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Efforts have been made among scholars from Japan, South Korea, and China since the 1980s--on both private and state initiatives--to narrow the gaps in their historiographies and to cultivate mutual understanding. This article offers an extensive discussion of the author's history project, "A Student Project of Writing a Common History Textbook," which which was incorporated in a multinational class environment in the Spring 2019 semester. First the author explains the development of the conceptual framework and the organization and management of the class. Then, some of the history teaching materials that the students created is introduced. Finally, the author examines what the students actually learned from this exercise and working with their group members, based on their journals and answers to the project survey. The author would argue that this was a success in promoting mutual understanding among students by having them learn history together from various points of view, as the goal was not a complete reconciliation of their historical viewpoints. Young people from different countries, even those from the countries embroiled in politico-historical controversies, are able to learn from one another to create more complex historical narratives that look beyond competing nationalisms. The results of the course confirm the value of teaching history from a global standpoint and hold promise that if adopted widely, it might have a long-term and larger, positive effect on society and even on international relations by producing globally competent future generations.

Drawing on a recent collaborative and interdisciplinary study of East Asian Images of Japan, this article discusses contemporary Chinese portrayals of Japan, their political context, and their significance for Sino-Japanese relations. It questions some widely-held assumptions concerning the extent of "thought control" in an authoritarian state, the nature of popular protest, and the relationship between official propaganda and popular lived experience. While the main focus is on portrayals of Japan in mainland China, for comparative purposes some reference is made to Hong Kong and Taiwan. The latter part of the article also features a brief discussion of images of China in Japan, especially relating to the Second World War. This reflects particularly on the role of museums as vehicles for "peace education," focusing on two key institutions in Kyushu. China's "bases for patriotic education" and Japan's "peace museums" ostensibly embody radically different institutional missions. However while Japan's memorials to the war evince greater diversity, in harping on national victimhood and obscuring the reasons for war key sites of "peace education" arguably deliver a message that is just as nationalistic as that conveyed by their Chinese counterparts. The article concludes by arguing that, notwithstanding its "totalitarian" facade, China's social and political fragility in fact limits the scope for the authorities there to moderate anti-Japanese public discourse. In democratic Japan, by contrast, a more honest and open engagement with the national past is--or should be--far more achievable. For both moral and political reasons, scholars and educationalists in Japan therefore urgently need to consider their role in improving Sino-Japanese relations, not least through more forceful engagement in public debate over the socialization of the young.

In light of popular nationalism on the rise in China and Japan, this inquiry develops and validates a survey instrument to document university students' motivation to learn Japanese in mainland China and explore how the learning of a foreign language may lead to better cross-cultural understanding. A total number of 398 Chinese learners of Japanese in Chinese universities participated in the survey and 12 of them participated further in post-survey interviews. The results confirm that participants' interest in Japan-related products, employment opportunities, and activities contribute to the motivation to learn the language for cross-cultural understanding and undertake cross-cultural exchanges with Japanese people. The results suggest that increased exposure to Japan-related affairs in the media coverage undermines their desire for intercultural communication and increases the approach for interacting with Japanese people. This means it is necessary for Japanese language educators to engage with Japanese language learners and to address macro contextual processes such as rising tensions between the two countries, negative coverage on China in Japan's media, and negative coverage on Japan in the Chinese media.

In spite of the fact that historical issues are challenges of political education, Japanese educational studies have not been able to properly deal with them. One of the reasons is that Japanese educational researchers have accepted without question the presence of nationalistic understanding of history as the most important cause of the difficulties in East Asia, while supporting textbook lawsuits over the last few decades. On this point, it is unreasonable to compare Japan with Germany which is more progressive in terms of overcoming its past, and to conclude that the undemocratic nature of the Japanese culture has bred such a social situation. Austria, which is deemed to be culturally closer to Germany than Japan, has likewise experienced history problems repeatedly since the 1980s. What this suggests is that the degree of progress made in efforts to critically examine history is dependent on the country's international environment rather than on its own culture. This understanding corresponds with a recognition that has gained increasing acceptance over recent years, which is that Japan is not necessarily the sole party at fault in these historical conflicts in East Asia. Needless to say, this does not release the Japanese and Japanese educational research from their special responsibility to deal with these issues. What is demanded of Japanese educational research today is to reveal what sort of axis of conflicts has been formed over the understanding of history in each of the post-war East Asian countries, and how they interact with each other across national borders. By seriously addressing this task, Japanese educational research will be able to construct a new research field that can respond to the expectations of peoples beyond East Asia who either already have faced or may face similar problems in the future. (Contains 9 notes.)

