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Is it possible to maintain classical logic, stay close to classical semantics, and yet accept that language might be semantically indeterminate? The article gives an affirmative answer by Ramsifying classical semantics , which yields a new semantic theory that remains much closer to classical semantics than supervaluationism but which at the same time avoids the problematic classical presupposition of semantic determinacy. The resulting Ramsey semantics is developed in detail, it is shown to supply a classical concept of truth and to fully support the rules and metarules of classical logic, and it is applied to vague terms as well as to theoretical or open-ended terms from mathematics and science. The theory also demonstrates how diachronic or synchronic interpretational continuity across languages is compatible with semantic indeterminacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Schroeder-Heister 2018, proof-theoretic semantics is 'an alternative to truth-condition semantics. It is based on the fundamental assumption that the central notion in terms of which meanings are assigned to certain expressions of our language, in particular to logical constants, is that of proof rather than truth. In this sense proof-theoretic semantics is semantics in terms of proof. Proof-theoretic semantics also means the semantics of proofs, i.e. the semantics of entities which describe how we arrive at certain assertions given certain assumptions.' This text advocates that proof-theoretic semantics, as described above, was an approach to semantical issues in logic that appeared in mainstream philosophical literature at least a couple of centuries before the tradition of general proof theory (cf. Prawitz 1971) came into being. This is done by means of an interpretive analysis of Kant's 1762 essay Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren, in which two theses are argued: first, that the issue of justifying the logical validity of inferences is approached by Kant in this text, in a strong sense, in terms of proofs; and second, that the purpose of his effort is to establish a point concerning the semantical equivalence between certain distinct valid inferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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'Visible Meaning' (Schlenker 2018b) claims (i) that sign language makes visible some aspects of the Logical Form of sentences that are covert in spoken language, and (ii) that, along some dimensions, sign languages are more expressive than spoken languages because iconic conditions can be found at their logical core. Following nine peer commentaries, we clarify both claims and discuss three main issues: what is the nature of the interaction between logic and iconicity in sign language and beyond? does iconicity in sign language play the same role as gestures in spoken language? and is sign language Role Shift best analyzed in terms of visible context shift, or by way of demonstrations referring to gestures? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to actualism, modal reality is constructed out of valuations (combinations of truth values for all propositions). According to possibilism, modal reality consists in a set of possible worlds, conceived as independent objects that assign truth values to propositions. According to possibilism, accounts of modal reality can intelligibly disagree with each other even if they agree on which valuations are contained in modal reality. According to actualism, these disagreements (possibilist disagreements) are completely unintelligible. An essentially actualist semantics for modal propositional logic specifies which sets of valuations are compatible with the meanings of the truth-functional connectives and modal operators without drawing on formal resources that would enable us to represent possibilist disagreements. The paper discusses the availability of an essentially actualist semantics for modal propositional logic. I argue that the standard Kripkean semantics is not essentially actualist and that other extant approaches also fail to provide a satisfactory essentially actualist semantics. I end by describing an essentialist actualist semantics for modal propositional logic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses notion of grammar in view of logic. It states that relationship between logic and the science about language, and mentions that logic does not deal with individual specific languages in their psychological individualized function. It notes that ethnic and national language may change over time, and cites that the semantics part of logic deals with problem of the function of parts of speech and their structure.

