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This paper explores how Japan employed language education to justify Japanese imperial surveillance practices by examining the depiction of policemen and military police officers in Japanese language textbooks used by Korean primary students during the colonial period under Japanese rule. The analysis of the Japanese language textbooks used during this period uncovered the colonial educational goals and ideologies presented to Korean students, the ideal colonial citizens desired by the ruling system, and colonial aims furthered. This study investigates the ideologies presented in the textbooks using Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Visual Image Analysis (VIA) by analyzing eight textbooks that were used in Japan and Korea. Both images and texts relating to Japanese government officials in the textbooks for Koreans from the colonial era are analyzed. The study reveals that the textbooks positioned Korean students to accept and integrate Japanese ideologies and attempted to indoctrinate Koreans into believing that the Japanese government officials were kind and cooperative, while also maximizing their authority over the colonized in their portrayal. The portrayal of government officials in the textbooks further reinforced this by showing the colonized having to display good behavior to authority figures, while not conveying any negative images of the government officials.

The author surveys the review of Japan's defense programs and several other key defense-related documents the Liberal Democratic government initiated in 2013. She focuses on the pivotal points of Japan's Defense White Paper and on the current state and prospects of military cooperation between the U.S. and Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Escalation of great power rivalry resulting from China's rise and Russia's invasion of Ukraine has prompted Japan to align its foreign and security policies more closely. This paper analyzes how ODA policy, which the Japanese government regards as a crucial diplomatic instrument, has been modified in the face of these changes. The most significant transformation is the securitization of ODA, or the deployment of ODA to advance Japan's national security interests. This trend is evident in the emergence of a new type of ODA that aims to contribute to Japan's security interests by strengthening the deterrence capabilities of developing countries involved in territorial disputes with China. Notably, Japan is justifying this new ODA trend in the name of upholding the universal value of the international rule of law. In other words, Japan is shifting the focus of assistance away from domestic issues of democracy and human rights in each recipient country toward the rule of law in international relations. This is a manifestation of Japan's effort to strike a careful balance between upholding universal values and avoiding the risk of offending incumbent governments in recipient countries with questionable domestic governance records. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does the notion of state security inform national approaches to managing cross-border in-migration in the increasingly interconnected but volatile Northeast Asian region? This paper explores this question by focusing on the intermestic politics of labor importation. Specifically, it theorizes the multidimensionality and multifunctionality of security fears that inform Japan's and Taiwan's approaches to the admission of low-skilled foreign workers. The paper proposes a comprehensive conceptual framework that explicates these relationships and argues that Northeast Asian labor importation regimes were formed at the intersection of a threefold logic of state security. Whereas economic security acted as an enabling (inclusionary) factor in both Japan and Taiwan and motivated the acceptance of foreign workers, internal security in Japan and external security in Taiwan acted as constraining (exclusionary) factors, which directly and distinctively conditioned the resulting policies. Moreover, ever since their inception in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the divergent policy regimes have been interlocked in these economic-internal and economic-external dynamics of state security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Social Sciences Research / Sosyal Bilimler Arastirmalari Dergisi is the property of ODU Journal of Social Sciences Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The paper examines the domestic politics explanations to Japanese security policy expansion between the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. In response to the various explanations offered in the literature, such as the implementation of administrative and institutional reforms since 1994 that resulted in the centralization of the decision-making process, changes to the balance of power of political parties within the Japanese political system, and shift in the type of politicians that dominate the LDP, opposition parties and security policymaking structure, this paper argues that it is important to incorporate collective identity into understanding Japanese security policy expansion. Two reasons highlight the importance of collective identity – first, without collective identity, it is difficult to understand the type of security policy produced as the discussion of vision is omitted; and, second, collective identity reveals the organizational make-up of the security policymaking structure that is responsible for the formulation of security policy. To explicate the collective identity–institution relationship, this paper focuses on Japanese security identity and the Japanese security policymaking regime in the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. Two security identities for Japan are examined – the peace-state and international-state; and three elements of the regime are studied – the agents involved or marginalized in the security policymaking process, the decision-making structure of the security policymaking, and the role of the US. This paper aids in our understanding of how collective identities are sustained and supported within an institution, and how Japanese security policy expanded in the post-Cold War period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper