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Systemic validity has been criticised based on its supposed inability to account for the validity of so-called extra systemic norms and unconstitutional statutes. The article argues that these criticisms are not sound by demonstrating that no truly extra-systemic norm is actually recognised as valid within the legal system and by claiming that there is nothing non-systemic with unconstitutional statutes. On the other hand, with respect to norms of public international law, foreign law applied in cases of conflict of laws and the norms of the former legal system, what is concerned is not the incorporation of the norms themselves, but the contents thereof. This means that there is a norm within the legal system identical in content with an actual extra-systemic norm. This content-based incorporation is usually carried out with two different methods respectively called 'dynamic' and 'static' incorporation and neither case provides a challenge for the understanding of systemic validity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is black-letter law that in order to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment, the rendering court must have had personal jurisdiction over the defendant. While the principle is clear, it is an open question as to whose law governs the question of personal jurisdiction: that of the rendering court or that of the recognizing court. In other words, is the foreign court's jurisdiction over the defendant governed by foreign law (the law of FI), domestic law (the law ofF2), or some combination thereof? While courts have taken a number of different approaches, it seems that many courts regard foreign law as relevant to the question of whether the foreign court possessed personal jurisdiction over the defendant. In this Article, I argue that U.S. courts should not be looking to foreign law (in whole or in part) to determine whether a foreign court hadjurisdiction over the defendant in the original action. I present five arguments in support of this contention: (1) there is no statutory authority pointing to the application of foreign law; (2) U.S. courts are not well-positioned to apply foreign jurisdictional law; (3) re-examining assertions of jurisdiction under foreign law violates international comity; (4) an examination of foreign law is usually unnecessary because jurisdiction is also assessed according to U.S. standards; and (5) U.S. courts do not do a good job applying foreign jurisdictional law. Instead, I argue that courts should apply American law to assess whether a foreign court was jurisdictionally competent. This, in turn, raises the question: What is "American" law? I maintain that courts should apply broad federal standards of jurisdiction, and not state-based ones, to determine whether the rendering court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant. This Article also looks closely at two particular areas of jurisdiction law that are particularly complicated as they relate to the choice of law issue: submission and notice. With respect to submission, U.S. courts seem to be unclear as to whose law applies in assessing whether a defendant in a foreign action submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign court. In particular, many U.S. courts defer to the foreign court's interpretations as to whether the acts of the defendant constituted submission. With respect to notice, there is a lack of clarity as to how notice relates to personal jurisdiction in the context of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Here too, there is confusion as to whose law of notice applies in assessing whether a defendant received adequate notice of the proceeding. Consistent with the argument above, this Article takes the position that U.S. standards, and not foreign ones, should ultimately guide the submission and notice inquiries in the recognition context. Finally, because much of the law in this area is codified in either the 1962 Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act or the 2005 Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, I propose concrete changes to the language of the uniform acts that would address the choice of law problem in the recognition of foreign judgments and would clarify the intersection between notice and personal jurisdiction in the uniform acts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Foreign law has become an increasingly important element of many cases brought before federal courts. Rule 44.1, which controls determinations of foreign law, is intended to make the process for determining foreign law as painless as possible, but like the regime that preceded it, it has become a procedural minefield for those wishing to rely on foreign law, as courts have declined to apply Rule 44.1 when it should be used, either deliberately or due to uncertainty as to its application. This is in large part due to the lack of concrete standards outlined in the rule. This Note examines the standards associated with the rule and their application in the years immediately after its promulgation and concludes that the reliant party's burden of production with respect to foreign law should vary based on whether statutory text is provided. If a statute is available, the courts should be required to undertake a Rule 44.1 analysis, while if a statute is unavailable, the reliant party should bear the burden of producing substantial evidence of foreign law. This standard, elaborated in the text of Rule 44.1, should ensure that as many foreign law determinations as possible can be resolved on the merits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Foreign law lies at the heart of private international law. After all, a true conflict of law cannot be resolved unless and until the content of foreign law is established. Despite this, the pleading and proof of foreign law remain among the most under-explored topics in Australian private international law. In light of the High Court of Australia's significant change of direction on choice of law since 2000, most notably in cases such as John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson, Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v Zhang and Neilson v Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd, it is all the more important to answer some of the basic questions about the pleading and proof of foreign law. Who pleads foreign law? What law do they plead? Are they obliged to do so? How do they prove its content? When can local law be applied in the place of foreign law? This article addresses these and related questions with a particular focus on Australian law as it has developed since 2000. It concludes that Australian courts take a more robust and pragmatic approach to these issues than might be supposed. In particular, the so-called presumption of identity is a label that masks a much richer and more complex reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay analises the subject of non evidence of proof of foreign law. The darkness of the spanish statutes norming the aplication of foreign law on courts (art. 12.6.1 Cc., art. 281.11 LEC 2000) does not allow show which must be the behaviour of the judge before this situation. Non estimation of the claim, one of the options used on courts, should not be considered as a suitable answer. Several reasons hold this affirmation. On one hand, difficult adaptation to procedure rules: in spanish Private International Law, foreign law is not a matter of fact; non estimation cannot be understood as a punitive sanction before non aplication of conflict rule; it is not equivalent to a case of non-admission of the claim; and it is not possible talk about a new procedure object of the claim. On the other, difficult adaptation of constitucional statutes: non estimation of the claim is not a resolution relative to the reclamation of the plaintiff, nor one of the cases of process resolution without solving the claim of the plaintiff; it is not suitable in cases of existence of the court duty of colaboration with the parties, nor in the rest, excesive sanction before the behaviour of the party of not pleading or proofing foreign law. Non estimation of the claim does not suit within art. 24 Spanish Constitution, risk of non provision of justice on courts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the evolution of a judge-made transformation of Canadian conflict of laws principles specific to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments exemplified in the Supreme Court of Canada's ruling in Beals v. Saldanha. Revision of the English formula in relation to the inter-provincial context in the Court's seminal ruling Morgard Investments Ltd. v. DeSavoye; Facts of the Beals case; Rulings of the lower courts.