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Blackstone's Commentaries stated that the common law imposed a duty on parents to provide for the maintenance, protection, and education of their children, and of these, the duty to provide an education was "of far the greatest importance." Early on American courts cited Blackstone for the proposition of the common law duty of parents educate their children. As the nineteenth century progressed, public and private schools were formed in most American states, and a number of states enacted compulsory education laws. American states also sometimes also enacted laws that interfered with the freedom of parents to direct the education of their children. In 1919, in the wake of the anti-German hysteria of World War I, Nebraska passed a law that prohibited the teaching of German in the Lutheran sectarian schools. In 1922, Oregon passed a law prohibiting parents from enrolling their children in private and sectarian schools. The Supreme Court held that both of these laws were unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, because they interfered with the liberty of parents to control the education of their children. In the United States, Blackstone's common law duty of parents to provide an education for their children had evolved into a constitutional right of parents to control the education of their children.

Magna Carta, that great cornerstone of American liberty, has been in the news lately. Put up for sale by three-time U.S. Presidential candidate Ross Perot in December 2007, the 1297 version of Magna Carta displayed in the National Archives was sold to financier David Rubenstein for $21.3 million. While its sale demonstrates the cash value of the document as a national treasure, it is debatable whether or not Magna Carta retains much currency in the nation's classrooms. As with other seminal elements of the history curriculum, when given the opportunity, teachers must not only make the commitment to teach a particular topic, but also to lead the way in demonstrating the value of their curricular choices. Magna Carta is the seminal document which America's founders referred to as that "great Charter of liberty." With the 800-year anniversary of Magna Carta in 2015, a scant five years away, it is timely for teachers to pause and reflect on what the document has meant for the Western world and on how they might use Magna Carta in their classrooms. This article is designed to stimulate educators to use Magna Carta and other seminal works and episodes of history to articulate the curricular importance of history in schools. Leaving the curricular politics for another venue, the author invites readers to consider the place Magna Carta holds in American heritage. His aim is to explore how Magna Carta was woven into the American fabric. (Contains 19 notes.)

Documents how the introduction of an integrated (or bijural) approach to the teaching of the civil and common law at Louisiana State University in 2001, as at McGill University in 1999, represents a restoration of a way of thinking about law that was not uncommon in 19th-century Louisiana and Quebec. (EV)

Describes the bijural program of McGill University Faculty of Law. The program educates all first-degree law students in both the common law and civil law traditions, preparing them for the increasing globalization of legal practice. (EV)

Offers an elementary two-legal-jurisdiction analysis using conventional economic assumptions, exploring how and why a distinctive body of legal doctrine comes into being. Asserts that elementary economic theory offers the simplified answer that the legal doctrine will take the shape it does because it is efficient for the group that adopts it. (EV)

Explores why bijuralism as a pedagogical strategy is not enough if globalization is to turn from ideal into reality, but asserts that, nevertheless, it will instill a certain intellectual curiosity of still other forms of legal life, and a sensibility that may result in a better understanding of these other forms. (EV)

Introduces papers from a conference focused on the bijural programs of Louisiana State University Law Center and McGill University Faculty of Law. The programs educate all first-degree law students in both the common law and civil law traditions, preparing them for the increasing globalization of legal practice. (EV)

Describes the bijural program of Louisiana State University Law Center. The program educates all first-degree law students in both the common law and civil law traditions, preparing them for the increasing globalization of legal practice. (EV)

Using the example of McGill University's bijural program, explores how teaching the common and civil law traditions together provides an opportunity to teach in law's "cosmos" rather than its "empire," so that a bijural legal education can plainly and confidently ally itself with the great university tradition of prizing knowledge over information. (EV)

Discusses why bijural legal education is a positive development. Describes a joint-degree law program at the University of Paris that offers some of the same benefits. (EV)

Explores a text by Rene David relating to the teaching of comparative law and the comparative teaching of law. Discusses bijural education as a way to comprehensively teach the civil and common law traditions. Addresses construction of a bijural curriculum and skills of comparative law teaching. (EV)