argues that a significant change in Japanese post-Cold War security policy has occurred, as compared to its Cold War security policy. Instead of relying solely on power-based realist variables, this paper argues that a significant change is taking place because of the shift in Japan's security identity from a 'peace state' to an 'international state'. What this refers to is that Japan sees itself as playing a more active role in military-strategic affairs in the post-Cold War period due to the normative structure shift within Japan in relation to the practices and role(s) in the regional and international security environment. To show change in Japan's security identity and its resultant security behaviour, norms in three areas that define and shape its security policy are contrasted - Japan's definition of national security; its contribution, in military terms, to regional and international security affairs; and the level of agency (control) Japan has in its security policy. The international-state security identity is increasingly recognised by the members of Japan's security policy-making elite and is used to formulate Japan's security policy in the post-Cold War period. It is also gradually being accepted by the larger Japanese society and has become a permanent feature of Japan's security discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper joins the debate on Japan's territorial dispute with South Korea over the Dokdo/Takeshima islets. Informed by the ontological security framework of analysis, this paper seeks to explain the decision to adopt the ‘Takeshima Day’ ordinance by the Shimane Prefectural Assembly and the subsequent ascendance of ‘Takeshima’ to the fore of Japan's identity construction vis-à-vis the Korean ‘other’. In this paper, I distinguish between two processes: one that led to the adoption of the ordinance and another that resulted in the entrenchment of ‘Takeshima’ in Japan's identity construction vis-à-vis the Korean ‘other’. The paper argues that the former process should be understood within the context of Shimane Prefecture's distinct identity construction vis-à-vis Tokyo, while the latter can be attributed to recent changes in Japan–Korea relations unrelated to the territorial dispute per se. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Structural realists might reasonably predict that foreign policy elites in countries like Japan and Australia would view China's economic and military rise as a potential threat and seek to balance against it. However, the actual policy behaviour of Japanese and Australian policy elites has been quite complex—pushing forward at times, hesitating at others and generally uncertain if an explicit counter-coalition against China through bilateral security cooperation is the right policy path. Why is this? This paper explains the puzzle by focusing on the perceptions of policy-makers regarding the risk of provoking China; entrapment with the other; and entrapment with the United States. The paper demonstrates how policy-makers' concerns regarding entrapment or abandonment related to their mutual US ally—as well as concerns about potentially provoking China—have had an instrumental effect on the degree to which Japan and Australia have strengthened their security commitments to each other. While the rise of China—and the relative decline of US power—has shaped the overall direction of Japan–Australia security ties, such structural imperatives are of course also complicated by how domestic actors think about the tactical aspects of understanding and surviving these structural features. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan is abandoning its once unidirectional foreign security policy towards the USA, two notable examples of which are its increasingly comprehensive and substantial security relations with the Philippines and Vietnam. Putting these burgeoning Japanese security partnerships front and center, this paper asks the following questions: What are the characteristics of Japan's maturing security partnerships with the Philippines and Vietnam? What factors have driven and enabled their recent emergence? What promotes and constrains their future development? What do these maturing Japanese non-US security partnerships reveal about Japan's direction as a security actor in and beyond East Asia? The paper finds that these two Japanese security bilaterals, which have six basic characteristics in common, are fundamentally driven by the contemporary shift in the balance of power and the strategic challenge that China's emerging maritime power and ambitions present Japan. It moreover argues that the substantiation of these security partnerships have been pursued under American auspices and further invited by Japanese nationalism and security legislative reforms. Notwithstanding these encouraging factors, however, domestic and geo-strategic constraints and counter incentives lead this paper to expect further substantiation, but limited military significance in the future of these security partnerships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper begins by establishing the context in which Japan's normal statehood will be based. The paper shows how difficult it is for Japan to attain the status of a normal state based on the country's political forces and the rising powers in the Asian region. The paper looks at the relationships between Japan and other nations like China and South Korea, which should be considered by Japan in order to attain normal statehood. These are countries that initially were under the control of Japan, especially in business and even militarily, but today they are assuming their own position in the world; an aspect that is considered a threat to Japan's smooth return to normalcy. The paper takes into consideration the models that Japan can adopt or adapt to attain the status of a normal state. The three models discussed are those of Britain, Germany, and France. The main aspect discussed under these models is autonomy; this is based on the fact that Japan can only attain the status of a normal state if it becomes autonomous. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While there is much theoretical and academic discussion of human security, as well as regional expressions of human security by the Organization of American States, African Union, and the European Union, little of this is translated into substance except for Japan, which has incorporated human security into foreign policy. This paper examines Japan's definition and aspiration for human security, especially its plans to expand development aid through this modality in Southeast Asia. This scrutiny will encompass Japanese human security foreign policy and its substantive action through the Japan International Cooperation Agency and the UN Trust Fund for Human Security. Thus, the potential for Japanese human security cooperation with Southeast Asian partners will be reviewed in light of Japan's projected trajectory. The paper concludes by positing that bilateral engagement might be expected for the considerable future and suggests policy consolidation before regional engagement can be effected. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the shadow of China's rise involving relative US hegemonic decline, Japan is considered to have played supplementary and complementary roles to buttress the international status quo and to have been engaged in a geoeconomic competition with China. Yet, in October 2018, Japan and China announced an about-face on their respective bilateral policy lines from competition to cooperation. This change begs the question of if the two in fact followed a competitive game at the grand-strategic levels. The study will cast a doubt about the assumed link of the two countries' declared policy lines and actual policy actions and argue for the case of a propaganda rivalry. This study will examine Japan's "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy" against China's "Belt and Road Initiative" Strategy, with focus on their status within the respective national strategy systems, financial resources and funds, and project feasibility/viability. Then the study will identify some crucial factors of the two countries' setbacks and analyze their transitory reconciliation. This paper is intended to exemplify a realist approach to systematic and critical examination of "strategy", a most abused term, that often misguides foreign and security policy analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The goal of this paper is to examine the process by which rapes and other acts of sexual violence lead to changes in international relations. This paper focuses on the rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl in 1995 because it presents a mysterious puzzle: given the changing international structural and epistemic environment, why did the US and Japanese governments fail to answer local calls for measures to prevent future rapes and other crimes by soldiers, perhaps by reducing the size of US forces deployed in Okinawa? By looking into factors that affected the decision-making process within the US and Japanese governments, this paper tries to explain why the issue of US bases in Okinawa evolved in the way it has since 1995. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent domestic constructivist studies characterize Japanese security policy as a serious anomaly to realism and a crucial case vindicating their approach to the larger study of world politics. The present paper challenges this view. It advances a postclassical realist interpretation of Japan's core security policy in the past quarter century. Japan's military doctrine expressed in the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) is consistent with postclassical realism's predictions, as opposed to neorealism's predictions, which focus on the dynamics of the regional security dilemma and the question of financial burden resulting from military build-up. In addition, postclassical realism offers a more compelling theoretical guide for understanding Japan's core security policy than defensive realism or mercantile realism. This paper backs up its argument with the empirical evidence that Takuya Kubo, the author of the NDPO, himself intentionally based the NDPO on a postclassical realist line of thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using hitherto underutilized Japanese material, this paper systematically analyzes two competing theories of military doctrine formation that account for the construction of the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), postwar Japan’s first military doctrine. It demonstrates that, on balance, available evidence on the policy preference of two key civilian policymakers, Michio Sakata and Takuya Kubo, is more consistent with the interpretation drawn from Posen’s balance‐of‐power theory than with that from Kier’s domestic culturalist theory. While by no means ignored by these policymakers, domestic political concerns neither dominantly shaped, nor gave a specific direction to their policy action. Rather, the policymakers were motivated to formulate the best response possible to Japan’s new international strategic conditions. This finding relates the hitherto neglected significance of the NDPO case to the larger, ongoing realist–constructivist debate on the formation of military doctrine. It also leads us to a more sophisticated understanding of NDPO formation, which focuses on the process of how a combination of political leadership and ideas triggered the breakthrough in Japanese security policymaking. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Given the fluid nature of the security environment in the Asia-Pacific, a trilateral security partnership among the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) is essential to enhance stability in the region. Yet both Japan and the ROK are currently experiencing transitions, as well as facing strategic perception gaps and political difficulties in the bilateral relationship that need to be reconciled. The purpose of this paper is to examine the prospects and issues in establishing a Japan-ROK security partnership to the U.S. alliance triangle. The paper promotes a capability-based cooperation framework for the United States, Japan, and the ROK, focusing on the strategic and operational dimensions that would effectively deal with the security risks in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. The paper will first outline the developments in Japan-ROK security relations, and then look at the constraints and restraints in the bilateral relations. Next, the paper will assess the political framework needed to facilitate cooperative ties between Japan and the ROK. Then the paper will propose the criteria and viable options to shape the strategic and operational framework for a Japan-ROK partnership. The paper will conclude by arguing that a Japan-ROK partnership is essential in completing the alliance triangle with the United States to serve as the lynchpin of security in the Asia-Pacific. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Korea and Japan have experienced their worst deterioration of bilateral relations since 2012. What are the long-term prospects for this relationship? Will it continue on this negative trajectory or recover positively in the long term? Challenging the conventional view that supports the former conclusion, this paper argues for a positive outlook for the relationship in the long term. This is defended from a structural perspective relying on two long-term strategic trends for Northeast/ East Asia--the elevated uncertainty in the regional environment (due to North Korea and China's strategic rise); and the rising strain on the U.S. military presence in both countries. In response to these structural pressures, South Korea and Japan will adapt and adopt strategies to defend their national security within a reformed U.S. alliance structure and strengthen strategic cooperation through bilateral and trilateral (with the United States) means. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's policy toward India since 2000 appears to be a sign of new directions in Japan's security policy since its decision to establish a strategic partnership with India is different from the previous policy of exclusive bilateralism centering on the US-Japan alliance. Nonetheless, Japan's recent security partnership with India is part of Japan's long-term effort to support the US-led liberal political and economic order in East Asia. This paper argues that Japan's policy toward India since 2000 has evolved toward becoming fully aligned with US policy toward the Indo-Pacific region. The critical shift in Tokyo's policy toward India came in spring 2005, when Japanese political leaders and policy elites came to recognize India as an important balancer against China as a result of the violent anti-Japanese demonstrations in China. They decided to support including India into the East Asian Summit and incorporated India into their new values diplomacy. This shift in Japan's policy toward India, along with efforts to increase interoperability between Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Forces and Indian Navy, coincides with US strategy to bring India into the US-led coalition to balance against China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Amid the soured bilateral relations with South Korea, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has taken swift steps toward transforming Japan into a more active player in East Asian power politics. This is in response to North Korea's military threat and China's maritime expansionism. These intensifying security challenges prompted Tokyo to promote military readiness and introduce a force development plan in 2013. On 1 July 2014, Japan's Cabinet passed the decision on exercising collective self-defense, signaling a shift from the old self-imposed restriction on the use of force as a means of dispute settlement. The reinterpretation of Article 9 heralded a more proactive engagement of Japan's military in the regional power balance. Accordingly, Japan revised the US-Japan Defense Guidelines in April 2015, strengthening ties with the United States. South Koreans expressed sharply divided attitudes toward Japan's military empowerment. Marked differences ranged between the watchful eyes of the public on the one hand, and conditional acceptance by the government and security specialists on the other. Referring to regional geopolitics and historical bilateral relations, this paper presents conditions and rationales reconciling these conflicting positions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study aims to evaluate the involvement of public administration in addressing hybrid threats in cyberspace. A comparative analysis was conducted on the entities involved in combating hybrid threats in the digital realm in Ukraine, France, and Japan, utilising visual and graphic techniques. It was established that the prevalence of hybrid threats targeting the cyber domain is contingent upon adequate organisational support. The subjects of public administration in countering hybrid threats in cyberspace in Ukraine, France and Japan were indicated. It was determined that hybrid threats predominantly encompass challenges to a state's sovereignty, national security, public awareness, classified information, and communication. It is important to acknowledge many constantly evolving tactics and strategies employed in these threats. At the same time, there is potential to draw upon the experience of France and Japan and establish a separate entity in Ukraine dedicated to countering hybrid threats in cyberspace. Future research could explore the feasibility of implementing such a system in Ukraine, highlighting the key tasks, goals, competencies, authorities, functions, and operational objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does America's greater focus on Asia impact the security policies of Japan and Australia? How does it change the nature of the Japan-US-Australia security partnership? This paper attempts to answer these questions by looking at Japanese and Australian responses to the Obama Administration's new security policy toward Asia called “rebalancing.” After examining them, it argues that the regional allied response to America's new security posture has generated greater momentum for both allies to collaborate in wider areas in a more timely and effective way than before. It concludes asserting that, in the era of rebalance, Japan, the United States, and Australia have not only deepened their existing cooperation, but also have expanded potential areas of cooperation toward a more “dynamic” partnership. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Japan has steadily extended its military reach from a domestic zone of defense against territorial invasion in the late 1950s, through regional security policy in the late 1970s to what has now become a globally scaled military role. This re-expansion is perceived by some as evidence of revived militaristic ambitions, and by others as subservience to the US global strategy. However, taking the cue from Japan's 2004 National Defence Programme Guideline (New Taikō), this paper assesses the role globalization has played in this territorial expansion. The impact of globalization is evident in the double expansion of Japan's national security conception in geographical terms and self-defense forces roles in global security. These ‘expansions’ are studied through two key elements of globalization – the deterritorialization of complex relations of interdependence between states (security globality) and the inter-penetrating nature of these relations blur the boundary between foreign and domestic spaces (intermestic space). [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

