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Systemic validity has been criticised based on its supposed inability to account for the validity of so-called extra systemic norms and unconstitutional statutes. The article argues that these criticisms are not sound by demonstrating that no truly extra-systemic norm is actually recognised as valid within the legal system and by claiming that there is nothing non-systemic with unconstitutional statutes. On the other hand, with respect to norms of public international law, foreign law applied in cases of conflict of laws and the norms of the former legal system, what is concerned is not the incorporation of the norms themselves, but the contents thereof. This means that there is a norm within the legal system identical in content with an actual extra-systemic norm. This content-based incorporation is usually carried out with two different methods respectively called 'dynamic' and 'static' incorporation and neither case provides a challenge for the understanding of systemic validity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The newest and gradually evolving trends in global law-making have been defined by an ever increasing interplay between rules and principles of different legal orders and between national legal orders and international legal order. References in national constitutions to the binding force of international law within the domestic sphere and sometimes the primacy of such internationally-made law over national laws are now a widespread and unsurprising phenomenon. Clauses referring to international human rights, including direct applicability of specific international human rights instruments, also to international organizations such as the UN, or accession to new international organizations, including transfer of sovereignty, can also be found in a significant variety of cases. The most unique feature of these trends could, however, be the establishment of national constitutional and legal order based on, or modeled after, international law and comparative law. At a broader constitutional level, for example, the international community has played a pivotal role in the style and substance of the constitutions of a number of post-conflict, newly-formed or transformed societies (e. g., Constitutions of Cambodia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, South Africa, East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Libya, and South Sudan). This process of constitution-making influenced by, based on, or modeled after, international law, has unique features that resonate with a cosmopolitan constitutional law-making. This paper seeks to understand the contours of this phenomenon, ascribe the proper value, and identify the degree to which contemporary constitution-making conforms to the original ideals of cosmopolitanism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is black-letter law that in order to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment, the rendering court must have had personal jurisdiction over the defendant. While the principle is clear, it is an open question as to whose law governs the question of personal jurisdiction: that of the rendering court or that of the recognizing court. In other words, is the foreign court's jurisdiction over the defendant governed by foreign law (the law of FI), domestic law (the law ofF2), or some combination thereof? While courts have taken a number of different approaches, it seems that many courts regard foreign law as relevant to the question of whether the foreign court possessed personal jurisdiction over the defendant. In this Article, I argue that U.S. courts should not be looking to foreign law (in whole or in part) to determine whether a foreign court hadjurisdiction over the defendant in the original action. I present five arguments in support of this contention: (1) there is no statutory authority pointing to the application of foreign law; (2) U.S. courts are not well-positioned to apply foreign jurisdictional law; (3) re-examining assertions of jurisdiction under foreign law violates international comity; (4) an examination of foreign law is usually unnecessary because jurisdiction is also assessed according to U.S. standards; and (5) U.S. courts do not do a good job applying foreign jurisdictional law. Instead, I argue that courts should apply American law to assess whether a foreign court was jurisdictionally competent. This, in turn, raises the question: What is "American" law? I maintain that courts should apply broad federal standards of jurisdiction, and not state-based ones, to determine whether the rendering court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant. This Article also looks closely at two particular areas of jurisdiction law that are particularly complicated as they relate to the choice of law issue: submission and notice. With respect to submission, U.S. courts seem to be unclear as to whose law applies in assessing whether a defendant in a foreign action submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign court. In particular, many U.S. courts defer to the foreign court's interpretations as to whether the acts of the defendant constituted submission. With respect to notice, there is a lack of clarity as to how notice relates to personal jurisdiction in the context of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Here too, there is confusion as to whose law of notice applies in assessing whether a defendant received adequate notice of the proceeding. Consistent with the argument above, this Article takes the position that U.S. standards, and not foreign ones, should ultimately guide the submission and notice inquiries in the recognition context. Finally, because much of the law in this area is codified in either the 1962 Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act or the 2005 Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, I propose concrete changes to the language of the uniform acts that would address the choice of law problem in the recognition of foreign judgments and would clarify the intersection between notice and personal jurisdiction in the uniform acts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article looks at the rules on proof of foreign law before Icelandic courts. It provides a detailed discussion on the methods available to ascertain foreign law in civil proceedings, as well as a concise comparison to several relevant jurisdictions. The methods, consisting of party and witness testimony, assessment reports and documents and other visible evidence, are not equally suitable for the intended purpose. As fairly obvious, a party testimony is of little use in this respect. On the contrary, and perhaps less obvious for the international reader, Icelandic law does not allow for expert witness testimony on foreign law, unless the expert has been summoned by court to provide an assessment report on the issue. However, recent judgments show that Icelandic courts have begun giving consideration to unilaterally obtained legal opinions, contrary to accepted practise. This, whether down to inconsistency or a deliberate change of course, represents a more flexible approach then previously acknowledged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Major sources of corporate law in Russia, several continental European countries, as well as the sources of corporate law in the USA and Great Britain are elucidated in the article. The article is dedicated to general trends in historical and modern development of these sources: the impact of separated trade (commercial) law on the development of corporate law in Europe; the correspondence between federal legislation and the legislation of the individual states as the source of the corporate law development in the USA; the impact of foreign law and the national peculiarities on the development of Russian corporate law. The greater emphasis is placed on the reform of Russian corporate law legislation as a part of the modern reform of Russian Civil Law; correlation between the general rules of the Civil Code of the Russian Fedaration on legal persons and special rules of statutes on corporations is shown. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]