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The evolution of China's defense industrial cluster is essentially a game of military enterprises and civil enterprises. In order to analyze the behavior of military enterprises and civil enterprises in the evolution process of defense industrial cluster, this paper construct an evolutionary model for analyzing the evolution mechanism of China's defense industry cluster based on evolutionary game theory. The results show that, in the development of China's defense industrial cluster, there are two long-run equilibriums: cooperation and non-cooperation. There are four factors have significant influence on the long-term equilibriums: profit of cooperation, distribution of cooperation profit, amount of investment and transaction cost. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the post-Cold War era, civil-military integration has been an important subject of study across the globe. As years went by and its economic development took a turn in a different direction, China followed the example of the West to establish cooperation between the defense industry and the private sector. All those policies were based on lessons learned from other countries’ defense industry development. How to use capital from the private sector and modern business management skills to boost the development of the defense industry is now a goal for Beijing to achieve. With China’s defense industry as the subject of research, this paper introduces the history of China’s CMI while making an analysis of relevant cases and trying to express how China uses the experience of other countries. References were mainly cited from dissertations and theses in China, and two cases were chosen for analysis, one about the transfer of military technology to the private sector and the other about the private sector’s participation in the defense industry. The analysis was supplemented with the two companies’ financial reports and brief introductions. The discussion was focused on problems that China’s defense and civilian industries may encounter in the process of CMI and possible solutions to the problems. It could help us find out the effects of China’s efforts to copy and learn from other countries’ defense industry development. Maybe “Emulated Innovation” is a better description of China’s type of innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines defense industrialization in three leading arms-producing states in Asia - India, Japan, and South Korea - and how their experiences compare to China's recent defense industrial developments. It argues that despite decades of considerable effort and investments in pursuit of a techno-nationalist self-arming strategy, these countries have experienced only modest success when it comes to achieving such self-reliance. Most regional defense industrial bases lack the necessary design skills and technological expertise in order to truly innovate, and at best these countries act as 'late innovators' when it comes to armaments production. The experiences of these countries have lessons for China as it attempts to move into the first tier of arms-producing states. China has over the past 15 years made significant progress in modernizing its defense technological and industrial base. At the same time, China faces the same long-term challenges that currently confront other regional arms industries - that is, making techno-nationalism work at the later stages of innovation. This is particularly critical as China's defense industry strives to move from a basically platform-centric to an increasingly network-centric technological-industrial process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the most knowledge-intensive industrial sectors, China’s defense industries are developing very fast. The present paper will explore the contribution of China’s defense innovation to its economic growth. Cobb–Douglas production function, integrating defense and non-defense stock in knowledge, is applied during the course. In addition, an input–output analysis of defense equipment procurement was done. Positive effect of China’s defense innovation on economic growth has been revealed by comparing the results from the two methods. And some suggestions are made to strengthen the effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the U. S. role in cross-strait relations before and after the political power transition in Taiwan during 2008. It explores the question of whether a new dynamic is shaping the Beijing-Taipei-Washington trilateral relations with the significant relaxation of cross-strait relations, and how that affects Washington's ability to influence the direction of cross-strait relations in the future. More specifically the paper analyzes the role the United States played in shaping the new reality in the Taiwan Straits, and the evolving thinking on Taiwan in American strategic and political circles. It will also discuss how Washington has managed the cross-strait relations so far as well as how Beijing and Taipei have handled the American factor on some sensitive issues. Finally it will look at the potential benefits and limitations that the United States could contribute to achieving a higher level of reconciliation and integration between the two sides across the Taiwan Straits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores seven decades of development and evolution in China's defense industry (DI) policy since 1949 via Systems Thinking methodology; to construct the issue interlinked by dynamic, complex, domestic and international factors; and to propose a dynamic model for the construction of China's armament systems. Furthermore, this study will attempt to elaborate how China, based on its traditional philosophy of "army integrated into civilian support and sustained through the people," establishes a win-win-win situation of DI development. This study finds that China uses DI development to lead civil industry upgrades and, with its colossal economic scale, helps to boost overall macroeconomic growth. China then applies its economic and industrial advantages to support defense building. In this way, a positive feedback cycle mutually supported by defense building, technological and economic development is created. With the trend toward the commercialization of global armaments, this dynamic model is worthy of reference for developing countries, newly industrialized countries, and those countries which are facing the issue of DI transformation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The economic system reform in 1978 had a profound effect on the harmonious development of the defense and the economic construction in China. Having the defense expenditure and the annual GDP of China as the empirical data, this paper studied the effect of economic system reform on the harmonious development the defense and the economic construction in China. The result indicates that there was structural change in Chinese defense expense growth rate time series and GDP growth rate time series before and after the reform. After the Opening and Reform, the mean value of defense expense growth rate was falling, and the mean value of GDP growth rate was rising. The sensitivity of GDP growth rate to the change of defense expense growth rate has weakened dramatically, while the sensitivity of defense expense growth rate to the change of GDP growth rate experienced almost no change at all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To understand broader questions concerning the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), one needs to understand Chinese denial and deception (D&D)--in terms of both theory and practice. There is evidence that China regards D&D as an integral component of national security policy and military planning. Deception readily lends itself to the defensive portion of the PLA's new combat strategy of "three attacks, three defenses" (attacking with stealth aircraft, cruise missiles, and armed helicopters; defending against precision attack, electronic interference, and reconnaissance and monitoring). Furthermore, the People's Republic of China (PRC) selectively releases information on the PLA to the public. This intentional lack of transparency complicates assessments of the Chinese military. The PRC conducts broad-based research and development on D&D, with the subject appearing in several military and academic journal articles. Deception has been used both throughout the history of Imperial China and since the founding of the PRC in 1949. This paper examines the following issues of Chinese deception in both theory and practice: contemporary Chinese perspectives on deception; the relation of cultural and regime characteristics on deception in decision-making; PLA applications for deception; PRC employment of deception at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels; and PRC potential at successful deception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the end of the Cold War, the "China threat" has become an issue of debate, and different policy proposals have been drawn accordingly. By reviewing two rounds of defense industry reform in China and the resulting defense industry capability level, this paper argues that China is not likely to pose a long-term threat to the United States, because China does not have strong indigenous defense industry capability. China cannot, moreover, sustain competition with the United States without a strong defense industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers recent American attempts to use economic sanctions to alter mainland China `s policies on human rights and arms sales. The analysis follows from a formal, general theory of economic sanctions that stresses the importance of domestic politics. The results from the model suggest that sanctions, or the threat of sanctions, should be wholly ineffective in the human rights case but should be able to bring about some changes in Chinese arms sales policy. These results correspond with our empirical observations, indicating that the theory offers a useful explanation for the observed events. This explanation focuses on the political competition among domestic political actors and suggests that sanctions can be effective only when they impose significant costs, relative to the value of the issues at stake, on those domestic actors having the ability to change the targeted policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's defence spending has long been the subject of controversy. Beijing continues to resist international pressure to publish accurate data, and instead groups areas of spending under broad and potentially misleading headings in its budgets.While it might be difficult to assess the true extent of defence spending, there is no doubt that the budget has expanded dramatically in recent years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Even with sizable economic inputs, access to foreign technologies, and considerable political will, China, up until the late 1990s, experienced only limited success when it came to the local design, development, and manufacture of advanced conventional weapons. Not surprisingly, therefore, reforming the local defense industry in order to upgrade its technology base and manufacturing capabilities and to make armaments production more efficient and cost-effective has long preoccupied the Chinese leadership. The fact that most of these efforts had little positive impact on the country’s military technological and industrial capabilities only encouraged Beijing to experiment with additional reforms in the hopes of finally getting it right. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

