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This paper provides an overview of the Canadian defence sector following the Cold War. A review of Canadian defence policy in this period indicates that, though the mission of the Canadian military did not change, fiscal realities forced severe restrictions on the size and capabilities of the organization. Comparisons between Canada and other G7 NATO nations indicate that throughout this period, Canada has consistently devoted fewer resources to the military than its allies. A review of Canada's defence industrial base and defence policy indicates that this limited funding has led to a small and uncompetitive defence sector in the Canadian economy. Lastly, a regression analysis of Canada's defence spending is undertaken which reveals that domestic economic variables are the primary determinant of Canadian defence spending during this period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Canada's much-heralded--but now considerably delayed--recommitment to UN peace support operations. It explores both the changing environment of contemporary peacekeeping as well as the evolving nature of the Canadian debate around the place of peacekeeping within Canadian foreign policy. The paper's central argument is that Canada's deferred - and increasingly lukewarm--re-engagement with peacekeeping is indicative of a broader and deepening crisis of confidence, within Western states in particular, in the liberal interventionist paradigm that has governed international engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states since the end of the cold war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South African apartheid served as a battleground between East and West, and North and South, but it was also an issue that gave coherence to an often disparate Third World political project. And, though it has rarely been appreciated by historians, apartheid exposed and deepened fault lines between allies. This article addresses this oversight by exploring why, during the mid 1980s, Canada became so engaged on a file that was seemingly peripheral to its national interests. Drawing on recently declassified Canadian, British, and South African documents, and on interviews with former policymakers, officials, and activists, it shows how Canada became a diplomatic battleground in the fight for legitimacy between Pretoria and the opponents of apartheid. These entanglements shaped public discourses and, in turn, informed Canadian policy towards apartheid. For Canada, the issue was not solely about the East–West conflict but a deeper struggle to maintain the credibility of the liberal world order. This paper thus offers an 'outside-in' vantage point to the international history of the Commonwealth and a window to understand global dynamics, priorities, and norms beyond the Cold War paradigm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract The goal of the paper is to analyze the Canadian policy towards Bangladesh. In this paper I argue that Canadian approach towards Bangladesh was different in different phases of history. In the liberation war of Bangladesh Canada played a role that went against the interest of Bangladesh and suited with the triple alliance of the US-Pakistan and China. Against the backdrop of Cold War politics, Canadian policy demonstrated the reflection of her national interest. In the dawn of the independence of Bangladesh in the early 1970's Canada revised its policy, immediately recognized the new nation and supported Bangladesh's admission in to the Commonwealth, the United Nations and other international organizations. Since the threshold of Bangladesh's journey Canada emerged as a development partner of the new nation. Apart from significant aid, Canada also provided immigration facilities to the Bangladeshis. All these are consistent with its national interest. I also focus on the Canadian concerns over the violation of human rights and poor governance that gradually eroded the image of Bangladesh among the Canadian policy makers. Finally, I suggest a way out to improve relations between the two countries of the 'North' and 'South'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On the basis of a study of American, British and Canadian records, this article examines the relationship of France to the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty from the perspective of the ‘ABC’ countries, particularly Canada. How did the perceived vulnerability of France influence the approach of the members of the ‘North Atlantic Triangle’ to the justification, timing and contents of the proposed pact? How did France's inclusion in Western Union and its exclusion from the preliminary talks in the Pentagon affect American, British and Canadian attitudes to the development of the draft alternatively known as the ‘Pentagon Paper’ or the ‘State Department Draft’? These questions are addressed, as well as the impact on the later ambassadorial talks of France's priority to immediate rearmament and its determination to include the departments of Algeria within the defensive perimeter of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Finally, the article assesses the extent to which France and its requirements influenced the policies and actions of the Canadian government throughout the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

