 dpi, marked changes in the expression of over 1300 host genes were apparent. This was co-incident with the major increase in viral gene expression. The majority of the changes in host gene expression were up-regulation, but many down-regulated genes were also identified. The patterns of changes in gene expression within the PBMCs detected by RNAseq were similar in each of the four infected pigs. Furthermore, changes in the expression of about twenty selected host genes, known to be important in host defence and inflammatory responses, were confirmed using high-throughput microfluidic qPCR assays. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

African swine fever is an important viral disease of wild and domestic pigs. To gain further knowledge of the properties of the currently circulating African swine fever virus (ASFV), experimental infections of young pigs (approximately 8 weeks of age) and pregnant sows (infected at about 100 days of gestation) with the genotype II ASFV Georgia/2007 were performed. The inoculated young pigs developed typical clinical signs of the disease and the infection was transmitted (usually within 3–4 days) to all of the "in contact" animals that shared the same pen. Furthermore, typical pathogical lesions for ASFV infection were found at necropsy. Inoculation of pregnant sows with the same virus also produced rapid onset of disease from post-infection day three; two of the three sows died suddenly on post-infection day five, while the third was euthanized on the same day for animal welfare reasons. Following necropsy, the presence of ASFV DNA was detected in tonsils, spleen and lymph nodes of some of the fetuses, but the levels of viral DNA were much lower than in these tissues from the sows. Thus, only limited transplacental transmission occurred during the course of this experiment. These studies contribute towards further understanding about the spread of this important viral disease in domestic pigs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

African swine fever is a viral disease of the family Suidae. Methods to detect and quantify African swine fever virus (ASFV) include qPCR and virus infectivity assays. Individual laboratories often use in-house procedures for these assays, which can hamper the comparison of results. The objective of this study was to estimate the probability of ASFV detection using these assays, and to determine the inter-test correlations between results. This was achieved by testing a panel of 80 samples at three reference laboratories. Samples were analysed using nucleic acid extraction and qPCR, as well as virus infectivity assays. For qPCR, a very high probability (ranging from 0.96 to 1.0) of detecting ASFV DNA was observed for all tested systems. For virus infectivity assays in cells, the probability of detecting infectious ASFV varied from 0.68 to 0.90 and was highest using pulmonary alveolar macrophages, followed by MARC145 cells, peripheral blood monocytes, and finally wild boar lung cells. Intraclass correlation coefficient estimates of 0.97 (0.96–0.98) between qPCR methods, 0.80 (0.74–0.85) to 0.94 (0.92–0.96) between virus infectivity assays, and 0.77 (0.68–0.83) to 0.95 (0.93–0.96) between qPCR methods and virus infectivity assays were obtained. These findings show that qPCR gives the highest probability for the detection of ASFV. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mink, on a farm with about 15,000 animals, became infected with SARS-CoV-2. Over 75% of tested animals were positive for SARS-CoV-2 RNA in throat swabs and 100% of tested animals were seropositive. The virus responsible had a deletion of nucleotides encoding residues H69 and V70 within the spike protein gene as well as the A22920T mutation, resulting in the Y453F substitution within this protein, seen previously in mink. The infected mink recovered and after free-testing of 300 mink (a level giving 93% confidence of detecting a 1% prevalence), the animals remained seropositive. During further follow-up studies, after a period of more than 2 months without any virus detection, over 75% of tested animals again scored positive for SARS-CoV-2 RNA. Whole genome sequencing showed that the viruses circulating during this re-infection were most closely related to those identified in the first outbreak on this farm but additional sequence changes had occurred. Animals had much higher levels of anti-SARS-CoV-2 antibodies in serum samples after the second round of infection than at free-testing or during recovery from initial infection, consistent with a boosted immune response. Thus, it was concluded that following recovery from an initial infection, seropositive mink were readily re-infected by SARS-CoV-2. Author summary: Early on, in the course of SARS-CoV-2 infections among mink in Denmark, we identified a farm, with about 15,000 mink, that had virus-infected animals. At this time, we found that a very high proportion of the mink had been infected and made antibodies against the virus. In contrast to the three previously infected farms, the mink were allowed to recover (the mink had shown few signs of disease and only low mortality) and our testing demonstrated the absence of circulating virus. Continued screening, in the following weeks, supported the absence of infection in the mink but the maintenance of antibodies against the virus. However, less than 3 months after the initial