To many observers Japanese decision-making is an enigma that defies conventional analysis. Neither the traditional rational actor model of decision-making, nor alternative pluralist models proposed for the analysis of Western democracies fit the Japanese case. As a result Japanese security policy decision-making is described as ‘reactive’ or even non-existent. Likewise, the anomaly of Japanese decision-making is ultimately predicted to be resolved through a process of ‘normalization’ whereby Japanese policy formation evolves into a form that does fit these models. However, this paper contends that the fact that Japan’s security decision-making does not fit commonly-used models is due rather to the limitations of those models. Japan’s security policy, like that of all states, is gradually evolving, but this does not mean that it is about to become just like the West. This paper addresses how a conjuncture of external factors and internal factors has stimulated important changes in Japanese security policy-making which are frequently missed or misinterpreted by observers. In order to understand Japanese security policy-making, and to chart its future course, a refined cybernetic approach is introduced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the post-war period Australian Prime Ministers have played a proactive role in formulating foreign policy towards Japan. This paper explores the role of executive leadership towards Japan and its impact on the bilateral relationship. The Howard period and current Rudd-led initiatives on whaling, nuclear disarmament, climate change and regional architecture are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The importance of Northeast Asian energy cooperation has been consistently emphasized in recent years to cope with uncertainties in the global energy market and to avert potential conflicts regarding energy supply among consumer countries. Energy supply, climate change, and the North Korean energy crisis have posed major concerns with respect to the energy security of Northeast Asian countries. However, the actual implementation of energy cooperation has reflected strong competition among major energy consuming countries, despite the perceived necessity of energy cooperation. Energy cooperation in Northeast Asia has become essential—not only for the facilitation of energy supply but also for the prevention of potential conflicts stemming from competitive energy procurement. This paper proposes that intergovernmental energy cooperation in Northeast Asia should focus more on the aspect of public goods. Intergovernmental energy cooperation should be based on a practical and achievable “soft agenda” rather than a “hard agenda” of large-scale supply projects. Successful energy cooperation in Northeast Asia needs a careful reconsideration of the agenda-setting and the modality of cooperation in terms of scope, membership, and issue linkage. The case for regional energy cooperation could be guaranteed if participating countries were to move together toward a virtuous circle of energy cooperation out of neo-mercantilist competition. Confidence-building measures to ease the escalation of conflicts regarding energy supply may also be an important basis for further energy cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The build-up of Japan's military apparatus in the 1990s and 2000s has been often regarded by security analysts as indicative of a departure from the country's Cold War strategic posture. Japan appears to be engaged in a process of militarisation that is eroding the foundations of its 'exclusively defence-oriented' policy. In the case of the archipelago's naval strategy, such assessments overlook the longstanding significance of a core feature of its defence policy, namely the surveillance of maritime crossroads delivering the wealth of the country. The paper reassesses the evolution of the Japanese strategy since the Cold War by examining the development of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force's submarine force, one of the key components of the defensive shield for these crossroads. The paper argues that with the changes in the security environment of the 1990s, Japan already fielded a mature force with state-of-the-art submarines, and that the rise of a new naval competitor aiming at controlling key strategic points along Japan's sea lanes reconfirmed the critical importance of submarine operations to Japanese national security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many analysts of Japanese security policy sense that Japan is on the cusp of a fundamental breakaway from its long-standing Yoshida Doctrine, and they have engaged in a spirited debate about the sources of Japan's security threat, policies needed to meet these threats, and the extent of the policy changes that would occur in Japan. However, very little analysis has been done to date on explaining Japanese foreign policy changes in recent years. This paper advances an ideationalist explanation for the recent changes in Japanese foreign policy orientation. It argues that a domestically generated change in self-role conception to act as a "global player" underlies the recent foreign policy changes. The Yoshida Doctrine that has formed the basis of the post-war Japanese foreign policy orientation is moribund now, and Japan wants to increase its political influence that matches its economic might. As a result, Japanese foreign policy has become more active and assertive since the 1990s, and a diverse set of policies ranging from the peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in Iraq, the UN reform proposals, history issues, and intensifying territorial disputes with China and Korea reflect this change in Japanese foreign policy orientation. This paper supports the argument with the cognitive maps of National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPGs) published by the then Japan Defense Agency and the original survey of Japanese politicians in the Diet conducted in 2006. Both the cognitive maps and the survey support reveal that there is a greater emphasis on internationalism, which is closely connected with the new role conception of global player. The survey also suggests that a sense of insecurity resulting from two security threats to Japan - the rise of China and the North Korean nuclear issue-may be at the root of the emergence of the new role conception. We are already witnessing the emergence of more conflictual international relations in Northeast Asia due to Japan's desire to play a greater role in the region and beyond, and this trend is likely to continue in the near future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a rapidly changing geopolitical and strategic environment in which the current US administration is willing to demonstrate to the world that the pursuit of its national interest will not be encumbered by multilateral forums, what role will US bilateral alliance partners such as Japan and Australia play in redefining the international order, especially in their area of primary interest – East Asia? This paper examines an Australian proposal for establishing an informal security dialogue at the ministerial level comprising the United States and two of its bilateral allies in the Asia-Pacific. While the dialogue process has begun, the success of any such structure, however, will be largely coloured by accommodating the very different histories and strategic cultures that have developed within these countries, and the very different expectations other regional states have of them. Through the examples of the war on terror and the war against Iraq, this paper argues that there is little evidence of structured co-operation at the ministerial level in place. Further, any exclusive high-level security dialogue which forms around this troika will incur the suspicion of many East Asian nations, as it may be seen as a platform for unrestrained US unilateralism and exceptionalism, which may in turn have negative implications for Japan and Australia's continuing role in Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article explains how Japan's strategic interests are converging with India against an assertive China in the Indo-Pacific. Japan has been pursuing a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP) policy, which seeks to manage China's rise by deepening Japan's strategic coordination and cooperation with its closest partners through the Quad. Though Japan still values its bilateral relationship with the United States (US), its security partnership with India is part of Tokyo's persistent efforts to support the US-led rules-based international order. In order to counter China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan has been a strong supporter among the Quad to promote non-military cooperation, primarily focusing on infrastructure building, supply chain resilience and technological innovations. The article argues that Japan's strategic engagement with India is now an integral part of its wider national security posture as Tokyo has come to recognise New Delhi as an important balancer against Beijing. That the US has enhanced its ties with India in recent years has further facilitated Japan–India strategic convergence since it is aligned with American policy towards the Indo-Pacific region in an era of great power competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India believes in the peaceful emergence of the Asian region, but China has not declared its clear vision about the region. In November 2013, China announced Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea over the Senkaku/Diayou Island, meaning thereby that any plane passing over the Island has to take the prior permission of Chinese authorities. Some of these assertive gestures by China impinge on India to search for new strategic partners at global level like USA and Australia and maintaining smooth relationship with old friend and ally Russia because of the rise of China as uncertain power, but simultaneously India also abstains from any grouping which is anti-China. India wanted to see the peaceful rise of China in the interest of the region and world at large. In the paper, an attempt has been made to explore the India global strategic partnership with special focus on India-Japan strategic partnership in the field of East Asian security, maritime security, energy, defence, space and cooperation at global forums. These two countries are emerging as good strategic partners at bilateral, regional, multilateral and global issues. To strengthen this strategic partnership, there is a need for more and more economic engagement between the two countries, which is still lagging behind the optimum level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focusing on Japan, this paper explores whether powers and competences in the political system are likely to be recalibrated in favour of the executive when the environment is perceived as increasingly threatening. It shows that the executive has been significantly strengthened during the past two decades of political reforms, though a closer look reveals that only the most recent efforts are motivated by security concerns. Case studies on military deployments and arms exports do not expose any clear trend towards curbing parliament’s formal control powers, but they indicate two related mechanisms that affect executive‒legislative relations. Firstly, the executive has sought to ensure faster decision-making in security policy, which may limit the Diet’s ability to scrutinise policies in depth. Secondly, the level of contestation over security policy issues has been decreasing, especially given the securitisation of North Korea and China. This provides the