Widespread "family abuse" by the child protective services industry and feelings of parental "disenfranchisement" have spawned the Parental Rights Movement and associated legislation. Legislation often focuses on formal recognition that parental rights are fundamental and should be protected from government interference; enforcement of due process restrictions on child protective services workers; and increased parental control over their children's public education. Common law origins are discussed. (MLH)

Although statutes, not common law, have become the dominant source of law in the United States, the time and intellectual energy most law schools devote to legislation and interpretation is inadequate. Teachers of evidence courses are uniquely positioned to change this through creative instructional use of the Federal Rules of Evidence. (MSE)

Is playing big-time college sports an extracurricular activity or a job? Two law professors at Michigan State University, Robert and Amy McCormick, think it is definitely a job for football and basketball players on athletic scholarships at Division I schools. The married couple has added a new dimension to the long debate over paying athletes by arguing they are "employees" under federal labor laws and entitled to form unions and negotiate wages, hours and working conditions. The NCAA, in accordance with courts that have addressed the issue, believes that student-athletes are not employees, under the law, and that they should not be treated as employees either by the law or by the schools they attend. Moreover, taxing authorities do not consider the benefits student athletes receive to be taxable compensation. In an article in the Washington Law Review, the McCormicks analyze whether Division I football and basketball players are really employees under common law and the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) 2004 decision that graduate assistants at Brown University were students, not employees. Common law has three tests: (1) the right of others to control a person's activities; (2) whether that person is compensated; and (3) if that person is economically dependent on that compensation. The law professors find that college athletes meet all three because a coach has much control over what they do, an athletic scholarship amounts to compensation and players depend on those funds for food and shelter as well as schooling. In their analysis of the Brown University decision, the McCormicks conclude the status of athletes differs from graduate assistants'. The professors say athletes are not primarily engaged in learning, play sports unrelated to their course of study and fall under the supervision of coaches rather than faculty members. The McCormicks dispute the NLRB's finding on the fourth test, which has to do with compensation. In their judgment, young men playing major football and basketball are not there primarily for an education. They're primarily there to win football games and basketball games and perform well.