infection, we again identified the presence of virus in some dead mink from this farm and in many live mink. The viruses responsible for this second wave of infection were slightly different from those found in the first wave but were closer to each other than to the SARS-CoV-2s found on other mink farms. The antibody levels in mink during this second wave of infection were much higher than observed after the initial infection. We concluded that the initial round of infection in mink was insufficient to confer protection against re-infection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In addition to humans, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) can transmit to animals that include hamsters, cats, dogs, mink, ferrets, tigers, lions, cynomolgus macaques, rhesus macaques, and treeshrew. Among these, mink are particularly susceptible. Indeed, 10 countries in Europe and North America reported SARS-CoV-2 infection among mink on fur farms. In Denmark, SARS-CoV-2 spread rapidly among mink farms and spilled-over back into humans, acquiring mutations/deletions with unknown consequences for virulence and antigenicity. Here we describe a mink-associated SARS-CoV-2 variant (Cluster 5) characterized by 11 amino acid substitutions and four amino acid deletions relative to Wuhan-Hu-1. Temporal virus titration, together with genomic and subgenomic viral RNA quantitation, demonstrated a modest in vitro fitness attenuation of the Cluster 5 virus in the Vero-E6 cell line. Potential alterations in antigenicity conferred by amino acid changes in the spike protein that include three substitutions (Y453F, I692V, and M1229I) and a loss of two amino acid residues 69 and 70 (ΔH69/V70), were evaluated in a virus microneutralization assay. Compared to a reference strain, the Cluster 5 variant showed reduced neutralization in a proportion of convalescent human COVID-19 samples. The findings underscore the need for active surveillance SARS-CoV-2 infection and virus evolution in susceptible animal hosts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract The surface exposed capsid proteins, VP1, VP2 and VP3, of foot-and-mouth disease virus (FMDV) determine its antigenicity and the ability of the virus to interact with host-cell receptors. Hence, modification of these structural proteins may alter the properties of the virus. In the present study we compared the pathogenicity of different FMDVs in young pigs. In total 32 pigs, 7-weeks-old, were exposed to virus, either by direct inoculation or through contact with inoculated pigs, using cell culture adapted (O1K B64), chimeric (O1K/A-TUR and O1K/O-UKG) or field strain (O-UKG/34/2001) viruses. The O1K B64 virus and the two chimeric viruses are identical to each other except for the capsid coding region. Animals exposed to O1K B64 did not exhibit signs of disease, while pigs exposed to each of the other viruses showed typical clinical signs of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD). All pigs infected with the O1K/O-UKG chimera or the field strain (O-UKG/34/2001) developed fulminant disease. Furthermore, 3 of 4 in-contact pigs exposed to the O1K/O-UKG virus died in the acute phase of infection, likely from myocardial infection. However, in the group exposed to the O1K/A-TUR chimeric virus, only 1 pig showed symptoms of disease within the time frame of the experiment (10 days). All pigs that developed clinical disease showed a high level of viral RNA in serum and infected pigs that survived the acute phase of infection developed a serotype specific antibody response. It is concluded that the capsid coding sequences are determinants of FMDV pathogenicity in pigs.

Abstract Background Myxoma virus is a member of the Poxviridae and causes disease in European rabbits. Laboratory confirmation of the clinical disease, which occurs in the autumn of most years in Denmark, has been achieved previously using antigen ELISA and electron microscopy. Results An unusually large number of clinically suspected cases of myxomatosis were observed in Denmark during 2007. Myxoma virus DNA was detected, using a new real time PCR assay which targets the M029L gene, in over 70% of the clinical samples submitted for laboratory confirmation. Unexpectedly, further analysis revealed that a high proportion of these viral DNA preparations contained a frame-shift mutation within the M135R gene that has previously been identified as a virulence factor. This frame-shift mutation results in expression of a greatly truncated product. The same frame-shift mutation has also been found recently within an avirulent strain of myxoma virus (6918). However, three other frame-shift mutations found in this strain (in the genes M009L, M036L and M148R) were not shared with the Danish viruses but a single nucleotide deletion in the M138R/M139R intergenic region was a common feature. Conclusions It appears that expression of the full-length myxoma virus M135R protein is not required for virulence in rabbits. Hence, the frame-shift mutation in the M135R gene in the nonpathogenic 6918 virus strain is not sufficient to explain the attenuation of this myxoma virus but one/some of the other frame-shift mutations alone or in conjunction with one/some of the thirty two amino acid substitutions must also contribute. The real time PCR assay for myxoma virus is a useful diagnostic tool for laboratory confirmation of suspected cases of myxomatosis.

