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Political competition in Africa is often characterized as suffering from a number of deficiencies at the level of political discourse and electoral campaigns, which together paint a picture of an essentially vacuous political life. This article contends that these absences are to some degree methodologically generated. If African political actors appear to have little substance to say about the most pressing social and economic issue of the day, then perhaps as scholars of politics we are looking at what they say in the wrong way? This article points to the limitations of an increasingly popular method of discourse analysis in African politics based on coding political statements within a framework that contrasts valence politics with a position-based appeals framework. It argues for an alternative more contextualized, inductive method of analysing political discourse as the struggle to control the meaning of key terms, using the example highly contested gubernatorial election in Nigeria's southwest. Debates over "stomach infrastructure" and a "hierarchy of needs" reveal the possibility that political discourse and electoral campaigning that on more mechanistic methodologies look devoid of substantive political contestation in fact contain competing conceptions of development and what the state should do. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Campaign costs have risen in Africa. I ask: what has driven this cost inflation? Studies of Western parties attribute it to campaign modernization as mediatization. Studies of African parties do not recognize this campaign advancement. They attribute these it to another cause: spiraling clientelism. I argue that there is a third, hitherto overlooked driver of such inflation and adaptation: the hybridization of rallies with capital-intensive practices. This capitalization of rally production amounts to an alternative form of campaign modernization which diverges from those found in the global north. I trace this process in Tanzania, but this theory has wider reach. Many African campaigns are rally-intensive and have fewer authoritarian retardants of party competition than Tanzania. This makes it likely that other countries' experiences resembled or surpassed Tanzania's in Africa and beyond. Altogether, I demonstrate that there is ongoing innovation at rallies which is driving significant rises in campaign costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent advances in text-as-data provide new opportunities to document how elites shape public discourse on contentious issues. Using a novel word embeddings approach to measure elite-driven political narratives in local news, we analyze Kenyan newspaper coverage of the International Criminal Court's (ICC) prosecutions against domestic leaders. We train our embeddings on an original corpus of 5,292 Kenyan newspaper articles from 2007 to 2020 and identify significant changes in how local media vilifies the ICC before, during, and after major investigations. We find that as the case progressed, the ICC became more strongly associated with terms of bias and illegitimacy, an association that quickly dissipated after the court terminated its last proceeding. Our approach illustrates the utility of text-based measures of political sentiment on contentious issues, with implications for research on media narratives, the effects of controversial jurisprudence on public discourse, and backlash against international institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 1990s, seventeen African states have added a second chamber to their legislatures. This sudden trend is puzzling for two reasons. First, bicameral legislatures have decreased by 33 percent worldwide. Second, although upper houses often aim to improve democratic representation, descriptive statistics suggest these institutional changes were not due to democratic or representative pressures. The changes occurred primarily in hybrid regimes. What explains this resurgence of bicameral legislatures in Africa? I argue that incumbents introduce a second chamber when the opposition has sufficient power in the lower chamber to contain the executive branch. I adopt a mixed-methods approach combining statistical analysis and two case studies of Côte d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe. I find that African incumbents have created a second chamber to (1) weaken the legislature as a whole and the opposition in particular and (2) manage intra-party dissent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The problem of massive socio-political and economic corruption in Nigeria bring to the foreground the need for moral rebirth or re-evaluation. The concept of Ubuntu in Ramose, as an African holistic humanism elicits the need for African brotherhood and the need for the enthronement the summun bonum of the people in Nigeria. Nigeria as a country has been bedeviled by a myriad of fundamental politico-developmental malaise that impede its development. Given the above, this paper proposes that the concept of Ubuntu if well natured and nurtured could serve as a springboard for responsible governance in Nigeria. It also adopts the analytical framework in discussing the contemporary and the politicoepietemological relevance of Ubuntu to the Nigerian democratic setting. The findings of this paper is that the concept of Ubuntu requires the need for democratic accountability, common engagement and effective leadership structure that is people-oriented. It is a reflection of African holistic humanism. This arises from the fact that Ubuntu is not based on the Western notion of individualism but fundamentally inspired by the principle of African communalism. Thus it concludes that the concept of Ubuntu presupposes an ontological, metaphysical and politico-epistemological imperative for African politics and development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How is social media used in African elections and what is its impact? This article