The paper proposes an extension of the definition of a canonical proof, central to proof-theoretic semantics, to a definition of a canonical derivation from open assumptions. The impact of the extension on the definition of (reified) proof-theoretic meaning of logical constants is discussed. The extended definition also sheds light on a puzzle regarding the definition of local-completeness of a natural-deduction proof-system, underlying its harmony. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to investigate various limitative results about the concept of validity. In particular, I argue that higher-order logic with the standard semantics cannot be sufficiently expressive to capture its own concept of validity. Moreover, I show that the logic of transparent truth recently developed by Hartry Field leads to similar limitative results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I claim that the so-called present perfect puzzle is, in reality, a puzzle about the simple past. It is the latter, I argue, that shows a puzzling behavior, given that it can be used not only in definite contexts but also in seemingly indefinite ones. I employ the notions of time frame and specifiability to show how the obvious distinction between the two tenses in terms of temporal logic can be accounted for. I also propose that the past morpheme -ed be considered a kind of verb determiner which selects a temporal XP as a complement. Such complement can (and usually is) expressed either in the sentence or in the larger discourse; however, it can also remain implicit, or covert. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dung’s (1995)argumentation frameworktakes as input two abstract entities: a set ofargumentsand abinary relationencoding attacks between these arguments. It returns acceptable sets of arguments, calledextensions, w.r.t. a givensemantics. While the abstract nature of this setting is seen as a great advantage, it induces a big gap with the application that it is used to. This raises some questions about the compatibility of the setting with a logical formalism (i.e., whether it is possible to instantiate it properly from alogicalknowledge base), and about the significance of the various semantics in the application context. In this paper we tackle the above questions. We first propose to fill in the previous gap by extending Dung’s (1995) framework. The idea is to consider all the ingredients involved in an argumentation process. We start with the notion of an abstract monotonic logic which consists of a language (defining the formulas) and a consequence operator. We show how to build, in a systematic way, arguments from a knowledge base formalised in such a logic. We then recall some basic postulates that any instantiation should satisfy. We study how to choose an attack relation so that the instantiation satisfies the postulates. We show that symmetric attack relations are generally not suitable. However, we identify at least one ‘appropriate’ attack relation. Next, we investigate under stable, semi-stable, preferred, grounded and ideal semantics the outputs of logic-based instantiations that satisfy the postulates. For each semantics, we delimit the number of extensions an argumentation system may have, characterise the extensions in terms of subsets of the knowledge base, and finally characterise the set of conclusions that are drawn from the knowledge base. The study reveals that stable, semi-stable and preferred semantics either lead to counter-intuitive results or provide no added value w.r.t. naive semantics. Besides, naive semantics either leads to arbitrary results or generalises the coherence-based approach initially developed by Rescher and Manor (1970). Ideal and grounded semantics either coincide and generalise the free consequence relation developed by Benferhat, Dubois, and Prade (1997), or return arbitrary results. Consequently, Dung’s (1995) framework seems problematic when applied over deductive logical formalisms. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Kaplan () insists that natural languages do not contain displacing devices that operate on character-such displacing devices are called monsters. This thesis has recently faced various empirical challenges (e.g., Schlenker ; Anand and Nevins ). In this note, the thesis is challenged on grounds of a more theoretical nature. It is argued that the standard compositional semantics of variable binding employs monstrous operations. As a dramatic first example, Kaplan's formal language, the Logic of Demonstratives, is shown to contain monsters. For similar reasons, the orthodox lambda-calculus-based semantics for variable binding is argued to be monstrous. This technical point promises to provide some far-reaching implications for our understanding of semantic theory and content. The theoretical upshot of the discussion is at least threefold: (i) the Kaplanian thesis that 'directly referential' terms are not shiftable/bindable is unmotivated, (ii) since monsters operate on something distinct from the assertoric content of their operands, we must distinguish ingredient sense from assertoric content (cf. Dummett ; Evans ; Stanley ), and (iii) since the case of variable binding provides a paradigm of semantic shift that differs from the other types, it is plausible to think that indexicals-which are standardly treated by means of the assignment function-might undergo the same kind of shift. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues for an account of Chinese syntactic structure that takes both structure and function into consideration. It argues that Chinese syntax can be given a rather neat and natural account if we take iconicity and information status into account and if we look at the following three orders separately: the order of the head and its NP or clause complements, the order of the head and its PP complements, and the order of the head and the adjuncts. It points out that Chinese is head-initial in terms of the order of the head and its NP or clause complement. However, when the complement is a PP, it typically precedes the head except that it can also occur after the head if such an ordering conforms to the unfolding of the event in the real world. As for the order of the head and the adjuncts, Chinese is head-final except when the adjunct is used to provide new information about degree or result or new (evaluative) information in terms of quality or quantity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a nominalist, Buridan insisted that there is no place for universal things in his nominalist ontology and logic. Every thing in the world is singular; and everything that exists is numerically one and undivided. Indeed, a genus in this way is also one singular term, insofar as it exists just as singularly in my understanding or yours, or in my voice or yours. This nominalist ontology entails that any proposition should be existent by token, whatever they are spoken tokens or written tokens. If the tokens disappear, all the corresponding terms or propositions will disappear, and any proposition that consists of such tokens will be false. However, the existence of proposition token is not the truth carrier for a proposition, neither does the signification of a proposition decide its truth conditions. Any proposition token has two types of significations classified into intramental signification and extramental signification. But the intramental signification obviously does not provide the condition for the truth since its presence is just the precondition of the meaningfulness of the corresponding spoken proposition, and neither does the extramental signification can serve to determine the truth conditions, for the contradictory propositions, having the same categorematic terms, always have the same extramental signification (the syncategorematic terms cannot have extramental signification by themselves). Therefore, it is not sufficient to deal with significations in assigning the truth conditions of a proposition, we have to take into account the suppositions concerned, namely, the co-suppositting of the terms of a proposition from which we can assign the truth conditions of a proposition in terms of the co-supposition (or non-co-supposition) of its categorematic terms. According to such semantics, Buridan can consistently handle Liar-type paradoxes that are undoubtedly semantically closed sentences. To be sure, Buridan's theory of semantics takes the correspondent token of a proposition with reality as a necessary, but not sufficient condition for its truth; the extra conditions he requires are the existence of the proposition we evaluate and the satisfaction of its "virtual implication," i. e., basically, that our proposition in question would fall within the actual extension of a truth-predicate (is true) in a proposition that states its truth, if such a proposition were to be formed. Based on this, given the classic Liar-type paradox "What I am saying is a lie," we get: "What I am saying (A) is a lie" is true, if and only if (a) this proposition token exists, as it obviously does since I have typed it here; (b) its terms co-supposit (obviously, the intended reference of the subject (A) here is this token itself, and the intended import of the predicate is that this token is not true), i. e., "A is false" co-supposit ; (c) and that if A refers to this token, and this is obviously not problematic since this is a semantically closed sentence, then the terms of the proposition "A is true" co-supposit. However, (b) and (c) cannot be satisfied together, so the original token cannot be true. Therefore, there is no paradox, the evaluation coherently deems the original token not to be true, but to be simply false. Actually, Buridan's token based and semantically closed logic which focuses on the virtual implication of a proposition can serve as a general apparatus or device to avoid Liar-type paradox. When the terms of an affirmative proposition can co-supposit in a possible situation without placing the proposition itself among what the term "false" supposit, Buridan can be sure that the proposition in that situation is true, provided its tokens exists in that situation. By contrast, when the co-supposition of its terms places the proposition itself among what the term "false" supposit, Buridan can also he sure that its virtually implied proposition cannot be true, and hence the original proposition cannot be true either. This procedure is entirely effective to resolve any Liar-type paradox. Definitely, Buridan's solution to the Liar-type paradoxes is totally natural. That is to say, he can consistently handle Liar-type paradoxes in a semantically closed language without the Tarskian distinction of object language and recta-language, he merely appealed to the natural language with purely natural analysis that is close to the regular thinking methods of common people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sigma is an open source