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Is temporal representation constitutively necessary for perception? Tyler Burge argues that it is, in part because perception requires a form of memory sufficiently sophisticated as to require temporal representation. I critically discuss Burge's argument, maintaining that it does not succeed. I conclude by reflecting on the consequences for the origins of temporal representation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is not rare in philosophy and psychology to see theorists fall into dichotomous thinking about mental phenomena. On one side of the dichotomy there are processes that I will label 'unintelligent.' These processes are thought to be unconscious, implicit, automatic, unintentional, involuntary, procedural, and non-cognitive. On the other side, there are 'intelligent' processes that are conscious, explicit, controlled, intentional, voluntary, declarative, and cognitive. Often, if a process or behavior is characterized by one of the features from either of the above lists, the process or behavior is classified as falling under the category to which the feature belongs. For example, if a process is implicit this is usually considered sufficient for classifying it as 'unintelligent' and for assuming that the remaining features that fall under the 'unintelligent' grouping will apply to it as well. Accordingly, if a process or behavior is automatic, philosophers often consider it to be unintelligent. It is my goal in this paper to challenge the conceptual slip from 'automatic' to 'unintelligent'. I will argue that there are a whole range of properties highlighted by the existing psychological literature that make automaticity a much more complex phenomenon than is usually appreciated. I will then go on to discuss two further important relationships between automatic processes and controlled processes (C-processes) that arise when we think about automatic processes in the context of skilled behavior. These interactions should add to our resistance to classifying automaticity as unintelligent or mindless. In Sect. 1, I present a few representative cases of philosophers classifying automatic processes and behaviors as mindless or unintelligent. In Sect. 2, I review trends in the psychology of automaticity in order highlight a complex set of features that are characteristic, though not definitive, of automatic processes and behaviors. In Sect. 3, I argue that at least some automatic processes are likely cognitively penetrable. In Sect. 4, I argue that the structure of skilled automatic processes is shaped diachronically by practice, training and learning. Taken together, these considerations should dislodge the temptation to equate 'automatic' with 'unintelligent'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By combining lexical recognition paradigms and written production it is possible to efficiently investigate the roles of perception, production, and participant properties in lexical processing. We report on an approach to experimentation that generates a rich set of dependent variables associated with naming stimuli aloud and with writing. Crucially, this approach allows for experimentation in which participants perform experiments in pairs. The first member of the pair sees a word and says it aloud. This oral production serves as input to the second member of the participant pair who writes the word down. We discuss the kinds of dependent variables generated by this experimental technique and the manner in which the components of the technique can be isolated in a system of control conditions. Finally, we report on an example of its use in the investigation of semantic transparency in the processing of English compound words. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophers of perception widely agree that sensory properties, like color, are represented in perceptual experience. Arguments are usually needed to establish that something other than sensory properties, for example three-dimensional objects or kind properties, are part of perceptual content. Call the idea that sensory properties are represented in perceptual experience the Sensation View (SV). Given its widespread acceptance, we may expect to find strong reasons for holding SV. In this paper, I argue that we lack such reasons: SV is largely unjustified. We have surprisingly poor justification for thinking that sensory properties are represented in perception. By focusing on the case of vision, I show that an embedded understanding of visual perception, and empirical evidence in cognitive psychology, indicate that SV is far from warranted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we approach the idea that, the ease or fluency of information processing being subjectively experienced as feeling of familiarity with a positive affective tone, interfere with evaluative processing. The close association of familiarity and positive affect is here addressed within a affective priming paradigm. Participants were asked to evaluate a set of target stimuli previously tested for their valence. These targets were immediately preceded either by a familiar or a unfamiliar stimuli. Congruently with the familiarity-positive affect association, familiar stimuli facilitated evaluations (generate faster responses) of affective consistent targets (positive targets). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To examine the effectiveness of various affect regulation strategies and categories of affect regulation strategies, a meta-analysis was conducted. Results generally indicate that reappraisal (d=0.65) and distraction (d=0.46 for all studies; d=0.95 for studies with a negative or no affect induction) are the most effective regulation/repair strategies, producing the largest hedonic shift in affect. The effectiveness of different categories of regulation/repair strategies depended on the valence of the preceding affect induction. Results also indicate that stronger affect inductions and the use of bivariate affect measures will provide a richer understanding of affect regulation. Additionally, not all specific strategies or categories of strategies have been researched and the impact of individual differences on affect regulation has received relatively little attention. Finally, results indicate that control conditions in affect regulation research may not provide a valid point for comparison, as they facilitate effective affect repair. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume attempts to explain all human cognition in terms of impressions, ideas, and their qualities, behaviors, and relations. This explanation includes a complicated attempted reduction of beliefs, or judgments, to single ideas. This paper attempts to demonstrate one of the inadequacies of this approach, and any of its kind (any attempted reduction of judgments to their constituent parts, single or multiple) via an argument concerning the logical forms of judgment found implicitly in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, and more explicitly in the works of Wilfrid Sellars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

