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Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are stealthy, multi-step attacks tailored to a specific target. Often described as 'low and slow', APTs remain undetected until the consequences of the cyber-attack become evident, usually in the form of damage to the physical world, as seen with the Stuxnet attack, or manipulation of an industrial process, as was the case in the Ukraine Power Grid attacks. Given the increasing sophistication and targeted nature of cyber-attacks, especially APTs, this paper delves into the substantial threats APTs pose to critical infrastructures, focusing on power grid substations. Through a detailed case study, we present and explore a 2-stage APT attack on an IEC 61850 power grid substation, employing a Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) testbed to simulate real-world conditions. More specifically, this paper discusses two significant experiments conducted to assess vulnerabilities in the control protocols used in IEC 61850 substations: IEC 60870-5-104 and IEC 61850. The integration of findings from these experiments revealed a number of previously undiscussed potential threats to power grid infrastructure that could arise from attacking one or more substations. To better address these potential threats, the paper proposes an extension to the Industrial Control System (ICS) kill chain that explicitly accounts for the consequences of attacks on the physical aspects of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Evaluating the impact of a cyber-vulnerability on device-level resilience of solar-based networks. • Designing a structure for assessing device resiliency using controller code verification in digital twin environment. • Determining the effect on microgrid resilience applying a new machine learning based cyber-physical resiliency metric (CPRM). • Adjusting control actions to improved situational awareness of solar-based networks. Cyber-attacks (CAs) on electrical networks in presents of renewable energies, particularly solar energy, have become more complex and sophisticated over the past few years by making severe system outages. In light of increased automation in solar-based energy industries, a holistic cyber-physical infrastructure must be considered to predict the effect of CAs on electrical networks and the ways to enhance its resilience. The present study examines the resilience characteristics at the equipment area of the diverse control methods and their effect on the outage severity of the smart grid using digital twins (DT) simulation technology. The paper presents a machine learning based metric for measuring the resilience of cyber-physical features that considers device-level characteristics, vulnerabilities, and system models. Resiliency refers to a system's capability of providing energy even during severe contingencies and relates to the ability to resist, forecast, and recover. An example based on the newest CA against Ukraine has been provided and simulated on DT environment. A case study is proposed to illustrate how cyber-physical resilience metrics can be applied to improve operators' situational awareness and provide more proactive or corrective control measures for improving resilience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent cyber attacks on the power grid have been of increasing complexity and sophistication. In order to understand the impact of cyber-attacks on the power system resiliency, it is important to consider an holistic cyber-physical system specially with increasing industrial automation. In this study, device-level resilience properties of the various controllers and their impact on the microgrid resiliency is studied. In addition, a cyber-physical resiliency metric considering vulnerabilities, system model, and device-level properties is proposed. Resiliency is defined as the system ability to provide energy to critical loads even in extreme contingencies and depends on system ability to withstand, predict, and recover. A use case is presented inspired by the recent Ukraine cyber-attack. A use case has been presented to demonstrate application of the developed cyber-physical resiliency metric to enhance situational awareness of the operator, and enable better proactive or remedial control actions to improve resiliency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The increasing importance of continuingly complex Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) challenges and encourages universities worldwide to organize up-to-date CPS oriented educational programs. The Erasmus+ project "CybPhys" aims to support CPS oriented educational programs in Belarus and Ukraine. We put forward a hypothesis that the educational situation, training opportunities, situation of the labor market, and general economic development are related to each other and can vary depending on the region. In order to validate our hypothesis and to provide input to curricula modernizations, an in-depth study in the form of surveys was conducted in the years 2019–2020. The results of the study showed that the differences between the perceptions of stakeholders in different regions of one country were more significant than the deviations between the global evaluation marks obtained from Belarusian and Ukrainian respondents. In order to increase the synergy of the CybPhys partners, the transdisciplinary and T-shape skills approaches are introduced to the education programs of the partner's universities. An innovative ICT based teaching and learning environment and associated teaching methodologies will be developed. The research provides valuable input to the development of industry and research-oriented cross-domain study programs in Cyber-Physical Systems focused on the needs of Belarusian and Ukrainian industries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]