THE PAPER EXAMINES THE EXPERIENCE of C.B. Wade (1906-1982), a chartered accountant and university instructor who was recruited to work for organized labour during the period of transition from wartime mobilization to postwar reconstruction at the end of the Second World War. In hiring Wade in 1944, District 26 of the United Mine Workers of America became one of the first Canadian unions to employ a research director to help address the challenges of the new age of industrial legality and advance their social democratic agenda. The paper discusses Wade's background, including his involvement in the Workers' Educational Association, and documents his contributions to the work of the coal miners' union, including the efforts to promote public ownership of the industry. In addition, the paper discusses Wade's unpublished history of the union, a manuscript that has had a long life as an underground classic. While the negotiation of the postwar compromises between labour, capital and the state gave union staff such as Wade an increasingly central role in labour relations, this was not a stable context, and the paper also considers the deepening Cold War conditions that led to the end of his employment in 1950. In the context of labour and working-class history, Wade can be associated with a relatively small cohort of politically engaged intellectuals who made lasting contributions to the research capacity of unions and to the field of labour studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In September 1954 forces from the People's Republic of China began shelling Chinese Nationalist positions on the tiny offshore islands that lay between the mainland and Formosa (present-day Taiwan). The outsized US response to this routine harassment sparked a Cold War confrontation that soon threatened to escalate out of control. This paper explores Canada's stake in that crisis. It follows Ottawa's early reaction to the events in the straits and traces foreign minister Lester B. Pearson's mediatory efforts to promote negotiations and a peaceful settlement. Pearson's liberal internationalist impulses, the paper argues, were always balanced and shaped by a realist calculation of where Canada's national interest lay. His doubts about the wisdom of US policy and his commitment to allied unity ensured that he beat a dignified retreat when the circumstances for peacemaking proved unpropitious. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Canada's self-image in world affairs has been as a bold internationalist, with its status and responsibility as a middle power and its role as a mediator emphasised. Assessments highlight the transformation of Canada's international relations after the Second World War and contrast its engagement in the United Nations with its performance at the League of Nations. Curiously, these appraisals ignore Canada's first term on the UN Security Council (1948-1949), particularly its response to crises which challenged world peace and the UN's authority. From an examination of unpublished and published papers in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom, this article contends that Canada's performance did not correspond with the popular image of its role in world affairs, nor did the government take advantage of this exceptional opportunity to demonstrate its international commitment. Moreover, it also shied away from taking a leading part in advocating the ideals and objectives of the western alliance. Instead, it preferred to play a supporting role as the divisions of the cold war deepened. When the UN Security Council dealt with controversies and clashes, Canada followed the lead of the United States and the United Kingdom, and its priority was to maintain a common outlook and approach within the North Atlantic Triangle. Canada's early post-war foreign policy, as evident in its first term on the UN Security Council, seems remarkably consistent with its longstanding concerns and priorities in world affairs and considerably less indicative of any significant departure in approach or policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For the past two decades, Canadian international historians have largely missed the Cold War, or at least a significant portion of it. Certainly, there has been no shortage of studies of Canadian foreign policy featuring the bipolar struggle, and yet historians have largely confined their attention to Canada's admittedly crucial relationship with the United States, while Canadian–Soviet relations have been ignored. Indeed, in the historiography of Canada's Cold War international relations, the communist powers are largely missing. Hoping to challenge this limited focus, we frame our article around two Canada–US air defence exercises held in 1959 and 1960. While historians have viewed these exercises within the context of Canada's relationship with the United States, we highlight the wider Cold War framework in which Canadian policy was formed. After all, these exercises occurred during the mini-détente of the late 1950s and the collapse of the Paris summit in May 1960. As we demonstrate, the failure to take full account of the Cold War is a shortcoming of much of the writing on Canadian international relations, and so we offer an example of the need to take seriously Canada's foreign policy toward the communist bloc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Canadian Foreign Policy Journal (CFPJ) is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article focuses on the difficult relationships between the United States and Canada during the 1960s and their policy regarding nuclear weapons. Topics mentioned include the acquisition by the Canadian government led by John Diefenbaker of U.S. weapons, the diplomatic crisis between the two countries during the Cold War, and the political crisis faced by Canada in 1963.