James Conroy's Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Imagination, Education and Democracy implies three main aims: first, to celebrate aspects of imagination in education and politics; second, to challenge defensive closure in varieties of discourse, especially in the language of economic and monetary management in education and politics; and third, to open up, for reciprocal enrichment, situations and discourses pertaining to consideration of state funding for religiously affiliated schools. Liminality, characteristic of thresholds and borders, calls for interpretation and mediation, as well as appreciation of uncertainties. Liminality of imagination is explored in contexts associated with this third aim, but also in other kinds of context associated with the first two aims. As well as offering critical assessment of the book, this review article indicates some scope for interpretation and development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Not all empirical work in the psychology of perception has operated explicitly within a theoretical framework. But when it has, that framework has usually been provided by the inferential theory of perception. I argue that in spite of its explanatory strengths, the inferential theory of perception conceals a well-established empirical phenomenon. That phenomenon is known in ordinary parlance as 'familiarity'. I discuss why the inferential theory of perception cannot deal with familiarity and what it reveals about the limits of the inferential theory of perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explored Kocsis and Heller's findings concerning the relationship between one's belief and the perceived accuracy of a profile. The influence of types of information was also considered. A sample of 353 participants was used in the present experiment that gauged the perception of information contained in a profile. The results supported Kocsis and Heller's earlier findings with a positive relationship found between belief and perceived accuracy. The more an individual believes in profiling, the more likely he or she is to perceive a profile to be accurate. This relationship was most pronounced in participants' perceptions of information contained in a profile concerning an unknown offender's crime behavior and past history. The more an individual believes in profiling, the more information relating to these two factors is likely to be perceived. This relationship was not observed where information in the same profile involved physical features O f the offender [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Argues that although distinction between simple perception and cognitive perception constitutes an important milestone in contemporary theorizing on perception, it remains too coarse to account for a number of phenomena that do not seem to fall squarely on either side of the divide. Key issues of interest; Analysis of pertinent topics and relevant issues; Implications on philosophical studies.

A brinkmanship crisis with two-sided incomplete in formation is modeled as a game of sequential bargaining in which each state is uncertain of its adversary's resolve. The sequential crisis equilibria are characterized explicitly and used to analyze the influences of resolve, misperception, and the status quo on escalation and crisis stability. The description of brinkmanship as a contest of resolve is found to be misleading: the state with the greatest resolve may not prevail in the crisis; a state may be less, not more, likely to prevail the greater its resolve; and a states' expected payoff may be less, not more, the greater its resolve. Moreover, reducing misperception may destabilize a crisis. Surprisingly, increasing the stake a potential challenger has in the status quo may not make a challenge less likely. Finally, crises involving severe conflicts of interest are shown to be less likely than crises not entailing a severe conflict of interest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents information on imagination. Philosophy could not avoid, however, an encounter with the other dimension of the radical imaginary, its psychical dimension, the radical imagination of the subject. Here, the occultation cannot be radical. It has been the occultation of the radical character of the imagination, the reduction of the latter to a secondary role, sometimes a perturbing and negative one, sometimes auxiliary and instrumental: the question has always been posed in terms of the role the imagination plays in the relation to a True/False, Beauty/Ugliness, Good/Bad posited as already given and determined elsewhere. What mattered, indeed, was to assure the theory - the view, or the constitution - of what is, of what must be done, of what is valid, in its necessity, in its very determinacy. The imagination is, however, in its essence rebellious against determinacy. To this extent, it most of the time will be simply scotomized, or relegated to "psychology," or "interpreted" and "explained" in terms of its products, using flagrantly superficial ideas such as "compensation" for some unsatisfied need or desire.

Two experiments investigated equivalence relations among auditory, visual, and tactile stimuli. In Experiment 1, three 6- and 7-year-old children learned conditional discriminations with auditory samples and tactile comparisons. In subsequent tests, they demonstrated that the conditional relations of the auditory and tactile stimuli were equivalence relations. Through cross-modal transfer, the classes also had extended to include novel visual stimuli that resembled the tactile stimuli in form and size. Experiment 2 reversed the role of the tactile and visual stimuli. After learning conditional discriminations with auditory samples and visual comparisons, the children demonstrated equivalence classes that included the training stimuli plus novel tactile stimuli that resembled the visual stimuli. One child in this experiment needed cross-modal training before the classes appeared. The experiments illustrate one way in which stimulus equivalence classes are extended and relate the paradigm of stimulus equivalence to studying perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A matching-to-sample procedure that engenders observation of two elements of a complex sample stimulus may establish equivalence relations among those elements. Studies that focus on complex stimulus control will help determine the necessary and sufficient conditions for equivalence class formation. Further studies in this area will benefit by blending the methods and concepts of stimulus equivalence research with those used in studies of conceptually related learning processes. The enterprise may also profit by reconsidering the role of compound stimulus control in the formation of equivalence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A critical examination of dialectical person perception as advanced by Lamiell, Foss, Trierweiler, and Leffel, (1983) reveals some important problems both in its empirical basis and in the underlying model of the intuitive personologist. The present article discusses these problems and suggests some alternative conceptions of the intuitive personologist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the subliminal perception or perception of partial cues. The section attempts to explore the perceptual conditions in these paradigmatic experiments to determine whether partial cues are perceived, or whether it is reasonable to conclude that since there is no evidence of any supraliminal cue perception, subliminal perceptual processes can be inferred. The study intends to explore each of the above possible alternatives by systematically exploring changes in choice behavior when a stimulus is presented ay a low percentage threshold intensity.

The article presents a study that examines the role of international perception in predicting personal adjustment. The researchers reanalyzes a certain data from a study relating assumed similarity (AS) scores to adjustment in order to determine empirically the extent to which dyadic or pattern scores contribute to prediction and interpretation of results. The first of these involves the similarity a man sees between himself and others in his group. The second type of AS involves the similarity that the subject fellow group members perceive between themselves. Meanwhile, the subjects of the research were 200 members of small antiaircraft artillery units.