A study of the evidence in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals is provided. Attention is paid that the Yugoslav and Rwandan tribunals, established by the UN Security Council based on UN Security Council resolutions; the reasons for the creation of these tribunals were the most audacious violations of human rights in the form of international crimes. In fact, in the resolution that established the Yugoslav Tribunal, the UN Security Council expressed its concern about the numerous reports of large-scale and brazen violations of international humanitarian law that occurred in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and, in particular, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and aimed to put an end to such crimes and take effective measures to bring to justice the persons responsible for the mentioned crimes. Since both the ICTY and the ICTR were created as temporary ad hoc tribunals, after their termination, pending cases were transferred to the newly formed body - the IRMCT, which has the same jurisdiction as the ICTY and the ICTR. It was concluded that the rules of evidence adopted by the ICTY, ICTR and IRMCT are «unique». They were formed based on consensus between national legal systems that belong to the legal systems of common law and civil law. It is emphasized that the ICTY and the ICTY, and later the IRMCT adopted fairly soft and flexible rules for the admissibility of evidence. In the event that the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY, the ICTR or the IRMCT do not contain relevant norms that regulate the rules of evidence, the Chamber considering the case has the right to apply such rules that best contribute to the fair resolution of the case under consideration and correspond to the spirit of the Statute and the general principles of law. Special attention is paid to the principle of equality of the parties and its role in the collection and presentation of evidence in ad hoc international criminal tribunals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Beyond the gravitational pull of Earth, space travel poses substantial public health hazards pertaining to the physical and mental well-being of astronauts and passengers, in addition to a possible threat to the populace of Earth upon re-entry. Exposure to cosmic radiation, cranial pressure from microgravity, weakened immunity to contagion, and the potential for depression and psychosis are all risks. Public health crises of this nature are to be expected as the duration of missions extends, as is the case with Mars settlement. In contrast to national space programmes, which have regarded these obstacles as human factors effecting the mission, public health law in common law British nations approaches them from the perspective of social justice and the preservation of human life and societal welfare. Countries including Australia, Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom continue to apply traditional common law principles of public health law, which provide a sensible and enduring method for reconciling competing public and private interests. Common law permits the violation of civil liberties through the use of force in public health restraint, forced medication, and quarantine, but only if necessary, reasonable, and equitable. While the understanding of the health challenges associated with long-duration spaceflight may be in its infancy for national space programmes and civilian space ventures, the application of common law public health principles could aid in the establishment of health and safety protocols in which human reactions to crises in space resemble those observed on Earth. This may, nevertheless, necessitate the enactment of a more comprehensive federal public health statute. Embedded in both public health common law and international space law, the pre-eminence of preserving and respecting human life and well-being continues to be a cornerstone of humane justice despite the perilous conditions of space. • National space programmes have historically been required to develop mitigation strategies for the severe health hazards. • In a situation where one individual may expose other crew members to contagious illness or violence, the stakes are high. • The occurrence of crises during extended missions diminishes the probability of a successful return to Earth and legal repercussions. • The potential for severe risks to crew members on various levels is heightened as the duration of spaceflight increases. • The potential emergence of mental health crises during space travel presents supplementary risks to public health and safety. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is devoted to the study of the application of Latin legal terminology in Ukrainian jurisprudence. At the outset of the article, the author emphasizes on the correlation of Latin terminology with Roman law, as well as the significance of the reception of Roman law for the further preservation of Latinisms. Particular focus is given to the retrospective analysis of the incorporation of Latinisms into the Ukrainian language. The first trend highlighted by the author is the etymology of Latinisms in court decisions; the second is the Latinisation of legal terms in court decisions. The application of Latinisms in national and foreign scientific research is considered from the angles of (1) being conditioned by practical needs, (2) the element of citing normative provisions, (3) a way of preserving tradition, and (4) a stylistic tool. The article lists a large number of Roman legal terms that are actively applied by Ukrainian judges. At the same time, the author claims that not all Latin terms applied in jurisprudence are related to the sources of Roman law: firstly, some Latinisms date back to the Middle Ages, as well as the New and even Modern times; secondly, individual Latinisms express legal phenomena (principles, doctrines) that originally belonged to the Anglo-American legal tradition. At the same time, the Latin legal terminology applied in court decisions is very diverse