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The article presents a discussion of the reluctance of Japan to build an arsenal of nuclear weapons and its eagerness to extend nuclear nonproliferation, adapted from the chapter "Japan's Nuclear Hedge: Beyond 'Allergy' and Breakout,'" by Richard J. Samuels and James L. Schoff, in the book "Strategic Asia 2013-14: Asia in the Second Nuclear Age." It examines Japan's periodic reexamination of its non-nuclear weapons stance during regional security concerns in Asia and reassurance from the U.S. government concerning nuclear deterrence, and public opinion in Japan concerning nuclear weapons.

A Northeast Asian nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ) or a Japan-South Korea NWFZ could help entice the DPRK to carry out its commitment in the September 2005 Six-Party Joint Statement to 'abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs'. There are two possible scenarios for the nuclear future of North Korea, and in turn, the security of South Korea and Northeast Asia: containment, in which North Korea remains nuclear-armed with a growing stockpile of nuclear weapons and gradually improving delivery capabilities; and gradual rapprochement with the USA, South Korea, and Japan. In either of these cases a Northeast Asian NWFZ or a Japan-South Korea NWFZ would improve prospects for regional stability and a denuclearized Korean peninsula and could make a significant impact in light of North Korea's nuclear arming and other recent changes in the security environment in the region. An NWFZ has implications for the future role of nuclear weapons in the regional balance of power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports on the nuclear proliferation and deterrence in Asia. The section examines how the spread of nuclear weapons might affect deterrence stability and the possibility of deliberate or accidental/inadvertent war in Asia, with implications for Russian and U.S. national security and arms control policy.