This paper explores the ways in which policies for national identity formation and internationalization interact to complement and contradict each other in the context of global higher education. These themes are explored by comparing recent policies in two countries in East Asia, a part of the world currently on the rise in the global hierarchy of higher education (Altbach in "Tert Educ Manag" 10:3-25, 2004; Marginson in "High Educ" 4(1), 2011b). China and Japan are presented as case studies, with a focus on the ways the two countries have pursued both higher education internationalization and nationalist agendas through education more broadly. The paper then turns to a discussion of the factors that might explain these approaches as well as the dilemmas that arise from the interaction of these policy agendas in the context of global higher education. The paper argues that while increasing global competitiveness through HE internationalization may prove beneficial to individual nation-states in the short term, countries in East Asia should consider the potential pitfalls of becoming too singly focused on competitiveness at the expense of mutual understanding and peaceful international relations in the region. Furthermore, the continued push to create uncritical nationalistic citizens threatens to undermine the goals of internationalization and may be detrimental to efforts at HE regional cooperation and integration. The paper concludes with recommendations that the two countries consider the potential benefits of global citizenship education and the expansion of regionally focused study abroad programs to help develop graduates with the global competencies conducive to both national competitiveness and regional cooperation.

Because of revisions made in the content of history textbooks, Japan has been accused of attempting to rewrite history as part of a larger conspiracy to brainwash students and to rearm the nation. Discussed are the legal authority of the national government to screen and approve textbooks and international reactions. (RM)

Existing theories of international relations have failed to interpret the hostile relations between Korea and Japan due to their Cartesian assumptions about the nature of national sovereignty and identity. Such theories view the hostilities between the two states as the result of incorrect policies or unhealthy interactions between domestic norms and foreign policies, because they believe that there are few negative structural elements between Japan and Korea. This study suggests an alternative explanation by utilising the worldview of East Asian medicine. By interpreting the formation of the Japanese and Korean national identities from the late nineteenth century and by viewing the hostility between the two states not as evidence of 'malfunctioning' inter-state relations but as a core element of their national identities, this study proposes an alternative understanding of 'problem-solving' with respect to Korea–Japan relations that is directed towards healing their relations with a long-term perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last two decades, against the backdrop of multiple anti-Japanese protests in China, the rise of Chinese nationalism has been much debated. By taking the 2010 and 2012 Sino–Japanese crises over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands as a case study, the article applies discourse analysis to media articles and interviews to ascertain the Chinese government's propaganda toolbox in shaping the nationalist discourse, as well as to substantiate the defining features of anti-Japanese nationalism. The findings reveal a combination of strategies and techniques that the propaganda apparatus uses, such as the creation of an 'us-versus-them' dichotomy, galvanised inclusiveness, censorship, and 'card-stacking' to mould nationalism. The article substantiates empirically both top-down and bottom-up strains of nationalism, and their interaction through the four key themes of sovereignty, history, mistrust and reactivity. It finds that Japan bridges these strands of Chinese nationalism, but in its absence alternative views of nationalism are articulated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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It is well known that regime types affect international conflicts. This article explores political parties as a mechanism through which they do so. Political parties operate in fundamentally different ways in democracies vs. non-democracies, which has consequences for foreign policy. Core supporters of a party in a democracy, if they are hawkish, may be more successful at demanding hawkish behavior from their party representatives than would be their counterparts in an autocracy. The study draws on evidence from paired experiments in democratic Japan and non-democratic China to show that supporters of the ruling party in Japan punish their leaders for discouraging nationalist protests, while ruling party insiders in China are less likely to do so. Under some circumstances, then, non-democratic regimes may be better able to rein in peace-threatening displays of nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to analyze the influence of Prime Minister Abe Shinzō's nationalist stance on Japan's policy towards China from a neoclassical realist perspective. It is argued that the extent to which Abe's ideological leaning exerted impact on foreign policy making depended on external stimuli, as well as Abe's domestic political interests. Prime Minister Abe generally perceived China as a threat to Japan, and remained assertive towards it, but he also pragmatically displayed flexibility in such areas as history issues, security policy, and territorial dispute. This article analyzes these complex developments in light of the changes in international