environment for the development of logical theories. It has been under development and regular release for nearly a decade, and has been the principal environment under which the open source Suggested Upper Merged Ontology (SUMO) has been created. We discuss its features and evolution, and explain why it is an appropriate environment for the development of expressive ontologies in first and higher order logic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines relations between formal logic and semiotics. The latter is understood traditionally as consisting of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. The view that is presented follows classical approaches offered by Tarski, Carnap, and Quine. In particular, formal methods are extensively used. The main argument is that any formal analysis of language must proceed in partly informal metalanguage. This fact decides that pragmatic aspects of language are distinguished. Otherwise speaking, the concept of meaning is pragmatic in its character. Several formal results support this view. In particular, decisions that models of languages are standard (intended) are pragmatically grounded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper concerns existential expressions (EE), especially the verb 'be' and its equivalents in different languages of the world. EE are expressions that can refer to being or to existence. I sketch the lexicology, semantics, syntax (with Ajdukiewicz's tools), and pragmatics of EE and I point out the connections of EE with different alternative ontologies ('latent,' as Kahn says, in the natural language). I also indicate some ontological (existential) problems in formal logic. My conclusion is that the central function of Be is predicative (copulative) and Be means 'to be so-and-so' or 'to have a property.' [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider the notion of everyday language. We claim that everyday language is semantically bounded by the properties expressible in the existential fragment of second-order logic. Two arguments for this thesis are formulated. First, we show that Barwise's so-called test of negation normality works properly only when assuming our main thesis. Second, we discuss the argument from practical computability for finite universes. Everyday language sentences are directly or indirectly verifiable. We show that in both cases they are bounded by second-order existential properties. Moreover, there are known examples of everyday language sentences that are the most difficult in this class (NPTIME-complete). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Generics are statements such as “tigers are striped” and “ducks lay eggs”. They express general, though not universal or exceptionless, claims about kinds (). For example, the generic “ducks lay eggs” seems true even though many ducks (e.g. the males) do not lay eggs. The universally quantified version of the statement should be rejected, however: it is incorrect to say “all ducks lay eggs”, since many ducks do not lay eggs. We found that adults nonetheless often judged such universal statements true, despite knowing that only one gender had the relevant property (Experiment 1). The effect was not due to participants interpreting the universals as quantifying over subkinds, or as applying to only a subset of the kind (e.g. only the females) (Experiment 2), and it persisted even when people judged that male ducks did not lay eggs only moments before (Experiment 3). It also persisted when people were presented with correct alternatives such as “some ducks do not lay eggs” (Experiment 4). Our findings reveal a robust generic overgeneralization effect, predicted by the hypothesis that generics express primitive, default generalizations. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This paper investigates a generalized version of inquisitive semantics. A complete axiomatization of the associated logic is established, the connection with intuitionistic logic and several intermediate logics is explored, and the generalized version of inquisitive semantics is argued to have certain advantages over the system that was originally proposed by Groenendijk () and Mascarenhas (). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A form of quantification logic referred to by the author in earlier papers as being 'ontologically neutral' still made use of the actual infinite in its semantics. Here it is shown that one can have, if one desires, a formal logic that refers in its semantics only to the potential infinite. Included are two new quantifiers generalizing the sentential connectives, equivalence and non-equivalence. There are thus new avenues opening up for exploration in both quantification logic and semantics of the infinite. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In this paper, we introduce a new approach to independent quantifiers, as originally introduced in Informational independence as a semantic phenomenon by Hintikka and Sandu (1989) under the header of independence-friendly (IF) languages. Unlike other approaches, which rely heavily on compositional methods, we shall analyze independent quantifiers via equilibriums in strategic games. In this approach, coined equilibrium semantics, the value of an IF sentence on a particular structure is determined by the expected utility of the existential player in any of the game’s equilibriums. This approach was suggested in Henkin quantifiers and complete problems by Blass and Gurevich (1986) but has not been taken up before. We prove that each rational number can be realized by an IF sentence. We also give a lower and upper bound on the expressive power of IF logic under equilibrium semantics. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The temporal logic language (TLL) XYZ/E can represent both dynamic semantics and static semantic under a unified framework and carry out the smooth transition from abstract specification to execuable program. This paper analyzes the Real-time property of the postal ticketing system, and presents the system's component model, using XYZ/E describes the entire system architecture and the progressive refinement of the core components PCServer, PDClient, PSClient. Realize the Refinement of the two functional components PSSComputl, PSSComput2 smooth transition to the executable program. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The natural interpretation of counterfactuals with disjunctive antecedents involves selecting from each of the disjuncts the worlds that come closest to the world of evaluation. It has been long noticed that capturing this interpretation poses a problem for a minimal change semantics for counterfactuals, because selecting the closest worlds from each disjunct requires accessing the denotation of the disjuncts from the denotation of the disjunctive antecedent, which the standard boolean analysis of or does not allow (Creary and Hill, Philosophy of Science 43:341–344, 1975; Nute, Journal of Philosophy 72:773–778, 1975; Fine, Mind 84(335):451–458, 1975; Ellis et al. Journal of Philosophical Logic 6:335–357, 1977). This paper argues that the failure to capture the natural interpretation of disjunctive counterfactuals provides no reason to abandon a minimal change semantics. It shows that the natural interpretation of disjunctive counterfactuals is expected once we refine our assumptions about the semantics of or and the logical form of conditionals, and (i) we assume that disjunctions introduce propositional alternatives in the semantic derivation, in line with independently motivated proposals about the semantics of or (Aloni, 2003a; Simons, Natural Language Semantics 13:271–316, 2005; Alonso-Ovalle, Disjunction in Alternative Semantics. PhD thesis, 2006); and (ii) we treat conditionals as correlative constructions, as advocated in von Fintel (1994), Izvorski (Proceedings of NELS 26, 1996), Bhatt and Pancheva (2006), and Schlenker (2004). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policies are used to describe rules that are employed to modify (often distributed) system behaviour at runtime. Typically policies are created by many different people and there are many policies leading naturally to inconsistency between the policies, a problem that has been recognised and termed policy conflict. We present a novel formal semantics for distributed policies expressed in the APPEL language (so far APPEL only had an informal semantics and a recently defined formal semantics without distribution of policies). The semantics is expressed in ΔDSTL(x), an extension of temporal logic to deal with global applications: it includes modalities to localize properties to system components, an operator to deal with events, and temporal modalities à la Unity. A further contribution of the paper is the development of semantics based techniques to detect policy conflict and a consideration of conflict resolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The logic of singular terms that refer to nothing, such as ‘Santa Claus,’ has been studied extensively under the heading of free logic. The present essay examines expressions whose reference is defective in a different way: they signify more than one entity. The bulk of the effort aims to develop an acceptable formal semantics based upon an intuitive idea introduced informally by Hartry Field and discussed by Joseph Camp; the basic strategy is to use supervaluations. This idea, as it stands, encounters difficulties, but with suitable refinements it can be salvaged. Two other options for a formal semantics of multiply signifying terms are also presented, and I discuss the relative merits of the three semantics briefly. Finally, possible modifications to the standard logical regimentation of the notion of existence are considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract??This paper reports on an approach to model generalized implicatures using nonmonotonic logics. The approach, called compositional, is based on the idea of compositional semantics, where the implicatures carried by a sentence are constructed from the implicatures carried by its constituents, but it also includes some aspects nonmonotonic logics in order to model the defeasibility of generalized implicatures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The advent of proof-carrying code has generated significant interest in reasoning about low-level languages. It is widely believed that low-level languages with jumps must be difficult to reason about because of being inherently non-modular. We argue that this is untrue. We take it seriously that, unlike statements of a high-level language, pieces of low-level code are multiple-entry and multiple-exit. And we define a piece of code as consisting of either a single labelled instruction or a finite union of pieces of code. Thus we obtain a compositional natural semantics and a matching Hoare logic for a basic low-level language with jumps. By their simplicity and intuitiveness, these are comparable to the standard natural semantics and Hoare logic of While. The Hoare logic is sound and complete wrt the semantics and allows for compilation of proofs of the Hoare logic of While. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The article claims the importance of the notion of Paradigm and the knowledge or reflection on the paradigms that we reproduce when guiding our vital action and our understanding of the different facets of existence. We consider "paradigmatología" as the study of the paradigms like logic, semantics and ideological of knowledge and practice. Two authors converge to nurture this theoretical domain: Thomas S. Kuhn and Edgar Morin, each one from different perspectives has opened a thought horizon that promotes the debate on knowledge, its structuring, history and incorporation in academic life and in investigative production. The paradigms are species of glasses or lanterns that make visible and audible some phenomena and they hide or they leave others in an unconscious background. The article concludes with the illustration of a prevailing paradigm in the educational and pedagogic practice that possesses such power that is "naturalized"; it is the transmisionist paradigm of education in which one conceives and one lives language as an instrument, knowledge as a representation and pedagogy as transmission. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In this paper we compare the semantical and syntactical definitions of extensions for open default theories. We prove that, over monadic languages, these definitions are equivalent and do not depend on the cardinality of the underlying infinite world. We also show that, under the domain closure assumption, one free variable open default theories are decidable. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The language of the LBPc¬I system extends the language of the classical positive logic when including an operator of weak negation and an operator of incompatibility, and permit to define an operator of strong negation; this last one has all the characteristics of the classical negation. The system is characterized by a traditional semantics with which test that, with respect to the operator of weak negation, the system is paraconsistent. When the formulas involved in an argument behave classically, that is to say, are incompatible with his weak negation, then the weak negation behaves like the classical negation, but this requirement not always is necessary, the weak negation can precise be as powerful as the classical negation although the involved formulas do not behave classically. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this sequel to “The logic and meaning of plurals. Part I”, I continue to present an account of logic and language that acknowledges limitations of singular constructions of natural languages and recognizes plural constructions as their peers. To this end, I present a non-reductive account of plural constructions that results from the conception of plurals as devices for talking about the many. In this paper, I give an informal semantics of plurals, formulate a formal characterization of truth for the regimented languages that results from augmenting elementary languages with refinements of basic plural constructions of natural languages, and account for the logic of plural constructions by characterizing the logic of those regimented languages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This experimental study is a proof-of-concept of a theory of meaning first put forward by and foreshadowed by . The theory is the Popperian-like notion that the meaningfulness of a proposition is its a priori falsity. We tested this theory by translating to logical form a long, tightly written, published text and computed the meaningfulness of each proposition using the a priori falsity measure. We then selected the top propositions – by a priori falsity – and strung them together to form ad hoc abstracts and compared these abstracts with the published summary. The results are startling: Translation to logical form followed by application of the Asimov/Bar-Hillel/Carnap idea produces excellent abstracts, thereby providing a proof-of-concept that merely by knowing the logical form of large text passages, one can produce reasonable abstracts of it—without actually understanding the text. In other words, were the results of this experiment to generalize, that would show that logical form captures much more semantics than has heretofore been considered likely. Far from being merely the syntactical rewrite of text into formal notation commonly supposed, logical form, even without knowing almost anything about the particular predicates, individual constants, or other objects referred to in that form, might capture the core of the meaning in some important sense, still to be fully formalized into a comprehensive theory. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The article presents an alternative to standard semantic theories of subjunctive or "counterfactual" conditionals using "causal models." It is urged that associations are evidence of causal relations. Counterfactual relations are entirely epiphenomenal with respect to causal ones as merely hypothetical associations cannot be used as proof. Instead, the relations are actual frequencies and conditional probabilities estimated from them. It also appears likely that causal models will be helpful with regards to indicative conditionals.