and covers a number of legal phenomena. Particular attention is paid to the application in judicial practice of legal doctrines of different origins – Roman law (favor contractus, fraus creditorum) and common law (obiter dictum, per incuriam, ratio decidendi). In addition, the author calls the application of Latin language clichés in court decisions one of the distinct trends in Ukrainian jurisprudence, which can contribute to the accuracy of the presentation, brevity and comprehensibility of the text, as well as the standardisation of the language of law. The author summarises that the application of Latin legal terms by national courts is an absolutely logical process, which indicates the further integration of national jurisprudence into global processes and trends occurring in world jurisprudence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over twenty years ago, Congress developed a “mountain of evidence” that state criminal and civil remedies against sexual assault and battering were inadequate. The Supreme Court rejected that evidence in United States v. Morrison, striking down a federal civil rights remedy for sexual assault and battering. Since then, there have been many civil cases of sexual assault and battering against high-profile individuals, including the recent E. Jean Carroll lawsuit against a former President. This five-year study, surveying fifty states’ civil law, asks the question prompted by Morrison: Does the civil law today provide adequate remedies to survivors of sexual assault and battery? It argues that reform efforts in the past have failed to focus on the common law, something on keen display in the Supreme Court’s recent Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health decision, limiting women’s right to an abortion. A common law shadow lives on in the civil law of gender assault embraced sometimes by statute and elsewhere by judicial case law. Among the surprising findings of this study: (1) when state actors (e.g., police) rape they commit a constitutional violation, but damage remedies are limited in most states by immunity doctrines; (2) civil plaintiffs’ recovery may be limited by their “fault” for provoking battering and sexual assault, blaming the victim via common law comparative fault doctrines; and (3) in most states, civil plaintiffs’ irrelevant sexual history may be admitted even though relevant evidence of perpetrators’ prior assaults are excluded. The Article recommends that states “audit” their laws through high-level legal commissions to review states’ judicial decisions on civil sexual assault and battering to examine the persistence of the common law limits on civil sexual assault claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the use of surprise frames in judicial opinions of the HKSAR. Specifically, it examines the semantic variation of surprise frames and the discourse purposes for which they are used. In doing so, it explores the underlying interactivity of surprise frames by distinguishing between performative expressions of surprise (those that emanate from the current author's reflection) and descriptive expressions (those that report on another's sense of surprise). Recognising that legal discourse scholars often neglect lower courts, the paper contrasts opinions from three levels of court in the HKSAR. Genre and court-specific patterns emerge: a key similarity is that all three courts, performatively and descriptively, most often use the TYPICALITY frame. Key differences include a significantly greater use of the TYPICALITY frame by the appeal courts in relation to the trial courts; more qualitatively oriented analysis shows that the use of surprise frames maps onto the common law standard of review, i.e., the appeal courts largely use surprise frames to focus on legal issues. In contrast, the trial courts focus on facts and evidence. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of the main findings for researchers and professionals. • Surprise frames in the majority opinions of 119 HKSAR court cases analysed. • Three levels of court are analysed. • A distinction is made between performative and descriptive frames. • All courts used the TYPICALITY frame most frequently. • Appeal courts focus on legal issues, trial courts on facts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The peremptory challenge is one of the oldest and most well-established jury selection procedures. Its use dates back to the earliest days of English common law, and it was a firmly established and protected practice at the United States' founding and into the early twentieth century. But while peremptory challenges are foundational, they remain perhaps the most controversial aspect of jury selection today. This is because they are regularly used by the government and private parties to advance racist, sexist, and bigoted ends. For this reason, over the last three decades, calls to abolish the practice have been regularly made by U.S. Supreme Court Justices and law students alike. And in 2022, Arizona became the first state in U.S. history to take that dramatic step--eliminating peremptory challenges in all cases. This Article is the first to demonstrate that abolition of peremptory challenges is unconstitutional. Despite some contrary Supreme Court precedent, it contends that the early history, practice, and texts show that the Sixth Amendment secures to criminal defendants, particularly in capital cases, the right to participate in jury selection through peremptory challenges. Whether the Seventh Amendment secures an analogous right to civil litigants is less clear, though there is a strong argument that it should be so read. Crucially, constitutionalizing the right does not mean that peremptories may escape all regulation. The Fourteenth Amendment imposes limitations, and legislatures may make further appropriate restrictions. The Article concludes by reviewing paths for balancing the right to peremptory challenges with the need to eradicate systemic bias from jury selection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

