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Quad or Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, a group of four democracies, the US, India, Japan, and Australia, was first proposed in 2007 by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in his 'confluence of two seas' speech that subsequently embarked on the path to the foundation of the group. Quad perceives China's economic growth, which enables her to transform the world order as a threat and aims at containing the growing Chinese assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region. The Malabar naval exercises in the Indian Ocean by the Quad members were one such exercise. This paper, aims to analyze the formation of Quad and will contemplate whether the group is causing confrontation or stability in the Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific regions. The paper will also assess that the Quad is designed to counter China's growing influence in the Asia-pacific and Indo-pacific regions. Containing China is likely to create a confrontation in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the book "Toward a True Alliance: Restructuring U.S.-Japan Security Relations," edited by Mike M. Mochizuki. The book consists of eight papers, the outcome of a joint project of the Nomura Research Institute and the Brookings Institution, consider how the U.S.-Japan alliance might be redefined and restructured to respond more effectively to the security challenges and opportunities presented by the East Asia-Pacific region. Mike M. Mochizuki argues for a new strategic bargain between the United States and Japan and a more comprehensive and integrated approach to alliance restructuring. Mochizuki, in a separate paper, recommends a synthesis of strategies that would draw on the most attractive features of various perspectives. Satoshi Morimoto analyzes the evolving security environment in East Asia. Takuma Takahashi discusses economic interdependence and security in the East Asia-Pacific region. Morimoto considers a tighter Japan-U.S. defense cooperation based on greater trust. Michael O'Hanlon analyzes options for the restructuring of U.S. forces and bases in Japan and, in a separate paper, assesses the implications of theater missile defense programs for U.S.-Japan security interests and bilateral cooperation.

How does America's greater focus on Asia impact the security policies of Japan and Australia? How does it change the nature of the Japan-US-Australia security partnership? This paper attempts to answer these questions by looking at Japanese and Australian responses to the Obama Administration's new security policy toward Asia called “rebalancing.” After examining them, it argues that the regional allied response to America's new security posture has generated greater momentum for both allies to collaborate in wider areas in a more timely and effective way than before. It concludes asserting that, in the era of rebalance, Japan, the United States, and Australia have not only deepened their existing cooperation, but also have expanded potential areas of cooperation toward a more “dynamic” partnership. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

To many observers Japanese decision-making is an enigma that defies conventional analysis. Neither the traditional rational actor model of decision-making, nor alternative pluralist models proposed for the analysis of Western democracies fit the Japanese case. As a result Japanese security policy decision-making is described as ‘reactive’ or even non-existent. Likewise, the anomaly of Japanese decision-making is ultimately predicted to be resolved through a process of ‘normalization’ whereby Japanese policy formation evolves into a form that does fit these models. However, this paper contends that the fact that Japan’s security decision-making does not fit commonly-used models is due rather to the limitations of those models. Japan’s security policy, like that of all states, is gradually evolving, but this does not mean that it is about to become just like the West. This paper addresses how a conjuncture of external factors and internal factors has stimulated important changes in Japanese security policy-making which are frequently missed or misinterpreted by observers. In order to understand Japanese security policy-making, and to chart its future course, a refined cybernetic approach is introduced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the policy positions that relate to the U.S.