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The European Union (EU) Emission Trading System (ETS) has been a major tool of the EU climate policy. Despite its significance, the EU ETS faces serious challenges regarding its function. One of the major issues that encumber its contribution in EU climate policy is value added tax (VAT) carousel fraud within it. This paper examined the ways this type of swindle is conducted and its economic impact. It analyses the parameters that facilitate it and evaluates the responses of the EU and its Member States and mainly the introduction of the reverse charge mechanism. It finally highlights the need to implement some changes to the EU ETS, the VAT provisions, and the way the national tax authorities and the EU coordinate. Finally, it suggests the introduction of a real-time VAT collection mechanism that can be an effective and feasible solution to the problem in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is the cornerstone of EU climate policy, a grand policy experiment, as the first and largest international emissions trading system in the world. In this article, we seek to provide a broad overview of the initiation, decision-making and implementation of the EU ETS so far. We explore why the EU changed from a laggard to a leader in emissions trading, how it managed to establish the system rapidly, and the consequences to date, leading up to the 2008 proposal for a revised ET Directive for the post- 2012 period. We apply three explanatory approaches, focusing on the roles of the EU member states, the EU institutions and the international climate regime, and conclude that all three approaches are needed to understand what happened, how and why. This also reveals that what happened in the early days of developing the system had significant consequences for the problems experienced in practice and the prospects ahead. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses the controversy behind European Union Emissions Trading Scheme as a European climate policy to address climate change and reduce emissions of industrial greenhouse gas. He says that the carbon price that the scheme sets is too low to incentivize a switch from coal to low- or zero-emission alternatives. He also emphasizes that as an intertemporal trading scheme, prices of carbon should reflect expectations of future allowance scarcities in times of non-binding caps.