In automatic user interface adaptation, developers pursue the delivery of best-fit user interfaces according to the runtime-supplied profiles of individual end users and usage contexts. Software engineering of automatic interface adaptability entails: (a) storage and processing of user and usage-context profiles; (b) design and implementation of alternative interface components, to optimally support the various user activities and interface operations for different users and usage contexts; and (c) runtime decision-making, to choose on the fly the most appropriate alternative interface components, given the particular user and context profile. In automatic interface adaptation, the decision making process plays a key role in optimal on-the-fly interface assembly, engaging consolidated design wisdom in a computable form. A verifiable language has been designed and implemented which is particularly suited for the specification of adaptation-oriented decision-making logic, while also being easily deployable and usable by interface designers. This paper presents the language, its contextual role in adapted interface delivery and the automatic verification method. The employment of the language in an adaptation-design support tool is discussed, the latter automatically generating language rules by relying upon adaptation rule patterns. Finally, the deployment methodology of the language in supporting dynamic interface assembly is discussed, further generalizing towards dynamic software assembly, by introducing architectural contexts and polymorphic architectural containment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Results of a project focused on a sample of six Web-based libraries in the field of education. Our analysis of ad hoc classification structures considers three dimensions. "Structure" is described through quantitative data (e.g., number of main categories, average number of hierarchical levels, etc.). "Logic" concentrates on two aspects of the subdividing process: classificatory model and type of hierarchical relation. "Semantics" relates to concepts and their representation in the form of terms. We observe that the classification structures are hierarchical, not overly complex, and not very specific. The choice, arrangement, and sequence of classes are logic enough and are sufficient to facilitate navigation. However, we suggest that problems will arise at the semantic level, where conceptual and terminological inconsistencies emerge due to significant gaps in conceptual coverage and lack of terminological control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this research a new algebraic semantics of rough set theory including additional meta aspects is proposed. The semantics is based on enhancing the standard rough set theory with notions of 'relative ability of subsets of approximation spaces to approximate'. The eventual algebraic semantics is developed via many deep results in convexity in ordered structures. A new variation of rough set theory, namely 'ill-posed rough set theory' in which it may suffice to know some of the approximations of sets, is eventually introduced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we investigate some logics with weak Boolean (wB) negation (−), calling wB logics, obtained by dualizing intuitionistic negation (¬). We first provide Routley-Meyer (RM) semantics for wB-IC (the intuitionistic propositional logic IC with − in place of ¬), its neighbors wB-LC, wB-LC* (the extensions of wB-IC with the chain (c)), and wB-S4, wB-S4c (the systems with the strict implication as well as −). We give completeness for each of them by using RM semantics. We next provide RM semantics for IC, the Dummett's LC, the wB-S4 with ¬ in place of − (pB-S4), and the pB-S4 with c (pB-S4c), and give completeness for each system. Finally, we give a translation of the classical propositional logic PC into wB-IC, and a translation of PC into wB-S4c.1 [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Explores the argument posed by David Lewis that propositions are not semantic values of sentences. Semantic theory that assigns propositions to sentences relative to contexts; Standard treatments of operators of tense logic; Comments on the prospects of an argument that modal expressions are not index shifting operators.