environment and domestic politics, examining three periods: Abe's first administration (2006–2007); the escalation of diplomatic disputes with China (2012–2014); and gradual rapprochement with China (since 2014). It is concluded that the nationalist beliefs of decision makers affect foreign policy to the greatest extent whenever they are in line with other kinds of variables, such as external pressures and domestic interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's new treaties with the Western powers came into force in the summer of 1899. These signified Japan's recognition as a modern state, but also opened the whole of Japan to residence and commerce for the nationals of the Western powers. This article examines Japan's legislative response to this new era of both political equality and expanded foreign intercourse and exchange. This comprised two new laws, Japan's first nationality law and new entry restrictions, both of which defined the boundaries of Japanese identity. The West played a paramount role in the crafting of these laws, but often forgotten is the role played by China. By examining the international contexts and the debates that attended the passage of these laws, this article shows that each law enacted a form of exclusion: the former sought to mitigate Western influence, while the latter sought to minimize Chinese immigration. Together, they reflected Japan's international position between two others: China and the West. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationship between Japan and the Republic of Korea remains puzzling according to international relations theory. The two countries have failed to develop stable peace relationships even though they are both democracies, bound to each other by security arrangements with the United States, and have considerable interdependence between them. So, why have these two countries failed to produce equitable trust? Scholars tend to focus either on structural causes, or nationalistic actions and remarks by political leaders as possible reasons. While these reasons may explain their unstable relationship, it does not explain the worsening public perception in both countries. This article advances domestic economic inequality, which has been largely neglected in the literature, and argues that the growing economic inequality has aggravated the public's opinion. Findings from statistical analyses and case-study methods largely show that public opinion with nationalistic movements have fluctuated following the growing socio-economic inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Asia is narrated in Japanese foreign policy pronouncements as an opportunity as well as a threat. Despite the purported transformation from militarism to pacifism since August 1945, the reified images of Asia as an ‘entity out there’ remain resilient. The image of a dangerous Asia prompted Japan to engage in its programme of colonialism before the War and compels policy makers to address territorial disputes with Asian neighbours today. Simultaneously, Asia persistently symbolises an opportunity for Tokyo to exploit. Hence, despite the psychological rupture of August 1945, reified Asia remains a reality in Japanese foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Two approaches to identity have been employed to explore issues in Japan's international relations. One views identity as constituted by domestic norms and culture, and as constitutive of interests, which in turn cause behaviour. Proponents view Japan's ‘pacifist’ and ‘antimilitarist’ identity as inherently stable and likely to change only as a result of material factors. In the other approach, ‘Japan’ emerges and changes through processes of differentiation vis-à-vis ‘Others’. Neither ‘domestic’ nor ‘material’ factors can exist outside of such identity constructions. We argue that the second, relational, approach is more theoretically sound, but begs three questions. First, how can different identity constructions in relation to numerous Others be synthesised and understood comprehensively? Second, how can continuity and change be handled in the same relational framework? Third, what is the point of analysing identity in relational terms? This article addresses the first two questions by introducing an analytical framework consisting of three mutually interacting layers of identity construction. Based on the articles in this special issue, we argue that identity entrepreneurs and emotions are particularly likely to contribute to change within this model. We address the third question by stressing common ground with the first approach: identity enables and constrains behaviour. In the case of Japan, changes in identity construction highlighted by the articles in this special issue forebode a political agenda centred on strengthening Japan militarily. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper joins the debate on Japan's territorial dispute with South Korea over the Dokdo/Takeshima islets. Informed by the ontological security framework of analysis, this paper seeks to explain the decision to adopt the ‘Takeshima Day’ ordinance by the Shimane Prefectural Assembly and the subsequent ascendance of ‘Takeshima’ to the fore of Japan's identity construction vis-à-vis the Korean ‘other’. In this paper, I distinguish between two processes: one that led to the adoption of the ordinance and another that resulted in the entrenchment of ‘Takeshima’ in Japan's identity construction vis-à-vis the Korean ‘other’. The paper argues that the former process should be understood within the context of Shimane Prefecture's distinct identity construction vis-à-vis Tokyo, while the latter can be attributed to recent changes in Japan–Korea relations unrelated to the territorial dispute per se. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper studies the postwar phase of the integration of repatriates into Japanese society, thereby shedding new light on the nationalism of postwar Japan. To this end, it reviews the discourses surrounding the repatriation project and examines the existential consciousness of repatriates in postwar Japanese society. In particular, it examines the novels of Abe Kobo, who suffered from a confused identity after he returned to Japan from Manchuria. After its defeat in World War II, Japan endeavored to build a "New Japan" through re-education and repatriation. The repatriation project became the basis for the national solidarity required for this restructuring. The personal tales of repatriation, which record the experiences of those evacuated from the former colonies, constitute a history of the ordeals suffered by the Japanese victims of the war. However, repatriates felt both bitterness and discrimination directed against them by postwar Japanese society, as though they were strangers in their own country. Furthermore, they sensed the disjunction between the identity of the colonial Japanese and that of the "pure" mainland Japanese, which caused them to experience existential confusion. However, the cause of this sense of incompatibility was the ideology of postwar Japan, which aimed at reintegrating the nationstate. As the public memory of the Japanese as eternal victims spread, the truth was buried. A review of the postwar fate of the repatriates reveals the "crack" inherent in the nationalism of postwar Japan; it thus contributes to the deconstruction of the myth of the "great achievement" of Japanese homogeneity and reveals its illusory nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The "images" which have commonly distinguished Brussels' relations with Beijing (starting from the 1990s) and Tokyo (since the Cold War years) appear to actually be the result of the concurrence of events and of structuring factors that denoted trade problems on the surface, or dysfunctions generated by the systemic variable. Nonetheless, in this paper I try to explain that these problems are fundamentally based on a much more complex and inherent divergence of two universes of values and different political cultures. Zhao Tingyang's theory on "relation rationality" and the Japanese ethical notion of "relational coexistence" (linked to Watsuji Tetsuro) may help to inscribe and construct modern historical relations between China and Japan towards Europe into a narrative by bringing - in Carol Gluck's words - "the outside in". Finally, I analyze the relationship between the three actors in the light of the systemic changes occurred after the end of the bipolar system and especially following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, trying to highlight the potential of their political dialogue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Chinese nation building in the post-Cold War era from the perspective of foreign policy. It focuses on the role of Japan and the United States as significant 'Others' in Chinese leaders' construction of three major variants of Chinese national identity: as a victim (past), as a developing country (present) and as a great power (future). The article argues that Japan occupies a primary place in the enactment of the past aspect of Chinese identity, while the US plays a major role in its present and, especially, future aspects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paradigmatic case in which an almost permanent impasse exists in coming to terms with a difficult war past and ‘normalizing’ its international relations is that of Japan. Although successive Japanese governments have apologized over the last few decades, these have been countered by periodic episodes within Japan revolving largely around history textbooks, the remembrance of war dead and the quest by nationalists to restore national pride in the past. Regional relations were especially strained during the premiership of Koizumi Juni’chirô and his immediate successor, Abe Shinzô. They improved under Fukuda Yasuo, a moderate on war memory issues, and remained steady under Asô Tarô. Japan’s latest prime minister, Hatoyama Yukio, appears determined to address Japan’s war past more openly and critically than previous LDP figures, no doubt with an eye to improving Japan’s relations with its Asian neighbours. But whatever line he pursues, contestation over war memories will remain an issue. They are driven by deep divisions within Japan at the same time that political leaders seek a more prominent identity for Japan as a ‘normal’ actor in international affairs. This article analyses key aspects of the politics of Japan’s war memories, using insights from collective memory studies and constructivist IR theory. We suggest that the quest for ‘normality’ has generated a set of tensions and contradictions over the issue of war memories, both domestically and internationally, for which there is no resolution in sight. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Since the 1990s sushi has become a global product with a transnational market. Hybridised and localised sushi like California Rolls and Spider Rolls are now even being reverse-imported to Japan as 'genuine American sushi'. This article examines some attempts to re-nationalise global sushi, both from the Japanese state and from the vernacular media. We argue that, while popular reporting on the 'overseas sushi boom' generates a sense of national pride over 'them' eating 'our' food, the state's position is a more strategic one. It operates with a clear motive of increasing sales of Japanese food products overseas, mobilising the image of authenticity for this specific purpose. Both state and popular expressions of culinary nationalism claim Japanese ownership of culture not only in its 'authentic' forms but in its multiple, creative, hybrid and fusion forms. By examining