They say a picture is worth a thousand words--and charts, drawings, diagrams, computer animations, and even tangible items are utilized at trial in virtually every case tried in the federal and state court systems. Litigants have come to depend heavily upon such aids to engage visual learners in the jury box and to present a compelling narrative. And the creative use of trial aids has only increased with the rapid technological advancements of recent decades. The ubiquity of such aids notwithstanding, there is no written standard governing their use, no agreed-upon lexicon for describing them, and no set of uniform principles guiding courts and litigants in navigating their presentation at trial. Instead, trial lawyers and judges rely on a murky set of latent norms that can be learned only through literal trial--and unavoidable error. When difficult questions arise that require litigants to make concrete arguments about the use of such aids and trial judges to issue definitive rulings and to craft comprehensible jury instructions, those vague norms often prove inadequate to the task. The increasing reliance on illustrative aids in the courtroom has only amplified the risks inherent in vague and inconsistent standards. As PowerPoint presentations, interactive charts, graphs, and computer animations and recreations have become pervasive, the need for clear and predictable standards governing their use has grown An elegant and promising solution to the problems created by the nebulous and inconsistent common law standards governing the use of illustrative aids is a new Federal Rule of Evidence. The Federal Rules were tailor-made to provide an antidote to the complexity and inconsistency of the common law. And a new evidence rule is an optimal vehicle for creating a shared vernacular that distinguishes trial aids from evidence and that sets a uniform standard guiding the deployment of illustrative aids in every federal court. To help bring much-needed coherence to trial practice surrounding illustrative aids, the federal Evidence Advisory Committee has proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 107, the first brand-new provision since 2008. Rule 107 is on track to take effect on December 1, 2024, under the rulemaking procedures established by the Rules Enabling Act. This Article unveils new Federal Rule of Evidence 107, offering insights into the significant modifications made to proposals originally published for notice and comment and revealing the critical features of the final provision that promise to bring clarity and uniformity to the regulation of illustrative aids, while preserving the creativity and flexibility prized by trial counsel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Szeliga v. Lamone, a state trial court determined for the first time that Article III, Section 4 of the Maryland Constitution applies to restrict the Maryland General Assembly's power to adopt a plan of congressional redistricting. Using theories of constitutional interpretation including textualism, originalism, comparative constitutional law, and common law constitutional interpretation, we reject the trial court's interpretation. Instead, we suggest better techniques for interpreting the state constitution and perhaps for combating excessive partisan gerrymandering. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Supreme Court, in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, created additional standing hurdles by requiring plaintiffs to identify a common law historic- analogue when alleging a statutory harm. In doing so, the Court arguably limited informational standing a unique Article III standing theory whereby plaintiffs may establish an injury for failure to receive information-because informational injuries did not exist at common law. This Comment asks whether informational standing survives in a post- TransUnion universe, using 5 U.S.C. § 2954 and lower courts' interpretation of TransUnion for guidance. The statute, § 2954, comes to light in a string of litigation involving the potential illegality of former president Trump's lease of the Old Post Office Building in Washington, DC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ever-increasing commercial activities across borders and continental lines has led to the frequent drafting of international commercial contracts by contracting parties or their lawyers. When parties conclude an international contract, the question which often arises is with regard to the proper law of the contract. This is also the case when standard forms are used in contracting. Where more than one standard form is presented by the contracting parties (one from either party), the issue of battle of forms with respect to the proper law may arise. This study focuses on providing an appropriate solution to the battle of form situation with respect to the choice of law clauses in standard forms contracts. It examines the solutions by the Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts (Hague Principles) and that of India and, thereafter, proposes that India adopts the solution in the Hague Principles (as it better represents the position of the contracting parties).

