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Ever since China has formally joined the WHO-backed global COVID-19 vaccine initiative known as COVAX, there is a presumed notion that China's vaccine diplomacy will make a significant contribution to the international public good and thus uplift Beijing's role as the rule-maker of international order. To scrutinize this, the paper asks if China succeeded in proliferating its weaponized vaccine policy to obtain maximum diplomatic gains and soft power projection to intensify its international image, geopolitical power, and domestic politico legitimacy. The authors argue that despite its vaccine diplomacy demonstrated the robust governance capacity and responsibility to be a great power. Yet, Beijing's geopolitical influence and international image are significantly overrated and not enough to play a more prominent role in the global power fulcrum/equilibrium. On the contrary, China enjoys a leading position on the domestic political front. Its successful portrayal of China's vaccine provision in the global market and remarkable configuration to leverage a deep-rooted nationalism has fundamentally provided China with a powerful rationale to divert its public's attention from Beijing's earlier inadequate handling of the outbreak. The evaluation of the paper reveals that China's vaccine diplomacy's influence in promoting international image and geopolitics is limited but has successfully stabilized its domestic political environment and enhanced its domestic legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's rise has been accompanied by a rise in nationalism. But what are the characteristics of this nationalism now being witnessed? Does it support China's constructive engagement with the international order, or does it seek to assert China's supremacy? These questions lie at the hub of a rapidly expanding secondary literature on the emergence of nationalism in China and its impact on China's foreign relations. What is, however, absent from the academic discourse is the voice of the Chinese people themselves. What are their perceptions of the nation-state, and how do these beliefs shape their views of China's relationship with East Asia? To address this gap, we conducted a series of large-scale surveys in Beijing between 2011 and 2013 on the twinned topics of domestic nationalism and international relations. Our findings, as reported below, represent an initial attempt to answer this final and, arguably, most critical set of questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper revisits China's recent experiences of hosting three international mega-events: the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, the 2010 Shanghai World Expo and the 2010 Guangzhou Asian Games. While maintaining a critical political economic perspective, this paper builds upon the literature of viewing mega-events as societal spectacles and puts forward the proposition that these mega-events in China are promoted to facilitate capital accumulation and ensure socio-political stability for the nation's further accumulation. The rhetoric of a ‘Harmonious Society’ as well as patriotic slogans are used as key languages of spectacles in order to create a sense of unity through the consumption of spectacles, and pacify social and political discontents rising out of economic inequalities, religious and ethnic tensions, and urban–rural divide. The experiences of hosting mega-events, however, have shown that the creation of a ‘unified’, ‘harmonious’ society of spectacle is built on displacing problems rather than solving them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Cultural Palace of Nationalities, one of the Ten Monumental Buildings built in 1959 in Beijing to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), is considered a ‘political building’ in that it brings together ethnicity, architecture, art, technology and, most importantly, representations of the Party-state’s policy on the unity of the many different nationalities in China. A careful examination of the history of the Palace’s construction and its exhibits reveals two unsettling problems: the Chinese Communist Party’s manipulation of official images of national minorities, along with the Party’s difficulties in dealing with ethnic nationalism, regional separatism and local identity in the first decade of the PRC. These same thorny issues continue to cause the current government a major headache. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article addresses three facets of modernity that are signified by slogans and spatial settings in Beijing, China. The research was conducted as a preliminary study of the communication process in the course of globalization and nationalism reflected in the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. This article uses some photographs and observations to analyze symbolic meanings of slogans and spaces from Beijing in summer 2007, a year before the Games. Since slogans in China have a long tradition, the repeated usages of slogans and their relations to the spatial settings might signify strong messages to promote governmental orientations. This article explores slogans on Tiananmen Square in relation to the political space, a huge sign displaying the motto of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games in Wangfujing district in relation to the economic space, and slogans in an old and poor district under a redevelopment project. The article posits that these three slogans and spaces reflect three different facets of Chinese modernity: nationalism, globalization, and developmental ideology. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