builds on existing research on the role of social media in African elections to argue that its impact is linked to its interaction with traditional media and pre-existing political features of a country. Drawing on original survey data, Afrobarometer data, and content analysis of social media pages of the two main presidential candidates – William Ruto and Raila Odinga – and a selection of allied political influencers' accounts, we explore the use of social media in Kenya's 2022 presidential election campaigns. This article highlights how a complex media and electoral landscape incentivised candidates to adopt a segmentation strategy online. Through this strategy, the dissemination of negative information was delegated to social media influencers to avoid alienating undecided voters, while candidate's main pages were curated to publicise policy and cultivate a positive public image. In this regard, African politicians' innovative use of social media was shaped by both normative and contextual political factors. We outline how social media affords new avenues for electioneering that may mask old habits, and we encourage researchers to look beyond official campaign accounts when assessing the impact of social media on elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The phenomenon of elected representatives ditching the political party on whose ticket they were elected for another party constitutes a problem for representative democracy. Especially in settings where identity politics is reportedly common, it is important to interrogate whether voters simply follow their politicians to a new party. This article examines public responses to party switching in Nigeria, drawing from a nationwide representative survey of 1,023 participants against existing debates on ethno-religious and money politics. The author argues that while identity and money politics do have some influence on electoral choices, Nigerian voters generally disapprove of party switchers, except those with a prior track record of good performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding political and social effects of violence in local populations through public opinion surveys has become increasingly common internationally. Yet while researchers are attuned to possible challenges induced during survey implementation, this work focuses almost uniformly on respondents. This paper considers survey enumerators as critical actors for data collection in violent research settings. We present survey results from 245 enumerators in Cote d ˆ ’Ivoire to show that their personal feelings of insecurity and exposure to violence while conducting surveys may condition challenges faced and compromises made to gathering data. We shed light on how academic research in violent political settings poses unique security concerns for enumerators, with ramifications for data integrity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are there electoral consequences for elected politicians who switch from one party to another? Existing research on this question discovered that switchers often perform worse in elections than non-switchers because voters are suspicious of their intentions, especially in older democracies. Nonetheless, few robust studies have been conducted on this in Africa amidst concerns of weak party institutionalization and voters' passivism, despite the prevalence of switching on the continent and copious existing research on the issue on other continents. I conducted a nationwide representative survey gauging voters' response to party switching and analysed an original dataset on party switching among African MPs, using Nigeria with over 200 cases of party defection within eight years as a case study. I discovered party switchers in Nigeria, Africa's biggest democracy, performed worse in elections compared to non-switchers, with significant implications for our understanding of voting behaviour in Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars have argued that multiparty elections have a profound and immediate influence on mass evaluations of political support. However, what is less clear is whether the effects of elections are short lived or long lasting. Investigating dynamic effects of elections on mass perceptions of political regimes has profound implications on popular foundations of democratic consolidation in an era of democratic backsliding. This article examines electoral cycles in citizens' satisfaction with democracy (SWD)—an important dimension of political support—in multiparty regimes. First, we argue that proximity to elections enhances SWD because campaigns and elections include several processes that reduce the costs and increase the benefits of citizen engagement with the political system. This results in a bell‐shaped relationship between citizens' proximity to elections and SWD. Second, we contend that electoral cycles in SWD should vary by the quality of elections and citizens' winner/loser status. We examine these hypotheses using Afrobarometer data in 34 multiparty regimes between 1999 and 2015 finding compelling support. SWD is higher among respondents surveyed closer to elections, while electoral cycles in SWD are more prominent among winners and around low‐quality elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper challenges existing analyses of party cleavages in Sub-Saharan Africa which over-emphasise the centrality of ethnicity. Parties express ideological positions that reflect the socio-economic interests of specific regions, which, especially in Zambia, coincide with particular ethnic groups. We demonstrate this through an examination of party manifestos, policy documents and semi-structured interviews with members of two political parties in Zambia – the Patriotic Front and the United Party for National Development. These parties express clear normative ideas about social welfare, especially the role of the state in providing social assistance to the poorest. These ideological positions reflect the socio-economic interests of the ethnic groups and regions where support for each party is dominant. These are shaped by the ways in which these regions were historically incorporated into the colonial economy. In order to gain a better understanding of African politics, ethnicity must be conceptualised as a socio-cultural construct and situated historically. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: Taxation is crucial for revenue, political participation, and the demand for accountability in Africa. Most existing theories do not predict tax attitudes in informal economies with weak institutional capacity nor do they demonstrate how service delivery translates to stronger tax regimes. This article examines the fiscal exchange theory— how government's expenditure affects voluntary compliance—across Africa, showing mechanisms through which service delivery affects tax morale. Methods: The study uses a public opinion survey of over 41,000 respondents from 29 countries in sub‐Saharan Africa. The statistical analysis employs an ordered logit model and linear probability model to test the hypotheses. Results: The study finds that service delivery determines tax attitudes. In addition, the study examines aspects of service delivery that are of most concern to citizens and finds that services that cater to individual needs are stronger in inducing tax morale than those that address collective needs. The article also finds that citizens' acknowledgement of receipt of goods is not an indication of inherent incumbent support. Conclusion: This study sought to understand the relationship between different modes of service delivery and the likelihood of having tax morale among African citizens and ultimately sheds light upon citizen–state relationships, effective governance, and voluntary compliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ethiopia, the host of the African Union, did not ratify the African Women’s Rights framework (the Maputo Protocol) for fifteen years. While realist, liberal and constructivist scholars have theorised why countries ratify human rights treaties, this article adds to this debate by asking ‘why not?’. Based on interviews, archival material, document analysis and fieldwork in Addis Ababa, the article explores the dominant explanations for adopting human rights treaties, such as donor pressure, legitimacy, openness of a political system and normative alignment. By analysing the Ethiopian government’s decision not to ratify the Maputo Protocol on numerous occasions before finally ratifying it quietly and with a long list of reservations, the article argues that countries may adopt regional human rights treaties for different reasons than the global ones. By tracing this ‘non-event’ from the early attempts to adopt the Maputo Protocol until its ratification in 2018, the article provides an indepth analysis of the recent history of women’s rights in Ethiopia’s complex national context, including the rise of women’s movements, closing civil space, growing authoritarianism, anti-rights rhetoric, and a government crisis that paved way for reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the messy practice of decolonising a concept through collaborative work between scholars researching together the meaning of everyday humanitarianism in Tanzania. Humanitarianism is typically understood as the state-centric, formal, Northern-driven helping of distant others in crisis. Using the concept of everyday humanitarianism, our article challenges these assumptions in three ways. First, it explores the everyday humanitarian actions of ordinary citizens in times of crisis. Second, it explores these responses in a Southern context. Third, it focuses explicitly on the givers and not only the receivers of humanitarian help. Our work grounds decolonisation in the actual practices of research aimed at theory building as an iterative back-and-forth exchange with particular attention to power, rather than as a transplant of Northern theory on the South, or its opposite. Our first argument is that the objective of collaborative research to capture the local politics of giving and then use these practices to interrogate the theoretical concept of everyday humanitarianism can be decolonising. Second, we argue that the practices of the academic labour that produces knowledge or inductive theory can also be decolonising. Understanding both the challenges and the possibilities of decolonising 'humanitarianism' will provide an opportunity to document and thus legitimate the complexity that is inherent in decolonising a discipline. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Early and forced marriage (EFM) is an increasing focus of international organizations and local non-government organizations. This study assesses the extent to which attitudes and norms related to EFM can be changed by locally tailored media campaigns. A two-hour radio drama set in rural Tanzania was presented to Tanzanian villagers as part of a placebo-controlled experiment randomized at the village level. A random sample of 1200 villagers was interviewed at baseline and invited to a presentation of the radio drama, 83% of whom attended. 95% of baseline respondents were re-interviewed two weeks later, and 97% 15 months after that. The radio drama produced sizable and statistically significant effects on attitudes and perceived norms concerning forced marriage, which was the focus of the radio drama, as well as more general attitudes about gender equality. Fifteen months later, treatment effects diminished, but we continue to see evidence of EFM-related attitude change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This debate piece contains an assessment of the debate on the 'Pretoria Agreement' (or Cessation of Hostilities Agreement) concluded on 2 November 2022 regarding the armed conflict in Ethiopia. On the basis of a critical discussion of a paper by F. Gebresenbet and Y. Tariku (2023) published in the Spring issue of the Review of African Political Economy (ROAPE), the author here contests the short-term analysis of the authors, who miss essential points of the wider context of political conflict in Ethiopia and also scholastically misrepresent some other authors in the debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following an earlier piece by the authors debating the importance of the Pretoria Agreement (or Cessation of Hostilities Agreement) concluded in November 2022, this piece sets out their formal response to and rebuttal of blog comments received on Roape.net (Gebrehiwot et al. 2023), and also of comments in a debate piece by J. Abbink (2023) published in this issue of the Review of African Political Economy (ROAPE). The authors here contest the views put forward as lacking engagement with their arguments and mischaracterising their views. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is about democratic political thought and African political parties. Studies judge that opposition speak about democracy, but rarely express democratic ideologies. This determination arises from democracy's perceived hegemony. As democracy is accepted, opposition parties invoke democratic ideas without advocating them. I contest this line of argument. There are multiple visions of democracy. Therefore, whether or not democracy is hegemonic, not all arguments for and perspectives on it are. By omission, the literature on African parties has denied this variety in democratic thought and precluded the study of one variant of it in particular: republicanism. Republicanisms elevate domination and corruption as ills and advocate limiting state power and empowering citizens. I analyse the "people's power philosophy" of leading Tanzanian opposition party, Chadema. It imagines a ruling party oligarchy which pursues its private interests through an interconnected system of domination and corruption. Chadema advocates a new constitution to undo that system: institutional reforms that limit state power and empower citizens. It claims that it can do so by overpowering the oligarchy in a popular struggle. It imagines struggle as the breaking of everyday dominance and therefore as emancipatory: a second liberation. I argue that this philosophy constitutes a republican-democratic ideology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many socially conservative settings oppose pro-LGBT+ advocacy because of its perceived threat to "traditional values." Can messaging on these issues from sources considered to have similar values be more effective than messaging from sources considered to have different values? This research uses the move towards legal protection of certain LGBT+ rights in Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, and South Africa to understand whether signals of changing social norms from African sources are better able to shift perspectives of those elsewhere on the continent than primes from Western sources. Using a survey experiment conducted in Uganda, I show that neither one-off messaging from African sources nor one-off messaging from Western sources shifts beliefs or behavior on LGBT+ issues. Rather, these messages produce backlash to both African and Western sources. This work highlights the challenges of attempting to rapidly change perspectives on LGBT+ issues in the most socially conservative settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do parties historically dominated by one group diversify their representatives? I argue that ethnic parties adjust their strategies according to the institutional rules in place and the demographics of relevant constituencies. I study South Africa, which has a Mixed-Member Proportional electoral system, where parties nominate Single Member District and Proportional Representation candidates. Using original data on the racial, ethnic, and career background of over 10,000 local candidates nominated by the historically white Democratic Alliance party, I find that the party engages in vote-based inclusion by nominating black candidates to predominantly black districts. And while the DA symbolically includes non-whites on its PR lists, white candidates dominate electable list positions. These findings provide a demonstration at the micro-level of why ethnic parties struggle to meaningfully diversify. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do firms ensure secure exchange when the rule of law is weak and contracting institutions privilege the politically connected? In developing countries, firms may use social, formal, or political heuristics when selecting business partners, but how these factors jointly impact exchange remains understudied. In this article, I develop these theoretical mechanisms and test their impact with a conjoint experiment administered to 2389 formal and informal firms in Senegal. I find evidence in support of all three theories: To varying degrees, social, state, and political factors simultaneously impact firms' sense of deal security and likelihood of exchange. The results demonstrate the substantial influence of formal predictors of exchange even in an overwhelmingly informal business environment, and also establish the countervailing effects of political connections on trade. These findings suggest that firms in developing countries must contend with an intricate political calculus to ensure their growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reflects on Ian Taylor’s legacy for comparative regionalism which has not received as much recognition as it rightfully deserves. Some of Ian’s most important contributions to this research field evolve around two themes: firstly, neoliberalism and the relationship between globalisation and regionalisation, and, secondly, regionalisation beyond the rhetoric of regional organisations. This piece reflects on his article of 2003 published in the Review of International Political Economy, entitled ‘Globalization and regionalization in Africa: reactions to attempts at neo-liberal regionalism’. It also situates Ian’s contributions within a broader context and refers to Sarah Whiteford’s excellent contribution on Ian’s impact on regionalism studies. Finally, the last two sections reflect on Ian’s legacy as a field worker, as well as some of his personal traits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the legitimation strategies used by Jerry John Rawlings, a Ghanaian revolutionary leader, to license his revolutionary actions, including political enemy executions and a crackdown on corrupt practices. It adapts and extends van Leeuwen's legitimation framework by demonstrating how Rawlings exploited historical memory and the notion of sacrifice in conjunction with the strategies of authorization, rationalization and moralization to formulate his revolutionary rhetoric. The analysis reveals that the legitimation strategies enabled Rawlings to project a patriot-cum-nationalist identity as well as construct himself as a noble revolutionary mandated by the people of Ghana to represent their interests, protect them from evildoers and lead the process of social transformation. The study illustrates the persuasive power of revolutionary discourses in terms of how they function ideologically in the message they communicate (or exaggerate) and conceal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In many places around the world, young voters participate in politics at low rates. What factors might increase youth political participation? We investigate one possibility: exposure to a religious message that emphasizes the possibility of change through faithful action. We argue that this message, which is common in religious groups that attract large numbers of youth around the world, addresses several barriers to political participation by young voting-age adults. Working in collaboration with the major religious coalitions in Zambia, we randomly assigned young adults (18–35 years old) into civic engagement workshops. Identical informational material, based on pre-existing, non-partisan curricula, was presented in each workshop. Workshops then concluded with one of two randomly assigned, pre-recorded Christian motivational messages based on existing religious programming in Zambia. In some workshops, the concluding message emphasized a Christian obligation to work towards the greater good. In other workshops, the message emphasized the power of faith to make change in the world. We found that the power of faith message moved workshop participants to be more willing to participate in protest, to disavow political violence, and to criticize other people who choose not to participate, relative to pre-workshop measures and to an information-only condition. By contrast, the message focused on an obligation to the greater good did not change political participation, resulting in lower willingness to participate in politics than the power of faith message. We discuss implications for youth political participation and the study of religion and politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is an introductory essay for the special issue of the South African Journal of International Affairs, 'Russia in Africa: Who is courting whom?' [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Election violence is common in many developing countries and has potentially detrimental implications for democratic consolidation. Drawing on political psychology, we argue that citizens' fear of campaign violence undermines support for democracy while increasing support for autocracy. Using individual-level survey data from 21 electoral democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa, we find robust support for our argument. Citizens fearing campaign violence are less likely to support democracy and multi-party competition, more likely to favor a return to autocracy, and less likely to turn out to vote. Our findings have important implications for democratic survival and provide further impetus for reducing electoral violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do governments in post-conflict settings provide for policing within their countries? I argue that leaders respond to both electoral concerns and security threats in shaping the geographic provision of policing infrastructure. Focusing on Uganda, I contend that the territorial expansion of policing has followed a distinct political logic. First, I use panel data on police infrastructure to demonstrate increased construction in counties with previously lower electoral support for the incumbent regime. Additionally, I find that counties with violence are more likely to experience increases in construction, but especially in areas where the incumbent has more support. Finally, I show that (1) proximity to police infrastructure is associated with worse individual perceptions of the police and (2) that increased construction of police infrastructure has large significant effects on reducing voter turnout while increasing vote share for the incumbent president. These findings have important implications for post-conflict reconstruction, stability, and violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 1979 and 1983 soldiers, workers, and students in Ghana launched a revolution to destroy the neo-imperial order. In the Ghanaian historical imagination that era is not remembered for its radical populism but as a time of violent chaos before the nation-state followed the road to purported neoliberal stability. The sudden rise and fall of revolutionary Ghana reveals both the possibility of alternative modes of political power in Africa and how these forms have been contained through both violence and the control of representational practices. In the contemporary moment, it is hard to theorize alternate ideas of freedom and political difference. If we start a study of twentieth-century revolution with a coup d'état in 1979 Accra, Ghana—rather than student upheavals in 1968 Paris, for example—it reorients our understanding of power by showing how young radicals sought an African-grounded sovereignty, an alternate future now forgotten. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Kingdom of Morocco has been democratizing steadily since the reign of King Al-Hassan II which started in 1961, and its democracy appears to be advancing, flourishing, and stable. Morocco didn't encounter any extremist or progressive change in 2011 and it doesn't appear to be pursuing the direction of the Arabic Spring. Nor did it appear to be following the regular strides of the progress worldview (advancement, forward leap, and union) laid out by political researchers who handled democratization. Morocco isn't inflexible and has, in this way, to remain with the current the state of affairs; regardless of whether its majority rules system is very recognizable. One of the notable qualities of Moroccan majority rule government is that it contrasts from other vote based system in the Arab, African or underdeveloped nations. Accordingly, it very well may be viewed as a third method of democratization, frequently alluded to as the Moroccan superiority, which is formed by numerous elements that incorporate the part of the Monarch.

The ruler's ability to cope with crises is critical for authoritarian durability. Yet, the coping mechanism—the actual management strategies by which rulers confront crises—is largely treated as a black box. This study takes a step in addressing this problem by examining how rulers use their appointment powers to manage the crisis that is the aftermath of failed coups. I argue that the principle challenge of this period is that rulers cannot identify the opposition and to cope, they deliberately infuse the center of the regime with officials from the periphery to dilute and ultimately weaken the invisible enemy they confront. Using a novel dataset on the appointments of mid and high level officials over the course of 34 years in Ethiopia, I find that the ruler relied considerably on outside officials following the failed coup in 1960 in ways he never did before or after the event. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Who registers to vote? Although extensive research has examined the question of who votes, our understanding of the determinants of political participation will be limited until we know who is missing from the voter register. Studying voter registration in lower-income settings is particularly challenging due to data constraints. We link the official voter register with a complete social network census of 16 villages to analyze the correlates of voter registration in rural Uganda, examining the role of individual-level attributes and social ties. We find evidence that social ties are important for explaining registration status within and across households. Village leaders—and through them, household heads—play an important role in explaining the registration status of others in the village, suggesting a diffuse process of social influence. Socioeconomic factors such as income and education do not explain registration in this setting. Together these findings suggest an alternate theory of participation is required. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some communities protest to demand change, while other seemingly similar communities do not? A large body of literature has found that elites play an important role in this regard, and documented the wide variety of mobilization tactics they use. While such arguments go some way toward explaining protest patterns, however, the literature has so far struggled to explain why some elites are able to employ these mobilization tactics so much more effectively than others. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in South Africa, I argue that closer attention to the technology of mobilization helps to explain these patterns. Specifically, I identify the critical role played by protest brokers —intermediaries who connect elites desiring mobilization with potential protesters. Without these brokers, I argue, many elites lack the local knowledge, connections, and trust necessary to mobilize collective action, significantly decreasing the likelihood of protest occurrence, and helping to explain where protests happen. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much of the literature on clientelism views the distribution of state jobs in the same way it does other forms of clientelistic exchange: as a mechanism of political mobilization. Despite its prevalence, this perspective does not account for the services that job recipients frequently provide to their political principals beyond the one-time exchange of political support. Drawing on extensive data from Benin and Ghana, including a comprehensive database of minister biographies, surveys of bureaucrats, administrative data, and elite interviews, this article argues that leaders distribute and manage state jobs in ways that enable them to extract and control state money for political financing. Whether incumbent leaders extract state resources themselves, delegate to elite party agents, or co-opt and coerce bureaucrats to divert money to the party shapes which jobs they distribute politically and to whom. The findings suggest that jobs are substantively different from other currencies of clientelistic exchange. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do political parties implement primary elections? With multi-party elections firmly established, political parties in many young democracies have begun to democratize internally by adopting mass primaries. Previous work argues that parties institute primaries to select for high quality candidates, incentivize campaigning effort, and reduce intra-party conflict. In this paper, I theorize that parties also implement mass primaries to open up the political elite while protecting their most senior members. Consistent with this hypothesis, using original data from Botswana's ruling party, I find that primaries facilitate a limited and controlled turnover, decreasing the likelihood of re-nomination of long-term incumbents in favor of political newcomers while still protecting senior ministers. Combined with qualitative and historical evidence, these results suggest that electorally successful political parties may implement mass primaries to replace unpopular and entrenched leaders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I ask where African opposition parties organize. Party-building is communicative; it involves persuading people to become activists. The literature suggests that opposition parties organize where people are receptive to their messages and build outwards from there. I study Chadema's opposition party-building through site-intensive fieldwork. Chadema organized primarily in such receptive areas, but also in four unreceptive constituencies. I use these deviant constituencies to refine the literature. Prior theory neglects the heterogeneity of party-building. I decompose party-building into three modes as follows: by touring leaders, branches and concentrating leaders. Concentrating leaders dedicate their organizing to single places. They employ small rallies which afford interactive, individualized and iterative communication. This personalized communication enables them to overcome initial unreceptiveness to their messages. I conclude that opposition parties can organize in unreceptive areas, but only through the personalized methods of these 'lone organizers'. Altogether, I show how and through whom opposition parties organize in hostile environments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The African Americans who wrote the Liberian constitution of 1847 represent one of the few instances where Americans engaged national constitution-making after 1787. While the Liberians adopted many aspects of the American constitution, they also made substantial changes implicitly critiquing the American original and forging a uniquely African American constitutionalism. Examining the Liberian constitution contributes to three fields of study: comparative constitutionalism, American political development, and African American political thought. In comparative constitutionalism, the Liberians show the adaptability of American constitutional principles to the west coast of Africa. In American political development, the Liberians provide a snapshot of what a subset of Americans disliked about the American constitution and what they changed when given the chance. Finally, the Liberians demonstrate how ideas of black nationalism and American constitutionalism may be intertwined in African American political thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Empirical studies show that many governments gear the provision of goods and services towards their ethnic peers. This article investigates governments' strategies to provide ethnic favors in Africa. Recent studies of ethnic favoritism find that presidents' ethnic peers and home regions enjoy advantages, yet cannot disentangle whether goods are provided to entire regions or co-ethnic individuals. This article argues that local ethnic demography determines whether governments provide non-excludable public goods or more narrowly targeted handouts. Where government co-ethnics are in the majority, public goods benefit all locals regardless of their ethnic identity. Outside of these strongholds, incumbents pursue discriminatory strategies and only their co-ethnics gain from favoritism. Using fine-grained geographic data on ethnic demographics, the study finds support for the argument's implications in the local incidence of infant mortality. These findings have important implications for theories of distributive politics and conflict in multi-ethnic societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2016, the East African Community (EAC) pledged to phase out imports of used clothing within three years. The US Trade Representative (USTR) responded by threatening to revoke preferential market access for those involved. Within two years, all EAC states except Rwanda backed down. Using 21 original interviews, this article explores the extent to which political settlements theory can explain variation in commitment to the used clothing ban in Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda. Building on existing research into shrinking 'policy space,' I explicitly consider the role of foreign actors. The ban predominantly imposed costs on consumers, used clothing retailers, and foreign used clothing exporters whose interests were represented by the USTR. EAC apparel manufacturers stood to gain, but the most powerful firms in this sector were foreign-owned exporters who valued the US market more than domestic sales. The US intervention, therefore, changed the stakes for the policy's intended beneficiaries. While vulnerable and contested ruling coalitions in Kenya and Uganda struggled to hold out in conflict with affected groups, a strong dominant party in Rwanda could absorb resistance by marshaling legitimacy from alternative sources and increasing its efforts to sensitize the local population. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do so many voters in African countries vote for minor ethnic parties instead of unifying into a powerful multi-ethnic opposition coalition? I present a model that demonstrates that as the incumbent devotes more resources to programmatic goods, which voters can access regardless of how they voted, the opportunity cost of voting for a sincerely preferred, but losing, candidate decreases. I provide experimental and cross-national observational evidence that voters are more likely to support a minor party as they perceive more or more valuable goods being distributed programmatically. Those who perceive poor distribution, or only clientelist distribution, instead vote strategically for a major opposition party. In general, support for minor parties increases along with positive outcomes and approval of the incumbent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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While numerous studies have explored the foundations of autocratic stability by focusing on macroeconomic variables, the micro-foundations of autocratic support