China’s defense science, technology, and industrial system has been undergoing a far-reaching transformation over the past two decades and the single biggest factor behind this turnaround is the role of external technology and knowledge transfers and the defense industry’s improving ability to absorb these inputs and convert into localized output. China is pursuing an intensive campaign to obtain defense and dual-use civil–military foreign technology transfers using a wide variety of means, which is explored in this article. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Most aspiring great powers equate great power status with self-sufficiency, armaments production. China and India have both invested considerable resources over the past 60 years in establishing and nurturing indigenous military-industrial complexes (MICs). By the early 1990s, however, it was apparent that both countries' MICs were inadequate in delivering indigenously developed advanced conventional weaponry to their national militaries, due to technological inferiority and bloated, inefficient state-owned enterprise systems. Subsequently, both countries have undertaken efforts to reform their respective MICs, by injecting competition and other market-oriented changes, and by expanding their acquisition of cutting-edge military (and military-relevant civilian) technologies. China has made much more progress in reforming and modernizing its MIC, and the results can be seen in the types of vastly improved Chinese weapons systems coming off domestic assembly lines. India's MIC, meanwhile, seems to be still mired in Nehruvian socialist and protectionist past. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the evolution of the military thinking of China as well as the changed role of military space. It explores the country's space capabilities and development before dealing its concepts for military space operations and concludes with future Chinese space operations. It discusses space and local wars under modern and high-technology situations.