National image is not only a channel to wield a state’s national power, but also an important national power resource. It has become critically important for China as it tries to rise in a relatively favorable international environment. Following a theoretical discussion on national image management in international relations and a historical review of China’s national image management, this article examines China’s strengths and weaknesses in its national image management. On the one hand, China’s national image benefits from its strong commitment to cultural diplomacy, effective employment of information and communication technologies in international broadcasting, and close connections with the Chinese diaspora around the world. On the other hand, China’s national image management is constrained by such hurdles as weak political credibility, reviving popular nationalism, and various missteps in its foreign policies. This study concludes that China’s national image management will remain an uphill battle in the long run. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In March 2008, Tibet erupted in the biggest challenge to Chinese rule since 1959. While Beijing and Dharamsala engaged in their familiar battle of representations, pundits speculated on the causes of the uprising, ranging from conspiracy theories to informed policy analysis. Applying the framework of the insecurity dilemma, this article argues that Tibetan identity insecurity on account of the post-1989 hard-line Chinese policies was the chief cause of the uprising. Largely peaceful protests and occasionally violent riots in Tibet have been integral to Tibetan efforts to mitigate their societal insecurities provoked by Chinese migration, 'assimilationist' policies and 'cultural imperialism'. However, Tibetan protests and riots heighten Chinese insecurities and harden Beijing's policies both inside Tibet and towards the Dalai Lama. This paper reveals the dynamic cycle of hard-line Chinese policies provoking Tibetan uprisings; the resulting hardening in Chinese policies feeds back into Tibetan insecurities and protests. The 2008 uprising was the most recent cycle in the long-running saga of the Sino-Tibetan insecurity dilemma. The article warns that unless the Tibetans and the Chinese find a way to break out of the insecurity dilemma, Tibet could explode into another frenzy of violence and counter-violence in the near future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in Beijing, China and examines how hosting the event influenced Chinese education policy related to citizenship education. Particular focus is paid to ways in which Chinese nationalism and China's role as a global power were emphasized in citizenship education during this time. The relationship between citizenship, sport, and globalization are examined along with the rationale behind China's bid to host the games. Other topics include China's educational curriculum since the 1970s, educational research methodology, and international cooperation in education.

The article examines intertwined cosmopolitan and national narratives in the context of the Beijing 2008 Games. Through a discursive analysis of the opening and closing ceremonies it seeks to provide some insight into understandings of Chinese national identity as a 'displaced' agent in the 'birth' and 'evolution' of Western European civilisation, who returns to claim a central place in human history. The artistic production of such resentful discourses develops alongside its technological counterpart, providing insight into the ways national citizenships remain gendered and racialised. For activist networks and the critics of the Olympic project this 'mediated' cosmopolitanism harbours a performative contradiction, as it sanctions Chinese policies that erase certain social identities from the nation-state. The multicultural ambiance of the Olympic mega-event symbolically resolves the crisis generated by the calls for national development through careful urban planning that violates human rights. An interdisciplinary analysis of the two ceremonies and secondary material suggests that national self-narration takes place simultaneously in different expressive/visual modes, enabling the coexistence (and communication) of the 'symbolic' with the 'material' in what I will term an 'allegorical imperative'. This imperative, a miniature of the Olympic discourse on human dignity, is constitutive of the anthropopoetic project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Beijing Olympic Games, one of the most significant social events for contemporary China, is a milestone for China's efforts for globalization. ‘One World, One Dream’, the motto of the Beijing Olympic Games, is an embodiment of the encounter between Chinese culture and Western civilization, and a symbol of integration between China and the rest of the world. This Special Section seeks to address the psychosocial ramifications of the Beijing Olympic Games and, thereby, to shed light on China's domestic situation and its international relations from a social psychological perspective. Moving beyond the psychology of athletic excellence, the four papers included use a wide range of methods, ranging from longitudinal tracking to priming, to examining self-construal and volunteering, to representations of China's past and future, competition towards foreigners, and perceived intercultural differences. Consistently found across the papers, patriotism was associated with ingroup cohesion, whereas nationalism was associated with competition and differentiation towards outgroups. This Special Section thereby pays tribute to the social