Japanese responses to foreigners consuming sushi, we hope to provide some insights into the relationship between food, national culture, authenticity and globalisation. A further objective is to understand Japan's culinary nationalism within the larger context of the 'soft power' and 'cultural diplomacy' discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The advent of post-Cold War order, growing economic interdependence and dense social and cultural networks have greatly facilitated South Korea's bilateral ties with China and Japan since the early 1990s; however, disputes over the history and territory have recently strained such ties. Whereas Japan's renewed territorial claim over Dokdo Island, its distortion of history textbooks and Koizumi's tribute to the Yasukuni Shrine dealt a critical blow to Seoul-Tokyo relations, China's Northeast Project, which claims Korea's ancient kingdom of Goguryeo as a Chinese peripheral local government, provoked widespread anti-Chinese sentiments in South Korea. Nevertheless, South Korea's nationalist responses were not uniform. Seoul responded to Tokyo in a much tougher manner with profound diplomatic implications, whereas public outcry over China did not escalate into any specific retaliatory actions. This article argues that such variation can be explained by the dynamic interplay of issue-character, domestic political terrain involving public opinion and leadership perception and feedback from political leadership in China and Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the divergent approaches pursued by Japan and South Korea in their attempts to resolve an issue that is related to a fundamental responsibility of sovereign states: the protection of citizens. The case considered here is North Korea's abduction of Japanese and South Korean nationals. In Japan, the abduction issue has taken center stage in the country's North Korea policy, whereas in South Korea, recent administrations have downplayed the issue—despite the fact that nearly 500 South Korean citizens remain detained in North Korea, compared to fewer than 20 known Japanese abductions. The authors find that the key to understanding the divergent responses lies in the politicization of specific, ostensibly apolitical demands for the state to fulfill its duty to protect citizens. In particular, the proximity of the abductions issue to key nationalist themes, which politicians in each country use to mobilize support, prevents the matter from being addressed in a neutral way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the early 1970s, overseas Chinese students in the United States protested against Japan's claim to the Diaoyutai Islands. Emerging at a time when the rivalry between the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland to represent China was at a critical juncture, the movement soon found itself caught up in the struggle between the two sides. It was out of the Protect Diaoyutai Movement that a new ideological constituent of overseas Chinese nationalism came to light, looking to the PRC as the hope for a sovereign China. It became a predominant force among overseas Chinese activists and the movement changed its direction from defending Diaoyutai to seeking Taiwan's reunification with the mainland. The paper discusses the factors that shaped and eventually radicalized the movement. It asserts that the event was a turning point in the evolution of overseas Chinese nationalism which transformed an undercurrent into a surging tide that gave rise to a new Chinese national identity among overseas Chinese in America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article traces the Japanese media's response to Chinese poison pot-stickers (gyoza) in Japan's food system as they debate and guide consumer-citizens' feelings of increasing vulnerability as individuals in the global market, the nation, and families. Global food becomes a key metaphor for threats to national borders and the need for national food, yet simultaneously for inevitable risk to globally attuned stomachs that can be controlled only by alert housewives and education of the young. Food terror effectively signals citizens' lack of protection in risk society, but leaves unsaid important differences among consumer-citizens to save themselves with scarce Japanese-made food. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses recent claims of right-wing nationalism in Japan made in journalistic and academic commentary. It re-examines a broad range of evidence used to depict rising Japanese neo-nationalism and concludes that despite popular notions about a re-emergence of militarist attitudes, such currents are not as entrenched in Japanese public discourse as some commentators suggest. After a brief theoretical discussion of nationalism, we examine (1) opinion in Japan regarding constitutional change, (2) statements by elite policy makers which are often the focus of media and academic attention, (3) the debate surrounding the notorious New History Textbook and (4) war memory in popular culture--more specifically, manga. A detailed reading of these examples suggests that right-wing discourse is less prevalent in Japan than is often assumed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents information about the political and ideological movement called Asianism, which was reportedly popular in Japan during the first part of the 1920s. Special attention is given to the impact of Chinese, European, and US. notions of Asianism on Japanese political discussion. Descriptions are given of developments in Japanese perspectives on Asian unity from before World War I to 1926. It is noted that Asianism came to be regarded as a viable alternative or complement to other political doctrines popular in Japan in the early 20th century, including nationalism, internationalism, and imperialism.