China is North Korea's largest international trading partner. Since 2000, fuels and minerals have become a larger portion of North Korean exports and a smaller portion of imports. North Korea remains a net importer of Chinese crude oil and oil products; however, it became a net exporter of electricity and coal to China in 2003. Aside from coal, imports and exports of metallic minerals and mining equipment are growing segments of China-North Korea trade. Whereas North Korean electricity and iron ore exports are sold at sub-market "friendship prices" Chinese coal and oil products have been sold to North Korea at premium prices. Chinese Customs data suggest that Beijing is taking a pragmatic, market-oriented approach to trade with its reclusive neighbor, while the increasingly asymmetrical energy embodiment of bilateral trade may reflect deterioration of North Korea's non-military industries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's defense production model is often portrayed as an exemplar of techno-nationalism, but can it serve as a model for China to follow in pursuit of technological military catch-up? Japan in the past has exploited civilian industrial strengths to create a defense production base with footholds in key technologies. However, Japan's defense production model is now displaying structural limits - constrained defense budgets, deficient procurement management, limited international collaboration - with the risks of civilian industry exiting the sector, the loss of even basic competency in military technologies, and the consequent weakening of national security autonomy. Japan's case thus offers emerging comparative lessons for China to study in what to do and not to in pursuing civilian-military integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores how the development of the Soviet bloc, the relationship between China and the Soviet Union and Cold War was shaped by the Soviet Union's post World War II desire to develop a nuclear bomb. It examines industrial development in the territories gained by the Soviet Union following the war, including defense-related industries in the German zone and the mining of uranium in Czechoslovakia. The article discusses collaboration among members of the socialist bloc during the 1950s and explores how this period influenced the Sino-Soviet relationship.

China's grand ambition is to become a world-class military industrial power by 2020, but can it succeed? A concerted restructuring of the defense industry is taking place to tackle deep-seated obstacles constraining its ability to absorb, create and diffuse technological innovation. This includes promoting competition and creativity by reducing the reach of the state and encouraging enterprises to play a leading role, developing a robust regulatory and standards regime to provide benchmarks and rules, and forging integration between the civilian and military portions of the economy through spin-ons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The People's Republic of China has, since the 1950s, strived to become self- supporting in the development and production of armaments. The results of these endeavors, however, have been decidedly mixed. Since the late 1990s, China has engaged in a number of reforms intended to overhaul its defense industry, making it both more efficient and economically and technologically self-sustaining, as well as increasing its capacities to design, develop, and manufacture cutting-edge weaponry. Efforts to inject market forces into the local process of arms manufacturing—such as making defense firms more responsible for their own profits and losses, creating a professional management system, increasing inter-firm competition, introducing competitive bidding, and spurring corporative rationalization and consolidation—have, however, met with limited success, given the Chinese leadership's reluctance to truly "marketize" the arms industry. The Chinese defense industry has made considerable advances in its manufacturing capabilities, but this has been largely due to increased military spending, commercial-to-military technology spin-on, and the continued reliance upon transfers of military technologies from Russia (including licensed production) and of dual-use technologies from the West. It is also worth noting that Russian arms still comprise the most advanced armaments in the Chinese military's arsenal. Overall, it appears that Beijing's operational strategy regarding its defense sector is still to muddle through, with only minor structural tinkering. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The revolution in military affairs has inspired the People's Liberation Army to formulate its long-term modernization guidelines. To the PLA, RMA is the world standard and future trend for a powerful military. The very fact that China has little capability to cope with an RMA-type of war prods the PLA to study RMA and to apply, where it can, its principles. China will continue to reform the PLA along the lines of RMA, gradually streamlining and digitizing its C[sup 3]I systems, significantly trimming its force size and substantially restructuring its force components. Military research and development will give greater stress to new concept weapons. National defence strategy, campaign tactics, and combat principles will also be under constant review. In short, the PLA will become more open, flexible, forward-looking and, above all, more professional. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evaluates the current and future status of the defense industries in China. Examination of domestic and international background developments affecting the Chinese military-industrial complex; Impact of the reforms of the Deng Xiao Ping era and the changes in China's international environments on the defense industries; Shifts in strategy, doctrine, logistics and tactics.

Criticism of Israeli military-technology transfers to China is largely unfounded. The sales actually enjoyed tacit American support when they started in the 1970s (to Taiwan) and 1980s (to China). Washington's recent accusations of illegal transfers of US technologies reflect changed political considerations more than actual facts. Military sales to China have helped mitigate the economic crisis facing Israel's defence-industrial complex, have promoted political and strategic relations between Israel and China, and have had only a limited impact on the Asian balance of power. Israel's arms-export control mechanisms, moreover, have been tightened considerably in recent years, while military transfers to China and Taiwan have drastically declined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented to the articles in this issue dealing with China's military policy, defense industries and capabilities in military technology.

The article offers news briefs related to world politics as of December 1, 2012. Chinese welfare will improve while trading partner's welfare will be affected if it will allow the intense political pressure from the U.S. to cut its export subsidies. A new research published in the journal "Political Studies" suggests that the expertise and contacts brought by the former top public officials can be a significant resource for defense companies. Furthermore, a new innovative project that could provide politics students a detailed knowledge on Parliament was launched at the University of Sheffield in September 2012.