psychological significance of the Beijing Olympic Games to China and the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To investigate whether and how the Beijing Olympic Games influenced the Chinese competitiveness towards foreigners, we conducted a three-wave longitudinal study and found that participants' competitiveness towards foreigners from five comparison target nations, particularly towards Japanese, South Koreans and Kenyans, was higher during the Games than before and/or after. We further found that nationalism predicted the competitiveness toward Japanese and South Koreans, but did not predict the competitiveness toward Americans, Russians and Kenyans. Additionally, we found that patriotism played little role in the effects of the Games on competitiveness towards foreigners. We herein discuss the relationship between national comparisons, nationalism and national conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers whether China can emerge from the global economic crisis with its current policies vindicated and its social order intact. Or will the Chinese development model fail to cope? Will the socio-economic situation and the ever-present, deeply held fear of turmoil force Beijing to resort to whipping up nationalism and adopting an aggressive economic and political stance abroad? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been a growing political and scholarly interest in the re-emergence of Chinese development cooperation and this work explores the construction of South-South spatial matrix of knowledge, power and imagination. The paper examines the critical geopolitics of producing international development studies in China as an intellectual project over the last 5–10 years, in close relation to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Drawing on eight months' fieldwork in Beijing, it develops a political economic geography of individuals, institutions and ideologies that have shaped the geographically and politically situated processes of inventing Chinese international development studies. The paper traces the spatial genealogy of the disciplinary regime, making visible the rise of a division of social scientific labour at a complicated moment of geopolitical flux, especially against the backdrop of intensifying US-China rivalry. It also maps out the tensions and nuances in an uneven field of knowledge and power. The future of the nascent state-disciplinary apparatus is uncertain, not least dependent on China's ongoing reinterpretation of its national identity and national mission. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the transformation of China brought about by its sophisticated diplomatic strategy. The country has developed a style of diplomacy and soft power that is a sharp break from its own past and from the U.S. model of influence. Beijing tightened its controls over society and created a new nationalism designed to inculcate pride in the state. Beijing ties its efforts into a win-win set of values, the idea that China is growing into a power but supports a world in which nations do not interfere in other nations' affairs. The country's diplomacy also displays pragmatism unthinkable to a more ideological generation of leaders.

This article describes the motives behind the making of the current status-quo and risk-averse Chinese foreign policy. It identifies a three-P incentive structure that is based on the political preservation of the CCP regime, China's economic prosperity, and Beijing's pursuit of power and prestige. These three motives are stable and overlapping, featuring Taiwan and the relationship with the United States as the key issues. Beijing is expected to be motivated by these peculiar motives over the next two decades; but new internal and external developments may greatly change these motives and generate new impetus for China's foreign policy. Although the official line in Beijing is still the mild ‘peaceful development’, after a fling with the more majestic idea of ‘peaceful rise’, the rise of nationalist emotions and demands in the PRC continues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines how Beijing presented an Olympic bid that not only won the city the right to host the Olympic Games, but also served to increase the legitimacy of the IOC. Through discourse analysis, it is shown how Beijing was depicted as a natural choice for the next Olympic host city. Certain notions of time and space were fundamental in this presentation. The meanings of concepts related to time and space were determined by their oppositions — 'modernity' was defined in relation to 'underdevelopment', 'the new' was describes in relation to 'the old', and 'the West' was opposed to 'the Orient'. Beijing was constructed as an Olympic city within the context of two strongly modernist ideologies of the Chinese government and the Olympic Movement. 'Olympism' was portrayed as Ihe driving force behind modernity and associated with universalism, the new and the Western world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Will China's authoritarian leaders succeed in building a future by erasing the past? Can the ideology of “nationalist consumerism” obliterate memory altogether? Will the Olympic applause drown out the weak and exiled witnesses of the Tiananmen crackdown? In this section we listen to a key Tiananmen student leader two decades on as well as check in with today's young elites in Beijing. A political leader from the reformist regime in 1989 calls for justice from house arrest and a young Chinese novelist wonders what kind of identity is possible without memory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]