-Japan security relationship. Three different positions are analyzed in this paper: the current position that is working to maintain the existing bilateral security relationship, and two others that see major problems with it. Of these two, one position supports ending or changing significantly the bilateral security alliance and would, for the most part, force Japan to rearm so that it could defend itself without assistance from the United States under normal circumstances. The other position, which supports the termination of the existing security arrangement, argues that Japan can play a leading role in the development of a global disarmament agenda by helping to build strong and viable international and regional security structures. This position documents that Japan's peace constitution and its strong desire to strengthen the United Nations and eliminate all nuclear weapons uniquely qualify it to make an international contribution that provides real security to all nations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper traces the formal and informal aspects of Japan's robust bilateralism on issues of external and internal security and discusses a variety of embryonic multilateral arrangements that have sprung up in the 1990s. Asian-Pacific multilateralism is not yet a strong and unquestioned collectively held norm in either Tokyo or any of the major capitals in the Asia-Pacific. What matters instead are political practices shaped by a strong tradition of bilateralism and, only very recently, by an incipient multilateralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 'new' terrorism has not escaped Southeast Asia. Within this region, the Malay Archipelago has the world's largest Muslim population and Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim country. In the context of the struggle between radical Islam, and the West and its allies, the region assumes great, long-term strategic significance, particularly to the USA. The threat of terrorism to Australia, as demonstrated by the terrorist attacks at Bali in 2002 aimed at its citizens, has also ensured Australia's active interest and engagement with the littoral states of the Malay Archipelago. In addition, arguably the world's most strategic waterway and chokepoint, the narrow Straits of Malacca, is located within this cauldron. More than half the world's trade and oil passes through this strategic straits. By comparison, oil flows through the straits are three times more than through the Suez, and fifteen times greater than the Panama Canal. Not surprisingly, key Western states and their allies that have a deep interest in the security of the Straits of Malacca and in the global war on terrorism have paid special attention to the Malay Archipelago. Indeed, the idea of a Trilateral Security Dialogue centred on the USA, Japan and Australia was first mooted in 2001, and has since involved discussions on Asian security between senior officials of all three countries. In 2005, it was elevated to the level of the foreign ministers of Japan and Australia, and the US Secretary of State. This dialogue process is the third leg in the triangle between the two bilateral US alliances with Japan and Australia. It is obvious that all three are key strategic partners in Asia, with a strong common interest in maritime security and terrorism issues, particularly in Southeast Asia. It is the contention of this paper that this evolving trilateral extra-regional security nexus has benefited greatly from cooperation with Singapore, which has been doing everything it can to encourage and facilitate the regional involvement of these extra-regional powers. In fact, Singapore has become a critical regional ally of all three. On Singapore's part, this represents a striking success in foreign policy as security, political and economic allies enhance its own ability to better manage the new terrorist threats that have emerged since 9-11. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The new national security leaders in Japan, the United States, China and the two Koreas have assumed office at a precarious time. Despite the recent relaxation of tensions, conditions are ripe for further conflict in Northeast Asia. The new DPRK leadership is as determined as its predecessor to possess nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles while resisting unification or reconciliation with South Korea and its allies. The new government in Tokyo is also augmenting its military capabilities. Meanwhile, despite Chinese efforts to restart the Six-Party Talks, the Obama administration has refused to engage with the DPRK until it demonstrates a willingness to end its nuclear weapons program and improving intra-Korean ties. But this policy of patiently waiting for verifiable changes in DPRK policies may be too passive in the face of North Korea' s growing military capabilities, leading the new South Korean government, striving to maneuver between Beijing and Washington, to consider new initiatives to restart a dialogue with the North even while reinforcing its own military capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A new security environment in Northeast Asia is calling for fresh thinking and changes in terms of the security policies of the Republic of Korea, the US, and Japan. Especially, a series of provocations by North Korea in 2010 and a new assertiveness manifested in the rise of China provide a rationale for closer defense cooperation among the three countries. A bolstered trilateral defense arrangement among the ROK, the US, and Japan could provide the best platform to deter further provocations from the North, and to prepare for potential instabilities in the current power succession inside North Korea. At the same time, tighter trilateral defense cooperation can deter China's one-sided support of North Korea in its efforts to relate to future provocations by the North. It also puts indirect pressure