In 1309, the parish church of Harewood in Yorkshire, England, was invaded by a group of armed parishioners opposing the decisions of the church courts. The story of this invasion and the ways in which Church and State attempted and failed to remove it demonstrate how an apparently local quarrel could be part of national political events and of the intertwining of the laws of Church and State. It also demonstrates, importantly, a largely overlooked aspect of the relationship between the laity at a local level and the Church as an institution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last few decades, the Supreme Court has largely turned to a history-based, originalist approach to the Fourth Amendment. Many scholars have been quick to laud the change, criticize the methodology, or argue their views of the historical record. But few have taken the time to catalogue what historical sources and evidence the Supreme Court has found persuasive in its originalist cases. This Note does so. It takes the Court's originalist methodology as a given and recognizes that historical analysis has become a key part of the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. So, this Note analyzes various originalist opinions of the Court to compile a set of tools that litigants should be using when arguing Fourth Amendment issues. This Note then undertakes to apply these tools in an area where the Court has not. In Illinois v. Rodriguez, the Court established its doctrine of apparent-authority consent. But the case was decided under a non-originalist framework. Using the Court's preferred historical sources, this Note argues that Rodriguez's approach to apparent-authority consent was unknown to the common law of trespass, searches, and seizures. And if apparent authority would not have excused a trespass at common law, it should not excuse a government search now. Thus, doctrine and methodology conflict regarding apparent-authority consent. In response, this Note advances a few possible ways to harmonize that inconsistency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On the basis of a generalization of those dominant viewpoints on objectives of administrative law that are developed within Ukrainian administrative legal science, the author determined that they are united by the recognition of the following to be objectives of administrative law: (1) specifying and ensuring the implementation of human rights and freedoms in the public-legal sphere through the introduction of mechanisms administrative legal regulation and protection in the public administration domain; (2) determination of the standards for the exercise of public management functions by administrative authorities and the provision of administrative services by them, as well as the establishment and improvement of substantive and procedural tools for activities of administrative authorities, including the means of legal protection against violations on their part as well as mechanisms of civil control over their activities. According to the outcomes of the study of approaches to understanding of the tasks of administrative law in world scientific community, the article notes that according to the national tradition of the common law countries, which was adopted by many states that represent the civil law legal tradition, the fundamental objective of administrative law is recognized to be the determination of optimal (from the point of view of the rule of law and good governance) limits of the margin of appreciation of administrative authorities and providing private individuals with legal protection against abuse of administrative power. Moreover, it is particularly noticeable that a special emphasis is placed on guaranteeing the transparency and accountability of administrative authorities to civil society. Less important is the task of administrative law, which consists in establishing the principles, substantive rules and procedures for the performance of administrative functions by government authorities, as well as the accumulation in administrative practice and judicial case-law of the potential for increasing the effectiveness of administrative law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Lifts, or elevators, are transportation facilities that are indispensable for countless end users in high-rise buildings. They require proper maintenance to ensure safe operation. In addition to technological applications, effective management and legislative controls play a crucial role in ensuring lift safety. Given the limited understanding of an optimal regulatory model for governing lift maintenance, a cross-discipline comparative study was conducted to examine lift maintenance regulations in regions with different legal systems. Following a systematic and comparative review approach, this study focused on regulatory controls across civil and common law jurisdictions, specifically Beijing, Hong Kong, and London. Relevant statutes and publications were searched from engineering, law and management databases, which included Scopus, JSTOR, Lexis+, Lexis China, Lexis Advance Hong Kong, and Westlaw Asia. Through scrutinizing the retrieved documents, key features of the regulations were identified and compared in terms of lift classifications, types and frequencies of mandatory maintenance works, qualifications for authorized parties, and legal liabilities for non-compliance. Validated by industry experts, the results reveal both similarities and differences in the regulations among the three jurisdictions. While these findings serve as valuable references for policymakers in formulating optimal legislative controls to enhance lift safety in the future, further research could expand the scope of this study to examine the regulations in other regions and investigate the effectiveness of existing statutory controls on lift maintenance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent developments within American politics have witnessed an increase in the use of history to highlight the need for social justice and civic engagement. Yet, on its own, history is an altogether impotent means of doing so, for it fails to provide the public with the moral framework necessary for evaluating past injustices on an objective basis. To remedy this problem, this essay suggests that historians and other scholars and activists who are interested in civic engagement and social justice should look to the classical and common law traditions; the answer to the theoretical need for a solution to problems within presentist activism has, in other words, been the law. Doing so would provide a more universal and shared conception of past injustices and help increase a polity's moral consciousness. Practically, this strategy can be implemented through a classical or liberal education, with the additional help of state legislatures. In all, this essay argues that history on its own is insufficient for moral education, that the best moral education is offered through the classical model, and that, as a practical matter, it is necessary for a legislative solution to mandate that education, if it will ever be possible to find an objective basis for civic engagement and social justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Africa's democracy turned 30 years old in 2024. At the same time, its constitutional order and jurisprudence marked three decades since the Interim Constitution and its successor, the 1996 Constitution, came into operation. Coincidentally, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) turned 75 years old in the previous year, 2023. The confluence of these facts is quite poignant in the context of a constitutional text that is often lauded for its commitment to the protection of human rights and the eradication of the injustices of the past, which were firmly entrenched by the segregationist policies of the apartheid regime. At the centre of this hype about South African constitutional jurisprudence is the centrality of international law to the interpretation of the Bill of Rights as well as the development of the common law, customary law, and statutory law. With the UDHR being such a central pillar in the human rights sector, this study set out to determine the extent to which the Constitutional Court of South Africa relied on the UDHR and other international instruments in carrying out the mandate set out above. The study analysed cases delivered by the Court in two separate years, spaced ten years apart. The study did not necessarily attempt to determine a correlation, but simply to use descriptive statistics to determine how often, in those two years, the Court relied on international law in general, and on the UDHR in particular, in its interpretive and legal development mandate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research focuses on the Proportionality test model of Competing Rights in practice in civil law countries (Germany and South Korea) and the Common Law System (United States and Canada). The research method used is a normative legal research method with statutory, comparative, and case approaches. The results show that the proportionality test is the "ultimate rule of law," a fundamental benchmark in judicial review, and has become a global constitutionalism recognised and applied internationally. Its application is structured and systematic with four test stages, such as German, Canadian, and South Korean models. Meanwhile, it is unstructured in the United States, and there is only one analytical tool (balancing test). In the case of decision, the four stages are only sometimes applied, but according to the needs of the analysis. If, at the third stage (necessity/minimal impairment), it is found that the object being tested is contrary to the Constitution, then the argumentation focuses on that analysis of it. The fourth stage is used if the case is more complicated and requires analysing the balance of norms and legal values. Meanwhile, in the Indonesian Constitutional Court practice, there is a proportional analysis, but it is partial, unstructured, and unsystematic. Therefore, in the future, it is essential to develop an Indonesian model of the principle of proportionality under the values of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can existing corporate governance principles properly guide the relationship between shareholders and directors as artificial intelligence ("AI") plays an increasingly prominent role in corporate management, planning, and operations? Without a doubt, AI technologies allow corporations to enjoy enhanced efficiency and innovation. But the vast range of AI capabilities--from sophisticated data analytics to autonomous decision-making--raises profound questions about whether traditional governance principles remain sufficiently robust to cabin the proper development and deployment of such a powerful and rapidly evolving set of new technologies. Current corporate governance structures that focus on human actors and traditional business decision-making mechanisms seem ill-suited to address some of the novel legal questions that increased reliance on AI poses, especially considering the opacity regarding how AI technologies actually function. Because the existing fiduciary framework for corporate governance remains insufficiently supple to accommodate AI's transformative impact on corporate practices and strategy, there is a pressing need to reconsider basic corporate governance principles. Shaping appropriate corporate legal constructs to guide the development and dissemination of AI technologies will most likely require a multifaced approach involving new legislative enactments, reconsideration of existing common law principles, and regulatory reforms. Without this concerted approach, striking a sustainable balance between protecting the public interest and fostering innovation becomes far too precarious and uncertain. AI technologies offer incredible opportunities for economic growth, enhanced efficiency, and revolutionary innovation in the corporate realm. But enhanced reliance on algorithmic decision-making also raises troubling concerns regarding corporate accountability, transparency, and threats to important social and civic institutions. As a result, a holistic reconsideration of corporate rights and responsibilities seems essential to ensure a proper balancing between the manifold benefits AI advancements might produce and the continued integrity of public institutions and civic values. By examining the potential disconnect between AI advancements and current corporate governance standards, this Article uncovers the shortcomings of existing corporate jurisprudence and advances a set of principles for guiding the articulation of a more dynamic and responsible corporate governance approach to AI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article assesses a hypothetical battery claim for noise exposure in Australia using Canada's Freedom Convoy as a case study. I first advance a normative account for why battery ought to respond to noiserelated interferences using Kit Barker's taxonomy of 'vindication events'. I argue that battery, relative to negligence and private nuisance: (1) more accurately 'marks' and 'declares' the plaintiff's right to bodily integrity and 'denounces' the defendant's intentional