executive with more leeway in devising policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is obvious that the security environment in East Asia is more unstable and unpredictable. In the South China Sea, tensions over disputed islands initiate a more severe Sino–American rivalry. In the East China Sea, China disputes the control over the Senkaku Islands, and is escalating military activities around those islands. North Korea continues provocative activities including launching of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons tests. This naturally leads to the idea that Japan needs to play a larger role to restore stability in the international order. This paper explores the challenges facing East Asian security in the face of the passage of Japan's new security bills in 2015 and how they impact the future of Japanese security policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper makes three related points. First, Japan has played an instrumental role in helping to define the shape and substance of multilateralism in Asia in ways deeper than scholarly literature on Asia's regional architecture has allowed. A key driving force behind Japan's contributions is the perceived utility of multilateralism in facilitating Japan's engagement of and/or balancing against China. Second, Japan has been able to achieve this because of the United States' support for Asian multilateralism and Japanese security interests. In the immediate post-Cold War period, Japan facilitated US participation in regional arrangements such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the ASEAN Regional Forum. But Japanese ambivalence over its dependence on the United States was also apparent in Tokyo's attempts to exclude Washington from the newly formed East Asia Summit in late 2005, despite Japan's felt need to balance China. Japan's reliance on quiet diplomacy and an implicit regional leadership has equally been instrumental to its achievements in regional integration. Third, in the light of Japan's longstanding aim to become a normal military power and adopt a more assertive policy toward China, Japan‒US security ties are likely to deepen with negative consequences for Asian multilateralism. However, if its ties with China and South Korea worsen over their islands disputes in the East China Sea, Japan risks undermining its relations with the United States. How Japan balances its normalization with a continued engagement with multilateralism could be key to a stable and secure Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper sheds light on a relatively underexplored aspect of Japan’s recent security changes by examining the subnational level where the impact has been far-reaching. It focuses on Japan’s maritime frontier zone: the Yaeyama Islands located at the southwestern end of the Japanese archipelago and administered as part of Okinawa Prefecture. It argues that while Yaeyama militarization has been primarily a national response to China’s portrayed assertiveness in the East China Sea, it has also been facilitated by the strategic actions of local political elites, in cooperation with sympathetic extra-local forces. Political elites from two islands, Yonaguni and Ishigaki, have been motivated primarily by diverging material and ideational factors. Yonaguni elites have viewed militarization largely through the prism of “compensation politics.” Their counterparts in Ishigaki have been driven by more ideological objectives, seeking militarization for deterrence purposes and otherwise transforming the island into a rightist breeding ground in defence of Japanese territory. Yaeyama militarization has not only diminished enthusiasm for seeking autonomy and enhancing economic security through microregional cooperation, but has also enhanced local-level insecurities while creating and exacerbating divisions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Former Prime Minister of Japan Nakasone Yasuhiro advocated autonomous defense throughout the post-WWII period. Nakasone's concept of autonomous defense (jishu boei) went beyond the idea of enhancing national defense capabilities—it was accompanied by a rich and varied internationalism that strove toward assuaging neighboring countries' concerns toward Japan's remilitarization. Nakasone also actively engaged major western powers in the global debate over nuclear issues during his term as prime minister, and it went beyond the confines of Japan's bilateral security relationship with the United States. Thus, Nakasone's autonomous defense concept reflected both the development of postwar Japan and the many turbulent changes in the postwar global security landscape. This essay follows the evolution of Nakasone's autonomous defense concept during his political career from 1950 to the end of his premiership in 1988 and concludes with an overall assessment of his initiatives regarding Japanese security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Japan faces its most serious and complex defence environment since the end of World War II. The country holds two significant security concerns: first, and critically, China’s burgeoning military, increasingly aggressive diplomacy, and destabilising actions around the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea; second, North Korea’s continued unpredictable rhetoric and actions in its nuclear arming program and ballistic missile testing. Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy proposes two unprecedented policy ideas to counter these threats: first, to significantly increase Japan’s defence budget; second, to acquire counterstrike long-range missile capabilities in response to an attack. Nonetheless, despite these security issues and policy developments, this article argues that formal amendment of the peace clause in art 9 of the Japanese Constitution remains unlikely. To understand the improbability of constitutional amendment, this article first explores Japan’s constitutional pacifism under the post-World War II Yoshida Doctrine and the United States–Japan cornerstone security alliance, as well as the context of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile threat and the emotive issue of abductions of Japanese citizens. The article then turns to Japan’s historic imperial relationship with China as an avenue to understand contemporary relations, including the key issues of trade and its link to security, and the Senkaku Islands sovereignty dispute. It concludes that formal constitutional amendment of the peace clause remains unlikely in the short to medium term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the role of think tanks in the foreign and security policy-making at Japan. It mentions that the foreign policy think tanks in Japan includes the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA) and the Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS). It mentions that the U.S. think tanks including the Brookings Institute or the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) plays a vital role in the foreign policy-making of Washington and hosting members of outgoing administrations. It mentions that during the Cold War, the JIIA developed a domestic and international reputation for determing the politics in the Communist party.

