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North Korea's unpredictable behavior with respect to its nuclear arsenal is only one element of a nuclear arms competition among powers in Asia. Nuclear Asia is a potential cockpit for an outbreak of accidental nuclear war or deliberate nuclear first use, as among regional rivals and adversaries. In addition, a limited nuclear war between regional enemies could ignite intervention by outside powers and intensify, in terms of its potential for horizontal or vertical escalation. Research does not support a definitive relationship between the numbers of nuclear weapons states acting in Asia or in the Pacific and the probability of war, including nuclear war. On the other hand, the availability of nuclear weapons may make more states risk acceptant instead of risk averse in regional conflicts, and overconfident with respect to their skills in managing escalation. That finding is important because states' abilities to manage escalation may be more important than the sizes of their arsenals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a discussion of the reluctance of Japan to build an arsenal of nuclear weapons and its eagerness to extend nuclear nonproliferation, adapted from the chapter "Japan's Nuclear Hedge: Beyond 'Allergy' and Breakout,'" by Richard J. Samuels and James L. Schoff, in the book "Strategic Asia 2013-14: Asia in the Second Nuclear Age." It examines Japan's periodic reexamination of its non-nuclear weapons stance during regional security concerns in Asia and reassurance from the U.S. government concerning nuclear deterrence, and public opinion in Japan concerning nuclear weapons.

The United States' military-strategic pivot toward Asia is motived by concerns about a rising China, about the increased significance of Asia on the world economic and political stages, and about the growing risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear first use in that region. Nuclear Asia already numbers five acknowledged or de facto nuclear weapons states among its members: Russia, China, North Korea, India, and Pakistan. Failure to reverse North Korea's nuclear weapons status or political distrust among other powers may increase the number of Asian nuclear weapons states (including states with prospective nuclear-missile reach into Asia) to eight, creating an Asian-Middle Eastern nuclear arms race that defies containment. On the other hand, an alternative presents itself, in the form of a multilateral nuclear arms reduction agreement that would create three tiers of accepted nuclear weapons states and bar the door to new admits. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Even if the international mood in favour of steep US and Russian nuclear cuts was to last, it is unlikely to spread to Asia, where nuclear arsenals remain comparatively modest and where regional allies rely on Washington for extended deterrence. This does not render nuclear arms control irrelevant in Asia, where there is a modest but significant tradition based on informal and unilateral restraint rather than formal agreement. But as more of Asia's nuclear programs have come out of the closet and as great power relationships intensify, the region needs to look nuclear arms control more squarely in the eye. For arms control to have real purchase in tomorrow's Asia, China and the USA will need to look beyond their currently asymmetrical relationship and find an understanding based on increased nuclear transparency which also restrains their potentially escalatory competition in advanced conventional war-fighting abilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the recent surge in both governmental and academic advocacy of nuclear disarmament, including initiatives of the Obama administration and the Australian and Japanese governments, the spectre of further nuclear proliferation arguably remains a key challenge for international security. This article suggests that this is particularly the case in Asia due to three major dynamics: (1) the stasis of the international non-proliferation regime embodied in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; (2) the state of flux in the global and regional strategic nuclear environment; and (3) increasing regional demand for nuclear energy. This article argues that developments in each of these realms of nuclear affairs hold the potential to increase proliferation pressures in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This article provides a brief overview of the theoretical literature on the rise of China, and then explores the implications of the rise of China for the U.S.- China rivalry. It then describes sources of underlying tensions in the Sino-Indian relationship. China and India are not only engaged in a competition for power and influence in Asia, but they are also locked in a particularly contentious border dispute. The authors then argue that economic interdependence may not be enough to offset the sources of conflict in the Sino-Indian rivalry. This holds true in spite of the presence of nuclear weapons by both sides in this dyad. Therefore, a limited conventional war remains a distinct possibility even though it is by no means inevitable. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The primary purpose of this article is to propose general conditions for establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Korean Peninsula from the viewpoint of international law. North Korea's nuclear weapons development has created the most negative environment for the peace and security of Northeast Asia since the early 1990s. In spite of painstaking negotiations to denuclearize North Korea, the parties concerned have not found any fundamental solution yet. This interim failure is due to the uncompromising positions of the two sides as well as the inherently paradoxical structure of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which legalizes the development of nuclear weapons by the recognized nuclear powers. The most reasonable solution is to completely and fairly denuclearize the whole Korean Peninsula under an NWFZ. This paper scrutinizes legal, political and technical problems for realizing the plan for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. In a world that all too often seems dark and ominous, the Treaty of Tlatelolco will shine like a beacon. This Treaty is a practical demonstration to all humanity of what can be accomplished when sufficient dedication and the necessary will exist.U Thant [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article considers the political and security implications should Japan become a nuclear power. The authors report that scientific and political commentators have remarked that, if Japan should choose to pursue such a course, it could acquire nuclear weapons in a matter of days or weeks since they have available supplies and scientific knowledge. The article also discusses the likelihood of Japan developing a nuclear arsenal, how such weapons would affect their foreign relations with countries including the U.S. China, and North Korea, and an analysis of the balance of power in Asia.