on Beijing to hold Pyongyang accountable for its hostile actions. Given the asymmetric threats from the North, in particular, trilateral naval cooperation in the future should be focused on the following three categories: sea-borne Missile Defense (MD) and Proliferation Strategy Initiative (PSI), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), and, Mine Warfare (MIW), and preparation for contingencies in North Korea. Furthermore, the three navies should put more efforts behind regional maritime security activities, such as HA/DR and anti-piracy. In doing so, the three navies also should try to engage China in these efforts because the future of maritime security of the region depends on how to engage China in the international security system. Doing so is also a way to contribute to the building of multilateral cooperative mechanism for maritime security in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that Japan matters crucially in the evolving East Asian security order because it is embedded both in the structural transition and the ongoing regional strategies to manage it. The post-Cold War East Asian order transition centres on the disintegration of the post-Second World War Great Power bargain that saw Japan subjecting itself to extraordinary strategic constraint under the US alliance, leaving the conundrum of how to negotiate a new bargain that would keep the peace between Japan and China. To manage the uncertainties of this transition, East Asian states have adopted a three-pronged strategy of: maintaining US military preponderance; socializing China as a responsible regional great power; and cultivating regionalism as the basis for a long-term East Asian security community. Japan provides essential public goods for each of these three elements: it keeps the US anchored in East Asia with its security treaty; it is the one major regional power that can and has helped to constrain the potential excesses of growing Chinese power while at the same time crucially engaging with and helping to socialize China; and its economic and political participation is critical for meaningful regionalism and regional integration. It does not need to be a fully fledged, 'normal' Great Power in order to carry out these roles. As the region tries to mediate the growing security dilemma among the three great powers, Japan's importance to regional security will only grow. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Members of the Japanese government and the Japanese security elite welcomed the 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Report, praising its emphasis on the twin goals of pursuing disarmament and protecting international peace and stability. Unlike many non-nuclear weapon states, Japan does not condition its support for nonproliferation upon nuclear weapon states' progress on denuclearization. Despite general enthusiasm for the review in Japan, concerns remain. The NPR emphasizes the threat posed by nuclear weapons in the hands of non-state actors; from Japan's vantage point, state actors-North Korea, China, and Russia-are just as worrisome. While disarmament advocates in Japan had hoped the NPR would endorse a no-first-use doctrine or 'sole purpose' declaration, defense officials and strategists were relieved it did not go that far, fearing that to do so would undermine US extended deterrence and leave Japan vulnerable to attack by North Korean biological or chemical weapons. US policy toward China shadows many Japanese concerns about security policy in general and nuclear policy in particular. In the absence of more clarity on the Sino-US relationship, Japanese concerns can be expected to increase. Nonetheless, the Japanese government has responded positively to the release of the NPR, in large part due to unprecedented levels of coordination and consultation between Tokyo and Washington during the drafting process. Tokyo now seeks continued close consultation on nuclear strategy and policy to develop a better understanding of the concept of extended deterrence and what Tokyo can do to support this shared goal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the security relations among the U.S., Japan and Australia in the 1990s. It highlights the establishment of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) or bilateral security relations between Japan and Australia in 2005. It states that in 1993, the process of alliance redefinition started, after the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lost the majority in the lower house. The transformation of the defense policy of Japan and Australia from "national defense" to "international security" is discussed.

The author argues that India must restructure its foreign and security policies within the framework of a multipolar world, in which China has become the second largest economy, while the economies of U.S., Europe and Japan have stagnated. The key factors to a new Indian foreign policy are hinged on the presence of an unstable neighborhood, an assertive China and a divided domestic politics. The author also believes that India must use its economic, cultural, military and diplomatic profiles to highlights its place in the international arena.