interference; and (2) improves access to 'appropriate compensation' post-infringement. I also explain how the 'prevention of rights infringements' fits within my normative account. I then answer the key doctrinal questions of whether and when noise exposure constitutes an actionable battery. I draw from existing common law precedents to show that physical contact by sound waves is 'direct' and capable of being 'offensive'. I conclude by addressing the concern that my doctrinal conclusions would unduly burden protesters' implied freedom of political communication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The admissibility of evidence often turns on its probative value. Probative value measures the strength of connection between the challenged evidence and the fact in issue. It may be assessed with differing degrees of atomism/holism. The High Court, at common law and under the Uniform Evidence Law, from Pfennig v The Queen to Phillips v The Queen to TL v The King, has adopted an extremely holistic approach -- the trial judge should assess the challenged evidence together with other evidence. This introduces incoherence and uncertainty into the law. It contradicts the 'importance' admissibility criterion, under which the presence of other prosecution evidence may work against admissibility. The High Court's holism appears to be the product of a fallacious conflation of proof and probative value. It risks the trial judge, at admissibility, trespassing on the jury's fact-finding province. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many states, notably California, have adopted the ABC test to determine whether work relationships are employment subject to minimum labor standards. Businesses that classify their workforce as independent contractors argue that the adoption of the ABC test violates the freedom to contract on any terms the parties choose. We argue that conceiving of the ABC test as a departure from or infringement of contract law is misguided. The ABC test, rather, represents a long overdue alignment of the contractual doctrines governing work with the liberal conception of contract. Its foundation is in the so-called common law definition of employment. Moreover, a genuinely liberal conception of contract requires that contracts for the provision of labor or services for remuneration be subject to minimum terms like those mandated by New Deal and Civil Rights Era legislation. Put differently, rather than an antidote to the ills of contract, the ABC model is, by and large, an entailment of liberal contract. Jurisdictions that adopt the ABC model have not effected a rupture from contract; quite the contrary, they have prevented abusing the idea of contract for a purpose that contravenes the telos of liberal contract. The ABC test does so, first, by preventing hiring entities' use of what we deem a spurious version of contract law to opt out of the minimum labor standards laws that legislatures have deemed necessary to protect workers, their families and communities, and the economy. Second, it informs the analysis of the contractual relationship between hiring entities and their workforce even if the workers are properly deemed independent contractors. Contract, in other words, need not be the enemy of the effort to establish minimum labor standards. Because the ABC test aligns the law governing work agreements with the principles animating modern contract law writ large, the test should be proudly defended, expansively interpreted, and broadly followed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the nation’s founding, copyright law has worked to strike a balance between incentivizing artistic creation and allowing such creations to circulate among the public. The Copyright Act of 1976 codified the prevalent common law doctrine aimed at this balance: fair use. Yet, fair use often fails to create clear expectations for how courts would likely find in specific cases. This doctrinal uncertainty is exacerbated when paired with the realities of online fan communities. The current interaction of copyright law with online communities sees copyright holders attempting negotiations themselves to define a satisfactory relationship with creators of fan adaptations of their work. There are few clear guidelines on how to accomplish such a feat clearly and fairly, however. In recent years, two notable copyright holders have attempted such extrajudicial agreements. First, Disney successfully facilitated the transition of a musical based on its 2007 film Ratatouille from a TikTok trend to multiple authorized performances that generated millions of dollars for charity. Second, Netflix struggled to negotiate a mutually beneficial deal with two TikTok creators who had composed a musical based on its hit television show Bridgerton, and eventually, the conflict drove the streaming giant to litigate the issue. This Note argues that given the uncertainty these two examples represent, particularly in the face of Netflix’s failed attempts at private ordering, it is time for copyright law to adapt to the modern age and expand the scope of implied licenses to allow consideration of partial acquiescence and laches in cases filed against online fan creators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to address the problems that have arisen with respect to the binding nature of the recent jurisdictional plenary sessions of Peruvian labor justice issued by the Supreme Court, since it would be attempting to partially replicate the figure of stare decisis, whose Exegesis dates back to the so-called English common law, to our system, which has its roots in the Roman-Germanic system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of KUL Journal of Legal Studies / Studia Prawnicze KUL is the property of John Paul II Catholic University of Lubin / Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawla II and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

O presente artigo tem por objetivo analisar a estrutura do sistema jurídico brasileiro à luz dos sistemas Civil Law e a Common Law. O primeiro, utilizado na Europa continental e nos países por eles colonizados, baseia-se no ordenamento jurídico positivado, ao passo que o segundo, identificado na Grã-Bretanha e em suas colônias, toma como parâmetro as decisões proferidas pelos juízes e tribunais. Neste ínterim, será estudado em qual dos sistemas o ordenamento jurídico pátrio se encaixa, vez que, apesar de o Brasil utilizar a lei como matriz precípua, as decisões judiciais estão, cada vez mais, subordinadas às diversas súmulas e entendimentos judiciais diariamente proferidas pelas cortes e tribunais superiores.