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Research regards related party transactions (RPTs) and control-ownership divergence (wedge) as expropriation mechanisms manifesting severe agency conflict in emerging markets. Since corporate governance greatly influences firms' investments and strategic behavior, this study examines how different RPTs and the wedge affect cross-border acquisition (CBA) size and returns. In line with agency theory, opportunistic RPTs like loans/guarantees reduce CBA returns. However, operating RPTs are positively related to returns as the market seems to link these RPTs with benefits to firms. The CBA performance of wedge firms varies with RPT types. While loans/guarantees by wedge firms reduce returns due to combined tunneling incentives, operating RPTs impact returns positively, reflecting more economic benefits in wedge firms. The wedge or RPTs are also positively related to CBA size. But increased tunneling incentives restrain wedge firms that give loans/guarantees from large CBAs. Finally, family firms or large group affiliates that provide loans/guarantees or sustain the wedge reduce returns yet make larger CBAs. Overall, agency costs of expropriation mechanisms depend on RPT types and receive further impetus in family firms or group affiliates with extensive intra-group linkages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine how family-ownership influences takeover probability and takeover public announcement abnormal return of Indian publicly traded firms between 2003 and 2019. We find that family ownership has a significantly negative effect on target takeover probability at various levels of family ownership, viz. 20%, 40%, and 51%. Announcement period abnormal returns for target firms are positive at a lower level of family ownership of 20% and negative at a higher level of family ownership of 51%. These results are consistent with the agency cost explanation where family ownership reduces owner-manager agency conflict but exacerbates conflict between majority and minority shareholders. Our results hold for Heckman two-stage model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines the relationship between ownership concentrations and tax avoidance for small–medium enterprises (SMEs) in India. With a panel dataset built from small- and medium-sized enterprise surveys over the period between 2013 and 2014, we find that SMEs with concentrated ownership have a negative association with tax avoidance. The result is more pronounced for SMEs headquartered in states/provinces with stronger economic and institutional environment. The results also indicate that for any two SMEs with similar levels of ownership concentration, the SME with higher capital needs is more likely to avoid taxes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: This paper aims to assess the risks and challenges of corporate social responsibility (CSR) management in the Indian-mandated CSR ecosystem from a service purchaser–supplier dualistic perspective and the role management control systems (MCS) and social capital play in managing such risks and challenges. Design/methodology/approach: This study undertook a qualitative approach that involved in-depth interviews of 22 CSR directors, managers or chief executive officers from 13 central public sector enterprises (CPSEs) that had purchased CSR services and nine managers of non-government organisations (NGOs) serving as CSR suppliers. Data analysis was founded on the principal–agent and social capital theoretical perspectives. Findings: A highly bureaucratic, time-pressured mandated environment poses several goal congruence and adverse selection threats to outsourced CSR project arrangements. A mix of formal and informal control mechanisms is critical for enhancing trust or bonding between service purchasers and service providers and enriching bridging capital or access to resources derived from interpersonal connections between NGOs and communities. Practical implications: NGOs and CPSEs may benefit from understanding each other's goals and culture and using appropriate formal and informal MCS for managing CSR expectations and outcomes. Originality/value: Drawing on a unique mandatory CSR regime, this study offers principal–agent and social capital perspectives on CSR programme delivery, highlighting the importance of various formal and informal MCS in lowering agency costs in outsourced CSR relationships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dividend payout problem in literature has largely been misspecified. The roles of dividends as signals, agency cost reducers, fixed income providers or even the invariance of dividend payouts are all phenomenon that, based on market conditions, follow from the role of dividends as equalizers of firm value, discounted from a given point in time, across firm's life. In this study, I discuss few problems with prevalent approaches towards solving dividend puzzle in academia, provide justification for the aforementioned hypothesis based on few assumptions, derive a model applicable under ideal conditions and then measure the deviations from the ideal model in two market indices—Nifty 500 (India) and S&P 500 (USA). The results obtained are then compared with the studies already done on these market and the reasons for deviation are discussed. Once the dividend model is derived, all roles of dividend flow automatically from the primary role of dividends and the extent of efficacy of each of the secondary role is based on numerous factors which vary, giving different results across different studies. The empirical investigation gives a view of these different factors at work in the markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]