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This paper uses qualitative data conducted in São Paulo, Brazil with those who possessed the capability to emigrate yet had chosen to remain in place. It explores the strategies these 'stayers' employed to create and reproduce a sense of belonging to place in the midst of political disruption and alienation. This is in the context of Brazil's lava jato (car wash) political corruption scandal which culminated in the election of President Bolsonaro and affected many Brazilian citizens' sense of belonging. Particular attention is paid to the way articulations of subnational and supranational scales of belonging relate to the national. Belonging at the national scale remains salient but through a process of interpolation with affective, local, urban and cosmopolitan forms of belonging. Immobility thus becomes an active practice through the (re)imagining and re‐scaling of a sense of belonging. Developing this concept of 'active' immobility recognises immobility as a phenomenon that is driven by individual and structural elements that are as diverse and dynamic as those that affect mobility. The paper contributes to debates about the relationship between forms of local national and cosmopolitan belonging. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Right‐wing variants of populism are on the rise across the globe, creating new patterns of interaction between society and the environment. These new socio‐ecological relationships – dubbed "populist ecologies" – are not homogenous and, instead, can vary from country to country and populist to populist. In this paper, we adopt two illustrative case studies to outline two particular right‐wing populist ecologies. First, we turn to the government of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil (2019 onwards) and detail the ways in which Bolsonaro's anti‐science agenda is evident in his response to patterns of deforestation and the "burning of the Amazon" in 2019. Second, we explore the politics of Matteo Salvini in Italy, highlighting how, in this form of right‐wing populism, the environment has become a container for wider political ambitions. In doing so, this work highlights the complexity of the relationship between contemporary right‐wing populism and the environment – and the ways in which populist ecologies may act to conceal the more‐nefarious elements of the populist moment. This paper details how right‐wing variants of populism create new socio‐ecological patterns of interaction. Drawing on case studies of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil and Matteo Salvini in Italy, we advance a conceptualisation of "populist ecologies" to explore and make sense of how ecology is represented within far‐right populist projects. In doing so, we highlight an important complexity in which populist ecologies may function to conceal broader, more nefarious elements of far‐right populist projects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers an interpretation of the ideology expressed by Jair Bolsonaro, current president of Brazil, as a Brazilian far-right neoliberal nationalism, which typically distinguishes between the members of the nation and its traitors and enemies, creating an authoritarian atmosphere of governance combined with the defense of neoliberal values. To establish the bases that sustain this ideology, we investigate four key arenas of his administration – family issues; the anti-left rhetoric; the call for a mixed-race identity; and Brazilian foreign policy. We sustain that Bolsonaro's discourse, instead of revealing a fragmented political project, actually articulates a powerful and authoritarian image of the Brazilian nation, while also reinforcing the idea of individual entrepreneurship and traditional morality. Although this project is deeply informed by past national ideological traditions, it is also aligned with the expansion of the far right internationally and sheds light to its dynamics in periphery countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Direito e Práxis is the property of Editora da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (EdUERJ) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Cuestiones de Sociologia: Revista de Estudios Sociales is the property of Universidad Nacional de La Plata and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Lua Nova is the property of CEDEC and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this paper, we examine the rise of authoritarian populism in Brazil following the election in 2018 of Jair Messias Bolsonaro to the Presidency and reflect on the consequences of his far-right-wing politics for education. Our focus is broadly on three historical blocs (with five different presidents of the Republic) which make up the policy trajectory of Brazil over the period 1995–2019. We explore the complex cultural political economy surrounding more than a decade of left-wing government by Lula da Silva (2003–2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011–2016) of the Workers Party (PT). In what has been described as simultaneously a tragedy, a farce, and a soap opera, Bolsonaro's rise involves the impeachment of Dilma, accusations of corruption, the imprisonment of Lula and the resignation of multiple ministers of the government. The intersections of right-wing conservative discourse, evangelical proselytising and populist discourse in Brazil, coupled with resentment from those whose fortunes had been diminished because of declining economic competitiveness, contributed to the election of Bolsonaro in 2018. A final section focuses on the education policy in Brazil, the ways in which any progressive gains have been erased and what this means for Brazilians. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of O Social em Questão is the property of Faculdades Catolicas - Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Since its appearance in 2020, Brazil and Mexico have been among the most affected countries in the world by covid-19. Their respective presidents, Jair Bolsonaro and Andrés Manuel López Obrador (known as AMLO), have played a leading role in specific policies during the pandemic. Their choices were both singular and counter- intuitive. On the health front, AMLO initially underplayed the seriousness of the situation, and the Brazilian president, Bolsonaro, defended a frankly negationist attitude, with a dramatic balance sheet, without his popularity being seriously affected. On the economic front, they have chosen policies that contradict not only each other but also their own supposed ideological stances. Bolsonaro, who is ranked on the far right, has implemented an emergency transfer program on a scale comparable to those of developed countries and the most massive the country has ever seen. Conversely, AMLO, considered a progressist, provided just a minimum policy package, maintaining his previous electoral program. By adopting a comparative approach and mobilizing a unique and diversified set of data, the objective of this paper is to explore these apparent contradictions. After having established the precise diagnosis of the policies implemented to deal with the crisis and the economic and health situation in the two countries during the 2020-2022 period, we propose an original interpretation grid of the central role played by the two presidents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to expose the forces of structural transformation unleashed in the process of extractive capitalist development in Brazil and the rise of right-wing populism in the form of Jair Bolsonaro. The methodology employed might be described as a the political economy of capitalist development. It is employed within the framework of historical materialism and a Marxist theory of capitalist development. Within this framework it is argued that Bolsonaro's populist and right-wing regime, and his environmentally destructive extractivist regime, represented an attack on the working class and a fundamental assault on the territorial rights of the country's indigenous peoples as well as more broadly the rights of nature, with particular reference here to the Amazon as one of the world's greatest repositories of resources needed for confronting the global environmental crisis. The interlude of the short-lived Bolsonara regime is used to draw out the implications of the global rise of populism and authoritarianism in the early 21st century in the context of a multidimensional social and environmental crisis on a global scale. Under Bolsonaro's policies Brazil was very much part of the problem, whereas Brazil could be an important part of the solution. Whether Lula's policies will take us there is an open question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista FAMECOS - Mídia, Cultura e Tecnologia is the property of EDIPUCRS - Editora Universitaria da PUCRS and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política is the property of Instituto de Ciencia Politica (Universidad de la Republica de Uruguay) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article aims to understand how anti-environmentalism connects with the conservative, authoritarian and populist discourse of Brazilian far-right President Jair Bolsonaro. Indeed, we argue that anti-environmentalism is one of the critical factors for understanding the postures and practices of Bolsonarism. We analyse 852 speech acts, drawn from all statements involving environmental issues made by Bolsonaro and three Brazilian ministers over a 14 month period between 2018 and 2019. Our analysis offers two major contributions: a) we situate the contours of authoritarian populism in the Global South (Brazil), shifting the gaze that has hitherto been focused on Europe and the USA, and, above all; b) through focus on the texts of the leader we develop a discursive approach to the understanding of populism and anti-environmentalism. Our results show that Bolsonaro adopts authoritarian measures to defend global agribusiness, in addition to denying or minimising environmental problems.. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why did the far-right Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, with financial support from Donald Trump's US government, preside over the group recognition of around 47,000 displaced Venezuelans as refugees? It would appear implausible that a far-right, nationalistic government led by a president who had expressed visceral hostility to migrants and refugees would use the provisions of a progressive regional framework to grant refugee status to thousands of displaced people, aided by a US president whose government was literally caging child refugees. To address this question, we show that recognition of Venezuelans as refugees was grounded in an existing and credible legal and bureaucratic process managed by the Brazilian National Committee for Refugees (CONARE) that also brought to bear the influence and presence of key international actors, particularly the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). An additional crucial factor was Bolsonaro's anti-communism, which provided a strong ideological and instrumental motivation for his government to engage with the US government of Donald Trump in its efforts to undermine the Maduro regime in Venezuela and led to the seemingly paradoxical situation of a far-right Brazilian government granting refugee status to thousands of displaced people that exceeded responses in other South American countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Debates is the property of Revista Debates and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Is Brazil's president Jair Bolsonaro a classic populist? This article tries to answer this question by testing whether the political discourse of Bolsonaro fits the tenets of two major theories of populism: Mudde and Kaltwasser's and Laclau's. We analyse the entire text of his presidential campaign platform to find that Bolsonaro's discourse has almost no room for a 'concept of the people' or of nation, a fact that problematizes the bulk of the literature on populism, including its major theories. Conversely, his discourse is structured around the concept of corruption, which is tightly linked with a strong anti-left and anti-PT sentiment. It is corruption that connects the different regions (themes) of his discourse. We