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China's rise has been accompanied by a rise in nationalism. But what are the characteristics of this nationalism now being witnessed? Does it support China's constructive engagement with the international order, or does it seek to assert China's supremacy? These questions lie at the hub of a rapidly expanding secondary literature on the emergence of nationalism in China and its impact on China's foreign relations. What is, however, absent from the academic discourse is the voice of the Chinese people themselves. What are their perceptions of the nation-state, and how do these beliefs shape their views of China's relationship with East Asia? To address this gap, we conducted a series of large-scale surveys in Beijing between 2011 and 2013 on the twinned topics of domestic nationalism and international relations. Our findings, as reported below, represent an initial attempt to answer this final and, arguably, most critical set of questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of China has led some commentators to claim that Asia will dominate the twenty-first century. In this article the author argues that, to the extent that countries in the region define and understand their politics in Western terms, the rise of Asia will simply continue the influence of modernity that had its origins in the West. In order to demonstrate this case, the author examines the character of political legitimacy in the region, which is founded on the concept of the state, an idea derived from the West. The modern state form has provided considerable advantages to countries in the region, bestowing international legitimacy on those that claim sovereignty, endowing smaller nations with increased political power in international negotiations, and allowing states to use the idea of non-intervention to shield themselves from international scrutiny. But the concept of the state has also defined new territorial boundaries superimposed on pre-existing political, ethnic and traditional sources of power, thereby creating new problems of legitimacy. In confronting and negotiating these challenges, Asian states have resorted to Western concepts of legitimacy, including democracy, nationalism and performance. Thus, an examination of the politics of legitimacy in Asia reveals the extent to which countries in the region are fundamentally shaped in their architecture of governance and their conception of legitimacy by Western ideas. The success of Asia in the twenty-first century will therefore not introduce a new type of ‘Asian’ global politics, or restore a more ancient kind, but simply confirm the dominance of modernity in shaping thought and practice. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Typologies are widely used in the field of intercultural communication to explain cultural differences. Especially the typology ‘individualism versus collectivism’ (I/C) is a central theoretical construct in cross-cultural comparison. But are such typologies really suited for explaining cultural phenomena? Is their explanatory power limited because the theoretical underpinnings are based on a Western mindset? And is using typologies as scientific models appropriate to explain intercultural incidents and uncover cultural patterns from a non-Western view as well? Do such typologies meet the demands of a modern view on the field of intercultural communication? This article casts a critical light on the appropriateness and applicability of typologies. The aim is twofold. The first part examines the limitations of typologies from an East Asian standpoint, bringing out the hidden cultural mindset on which this bipolar construct is built. The second part presents a model meant to contribute to a more profound debate between East Asian and Western views on intercultural communication. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Chinese writings on international relations increasingly invoke history. In the past Chinese and foreigners alike have seen China's foreign policies through the lens of history, but recent Chinese stress on the 'harmonious world' resulting from Confucianism has shifted the discussion. It serves as a guide to resurgent claims for leadership, a source of legitimation for why China deserves leadership, and a warning of how its leadership may be abused to the detriment of countries agreeing to regionalism or multilateralism. Claims to superiority raise tensions in Japan, South Korea, and elsewhere where hopes had existed for a shared view of history. They arouse controversy among advocates of socialist ideology who fear that Confucianism will eclipse communism. The increasingly hereditary elite of Party leaders continues to bridge the gap between these two types of memory, but they face an ideological challenge at home and a credibility challenge abroad. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though China had never been part of Britain's formal empire, a century of trade and warfare had caused China to cede trading and territorial rights to Britain. But from 1925 to 1927 the rise of the Kuomintang and the anti-imperialistic movement began to threaten British interests in China, alarming policy makers in London. At the same time, the China issue also captured the attention of MPs, who spent long sessions debating British policy towards China. These debates reveal much about MPs' perceptions of China, and can be seen as a microcosm of the British public sphere, encapsulating the multivalent British opinions on the world around them. Discussions of the 'China Situation' became an opportunity to express opinions on most of the important topics of the day - the economy, the General Strike, the Red Scare, disarmament, and the future of empire. A close reading of these debates can tell us much, not only about assumptions MPs held about China and the Chinese people, but also about issues closer to home. Three major events in China grabbed the attention of parliament in the period 1925-7. They were: (1) the May 30th Movement and the subsequent anti-British boycott in 1925; (2) the decision to send troops to Shanghai in January 1927; and (3) the so-called Nanking outrages, when British subjects in China were killed by Nationalist Army troops. What follows is a description and analysis of the debates over these three episodes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article the author examines the state of international relations between the United States and Asia during 2008. It is noted that despite the fact that the Asia Pacific region underwent significant economic damage as a result of the global financial crisis originating in the United State, relations with the U.S. are not strained. The author notes that this lack of tension in the region is widespread despite concerns that North Korea will develop nuclear weapons and the lack of resolution in difficulties between Taiwan and China.

While the origins of nationalism are sought in global historical trends, few analysts have shown how nations themselves are constituted and re-shaped by circulating global power, ideas and models. The view from East Asia shows that these circulations are mediated by regional developments and interactions which bind these nations together in rivalry and interdependence. The histories of China, Japan and Korea have been closely tied together since the end of the nineteenth century and, with a gap of about thirty years during the Cold War, have intensified once again. The global and regional constitution of nations produces a dialectic between its global form and aspirations and misrecognition of this constitution arising from the self-perception of nationalism as historically immanent. This tension between the global constitution and national misrecognition contributes to the tenacity of nationalism. It also allows us to get a better grasp of the relationship between historical change and structure in nationalism and the relationship between state and popular nationalisms in the countries of the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]