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The 2013 White Paper reaffirms the centrality of the US Alliance for Australia. It identifies a number of concrete areas for future cooperation and provides the foundation for developing greater strategic ties with China while remaining firmly anchored in the US camp. It is less clear, however, when it comes to Australia's future contribution to burden-sharing within the Alliance. Putting actions behind the goal to play a greater role in Southeast Asia will be an important litmus test for the alliance relationship. In many ways, the White Paper reflects a phase of re-orientation in the Alliance: away from operations further afield towards the increasing security dynamics in Australia's own region. As the future of China's trajectory-and US-Sino strategic relations—is still very much uncertain, the 'hedging' approach taken White Paper's approach makes sense. What happens if US-Sino strategic relations become more competitive is left to another day. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Quad or Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, a group of four democracies, the US, India, Japan, and Australia, was first proposed in 2007 by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in his 'confluence of two seas' speech that subsequently embarked on the path to the foundation of the group. Quad perceives China's economic growth, which enables her to transform the world order as a threat and aims at containing the growing Chinese assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region. The Malabar naval exercises in the Indian Ocean by the Quad members were one such exercise. This paper, aims to analyze the formation of Quad and will contemplate whether the group is causing confrontation or stability in the Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific regions. The paper will also assess that the Quad is designed to counter China's growing influence in the Asia-pacific and Indo-pacific regions. Containing China is likely to create a confrontation in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the post-war period Australian Prime Ministers have played a proactive role in formulating foreign policy towards Japan. This paper explores the role of executive leadership towards Japan and its impact on the bilateral relationship. The Howard period and current Rudd-led initiatives on whaling, nuclear disarmament, climate change and regional architecture are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 'new' terrorism has not escaped Southeast Asia. Within this region, the Malay Archipelago has the world's largest Muslim population and Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim country. In the context of the struggle between radical Islam, and the West and its allies, the region assumes great, long-term strategic significance, particularly to the USA. The threat of terrorism to Australia, as demonstrated by the terrorist attacks at Bali in 2002 aimed at its citizens, has also ensured Australia's active interest and engagement with the littoral states of the Malay Archipelago. In addition, arguably the world's most strategic waterway and chokepoint, the narrow Straits of Malacca, is located within this cauldron. More than half the world's trade and oil passes through this strategic straits. By comparison, oil flows through the straits are three times more than through the Suez, and fifteen times greater than the Panama Canal. Not surprisingly, key Western states and their allies that have a deep interest in the security of the Straits of Malacca and in the global war on terrorism have paid special attention to the Malay Archipelago. Indeed, the idea of a Trilateral Security Dialogue centred on the USA, Japan and Australia was first mooted in 2001, and has since involved discussions on Asian security between senior officials of all three countries. In 2005, it was elevated to the level of the foreign ministers of Japan and Australia, and the US Secretary of State. This dialogue process is the third leg in the triangle between the two bilateral US alliances with Japan and Australia. It is obvious that all three are key strategic partners in Asia, with a strong common interest in maritime security and terrorism issues, particularly in Southeast Asia. It is the contention of this paper that this evolving trilateral extra-regional security nexus has benefited greatly from cooperation with Singapore, which has been doing everything it can to encourage and facilitate the regional involvement of these extra-regional powers. In fact, Singapore has become a critical regional ally of all three. On Singapore's part, this represents a striking success in foreign policy as security, political and economic allies enhance its own ability to better manage the new terrorist threats that have emerged since 9-11. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Philippines and Australia have a strong history of diplomatic and economic relations. Yet, their defense relations are still weak. Although the 1995 Defense Cooperation Agreement has provided the two countries a framework to cooperate closely on defense, the scope of their cooperation is still confined to confidence-building measures. There is a need to broaden their defense relations in the light of their mutual recognition of strategic interests in regional security, particularly in the context of the war on terrorism in Southeast Asia. Strong Philippine-Australia defense relations will expand the web of bilateral defense relations of like-minded states in the Asia Pacific to foster regional peace and stability. The Philippines and Australia have a strong potential for being defense partners in regional security by virtue of geographic proximity and cultural familiarity. But the glue that could help bond the two countries more closely is their shared regional security perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a discourse for peace education. How should our schools deal with questions about peace and war? Can the schools be somehow instrumental in enhancing the possibilities for peaceful coexistence in the future? Can they provide some form of education for peace-peace with our fellow human beings and peace with the Earth? Such questions are by no means simple to answer, and there is an obvious risk that we avoid them because of their complexity and because they may be judged as controversial. The Peace Education Commission (PEC), a subgroup of the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), was established in the early 1970s to facilitate international cooperation among individuals interested in peace education and research related to peace education. Robert Aspeslagh of The Netherlands was Executive Secretary of the Peace Education Commission from 1979 to 1983, and Robin J. Burns of Australia have edited a collection of papers from the PEC under the title "Three Decades of Peace Education Around the World: An Anthology."

Introduces a series of articles on the development of the Australia-United States alliance relationship. Informative range of perspectives on the history of the Australia-New Zealand-United States Security Treaty; Sign of continuing United States commitment to the region; Major foreign policy achievement of the Howard Government.