then run a computerized similarity analysis to confirm the central placement of corruption regarding the whole of his discourse and its different regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conspiracy Theories (CTs) are a global phenomenon, but some societies are better equipped than others to resist them. This article discusses the characteristics of the China-related COVID-19 CTs in the Brazilian Facebook, based on 28,312 posts published from January 2020 to June 2021. We argue that, in Brazil, the spread of CTs was facilitated by a widespread political and knowledge institutions' legitimacy crisis. The rise of the extremist politician Jair Bolsonaro to the Presidency provides evidence in this regard. In consequence, the boundaries between fringe and mainstream politics become porous. This article discusses which agents disseminate China-related COVID-19 CTs, and which topics receive more attention. We found a significant presence of actors belonging to mainstream politics and the media among the CTs' main disseminators. Additionally, the CTs circulating in the Brazilian social media environment reproduce concerns about China's growing presence in the global arena, which originate elsewhere. Still, they add a specific emphasis on the Communist threat. We sustain that this emphasis relates as much to Brazil's internal politics as to China itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article interrogates whether the social science scholarship on the political authority of organised crime in Brazil can serve as an analytical framework to understand the violent underpinnings of the Bolsonaro presidency. Reviewing ethnographic work on criminal governance groups in Brazil alongside judicial documents detailing the links between Bolsonaro and militia operatives as well as statements given by the president regarding organised crime and gun ownership indicates that criminal governance finds ideological support and functional resonance in the Bolsonaro administration. The interchange between organised crime and state criminality demands urgent dialogue between urban activists and ethnographers in Brazil. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Building on theories of cultural trauma, this research examines institutional trauma engendered by the pandemic in relation to journalism and public health in the US and Brazil. The trauma stemming from Covid-19 marks a transformational crisis not only in terms of global public health but also collective confidence in institutions writ large. To probe these issues, this article takes advantage of a vibrant digital discussion among Americans and Brazilians hosted by three flagship newspapers in the two countries: The New York Times, Folha de S. Paulo, and O Estado de S. Paulo. The analysis reveals that both groups experience Covid-accelerated trauma that undermines Brazilians' and Americans' faith in foundational institutions' ability to adequately respond to the pandemic. Comparing these interpretations of the Covid-19 crisis in the US and Brazil allows us to see how the acute health crisis triggered by the virus morphs into a form of institutional trauma, with deep implications for collective confidence in public health, journalism, and democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Debates is the property of Revista Debates and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Brazil's governance of the COVID-19 pandemic has been described as nothing short of tragic by several commentators. President Jair Bolsonaro's dangerous brew of neoliberal authoritarianism, science denialism and ableism has plunged this country into catastrophe. In this article we argue that this form (or lack) of public health governance can best be described as governance without (central) government. We begin with an overview of public health governance in the country before introducing the main theoretical concepts that guide our analysis, namely the notions of 'government by exception' and 'strategic ignorance'. Finally, we sketch the main features of this emerging form of (non)governance of COVID-19. We highlight the new forms of solidarity and mutual aid that have emerged in favelas and Indigenous communities, which have stepped in to fill the void left by a limited federal presence. The article concludes by reflecting on what this collapse of public health reveals about the limitations of democratic governance in the age of Bolsonaro. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We advocate for the relevance of taking Brazilian past experience and theorization of populism into account to understand present-day challenges. We depart from Weffort's conceptualization of populism to discuss the role of businesspeople movements in supporting and taking control of the political agenda through think tanks. According to Weffort, populism is built over precarious alliances that tend to favor policy or politics in different moments. During times of divergence among political elites, a populist leader emerges as a mediator in orchestrating an unstable hegemony among asymmetric classes. At the same time, the classes included in the populist alliance give legitimacy to the populist leader; they hinder his capacity of imposing decisions. However, treason of the weakest within the alliance is certain. We suggest that the political role played by the think tank IPES, in 1960s Brazil, in reframing middle-class demands is akin to contemporary populist events in Brazil—represented by the election of Jair Bolsonaro—and in the Anglo-Saxon world. Trumpism and Brexit are examples of a still-powerful free-market ideology project wrapped up under a populist discourse (re)framed with the support of businessmen and think tanks. A corporate takeover of government and the imposition of a free-market agenda are certain, as it is the treason of the weakest in the populist coalition. CMS academics should engage with the demands that give birth to populist movements as a way to dispute the neoliberal hegemony and anti-democratic populist solutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Lua Nova is the property of CEDEC and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)