Abstract Background In a previous study, it was demonstrated that high replication of Porcine circovirus 2 (PCV2) in a gnotobiotic pig was correlated with the absence of PCV2-neutralizing antibodies. The aim of the present study was to investigate if this correlation could also be found in SPF pigs in which PMWS was experimentally reproduced and in naturally PMWS-affected pigs. Results When looking at the total anti-PCV2 antibody titres, PMWS-affected and healthy animals seroconverted at the same time point, and titres in PMWS-affected animals were only slightly lower compared to those in healthy animals. In healthy animals, the evolution of PCV2-neutralizing antibodies coincided with that of total antibodies. In PMWS-affected animals, neutralizing antibodies could either not be found (sera from field studies) or were detected in low titres between 7 and 14 DPI only (sera from experimentally inoculated SPF pigs). Differences were also found in the evolution of specific antibody isotypes titres against PCV2. In healthy pigs, IgM antibodies persisted until the end of the study, whereas in PMWS-affected pigs they quickly decreased or remained present at low titres. The mean titres of other antibody isotypes (IgG1, IgG2 and IgA), were slightly lower in PMWS-affected pigs compared to their healthy group mates at the end of each study. Conclusion This study describes important differences in the development of the humoral immune response between pigs that get subclinically infected with PCV2 and pigs that experience a high level of PCV2-replication which in 3 of 4 experiments led to the development of PMWS. These observations may contribute to a better understanding of the pathogenesis of a PCV2-infection.

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 has caused a pandemic in humans. Farmed mink (Neovison vison) are also susceptible. In Denmark, this virus has spread rapidly among farmed mink, resulting in some respiratory disease. Full-length virus genome sequencing revealed novel virus variants in mink. These variants subsequently appeared within the local human community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following its introduction into Georgia in 2007, African swine fever virus (ASFV) has become widespread on the European continent and in Asia. In many cases, the exact route of introduction into domestic pig herds cannot be determined, but most introductions are attributed to indirect virus transmission. In this review, we describe knowledge gained about different matrices that may allow introduction of the virus into pig herds. These matrices include uncooked pig meat, processed pig‐derived products, feed, matrices contaminated with the virus and blood‐feeding invertebrates. Knowledge gaps still exist, and both field studies and laboratory research are needed to enhance understanding of the risks for ASFV introductions, especially via virus‐contaminated materials, including bedding and feed, and via blood‐feeding, flying insects. Knowledge obtained from such studies can be applied to epidemiological risk assessments for the different transmission routes. Such assessments can be utilized to help predict the most effective biosecurity and control strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The mechanisms underlying virus emergence are rarely well understood, making the appearance of outbreaks largely unpredictable. Bluetongue virus serotype 8 (BTV-8), an arthropod-borne virus of ruminants, emerged in livestock in northern Europe in 2006, spreading to most European countries by 2009 and causing losses of billions of euros. Although the outbreak was successfully controlled through vaccination by early 2010, puzzlingly, a closely related BTV-8 strain re-emerged in France in 2015, triggering a second outbreak that is still ongoing. The origin of this virus and the mechanisms underlying its re-emergence are unknown. Here, we performed phylogenetic analyses of 164 whole BTV-8 genomes sampled throughout the two outbreaks. We demonstrate consistent clock-like virus evolution during both epizootics but found negligible evolutionary change between them. We estimate that the ancestor of the second outbreak dates from the height of the first outbreak in 2008. This implies that the virus had not been replicating for multiple years prior to its re-emergence in 2015. Given the absence of any known natural mechanism that could explain BTV-8 persistence over this long period without replication, we hypothesise that the second outbreak could have been initiated by accidental exposure of livestock to frozen material contaminated with virus from approximately 2008. Our work highlights new targets for pathogen surveillance programmes in livestock and illustrates the power of genomic epidemiology to identify pathways of infectious disease emergence. Disease epidemics can be man-made: Molecular clocks and genomic data for an economically important livestock virus reveal that a current European outbreak may have been caused by accidental release, rather than natural transmission. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This report provides an update of the epidemiology of African swine fever (ASF) in the European Union during the period November 2018 to October 2019. In this period, ASF has been confirmed in Slovakia, whereas Czechia became officially ASF-free in March 2019, bringing the number of affected countries in the EU to nine. The report provides a narrative update of the situation in the different countries and an analysis of the temporal and spatial patterns of the disease. There has been no increase in the proportion of seropositive hunted wild boar in the affected areas. In hunted animals, the proportions of wild boar testing polymerase chain reaction-positive and enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay-positive has remained low (< 0.05). In addition to the obvious seasonal peak in summer in domestic pigs, seasonality of ASF in wild boar was statistically confirmed. A network