This article1 reviews the seminal influences on Australian national security planning and outlines a methodology for assessing national security risk which provides a workable analytical framework for prioritising Australia's national security challenges and allocating scarce resources in a systematic and integrated way. The authors argue for a System of Systems approach that addresses the most serious security challenges as a whole rather than treating them as independent, compartmentalised issues. The ability to develop effective analytical tools for assessing national security risk will be a key determinant of strategic success in the twenty-first century. Nations adept at anticipating developments, discerning trends and evaluating risk among the clutter of confusing and contradictory change indicators will be significantly advantaged over those which are not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article critically evaluates Australia's ‘creative middle power diplomacy’, encapsulated in the three pillars of the Labor government's foreign policy platform. It notes that each pillar has been accorded specific roles in the implementation of Australian foreign policy and makes particular reference to the government's preference for multilateral engagement. The article subsequently demonstrates that such an agenda actually impedes a creative approach to key issues such as trade, climate change and non-proliferation challenges, as well as Australia's participation in Asia-Pacific order-building. It then offers some suggestions for a more flexible posture that is not inconsistent with past Labor approaches, but which also better appreciates regional and global complexities. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article examines the security relations among the U.S., Japan and Australia in the 1990s. It highlights the establishment of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) or bilateral security relations between Japan and Australia in 2005. It states that in 1993, the process of alliance redefinition started, after the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lost the majority in the lower house. The transformation of the defense policy of Japan and Australia from "national defense" to "international security" is discussed.

During the early post-war era, a Japanese revival was a source of profound concern to members of the Commonwealth, especially Australia and New Zealand. Britain, having abdicated the leading role in the Western Pacific to the United States, attempted to retain some influence in the region, but economic frailties and lack of Commonwealth unity undermined these efforts. Under American guidance, diplomatic, commercial and (to a lesser extent) security ties with Japan were later promoted, but elements of cooperation and competition persisted in Commonwealth relations with their former enemy. Ultimately, Britain, Australia and New Zealand placed their respective regional identities ahead of their Commonwealth loyalties. Japan took advantage of this situation to promote its own national interests. Hence, the wider aperture of the 'Commonwealth lens' throws into sharp relief the contours of a number of members' bilateral relationships with Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent changes of government in Australia and Japan, and a pending one in the United States, signifies a historical crossroads in these three allies' security politics in the Asia-Pacific region. In recent years, all three countries have tended to rationalize their strategic collaboration on the need to build innovative and competitive-oriented "strategic geometries" as a means to counter China's growing power and to meet new types of threats in the region. Yet the Australian Government under John Howard simultaneously pursued a hedging strategy, exploiting its growing economic relationship with China while strengthening its diplomatic and strategic profile with the United States. Despite Tokyo's own substantial economic relationship with Beijing, recent Japanese leaders were unable to pursue the same type of "dual track" strategy to the same extent as Howard. With Kevin Rudd's election as the new Australian Prime Minister and Yasuo Fukuda's ascent to power in Japan, prospects for Australia and Japan to cultivate more independent politico-security ties with Beijing have strengthened. If so, the evolving regional security postures of both these US allies may compel the United States to reassess its own traditional skepticism towards multilateral security groupings in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The March 2007 Japan-Australia Security Declaration has garnered more than its share of hyperbole. Described variously as an historic milestone for peace or an agreement designed to encircle China; the declaration's actual strategic consequences are somewhat unclear. The purpose of this article is to provide a critical analysis of the security declaration and to assess its impact in the context of the changing patterns of the region's security setting. Some have argued that it marks a small but qualitatively significant shift in the essential features of the regional security architecture. The article assesses this claim and argues that while the declaration is of some diplomatic importance, and clearly contributes to improving cooperation in disaster relief and other humanitarian operations, it is of little strategic significance to the broader patterns of East Asian security over the short to medium term. Each side's operational constraints, their different strategic priorities, most obviously their perceptions of China, as well as the continued military predominance of the US, means that the agreement will be of little immediate significance for East Asian security. That said, it remains an important development for the respective parties and is a leading edge indicator of broader forces for change that are increasingly present in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australia in 2006 reaffirmed its close relationship with the United States while deepening engagement with other major power partners, with further agreements concluded with China, cooperation extended with Japan, and the profile of ties with India enhanced. Australia continued to navigate through the sometimes sensitive relations among the major powers, amid additional pressures arising from North Korea's nuclear test. Tensions with Indonesia were followed by a new security agreement, though increased confidence was needed in the relationship at both official and public levels. Internal disorder in several southwest Pacific states challenged Australia's capacities to provide effective short and medium term responses. Involvements in Afghanistan and Iraq continued, with the latter situation particularly problematic. Growing demand for energy in the Asia-Pacific region directed further attention towards Australia's uranium resources, as climate change issues assumed a higher profile in domestic debate and multilateral activities.1 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The policies of Australia's current government have been so close to the United States as to invite comparisons to an Australian `deputy sheriff' executing the interests and policies of a US global marshal. Advocates of the ANZUS alliance disagree, citing the immense politico-strategic benefits Australia extracts from that relationship and insisting that ANZUS objectives are commensurate with a stable and just world order. Recent developments in international security politics such as the Iraq conflict and the persistence of global terrorism may now challenge that proposition and test the Australian electorate's future support for the American alliance. A greater determination by Australia to cultivate a more balanced approach to alliance politics will underwrite its national security interests more effectively than a sustained and rigid adherence to alliance loyalty under any circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on role of Australia's External Affairs Minister Percy Spender in the formation of Australia-New Zealand-United States Security Treaty. Importance of including domestic politics when exploring strategically-minded politicians engaged in policy-making; Examination of state of international relations; Anticipation of what lies ahead in relations between parties to the treaty.

Deals with impact of bilateral military alliance between Australia and the United States on security politics in Northeast Asia. Survey of Australian-Japanese relations; Revised United States-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines.