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This paper seeks to enter the current debate over the future of the South Australian Legislative Council by critiquing recent reform proposals and then outlining some modest suggestions for reform. The paper contends that a number of recent reform proposals are explicitly partisan and seek to enlarge the role of large parties and majority government. On the contrary others would ban political parties. The paper contends that whilst the Legislative Council exhibits many of the characteristics of an effective and useful upper house, reform of four areas would enable its review function to be improved. These areas include: the size of the Council; the term lengths of members; the method for resolving deadlocks; and the method for replacing retiring members. The paper then critically examines the proposal to ban political parties; and argues instead that instituting the Robson Rotation system would promote freedom of association and freedom of choice by voters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a comparative analysis of the extent to which party law influences the internal organisation of parties in four Commonwealth common law states: Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The research engages with recent comparative party literature that emphasises the increasingly close relationship between political parties and the state, in particular the cartel party thesis. My findings indicate that over the last few decades parties have become subject to greater legal regulation, which supports the claim that parties are now managed more closely by the state. However, it is important to distinguish between legislative and common law (judicial) regulation, as each has a different impact on the organisational autonomy of the cartel party. I argue that parties (as autonomous actors and the authors of parliamentary decrees) have been able to shape legislative regulation to their advantage by eliciting significant financial support from the state, yet minimising the corresponding degree of legislative intrusion into their internal activities. However, cartel parties have not been able to prevent judicial scrutiny of their internal workings, and have lost a significant degree of organisational independence as principles of administrative law (usually reserved for state bodies) are being increasingly applied to their structure and behaviour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]