For many years the Japan-US Security Treaty has been the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy and security policy. Suspicions have long been voiced, however, that behind the security treaty there lurked unpublicized secret pacts. In particular, despite the denials of the Japanese government, there were suspicions that nuclear-armed warships had in fact called at Japanese ports. With the change in government in September 2009, the issue came to be the subject of an investigation by the new Democratic Party of Japan administration. The author of this article served as chairman of the commission of inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent changes of government in Australia and Japan, and a pending one in the United States, signifies a historical crossroads in these three allies' security politics in the Asia-Pacific region. In recent years, all three countries have tended to rationalize their strategic collaboration on the need to build innovative and competitive-oriented "strategic geometries" as a means to counter China's growing power and to meet new types of threats in the region. Yet the Australian Government under John Howard simultaneously pursued a hedging strategy, exploiting its growing economic relationship with China while strengthening its diplomatic and strategic profile with the United States. Despite Tokyo's own substantial economic relationship with Beijing, recent Japanese leaders were unable to pursue the same type of "dual track" strategy to the same extent as Howard. With Kevin Rudd's election as the new Australian Prime Minister and Yasuo Fukuda's ascent to power in Japan, prospects for Australia and Japan to cultivate more independent politico-security ties with Beijing have strengthened. If so, the evolving regional security postures of both these US allies may compel the United States to reassess its own traditional skepticism towards multilateral security groupings in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to put a lens on the issue of international security cooperation after 11 September 2001, this article examines the question of how collective action in International Relations becomes possible. The author maintains that a fair amount of inter-state collective action can be understood, even explained, by analysing the culture of the international system. Using discourse analysis as a tool, the analysis addresses the underlying ideas, norms and identities that constitute the relationship between the United States and Japan, on the one hand, and Germany and the United States, on the other, as it has evolved since September 2001. The method exposes how some ideas are privileged over others, how norms are maintained, reformulated and abandoned, how identity is constructed and how power is legitimized in the ‘war on terror’. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The development of a joint US-Japan theater missile defense system could have significant ramifications beyond the defense of Japan and of American forces in the region. A growing debate within Japan on its international security position, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and questions about the role of the United States in the region conspire to create conditions for significant changes in Japan's conception of its security status and its long-term political-military calculations. By upgrading Japan's strategic responsibilities, theater missile defense could inadvertently induce a reassessment of many of its national security policies, perhaps even the decision to forego nuclear weapons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In spite of the self-imposed constraints on Japan's security posture, the new Japan–US Defence Cooperation Guidelines which became Japanese law in May 1999 represent a potentially significant step in the evolution of Japan's defence roles and its burden-sharing with the United States. The new guidelines commit Japan to a range of rear-support functions and operational cooperation with US forces in the event of a regional contingency. The key question raised by the new guidelines is whether they sanction a new regional security role for Japan. Whilst confirming the basic framework of Japanese defence policy, the new guidelines appear to signal a Japanese contribution to the regional security functions of the US–Japan alliance and hence mark an important departure from Japan's traditional focus on self-defence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights the evolution of the security relationship between the United States and Japan through the revised Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation. Characterization of the US-Japan security strategies; Recognition of the two countries' complementary roles in terms of the operational division of labor; Regional reaction to the partnership.

Explores international security concerns in East Asia. Effects of historical legacies and racial hatred on Sino-Japanese relations; China's assessments of Japan's military power; Effects of United States-Japan relations to Chinese security analysts' views on Japan's military buildup; Provocative nature of efforts to boost Japan's relationship with the United States.

One of the twenty-first century's great challenges will be to fill Asia's security vacuum. The US maintains a heavy military presence and an important set of bilateral security arrangements, and the region's great powers cooperate on an ad hoc basis. But there is no developed security system embraced by Asia- Pacific's leading powers. Meanwhile, the 'Asian way' of consensus-based diplomacy has suffered greatly -- in coherence and prestige -- from the financial crisis which started in 1997. What the region needs is a limited and informal concert, based on the classical principles of European concert diplomacy. Such a framework would satisfy China's quest for enhanced international status, help US efforts to 'engage' China, and address the fear of Japan and Russia being marginalised if the Sino-US relationship develops into a true 'strategic partnership'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In early 1989, the Bash administration prepared to submit for congressional review the FSX codevelopment project. The project quickly became an object of technonationalism; critics charged that the FSX was another example of defense technology transfer that would undermine U.S. economic competitiveness. This article examines the room of the FSX controversy in the rising technonationalism, the procedural and substantive issues surrounding interagency review and clarification of the agreement, and the congressional and public debate over the degree of reciprocity in technology transfer. The article concludes with an assessment of the consequences of the FSX controversy for future defense technology cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]