This article takes a critical look at conventional studies of Sino-Japanese relations and East Asian security. While realizing that memories of Japanese aggression are a key causal factor of mutual suspicions and security dilemmas between China and Japan, mainstream studies do not offer us concrete solutions to this problem because their solutions are either military-centric, or have an excessive focus on Chinese nationalism and China's “patriotic education” as a key causal factor of Sino-Japanese tensions. Such works ignore the fact that Japanese atonement for its historical wrongs is necessary to prevent mutual suspicions and security dilemmas emerging between China and Japan. The article argues that an apology by Japan for its past aggression could be suggested as a new, albeit non-military, security policy that could contribute to the overall stability of Sino-Japanese relations and Northeast Asia. The article puts forward some suggestions of what an apology may look like under this policy, and argues that this policy could to remove historical animosity toward Japan by demarcating the postwar Japanese state from its prewar counterpart, allowing China the opportunity to “desecuritize” its deeply held identity as a “victimized state” and the need for a dangerous Japanese “other” to shore up this identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With East Asian international relations in flux since the end of the Cold War, Japan's security role is critical in influencing the region's future. In this article, the author examines Japanese opinion leaders' attitudes toward relations with Asian countries, the U.S.-Japan security alliance, the role of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, and Japan's culpability for the Fifteen-Year War of 1931-45. The four major contemporary security strands in Japan—pacifism, mercantilism, normalism, and nationalism—are analyzed. The author argues that normalism continues to rise in the post-Cold War era as the rightist conservatives (normalists) gradually gain predominance over the moderate conservatives (mercantilists). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Around 1907, 1987, and 2007 Japan faced a crossroads in defining internationalism and Asianism, determining their relative priorities, and assessing their relevance for national identity. Similarities can be found in the far-reaching changes occurring in Japan's external environment in the three periods and in the importance of setting a new direction for strategic thinking. Misjudgments in the first two periods are reviewed in order to draw lessons for responding to today's challenges. A distorted outlook on internationalism led to rejection of shifts in US thinking welcomed elsewhere in the global community. Now as attention focuses on debates over the Six-Party Talks as a test of internationalization and over the East Asian Community and regionalism as a test of Asianism, it is possible that the riveting impact of the "abductions" issue, as with the "Northern Territories" issue 20 years earlier, will remain a symbol that trumps a strategic approach toward Asia at a moment of far-reaching regional reorganization. Shortcomings in dealing with the concepts internationalism and Asianism are connected; at the very time the Japanese struggle with one, they are also at an impasse over the other. The same set of factors may be at work: an absence of agreed principles on which to anchor foreign policy; fragmented strategic thinking that loses sight of interconnections and the big picture; and national identity that excessively separates Japan from global forces that transform politics and society and that narrowly compartmentalize the historical developments that shaped relations with Asian countries without capturing the fundamental regional dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses China's foreign policy and diplomatic efforts during the War of Resistance against Japan. The author reveals that during the later stage of the War of Resistance against Japan, the Nationalist government made active efforts to win greater political power for China. The government attempted to accomplish this by presenting the image of a responsible power by playing a role in Asian politics and taking a long-term view of history and political action in the post-war settlement with Japan.