Quantified expressions in natural language generally are taken to act like quantifiers in logic, which either range over entities that need to satisfy or not satisfy the predicate in order for the sentence to be true or otherwise are substitutional quantifiers. I will argue that there is a philosophically rather important class of quantified expressions in English that act quite differently, a class that includes something, nothing, and several things. In addition to expressing quantification, such expressions act like nominalizations, introducing a new domain of objects that would not have been present in the semantic structure of the sentence otherwise. The entities those expressions introduce are of just the same sort as those that certain ordinary nominalizations refer to (such as John's wisdom or John's belief that S), namely they are tropes or entities related to tropes. Analysing certain quantifiers as nominalizing quantifiers will shed a new light on philosophical issues such as the status of properties and the nature of propositional attitudes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we propose a process language JSP which abstractly models timed statecharts with minimal and maximal delays associated to transitions. Statecharts processes are equipped with a labelled transition system semantics that combines the basic principles of the semantics of Pnueli and Shalev with discrete time. Furthermore, we propose a compositional proof system to check quantitative temporal properties of statecharts processes. Properties are expressed in a discrete extension of µ‐calculus with reset over clocks and clock constraints. The proof system is sound in general and it is complete for the class of regular processes (including processes corresponding to statecharts). [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This essay attempts to develop a psychologically informed semantics of perception reports, whose predictions match with the linguistic data. As suggested by the quotation from Miller and Johnson-Laird, we take a hallmark of perception to be its fallible nature; the resulting semantics thus necessarily differs from situation semantics. On the psychological side, our main inspiration is Marr's (1982) theory of vision, which can easily accomodate fallible perception. In Marr's theory, vision is a multi-layered process. The different layers have filters of different gradation, which makes vision at each of them approximate. On the logical side, our task is therefore twofold - to formalise the layers and the ways in which they may refine each other, and - to develop logical means to let description vary with such degrees of refinement. The first task is formalised by means of an inverse systems of first order models, with reality appearing as its inverse limit. The second task is formalised by means of so-called conditional quantifiers, a new form of generalised quantification which can best be described as resource bounded quantification. We show that the logic provides for a semantics and pragmatics of direct perception reports. In particular, direct perception reports have a possibly nonveridical, approximative semantics, which becomes veridical only by virtue of our pragmatic expectation that what is perceived would continue to be the case, were we to perceive more accurately. It is a general feature of resource bounded logics that the underlying logics are weak, but that stronger principles can be obtained pragmatically, by strengthening the resource. For the logic of vision this feature is clarified by showing how changes in the resource capture different notions of partiality, and by studying how the perception verb interacts with connectives and quantifiers in different visual contexts. The inference Veridicality, which is now viewed rather as a nonmonotonic inference, is also studied in depth. We end with an attempt to buttress the proposed model by comparing it with suggestions put forward in Cognitive or Conceptual Semantics, in the literature on evidentials, and in Husserl's philosophy of perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on Fregean metaphysical and semantical discourse. Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege's notorious paradox of the concept horse1 (PCH for short) arises from his doctrine that functions (of which concepts are a special case) are in a sense unmentionable: any attempt to treat one of them as logical subject for the purpose of predicating something of it always results in a reference not to a function but to a correlated object (presumably the function's value-range) that somehow goes proxy for it.

We propose to represent the syntax and semantics of natural languages with labelled proof nets in the implicative fragment of intuitionistic linear logic. Resource-sensitivity of linear logic is used to express all dependencies between the syntactic constituents of a sentence in the form of a proof net. Phonological and semantic labelling of the proof net from its inputs to the unique output are used to produce the well-formed phonological form and the semantic representation of a sentence from entries of a lexicon. In this way we obtain a linguistic model of great flexibility because labelling is not completely determined logically: it is used to introduce linguistic constraints which go beyond the underlying logic. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article analyzes complex predicates and conversion principles. The conversion principle holds without restriction in classical first-order logic, but it is known to fail in various other settings. There has been little discussion of the general topic of complex predicates and conversion in non-classical contexts. Various English constructions, including relative clauses and conjoined and disjoined verb phrases, are naturally construed as complex predicates. One can extend the standard semantics for first-order logic so that the semantic values of complex predicates are sets of individuals.

This article is intended to be a discussion of a few passages of Aristotle's "de interpretatione," in which the philosopher deals with the notion of simplicity of a proposition and with certain relations holding between several types of predicates contained in a proposition. It is the aim of these remarks to clarify Aristotle's view of the problems just mentioned and, secondly, to venture an explanation of one of the questions raised in terms of modern linguistics.

Robert van Rooij (2006) proposed an analysis of counterfactual donkey sentences by combining the Stalnaker–Lewis analysis of counterfactuals with standard dynamic semantics. This paper points out some problems with van Rooijs treatment of counterfactual sentences in the language of first-order logic and provides a new interpretation using dynamic semantics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]