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En yaygın pazar etkileşimi olduğunu söyleyebileceğimiz iki taraflı ticaret problemi bir satıcı ve bir alıcının karşılıklı değerlerini bilmedikleri durumda bölünemeyen bir nesne üzerinden pazarlık yaptıkları en basit iki taraflı pazar etkileşimi türüdür. Bu problemi kombinatoryal eniyileme problemi olarak ele alıyoruz ve sürekli değerler varsayımı altında iyi bilinen bazı iktisat teorisi sonuçlarını ayrık tip durumu için doğrusal programlama kullanarak yeniden kuruyoruz. İlk olarak Baskın Strateji Teşvik Uyumluluğu (BTU) ve Nihai Birey Rasyonelliği (NBR) özellikleri altındaki problem için matematiksel formülasyon öneriyoruz. Sonra nihai verimlilik koşulunun BTU ve NBR ile beraber elde edilebileceği gerek ve yeter koşulları türetiyoruz. Bunun yanında ismi `Allocation Maximality` olan yeni bir özellik tanımlıyoruz ve Posted Price mekanizmasının BTU, NBR ve allocation maximality özelliklerini sağlayan tek mekanizma olduğunu kanıtlıyoruz. Son bölümde, katılımcı tipleri üzerinde tanımlanan olasılık dağılımlarından kaynaklanan belirsizliği problem tanımına alıyoruz ve gürbüz problem çözümlerini buluyoruz. Buna müteakip kendi kazancını enbüyüklemek isteyen arabulucunun bulunduğu iki taraflı ticaret problemini çalışıyoruz. Ağ programlamasını kullanarak elimizdeki doğrusal formulasyonunu en iyi mekanizmanın anlaşılır olduğu bir duruma getiriyoruz. Daha sonra aracının riske duyarsızlık olduğu varsayımını kaldırıp problemi riskten kaçınan aracı gözünden ele alıyoruz. Riskten kaçınan varsayımının sonuçlar üzerindeki etkilerini hesaplama deneyleriyle sunuyoruz. Son olarak problem kapsamını genişletip satıcının aynı zamanda üretici olduğu ve ilgili taraflar için fayda ve masraf fonksiyonları düşünülen duruma eğiliyoruz. Dışbükey olmayan bir eniyileme probleminden başlayarak kendisine eşdeğer ve kolayca çözülen bir dışbükey eniyileme problemini elde ediyoruz. Tüm sonuçların uygulanabilirliğini korumak adına aynı problemi Baskın Strateji Teşvik Uyumluluğu ve Nihai Birey Rasyonelliği koşulları altında tekrar ele alıyoruz. Bilateral trade is probably the most common market interaction problem and can be considered as the simplest form of two sided markets where a seller and a buyer bargain over an indivisible object subject to incomplete information on the reservation values of participants.We treat this problem as a combinatorial optimization problem and re-establish some results of economic theory that are well-known under continuous valuations assumptions for the case of discrete valuations using linear programming techniques.First, we propose mathematical formulation for the problem under dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DIC) and ex-post individual rationality (EIR) properties. Then we derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which ex-post efficiency can be obtained together with DIC and EIR. We also define a new property called Allocation Maximality and prove that the Posted Price mechanism is the only mechanism that satisfies DIC, EIR and allocation maximality. In the final part we consider ambiguity in the problem framework originating from different sets of priors for agents types and derive robust counterparts.Next, we study the bilateral trade problem with an intermediary who wants to maximize her expected gains. Using network programming we transform the initial linear program into one from which the structure of mechanism is transparent. We then relax the risk-neutrality assumption of the intermediary and consider the problem from the perspective of risk-averse intermediary. The effects of risk-averse approach are presented using computational experiments.Finally, we broaden the scope of the problem and discuss the case in which the seller is also a producer at the same time and consider benefit and cost functions for the respective parties. Starting by a non-convex optimization problem, we obtain an equivalent convex optimization problem from which the problem is solved easily. We also reconsider the same problem under dominant strategy incentive compatibility and ex-post individual rationality constraints to preserve the practicality of all obtained solutions. 97

Küresel ölçekte önemli bir büyüklüğe ulaşan kamu alımlarının ekonomik ve sosyal açıdan önemi gün geçtikçe artmaktadır. Kamu alımları piyasasının ülke ekonomisi içerisinde önemli bir paya sahip olduğu dikkate alındığında, alım sürecine yönelik etkinliğin sağlanması gereği hasıl olmaktadır. Kamu alımları piyasasında etkinliğin sağlanması, hem kamu kaynaklarının etkin ve verimli kullanılması açısından hem de sosyal faydanın (refah) arttırılması açısından önem arz etmektedir.Bu çalışma, kamu alımları sürecinin etkinliğinin sağlanmasına yönelik optimal çözüm önerileri sunabilmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, kamu alımları piyasasında rekabetçi teklifler arasından en uygun bedelle ve en yüksek kalitede mal, hizmet veya yapım işinin sağlanması süreci olan ihale mekanizmasının başarısız olmasına yol açan eksik rekabet ve asimetrik bilgi kaynaklı sorunlar ve bu sorunların kamu alımları piyasasında meydana getirdiği olumsuzluklar incelenmiş; Mekanizma Tasarımı Teorisi perspektifinden, kamu alım piyasalarının etkin bir işleyiş yapısından uzaklaşmasına yol açan engellerin ne şekilde aşılabileceği teorik anlamda tartışılmış ve teorik tartışmadan çıkarılan sonuçlardan hareketle somut bir biçimde uygulanabilir olduğu düşünülen optimal regülasyon önerileri sunulmaya çalışılmıştır. Anahtar Kelimeler: Mekanizma Tasarımı Teorisi, Optimal Statik Mekanizma, Beyan Prensibi, Teşvik Sözleşmeleri, Asil-Vekil Sorunu. The economic and social importance of public procurement, which has reached an important scale globally, is on the rise day by day. Since public procurement market covers a serious portion of national economy, it is necessary to boost the efficiency of procurement process. Achieving the efficiency of public procurement market is crucial not only to use public resources efficiently and effectively, but also to increase social benefit (welfare).This study aims to offer optimal solutions towards achieving the efficiency of public procurement process. For that purpose, problems originating from imperfect competition and asymmetric information which lead to the failure of procurement mechanism – which is the process of procuring the most economical and the highest quality goods, services or construction jobs – are examined. Also, the unfavorable situations caused by aforementioned problems in public procurement market are analysed; ways of overcoming the obstacles that cause public procurement markets to diverge from operating efficiently are discussed in light of Mechanism Design Theory; finally optimal and applicable regulation advice are offered utilizing the results of theoretical discussion. Keywords: Mechanism Design Theory, Optimal Static Mechanism, Revelation Principle, İncentive Contracts, Principal-Agent Problem. 110

