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Mexico and Central America are the main source of foreign labor, both permanent and temporary, for the United States and Canada, and, with very similar characteristics, together they conform the Mesoamerican migration system. However, their historical processes are very different. In Mexico, the vicinity, recruitment and articulation of labor supply and demand were the main drivers of the migration that originated at the end of the 19th century. In Central America, the detonator was the violence unleashed in the last three decades of the 20th century, in its different modalities: political, armed, social and systemic, which gave rise to different types of migrants: exiles, refugees, economic migrants, forced and uprooted migrants. This article analyzes the main contemporary causes of migration in the Mesoamerican migration system, which are currently the so-called structural causes, but renamed as systemic violence, neoliberal poverty, and institutional impunity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

President Trump and his Administration have gravely damaged the institutions and values of American public administration. Harm has been done to the federal workforce, the policymaking process, the integrity of missions, agencies and programs, and the government's relation to science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Overview: Global economy in a lower gear in 2019–20 ▀ We still expect the pace of global GDP growth this year to be a little weaker than in 2018 and then to hold steady in 2020. Underlying financial conditions and an upturn in the manufacturing sector will be moderately supportive for growth but, with fiscal support set to wane and US‐China trade relations again looking more fractious, a rebound is unlikely and risks are still tilted to the downside.▀ In response to the strong but deceptive US expansion in Q1, we now think that global GDP growth in the early part of this year was a little stronger than previously anticipated. In response, our 2019 global GDP growth forecast has been nudged up from 2.7% to 2.8%. However, this tweak to the profile has mechanically lowered our forecast for world growth in 2020 slightly from 2.9% to 2.8%.▀ We still think that the recent soft growth patch is unlikely to morph into a substantial slowdown. Key to this is the ongoing resilience of the service sector – the global services PMI has been broadly flat since the start of this year. Meanwhile, the manufacturing data also seem to suggest that the sector has stabilised. Despite raising our end‐year Brent oil price forecast from $65pb to $73pb, inflation is set to rise only moderately. This, plus rising employment, bodes well for consumer spending.▀ But any significant re‐acceleration looks a tall order. Beyond the short term, tight labour markets and labour supply weakness will constrain employment growth. And ongoing accommodative monetary policy is unlikely to trigger further sustained rises in asset prices. Fiscal policy support at a global level is waning and we are sceptical that Chinese policymakers will provide the world economy with a major fillip.▀ Another fly in the ointment for growth is a potential re‐intensification of US‐China trade tensions; even if new tariffs do not materialise, they may undermine sentiment and investment. If President Trump implements his threat, this would probably push global GDP growth below the post‐crisis low of 2.6% in 2016. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]