have largely been overlooked. Using Afrobarometer survey data from 22 African autocracies, I examine how dictators stabilize their rule even during economic recessions. I find that the provision of welfare benefits alleviates the adverse impact of negative economic perceptions on support for the dictator. Citizens are likely to continue supporting the dictator as long as the government keeps providing universal welfare benefits. The results remain robust to different model specifications that account for alternative explanations and validity concerns associated with autocratic survey data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I argue that, in clientelist regimes, money officially allocated to local public goods will sometimes be diverted to private handouts, and that the extent of diversion will be systematically correlated with electoral outcomes. I show that allocated funds are more likely to translate into local public goods in opposition areas and the incumbent's ethnic core. Diversion of funds is greatest in areas outside the ethnic core that are nevertheless won by the regime. This is consistent with a model in which brokers tasked with delivering non-coethnic voters to the regime divert funds for this purpose. As a result of extensive diversion in loyal non-coethnic districts, these voters are significantly less likely to see completed local public goods projects than either core voters or those who oppose the regime. This unexpected result suggests that the behavior of local brokers may be responsible for a number of puzzling findings in the distributive politics literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent literature suggests that African Presidents tend to target co-ethnics with patronage, especially in non-democracies. Coupled with evidence on the role of incentives in driving ethnic identity change, I propose that a change in the ethnic identity of the President should lead to an increase in the proportion of people identifying with the President's ethnic group. I use survey data from fourteen African countries with Presidential transitions to show that ethnic Presidential change leads to an upwards shift in the percentage of respondents identifying with the new ruling ethnic group in non-democracies, and that this shift increases with the level of autocracy. I also show that countries where citizens perceive more ethnic favoritism see higher levels of ethnic switching. Within-survey evidence from Zambia demonstrates that this shift is immediate, and case study evidence from early modern China suggests that this phenomenon is not limited to Sub-Saharan Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What kind of people choose to join protests in contemporary Africa? Aiming to reduce the existing uncertainty related to the impact of different factors on protest participation, this article tests several hypotheses about participation in Third Wave demonstrations across the African continent, related to democratic values, socioeconomic status, and corruption perceptions. To do so, it deploys an innovative regression model that corrects for missing value bias through multiple imputation and that separates the broad survey data into regional subsamples, dependent upon historical patterns of neopatrimonialism and democratization. Its results show for the first time the existence of different profiles of protester associated with North, West, East, Central, and Southern Africa. Its most surprising result is that across the board, responders open to considering alternatives to democracy were more prone to protesting, while corruption perceptions mattered only in Western African countries. The largest contrast then regards the urban–rural divide: city dwellers lead the way in Southern Africa, while the countryside takes the helm in the Western part of the continent. Finally, people who declare to have voted and those who have more frequent political conversations also fit the profile of the average protester. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The effects of religion on political behavior are difficult to study for a number of reasons. One difficulty is that "religion" is not a singular entity and is thus unlikely to have a unidirectional effect on political behavior. Another difficulty is that everyone in a particular place and time might be embedded in the same set of religious practices, such that the counterfactual is difficult to assess. In response to these and other challenges, we suggest opening up the black box of religion in order to examine the influence of its component parts. Specifically, we focus on exposure to sermons. We describe a study about the impact of Christian sermons in sub-Saharan Africa on reactions to inequality. We discuss the approach's advantages and limitations and discuss how to integrate it with the study of other aspects of religion and how the approach might apply to other domains of political behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explains how presidential candidates in Africa's highly diverse states appeal across ethnic lines when ethnic identities are salient, but broader support is needed to win elections. I argue that election campaigns are much more bottom-up and salience-oriented than current theories allow and draw on the analysis of custom data of campaign appeals in Ghana, Kenya, and Uganda, as well as interviews with party strategists and campaign operatives in Ghana and Kenya to demonstrate clear patterns in presidential candidates' cross-ethnic outreach. Where ethnic salience is high, incumbents offer material incentives and targeted transfers to placate supporters, challengers fan grievances to split incumbents' coalitions, and also-rans stress unity and valence issues in the hope of joining the winner. The research contributes to our understanding of parties' mobilization strategies in Africa and further clarifies where and how ethnic divisions are politicized in elections in plural societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]