The article discusses the Russo-Japanese war in the context of the emergence of Japonisme. The author provides an in depth analysis of the impact of the war on Russian art and literature. He examines how the war manifested itself in Russian cultural consciousness on the domestic front. The nationalist response to the belligerent colonialist expansion of Russia in the Far East is discussed. Studies that investigate the causes and military operations of the war are highlighted. These include papers by writers Petr Vykhodtsev, Paul Bushkovitch, and Barbara Heldt.

The Yasukuni Shrine is a site of contested nationalist politics in Japan and in neighbouring countries. Within Japan the status of the Shrine exists in a tension between public and private and religious and secular meanings. These tensions are given a specific focus in the context of the visits to the Shrine by Japanese Prime Ministers. The history of such visits is discussed and analysed, with particular attention given to the causes and consequences of the visits by Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro between 2001 and 2006. It is argued that the controversies over the visits in Japan and elsewhere are best understood in the context of ‘revisionist nationalism’ in Japan. The reactions and nationalist problematics of the PRC and Taiwan with regard to the Yasukuni Shrine are then elaborated and analysed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has undergone a media revolution that has transformed the domestic context for making foreign policy as well as domestic policy. The commercialization of the mass media has changed the way leaders and publics interact in the process of making foreign policy. As they compete with one another, the new media naturally try to appeal to the tastes of their potential audiences. Editors make choices about which stories to cover based on their judgments about which ones will resonate best with audiences. In China today, that means a lot of stories about Japan, Taiwan, and the United States, the topics that are the objects of Chinese popular nationalism. The publicity given these topics makes them domestic political issues because they are potential focal points for elite disagreement and mass collective action, and thereby constrains the way China's leaders and diplomats deal with them. Even relatively minor events involving China's relations with Japan, Taiwan, or the United States become big news, and therefore relations with these three governments must be carefully handled by the politicians in the Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee. Because of the Internet, it is impossible for Party censors to screen out news from Japan, Taiwan or the United States that might upset the public. Common knowledge of such news forces officials to react to every slight, no matter how small. Foreign policy makers feel especially constrained by nationalist public opinion when it comes to its diplomacy with Japan. Media marketization and the Internet have helped make Japan China's most emotionally charged international relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines how Chinese intellectuals understand mass nationalism in China. Understanding their perspective is useful when analyzing the meaning and repercussions of nationalist trends throughout the 1990s, as well as its future course. While playing a major role in its revival, Chinese intellectuals actually have a very pragmatic view of nationalism based on China's goal of building a prosperous and powerful nation. They also play a role in influencing public opinion and the government's policy-making process. In the short to mid term, the public expression of anti-U.S. or anti-Japanese sentiments through nationalism is not likely to become extreme, as this would run counter to China's current development strategies and goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even though the argument runs counter to much of the detailed scholarship on the subject, Britain's decision in 1921 to terminate its alliance with Japan is sometimes held in general historical surveys to be a major blunder that helped to pave the way to the Pacific War. The lingering sympathy for the combination with Japan is largely due to an historical myth which has presented the alliance as a particularly close partnership. The roots of the myth lie in the inter-war period when, in order to attack the trend towards internationalism, the political right in Britain manipulated memory of the alliance so that it became an exemplar of 'old diplomacy'. It was then reinforced after 1945 by post-war memoirs and the 'declinist' literature of the 1960s and 1970s. By analysing the origins of this benevolent interpretation of the alliance, this article reveals how quickly and pervasively political discourse can turn history into myth and how the development of myths tells us much about the time in which they were created. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines several factors that contributed to the transition of Japanese youth from pacifism to nationalism. It is said that the level of perceived security concerns have increased due to the changes in the international environment surrounding Japan at the end of Cold War. It is said that conservative Japanese newspapers have begun to endorse nationalistic policies following an increasing threats from neighboring countries and weakening anti-nationalism pressures.