Northeast Asia is notable for the relative absence of regional institutions. The Six Party Talks could constitute an embryonic starting point for the development of such institutions. The path toward greater institutionalization is likely to begin in a modest fashion. Functional working groups on topics such as the environment, maritime transport, technical barriers to trade, road and rail links, and energy could provide the locus for integrating North Korea into the broader regional and global economies. Foreign ministries will inevitably take the lead in developing the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism (NEAPSM), but meaningful economic achievements will require the involvement of other ministries. North Korea has proved problematic in this regard thus far. Moreover, given the importance of private-sector involvement in achieving sustainable economic development in North Korea, modalities will have to be developed to integrate private-sector actors when possible. The governments of the region, and particularly China and South Korea, may continue support on a bilateral basis as a hedge against North Korea's collapse or as inducements in the context of the nuclear talks. But the development of more permanent multilateral structures is unlikely until the nuclear issue is resolved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article the author examines the state of international relations between the United States and Asia during 2008. It is noted that despite the fact that the Asia Pacific region underwent significant economic damage as a result of the global financial crisis originating in the United State, relations with the U.S. are not strained. The author notes that this lack of tension in the region is widespread despite concerns that North Korea will develop nuclear weapons and the lack of resolution in difficulties between Taiwan and China.

Neither a balance of power model nor a balance of terror model can predict with assurance whether nuclear Asia will be stable or unstable. Even if fewer than eight states in Asia become nuclear weapons states, the problems of crisis management and escalation control, growing out of clashes between conventional armed forces, becomes harder to manage. As well, nuclear weapons have psychological effects on their owners, and not always predictable ones. Classic balance of power theory, written prior to the nuclear age, anticipated the use of small wars for intrasystemic adjustments without the elimination of major actors. Balance of terror theory regards small nuclear wars as possible escalators into larger ones. Europe's nuclear experience may be a misleading guide for twenty-first century Asia - with regard to the effects of both power and terror relationships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports on the nuclear proliferation and deterrence in Asia. The section examines how the spread of nuclear weapons might affect deterrence stability and the possibility of deliberate or accidental/inadvertent war in Asia, with implications for Russian and U.S. national security and arms control policy.

The article discusses the implications of the inability of a six-party forum established as a foundation for creating an East Asian model of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to resolve the nuclear problem on the Korean Peninsula. It cites that the U.S. opposed the creation of a multilateral structure in the Asia-Pacific region due to its reliance on bilateral military alliances with Asian countries. It stresses that the formal continuation of the forum can become a mechanism that can actually influence the correlation of forces.

The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia during the first two decades of the twenty-first century has the potential to disrupt existing security arrangements within and outside of the region, to provide a catalytic agent for an outbreak of conventional or nuclear warfare, and to consign to the ash heap of history optimistic projections about the triumph of economic globalism and political postmodernism in the twenty-first century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars attribute conventional violence in a nuclear South Asia to a phenomenon known as the "stability/instability paradox." According to this paradox, the risk of nuclear war makes it unlikely that conventional conflict will escalate to the nuclear level, thereby making conventional conflict more likely. Although this phenomenon encouraged U.S.-Soviet violence during the Cold War, it does not explain the dynamics of the ongoing conflict between India and Pakistan. Recent violence has seen Pakistan or its proxies launching limited attacks on Indian territory, and India refusing to retaliate in kind. The stability/instability paradox would not predict such behavior. A low probability of conventional war escalating to the nuclear level would reduce the ability of Pakistan's nuclear weapons to deter an Indian conventional attack. Because Pakistan is conventionally weaker than India, this would discourage Pakistani aggression and encourage robust Indian conventional retaliation against Pakistani provocations. Pakistani boldness and Indian restraint have actually resulted from instability in the strategic environment. A full-scale Indo-Pakistani conventional conflict would create a significant risk of nuclear escalation. This danger enables Pakistan to launch limited attacks on India while deterring all-out Indian conventional retaliation and attracting international attention to the two countries' dispute over Kashmir. Unlike in Cold War Europe, in contemporary South Asia nuclear danger facilitates, rather than impedes, conventional conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses nuclear build-up in the Asia and its implications on worldwide security. Asian countries which are producing nuclear weapons; Nuclear acknowledgments in India and Pakistan; Likely risk of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan; North Korean nuclear crisis.

Presents arguments with regard to the causes and consequences of the second nuclear age in Asia. Comparison between proliferation pessimism and sober optimism in South Asia and East Asia; Consequences of proliferation; Role of the nonproliferation regime.

Talks about the danger posed by a nuclear arms race in Asia. Components of the United States security strategy in the Asia-Pacific region; Economic performance of China since 1998; How the accession of China to the World Trade Organization will affect state-owned enterprises; Development that could upset security and stability of the region.

Focuses on militarism and the development of nuclear weapons in Asia. Politicization of the armies; Modernization of the military; Establishment of military-industrial complex; Dangers of nationalism; Bombs and missiles as the symbols of modernity.

Focuses on the call for a Northeast Asia nuclear weapon free zone. Construction of underground nuclear facilities in North Korea; Launching of three-stage Taepodong missile or satellite over Japanese territory; Intrusion of two spy boats into Japanese territorial waters; Strengthening of Japan's military capabilities.

Focuses on the trilateral regionalism on the continental mainland in Asia. Connection of South Korea and China to North Korea; Role of the U.S. government in the semi-closed informal regionalism; Increase in both defensive and offensive preparations for military conflict; Involvement of North Korea in the production of nuclear weapons.