After the end of the Cold War, Japan became very active in its security policy. How can we explain this phenomenon? This essay argues that (neo-) realist settings (the end of the Cold War, the Taepodong missile launch) have triggered changes in Japanese domestic security culture, which subsequently affected Japanese security policy. In spite of rationalist theorists' criticism of the constructivist approach for not being able to clarify independent and dependent variables, this essay attempts to elucidate the relationship between security culture and policies thereof. By utilizing "cultural process-tracing," this paper investigates how cultural elements become linked and internalized into policymaker-level and illustrates the causal relationship between these two. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the Second World War, Japan began paying war reparations and instituted a strategy of international positioning - based on international cooperation activities - that aimed to ensure the supply of natural resources to its production and trade. Economic security became the target of Japanese cooperation. Japan soon became a major donor, whose strategy has been permeated by its interests. Taking a critical perspective, this paper analyses the evolution of the Japanese cooperation strategy, in particular the changes promoted by the prime minister, Shinzo Abe. Its starting point is a review of the stages of Japanese cooperation (emphasising the outside interference the country has had to respond to), the underpinning of which has shifted from the principle of economic security via the principle of human security to its present greater focus on strategic security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article represents the first attempt to examine the Chinese elite's threat perception of Japan using statistics to analyse what, if any, differences exist among the People's Liberation Army, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chinese economic institutes. It seeks to answer two questions that have not previously been addressed in the literature. First, has there been a change in perception of the Japanese threat in these three sectors over time? And if so, what can we deduce about the causes of this change? This study finds that there have indeed been two major shifts in China's threat perception of Japan since the 1980s, one in the late 1980s and the other in the mid-1990s. It also finds that there were no differences between sectors as to the direction and timing of these shifts. It suggests that Japan's military build-up in the late 1980s and the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance from 1996 onwards are what prompted these shifts in China's threat perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper traces the evolution of Japan-Southeast Asia security relations over the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods. It makes two main points. First, Japan's relationship with Southeast Asia is slowly overcoming its traditional aversion of security affairs in defining its relations with Southeast Asia in the post-Cold War period. Japan has moved beyond economics to gradually carve out a more proactive role in the security affairs of Southeast Asia in the areas of multilateral security dialogues, peacekeeping missions, disaster relief provision, combating piracy, and others. Second, Southeast Asian states have become more amenable to Japan assuming a security role in the region. Not only have the new security roles contributed to enhanced trust and confidence between Japan and Southeast Asia, but Japan has also achieved the status of being a core security actor in Southeast Asian affairs. This role will continue to flourish in the post-Cold War period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The “national systems of innovation” (NSI) framework for analyzing innovative performance and policy has been an important and influential area of scholarship for nearly 20 years, since the first articulation of the concept in Freeman (Technology policy and economic performance: lessons from Japan, 1987). Surprisingly, however, the large literature on national systems of innovation has devoted little attention to the role of defense-related R&D investment and innovation. This paper surveys the role of national defense within national innovation systems, focusing in particular on the United States during and after the Cold War, including a brief description of post-9/11 trends in defense-related and national security investments in R&D. I also summarize some of the abundant literature on the role of defense-related R&D and procurement within specific sectors of U.S. industry, including aircraft, machine tools, and information technology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper assesses the impact of recent upgrades in security ties between Australia and Japan and their implications for the bilateral relationship. In particular, the development and future of the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC) is assessed. It is argued that former Prime Ministers Abe and Howard encouraged the enhancement of security ties to unprecedented new highs, but that the rise of China and leadership change in Japan and Australia in 2007 will make the prospects of a full security treaty unlikely. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]