Although Canada was a committed member of the western alliance and publically supported Washington, DC's efforts to isolate communist China, Ottawa embarked on large-scale wheat sales to Beijing in the late 1950s in the face of sustained US opposition. Drawing on a broad range of archival records, this paper explores the three main factors that encouraged the Canadian government in this course: growing doubts about the wisdom of isolating communist China; mounting anger at Washington, DC'S use of subsidized wheat sales to capture traditional Canadian markets; and a surging sense of Canadian nationalism that sought a distinct role for Canada on the world stage. Clearly, as was so often the case in postwar Canadian foreign economic policy, a narrowly defined national interest easily trumped the ideological pressures of western solidarity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences (The Massey Commission, 1949-1951) is widely seen to be Canada's most important position paper on national cultural policy. This article explores the relation of this significant document to UNESCO and its characteristic discourse of "cultural relations." Not only did UNESCO appear in the terms of reference for the Massey Commission Report, but it also was a repeated touchstone for submissions to the Commission. This overlooked international aspect of the Massey Commission underscores the connection between politics and culture in Cold War Canada providing a clear case of how international political language becomes entangled with--and helps to legitimize--artistic and cultural endeavours. The combination of the discussion of education and culture with that of development and trade allowed Canada to reconsider its position on public funding for the arts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This comparative article reveals how the general focus of Canadian and Russian threat perceptions in the Arctic have shifted from a Cold War fixation on hard defence to accommodate soft security issues over the last three decades. Both countries now pay greater attention to threats and challenges stemming from climate change, security, and safety risks associated with resource development and increasingly accessible sea routes. Although concern about military conflict arising from Arctic disputes continues to frame some media discussions in both countries, most strategic analysts and academics have moved away from this line of argument. Instead, military functions now include assertion of Canadian and Russian sovereignty over their respective internal waters, as well as protection of resources in their exclusive economic zones and on and in extended continental shelves; protection of economic interests in the North, including mineral and bio-resources; prevention of potential terrorist attacks against critical industrial and state infrastructure; and dual-use functions, such as search and rescue operations, surveillance of air and maritime spaces, support to safe navigation, and mitigation of natural and human-made catastrophes. The authors argue that analysts should parse two forms of military modernization in the Arctic: one of capability development related to the global strategic balance, where the Arctic serves as a bastion or a thoroughfare; and a second intended to address emerging non-traditional security challenges. They contend that these modernization programs do not inherently upset the Arctic military balance and need not provoke a regional arms race. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In October 1957, Poland proposed the Rapacki Plan for the denuclearisation of Central Europe. While North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members attacked the initiative, Canada viewed it as a means to ease Cold War tensions. Although Canada joined with its allies to reject the Plan, it embarked on a quest for counterproposals to restrain NATO nuclear sharing and reduce the chances of nuclear war. Canada's efforts alarmed Western allies and helped lead to a second Rapacki Plan. Overall, this article details Canada's struggle to assert itself as a middle power and provides a robust example of Western interest in the Rapacki Plan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Anthropologica is the property of CASCA and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

An extensive literature on the cultural Cold War has shown that winning the hearts and minds of rival populations distinguished the conflict as an ideological contest. Yet the question of how ideology influenced the tracking of cross-bloc travellers in cultural and scientific exchanges remains largely unexplored. This article examines Canada's ideological approach to screening and monitoring visitors from communist countries along with its covert interest in collecting foreign intelligence from visits to the Eastern bloc. By analysing declassified documents from Canada's security service, this article argues that transnational surveillance allowed the Canadian government to imprint its own vision of Cold War mobility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Canadian signals intelligence effort during the Cold War was forged in the late 1940s and 1950s with a focus on the interceptions and processing of communications from the Soviet Arctic. Canadian authorities struggled hard to build capacity for this important mission, win bureaucratic battles at home, and convince our key SIGINT partners, the US and UK, that Canada should be granted status as the controlling agency for signals intelligence against the target-rich Soviet north. The story of the origins of Canada's Arctic SIGINT mission has remained highly classified until now. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Britain and Canada, two major nuclear Cold War actors, refrained from establishing close nuclear ties with Israel from 1958 to 1974, despite Israel's consistent interest in importing civilian nuclear technology. This was true both before and after the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty came into force in 1970, even though the treaty allowed for the export of safeguarded nuclear reactors. In comparison, the other two leading nuclear exporters of the period, France and the United States, were much more involved in the initial stages of the Israeli nuclear programme, exporting research reactors to Israel in the 1950s. How did Britain and Canada view Israel's military and civilian nuclear programme from 1958 to 1974? How did they form their nuclear export policy towards Israel and what considerations motivated them? This analysis examines these questions using archival material from British and Canadian archives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Canadian Historical Review is the property of University of Toronto Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In September 1991 the Canadian government announced that it would station a task force in Germany, to continue Canada's participation in NATO's defence of Western Europe. Six months later the government announced that Canada had cancelled the task force, which meant that by 1993 Canada would have no permanent military presence in Europe. Canada's allies were not pleased with the abrupt change, but while expressing their displeasure to Canada, they also thanked Canada for its military contribution during the Cold War, and reassured Canada that they understood Canada would continue to be an active member of the alliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the defence research and combat development in the early Cold War army of Canada. The author talks about the credibility of Canada as a nation that could successfully engage in combat development. He also tackles the move of the Canadian government to implement a defence policy designed to protect Canada's sovereignty and national interests amid the military aggression of Soviet and communist in Europe.

Copyright of Gender, Place & Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Relying on newly opened documents from Canada and the United States this article examines Washington's effort, from January to October 1962, to internationalise the embargo of Cuba and explores the Canadian response. It argues that the Canadian government sought to support American policy while still maintaining its independent course of action. Although officials in Ottawa did not feel the need to abandon their position, they did come to appreciate that Canada's connections to Cuba were having an adverse impact on their country's vital relationship with the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the grand strategy theory of Carl von Clausewitz applied to the culture and strategic choice of Canada in military strategy during the Cold War. It examines the explanations of the region's war strategy related to the theory of foreign policy and international relations. An overview of the conceptual and methodological challenges to Canada's military strategy is provided. It also explores the strategy applied in North Atlantic Triangle in Ottawa, Ontario wherein the strategy requires industrial, human, and military resources.