This paper presents a novel approach for designing and optimizing maintenance service contracts through the application of mechanism design theory. When offering a contract to its customer, the maintenance service provider seeks to specify contract terms - such as price, service features and incentives - that maximize the provider's profit, satisfy customer needs, allocate risks effectively and mitigate moral hazards. Optimal contract design has to account for asymmetric information and uncertainties associated with customer characteristics and behaviors. We illustrate our mechanism design approach by applying it to the contract design challenge of a gas turbine manufacturer, which also provides maintenance services for its aircraft engines. In our solution approach, we compute an optimal set of contracts. The entire set is presented to the customer and is designed such that the customer will accept one of the contract alternatives without negotiations. In addition to eliminating the costs and delays associated with negotiations, this approach also reveals the customer's private information to the service provider, which the provider can use to its benefit in maintenance management and future contract renewals. Furthermore, we design and incorporate win-win incentive mechanisms into the contracts, which reward the customer for actions that reduces maintenance costs. We present a deterministic and a stochastic mechanism design model, the latter accounting for uncertainties associated with customer actions, engine performance, and maintenance costs during the contract execution phase. Master of Science

Thanks to the recent studies of the history and philosophy of experimental economics, it is well known that around the early 1980s, experimental economists made a case for the legitimacy of their laboratory work by emphasizing that it was a nice and indispensable complement to mechanism design theorists' mathematical study of institutions. The present paper examines what mechanism design theorists thought of laboratory experimentation, or whether they were willing to form a coalition with experimental economists circa the mid-1980s. By exploring several dimensions of the relationship between mechanism design theory and experimental economics, the present paper shows that a close rapport had been established by the early 1980s between the representative members of the two camps, and also that mechanism design theorists were among the strongest supporters of laboratory experimentation in the economics profession in the mid-1980s.

The main aspiration behind the contributions of this research work is the achievement of simultaneuos delay-efficiency, autonomy, and security through innovative protocol design to address complex real-life problems. To achieve this, we take a holistic approach. We apply theoretical mathematical modeling implementing implications of social-economic behavioral characteristics to propose a cross-layer network security protocol. We further complement this approach by a layer-specific focus with implementations at two lower OSI layers. For the cross-layer design, we suggest the use of game and mechanism design theories. We design a network-wide consumer-centric and delay-efficient security protocol, DSIC-S. It induces a Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible equilibrium among all rational and selfish nodes. We prove it is network-wide socially desirable and Pareto optimal. We address resource management and delay-efficiency through synergy of several design aspects. We propose a scenario-based security model with different levels. Furthermore, we design a valuation system to integrate the caused delay in selection of security algorithms at each node without consumer's knowledge of the actual delays. We achieve this by incorporating the consumer's valuation system, in the calculation of the credit transfers through the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) payments with Clarke's pivotal rule. As the utmost significant contribution of this work, we solve the revelation theorem's problem of misrepresentation of agents' private information in mechanism design theory through the proposed design. We design an incentive model and incorporate the valuations in the incentives. The simulations validate the theoretical results. They prove the significance of this model and among others show the correlation of the credit transfers to actual delays and security valuations. In the layer-specific approach for the network-layer, we implement the DSIC-S protocol to extend current IPsec and IKEv2 protocols. IPsec-O and IKEv2-O inherit the strong properties of DSIC-S through the proposed extensions. Furthermore, we propose yet another layer-specific protocol, the SME_Q, for the datalink layer based on ATM. We develop an extensive simulation software, SMEQSIM, to simulate ATM security negotiations. We simulate the proposed protocol in a comprehensive real-life ATM network and prove the significance of this research work. Ph. D.

This paper analyzes resource allocation between principal-agent (and between agent-agent) in the upstream oil & gas industry. In the model, we incorporate the parties' preferences as we outline a principal-agent model. Further, we optimize the resource allocation between the parties as they are self-interested with the use of incentive-based contracts with risk and rewards. Our optimization determines that to realize the highest profit, the principal and the involved agents should avoid any agents' becoming dominant. Hence, the volume of sourced items from the agents should not vary too much. We further outline the on-boarding process of new agents in the network and how the network needs to compensate for the potential loss for some of the agents if the network should fulfill the incentive-compatibility condition.