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Avrupa’da din, hanedan rekabeti ve bölgesel genişleme çatışmalarının zirvesini temsil eden Otuz Yıl Savaşları hem askerî hem de siyasi sonuçları itibariyle bir dönüm noktasıdır. Her biri kendi hedef ve stratejilerine sahip birden çok aşamayı barındıran karmaşık çatışmalar Avrupa kıtası üzerinde yıkıcı etkiler bırakmıştır. Tarafların paralı askerlik uygulamasına sıklıkla başvurduğu Otuz Yıl Savaşları, piyade, süvari ve topçuların hayati roller oynadığı meydan savaşlarına sahne olmuştur. Çatışmalar ilerledikçe dini farklılıkların yarattığı gerilimin ötesine geçerek değişen ittifaklarıyla modern devletler, egemenlik ile daimî ordulara dair yapı ve algıları etkileyecek siyasi ve bölgesel üstünlük mücadelesi yaşanmıştır. Bu makalenin amacı, siyasal sonuçları itibariyle karşıt fikirlere kaynaklık eden Otuz Yıl Savaşları’nın askerî ile politik boyutunu analiz etmektir. Makalede bu savaşlar sonrasında avantajlı konumda olan aktörler olsa da iktidar rekabetinin son bulmadığı, ortaya çıkan kısıtlı seçenekler nedeniyle Avrupa’da askerî güç dengesi politikalarının devam ettiği gösterilmektedir. Bu çerçevede Otuz Yıl Savaşlarının öne çıkan askerî rolü, daimî orduların sistemdeki etkisinin artması, bu nedenle de sonraki aşamada büyük güçlerin öne çıkmasına yol açmasıdır. Öncelikle çatışmalara yol açan nedenler üzerinde durulacak, tarafların çatışmalara katılma durumlarına göre savaşların seyri dönemin siyasi ve askerî stratejik unsurları üzerinden tahlil edilecektir. Son olarak, savaşların geçtiği dönemin uzun vadeli etkileriyle birlikte toplumsal sonuçları değerlendirilecektir.

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The article presents the author's views on the formation of a standing United Nations (UN) army. It is observed that the establishment of such an army is neither desirable nor possible. It is opined that the hostile interests of member states are one of the many barriers standing in the formation of a permanent army. It is argued that other hindrances include, the absence of autonomous source of income, the absence of intelligence, and the weakness of existing logistical capabilities.

The article reports on the possibility of the establishment of a standing Untied Nations (UN) army. It is noted that the proposal for the creation of a permanent force under UN authority is a crucial question for the international organization. It is informed that the UN had never had such an army but in the aftermath of the Cold War it is not un-called for. It is observed that earlier the major Allied powers including the U.S. and China, examined the question and settled in the favor of on-call force. It is suggested that this question assumes more urgency since the UN peacekeeping operations have grown over the years in number and complexity.

The article presents information on the feasibility of a United Nations (UN) standing army. It is noted that the expansion of UN peacekeeping operations around the globe has brought into the focus the issue of a UN standing army. Critics of existing ad hoc arrangement have proposed standing or standby forces. It is informed that the Article 43 and Article 44 of the UN Charter create confusion regarding member states' military obligation that, in turn, create hindrance for the establishment of a standing army.

The article discusses the integration of the military in South Africa into South African National Defense Force (SANDF). It also discusses the contributions of the erstwhile revolutionary armies of the nation to the standing conventional army. The integration took place at the backdrop of a negotiated settlement that paved the way for nonracial multiparty elections in 1994. The African National Congress won the elections. An interim constitution was adopted and a Constitutional Court was instituted after the elections. The new constitution replaced the South African Defense Force (SADF), and the SANDF was formed. The SANDF included personnel and equipment from the SADF. Some of the personnel from the guerilla forces of some of the political parties were also included in the SANDF.

The article examines the contemporary conflicts in the Third World concerning war regulation by law and the rule that states to accept and respect such legal obligations in practice. The author said that the combination and interrelationship of all the considerations that lead a state to resort to armed force are political and the United Nations (UN) has played an important role in the inter-state disputes. Under the Articles in the UN Charter, it prohibits the unilateral use or threatened use of armed force to save in self-defense or in response to an act of aggression. Moreover, Chapter VII of the Charter states that the absence of the political will to enable such a scheme to work is obvious by the failure to establish a UN standing army.

This article describes the evolution of state control over military manpower through an examination of three centuries of mercenarism. It documents the decline of several eighteenth-century forms of mercenarism and presents a critique of the conventional explanations for that decline. I argue that an institutional analysis provides a much richer understanding of how and why state control has varied. I present an empirical analysis of the institutional basis of mercenarism and construct an alternative explanation for its decline. My argument is that mercenarism's decline resulted from the institutionalization of a new international norm of state control over nonstate violence in the international system. The norm reflected a new set of state practices developed by leading states in the context of the French Revolutionary War. In the course of the nineteenth century, these practices were universalized in the state system, setting a new standard for competent statesmanship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the concept of a standing United Nations (UN) army. It is noted that the UN Charter is silent about the establishment of its standing army. It, however, does bind its member states to provide, on ad hoc basis, armed forced for the maintaining of international peace and security. It is informed that former Prime Minister of Great Britain Winston Churchill envisioned a standing army of the UN in 1946. It is observed that this idea later evolved into an ad hoc improvisation called peacekeeping forces. The member states provide the UN with armed forces on voluntary basis. It is offered that the organization face many problems in deploying and obtaining resources required for peacekeeping operations.