analysis demonstrated that the median velocity of the natural propagation of the disease in wild boar populations was between 2.9 and 11.7 km/year. Human-mediated spread, both in pigs and wild boar, however, remains important. Several wild boar- and domestic pig-related risk factors for ASF occurrence in non-commercial farms in Romania were identified with a case–control study. This report also updates an extensive literature review on control measures to stop the spread of the disease in wild boar and on measures to separate wild boar populations. Several new studies have been identified in this reporting period, but these did not alter the conclusions of the previous reporting period. Field experience with the use of fences as part of the control strategy deployed in the Belgian focal outbreak of ASF in wild boar is described. So far, the measures have proven effective to keep ASF virus inside the affected area. This strategy included a combination of different measures, namely zoning, carcass removal, a complete feeding ban, specific hunting regulations and depopulation actions depending on the zone, a partial ban of people and logging, and setting up a network of concentric fences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Within Eastern Europe, African swine fever virus (ASFV) has unexpectedly spread to farms with high biosecurity. In an attempt to explain this process, pigs were allowed to ingest flies that had fed on ASFV‐spiked blood, which had a realistic titre for an infected pig. Some of the pigs became infected with the virus. Thus, ingestion of blood‐sucking flies, having fed on ASFV‐infected wild boar before entering stables, represents a potential route for disease transmission. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bat populations harbour a multitude of viruses; some of these are pathogenic or potentially pathogenic in other animals or humans. Therefore, it is important to monitor the populations and characterize these viruses. In this study, the presence of coronaviruses (CoVs) in different species of Danish bats was investigated using active surveillance at different geographical locations in Denmark. Faecal samples were screened for the presence of CoVs using pan-CoV real-time RT-PCR assays. The amplicons, obtained from five different species of bats, were sequenced. Phylogenetic analysis revealed a species-specific clustering with the samples from Myotis daubentonii, showing a close resemblance to coronavirus sequences obtained from the same species of bat in Germany and the United Kingdom. Our results show, for the first time, that multiple, distinct alphacoronaviruses are present in the Danish bat populations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Commission requested EFSA to compare the reliability of wild boar density estimates across the EU and to provide guidance to improve data collection methods. Currently, the only EU-wide available data are hunting data. Their collection methods should be harmonised to be comparable and to improve predictive models for wild boar density. These models could be validated by more precise density data, collected at local level e.g. by camera trapping. Based on practical and theoretical considerations, it is currently not possible to establish wild boar density thresholds that do not allow sustaining African swine fever (ASF). There are many drivers determining if ASF can be sustained or not, including heterogeneous population structures and human-mediated spread and there are still unknowns on the importance of different transmission modes in the epidemiology. Based on extensive literature reviews and observations from affected Member States, the efficacy of different wild boar population reduction and separation methods is evaluated. Different wild boar management strategies at different stages of the epidemic are suggested. Preventive measures to reduce and stabilise wild boar density, before ASF introduction, will be beneficial both in reducing the probability of exposure of the population to ASF and the efforts needed for potential emergency actions (i.e. less carcass removal) if an ASF incursion were to occur. Passive surveillance is the most effective and efficient method of surveillance for early detection of ASF in free areas. Following focal ASF introduction, the wild boar populations should be kept undisturbed for a short period (e.g. hunting ban on all species, leave crops unharvested to provide food and shelter within the affected area) and drastic reduction of the wild boar population may be performed only ahead of the ASF advance front, in the free populations. Following the decline in the epidemic, as demonstrated through passive surveillance, active population management should be reconsidered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This guidance defines the process for handling applications on new or modified stunning methods and the parameters that will be assessed by the EFSA Animal Health and Welfare (AHAW) Panel. The applications, received through the European Commission, should contain administrative information, a checklist of data to be submitted and a technical dossier. The dossier should include two or more studies (in laboratory and slaughterhouse conditions) reporting all parameters and methodological aspects that are indicated in the guidance. The applications will first be scrutinised by the EFSA's Applications Desk (APDESK) Unit for verification of the completeness of the data submitted for the risk assessment of the stunning method. If the application is considered not valid, additional information may be requested from the applicant. If considered valid, it will be subjected to assessment phase 1 where the data related to parameters for the scientific evaluation of the stunning method will be examined by the AHAW Panel. Such parameters focus on the stunning method and the outcomes of interest, i.e. immediate onset of unconsciousness or the absence of avoidable pain, distress and suffering until