In the post-cold war world Japanese security policy has grasped at nationalistic elements within Japanese society in attempts to "securitize" itself by means of a foreign policy independent of the United States. The role of absolute and relative gains in the making of Japanese foreign and security policy will be examined in light of alternative security issues. Working From International Security: A New Framework for Analysis by Barry Buzan et al., this article will examine Japanese security policy in light of Japan's attempts to securitize itself in non-traditional ways that impact traditional security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between about 1890 and 1919, the dominant discourse in Japanese nationalism emphasised Japan's status as a great modern nation, in contrast to earlier concerns about weakness and vulnerability in the face of Western imperialism, and despite continuing insecurities of various kinds. This paper revisits the ‘discourse of national greatness’, focusing on its construction, limitations and consequences. Emphasis on Japanese greatness was evident in the press, in self-presentation at industrial expositions, and in substantial written works by Japanese intellectuals. Several factors explain the rapid spread of such a discourse, including the decline of class and regional identification, the considerable expansion of the press, and the stimulus of war. The consequences of the rise of the notion of Japanese greatness for the later development of Japanese nationalism were profound. They included the further subordination of regionalism, entrenchment of the gendered nature of Japanese nationalism, the further denigration of other Asian peoples and of Japan's own past, reinforcement of the yet fragile cult of the emperor, encouragement to conflate ‘nation’ and ‘state’, and a strong tendency to associate nationalism with military conquest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan is arguably the single most important country in the International Political Economy literature on economic nationalism. The spectacular success that the Japanese state has enjoyed, both during the Meiji period in the late 19th century and during the high growth decades of the Cold War, in promoting economic development has made the country the most effective advertisement for economic nationalism since interest in the concept began to re-emerge in the early 1970s. The precise mix of policies that Japan has employed in spurring economic growth is, of course, the subject of scholarly debate.

From a forced renunciation in 1946 of war as a tool of international relations, Japan progressed during the next 58 years - first pushed by a former enemy, then entrained by world events and a renewed emergence of nationalism at home - to de facto repudiation of a position of studied neutrality. Armed Japanese troops are today once again present in a theatre of war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analyzes Sino-Japanese relations in the beginning of the 21st century. Responses of both countries to the changing international environment in the 1990s; Potential dangers of miscalculations in the fluidity of relations among major powers; Domestic factors affecting the bilateral relationship such as trade and rising nationalism in both countries.

In this article, the author describes and analyzes the transformation of Japan, from the perspective of Asia Pacific historical configuration and the international relations theory. The transformation of Japan goes from a country subordinated to the Chinese and European empires, to a modern nation, a military and economical powerful country in the economics and geopolitics of XIX and XX century settings, particularly in the 1900-1980 period. The article describes the way in which the transformation took place, as well as the human, nature, technological and financial costs that Japan had to paid in arriving where it is now. However, these costs were not just for Japan, but for most of the countries of the Asia Pacific region. In this transition from subordinated to imperial country, from the end of the XIX century and at the beginning of the XX, to a modern country, in the second half of the XX century, Japan waged wars against its neighbor countries, like China and Russia, as well as invasions to other countries and territories, and participated in two World Wars. Finally, the article concludes that some elements such as Japan's importance in Asia Pacific region, its international policy, its imperial voracity, its new American subordination since the middle of the XX century and its new international linking strategy through economic cooperation agreements, were the prelude of a new stage in Japanese historical construction into the XXI century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of nationalisms in Japan and China in the 1980s and 1990s aroused much interest in Western, Chinese and Japanese academic and journalistic circles and prompted some analysts to speculate about potential conflict between China and Japan. This article questions such arguments by examining nationalisms in China and Japan in the 1980s and 1990s. It identifies similar trends in the resurgence of state nationalism and cultural nationalism in both countries, and argues that, although élites in both countries were active in promoting patriotism in the 1980s and 1990s, their efforts had limited impact, whereas cultural nationalism, on the other hand, managed to capture the popular mood. The article suggests that, nonetheless, because both types of nationalism were predominantly inward-oriented responses to domestic and external changes, relations between China and Japan remained relatively stable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the dispute that involves the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, and Japan over the ownership of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands. It states that this dispute is fueled by the symbolic significance of the islands to the parties involved due to domestic pressures instead of a desire for natural resources. This article suggests that the three countries in the dispute should understand the importance of nationalism for their individual domestic politics.