The article presents an examination into the history of U.S.-Canadian military cooperation during the administration of U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower at the beginning of the Cold War. Focus is given to the Continental Air Defense initiative of 1953-1954, outlining the extent to which Canada resisted pressure from the U.S. and protected its own national interests. Analysis is provided regarding informal and secret meetings held between high officials in both countries during the period, noting how it allowed for communication outside mainstream channels, but also caused confusion between different levels of public discourse.

The 1950 Vancouver convention of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) opened against the backdrop of the Korean War and tense Cold War debates within Canada's social democratic party. Providing a window into this moment of ideological tension, the gathering demonstrates how leftists sought to forge domestic and foreign policies amenable to the narrow public opinion of the McCarthy era. The convention also illuminates the complex character of British Columbia's postwar left and the broader intellectual and political milieu of the early Cold War years in Canada – debates over the prohibition of atomic weapons and the relationship between markets and the state that would culminate in the CCF's Winnipeg Declaration of Principles later in the 1950s. Finally, the Vancouver convention highlights the role of Trotskyists within the CCF, a strategy of ‘entryism’ that has been explored only peripherally in the historiography of social democracy in Canada. The ideological confrontation at Vancouver left the CCF squarely in the hands of ‘moderates,’ shaping CCF strategy and policy for its final decade of political activity, while muting the Canadian left's independent voice in domestic and international affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article argues that Canada's geographical, historical and socioeconomic profile is well-positioned in emerging as a normative great power. It argues that nations may follow non-conventional approaches in expanding its power due to the different post-Cold War environment. It puts forward examples of non-conventional approaches striving affectivity and practicality after reviewing Canada's ill-fated bid for promotion of human security discourse and assumptions of middle-powerism. It proposes green lifestyle and multiculturalism as candidates for a Canadian global discourse.

The article explores the necessitate for a maritime security strategy in Canada for the post-9/11 world. It states that like all maritime nations, vital economic interests in Canada are best assisted by freedom and stability in oceanic trade. It says that since the end of the Cold War, the surge in organized crime and piracy has seen the oceans become yet more risky.

Despite current insistence that obesity is a new problem, obesity and fat were discussed frequently in the medical and popular presses and by state officials during the early Cold War in Canada. Using Kristeva's (1982, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection) concept of abjection, I argue that Cold War anxieties about fat, and specifically the obesity of white, middle-class men, had less to do with the growing girth of bodies than it did with a post-war crisis in masculinity related to the collapse of the public and private spheres. Through an analysis of fitness regimes and female-administered diets for men, I argue that anti-obesity rhetoric served to assuage dominant worries about degenerating masculinity by reasserting both the gendered division of labour and the white, middle-class, nuclear family as Canadian norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the historical evolution of anti-Americanism in Canada, and offers some reflections on its nature and implications today. It is stated that anti-Americanism is an attitude toward the U.S. and its people which is profoundly mistrustful. Canadians' experiences with anti-Americanism are just about as diverse as Canada itself, but they can be readily grouped into two main collective experiences: Anglophone and Francophone. It is commented that anti-American imagery and sentiments are deeply rooted in Canadian society, but they become politically salient only when they are "oxygenated" and given momentum by elites. During the Cold War, Francophone Canada developed its own set of frustrations and resentments with the U.S.

The article focuses on the history of military activity on Canadian soil, with an emphasis on the North, specifically examining a set of crucial projects and operations that redefined not only physical terrain but associated imaginative understandings of nature. The history of Cold War Canada is littered with suitable examples, from early military exercises and the construction of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) radar line to more recent missile tests and low-level training flights. According to the author, the case of the Cold War Canadian North is similar insofar as militarization was frequently disguised behind loftier goals.

Although a significant component of Cold War domestic security, counter-subversion has not received the same attention as counter-espionage in recent historical writing. This article examines one aspect of the history of counter-subversion, specifically an internal attempt by the Canadian Security Service to reform itself in the face of the social change of the 1960s. 'Key Sectors' attempted to modernize the RCMP's pursuit of subversives by emphasizing qualitative factors and broader criteria for what constituted subversion beyond an association with communism. In the end, however, the program failed because it could not free itself from the anti-communism paradigm that the Canadian security state had been constructed on in the first place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Looks at the state of bilateral defense relationship between the United States and Canada with focus on the question of Washington's National Missile Defense (NMD) initiative. Overview of the history and character of the Canada-U.S. security relationship; Essence of the Cold War bilateral defense relationship; Post Cold War relations and the creation of 'Homeland' defense; Implications of the NMD conflict for Canadian government.