the loss of consciousness and duration of the unconsciousness (until death). The applicant should also propose methodologies and results to assess the equivalence with existing stunning methods in terms of welfare outcomes. Applications passing assessment phase 1 will be subjected to the following phase 2 which will be carried out by the AHAW Panel and focuses on the animal welfare risk assessment. In this phase, the Panel will assess the outcomes, conclusions and discussion proposed by the applicant. The results of the assessment will be published in a scientific opinion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Batrachochytrium salamandrivorans (Bsal) is an emerging fungal pathogen of salamanders. Despite limited surveillance, Bsal was detected in kept salamanders populations in Belgium, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, and in wild populations in some regions of Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. According to niche modelling, at least part of the distribution range of every salamander species in Europe overlaps with the climate conditions predicted to be suitable for Bsal. Passive surveillance is considered the most suitable approach for detection of Bsal emergence in wild populations. Demonstration of Bsal absence is considered feasible only in closed populations of kept susceptible species. In the wild, Bsal can spread by both active (e.g. salamanders, anurans) and passive (e.g. birds, water) carriers; it is most likely maintained/spread in infected areas by contacts of salamanders or by interactions with anurans, whereas human activities most likely cause Bsal entry into new areas and populations. In kept amphibians, Bsal contamination via live silent carriers (wild birds and anurans) is considered extremely unlikely. The risk‐mitigation measures that were considered the most feasible and effective: (i) for ensuring safer international or intra‐EU trade of live salamanders, are: ban or restrictions on salamander imports, hygiene procedures and good practice manuals; (ii) for protecting kept salamanders from Bsal, are: identification and treatment of positive collections; (iii) for on‐site protection of wild salamanders, are: preventing translocation of wild amphibians and release/return to the wild of kept/temporarily housed wild salamanders, and setting up contact points/emergency teams for passive surveillance. Combining several risk‐mitigation measures improve the overall effectiveness. It is recommended to: introduce a harmonised protocol for Bsal detection throughout the EU; improve data acquisition on salamander abundance and distribution; enhance passive surveillance activities; increase public and professionals’ awareness; condition any movement of captive salamanders on Bsal known health status. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Porcine epidemic diarrhoea virus, strain CV777, was initially characterized in 1978 as the causative agent of a disease first identified in the UK in 1971. This coronavirus has been widely distributed among laboratories and has been passaged both within pigs and in cell culture. To determine the variability between different stocks of the PEDV strain CV777, sequencing of the full-length genome (ca. 28kb) has been performed in 6 different laboratories, using different protocols. Not surprisingly, each of the different full genome sequences were distinct from each other and from the reference sequence (Accession number AF353511) but they are >99% identical. Unique and shared differences between sequences were identified. The coding region for the surface-exposed spike protein showed the highest proportion of variability including both point mutations and small deletions. The predicted expression of the ORF3 gene product was more dramatically affected in three different variants of this virus through either loss of the initiation codon or gain of a premature termination codon. The genome of one isolate had a substantially rearranged 5´-terminal sequence. This rearrangement was validated through the analysis of sub-genomic mRNAs from infected cells. It is clearly important to know the features of the specific sample of CV777 being used for experimental studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 on the protection of animals at the time of killing lists in Annex I the stunning interventions currently allowed in the EU, together with the related conditions under which those interventions can be implemented. The regulation allows the Commission to amend Annex I, listing additional stunning interventions, provided they ensure a level of animal welare at least equivalent to that ensured by the one already approved. EFSA was requested to perform such assessment with regard to the implementation of the low atmospheric pressure stunning (LAPS) system on broiler chickens. The ad hoc Working Group (WG) set up by EFSA performed the assessment in three main steps, i.e. checking the data provided against the criteria laid down in the EFSA Guidance (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2013); running an extensive literature search, followed by data extraction and performing a judgemental ranking exercise based on expert opinion. As main outcome, the LAPS intervention was found to be able to provide a level of animal welfare not lower than that provided by at least one of the currently allowed methods. The overall assessment of EFSA is valid ONLY under the technical conditions described in the submission and for broiler chickens, intended for human consumption, weighting less than 4 kg. Deviations from these conditions might have different consequences for animal welfare which were not assessed in this exercise. The LAPS method may, in addition to commercial slaughter, be suitable for depopulation, respecting the technical conditions defined in the present conclusions. The WG considers that a revision of the present version of the EFSA Guidance could be beneficial. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]