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Individual investors are more likely to sell stocks with nominal gains and losses that are large relative to their brokerage portfolio value. The salience of nominal gains and losses affects stock sales in both taxable and tax-deferred accounts and across investor groups, but the effect of nominal losses is weaker for stocks with high valuation uncertainty. The effect has a time dimension: at short holding periods, individuals are more likely to sell stocks with large nominal losses than gains of the same size, mitigating the disposition effect. Investors may be compelled to revisit their beliefs after incurring large losses quickly.

Mutual fund advisers either expense the cost of research and other services or pay for them with soft dollars. This study is the first to use actual soft dollar and total brokerage commission figures for a large number of funds and to examine how soft dollars are linked to mutual fund governance. Employing a survivorship bias-free sample of actively managed US mutual funds, we find that higher soft dollar and total brokerage commissions are associated with higher advisory fees but not with higher risk-adjusted fund returns. These findings suggest that mutual fund shareholders, on average, do not benefit from the research and the information supplied by third parties such as brokers. We also find that larger and more highly compensated boards are associated with lower advisory fees. Larger boards are also associated with slightly lower turnover. The median tenure of board directors is negatively correlated with soft dollar commissions and turnover, but not correlated with total brokerage commissions or the cost of turning over a portfolio. Higher proportions of directors with a finance background are associated with higher advisory fees, brokerage commissions, and turnover costs. These associations might indicate greater agency costs.

The Federal Reserve’s AMLF program was designed to provide liquidity to money market funds (MMFs). Between September 2008 and May 2009, the program made $217 billion in non-recourse loans to depository institutions and bank holding companies to purchase asset-backed commercial paper from MMFs. JP Morgan and State Street dominated the program, accounting for over 90% of all loans made. Our analysis suggests that JP Morgan exhibited more self-dealing behavior than State Street. We find that JP Morgan and State Street earned economically and statistically significant cumulative returns of 2.28% and 2.49% (respectively) over the first seven days of the program after controlling for market returns and heteroscedasticity.

We examine the sensitivities of aggregate balances of retail and institutional money market funds (MMFs) and their potential substitutes, bank deposits, to changes in short-term interest rates while controlling for calendar-time effects. We find that institutional MMF and time deposit cash flows are sensitive to recent changes in short-term interest rates. Institutional MMF investors appear to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities created by MMFs using the amortized cost technique. Retail MMF investors are much less responsive to changes in interest rates.

The two main explanations for the crisis in the commercial paper (CP) market are credit concerns and liquidity issues. The CP market is not homogeneous in terms of credit quality, maturities and types of issues. We find that lower credit-quality CP suffered more during the crisis. Additionally, we find little evidence that Federal Reserve (Fed) liquidity facilities reduced the impact of the crisis, but that when the Fed became a lender in the CP market, the crisis pressures were dramatically reduced. We conclude that the crisis in the money markets is related more to increases in credit risk. Liquidity is a secondary issue.

This study incorporates year-end and quarter-end preferences for liquidity and other calendar-time effects into the test of the expectations hypothesis (EH) in the very short-term LIBOR (maturities of one month and shorter) in seven major world currencies. The calendar-time effects are found to alter long-term relations between very short-term rates in these currencies. These effects alone are not responsible for the rejection of the EH in the data, as it is rejected in most of the cases even after appropriate controls are introduced. However, such effects are capable of causing the EH to be rejected and should be controlled for when testing the EH in very short-term rates.

Griffiths and Winters [Griffiths, M., Winters, D., 1997. On a preferred habitat for liquidity at the turn-of-the-year: evidence from the term-repo market, Journal of Financial Services Research 12, 21–38] find a year-end preferred habitat for liquidity for US repo rates, and, later [Griffiths, M., Winters, D., 2005. The-turn-of-the-year in money markets: tests of the riskshifting window dressing and preferred habitat hypotheses, Journal of Business 78, 1337–1364] find a similar preferred habitat for US money market instruments. Kotomin et al. [Kotomin, V., Smith, S., Winters, D., 2008. Preferred habitat for liquidity in international shortterm interest rates, Journal of Banking and Finance 32, 240–250] document the preferred habitat in LIBOR for the major world currencies, excluding the British pound. We examine the robustness of these results using pound sterling and euro repo rates and find a year-end preferred habitat for liquidity in the euro repo rates. The British interest rates continue to behave differently, and we provide a possible explanation as to why this occurs.

Risk-shifting window dressing and a preferred habitat for liquidity have been offered as possible explanations as to why US money market rates are higher before the year-end than afterwards. The two hypotheses differ in the timing of the rate decline at the year-end and the evidence on the timing of the decline supports the preferred habitat hypothesis in US money markets. This paper extends this line of research to the behavior of international short-term interest rates at year-ends and quarter-ends using London interbank offer rates (LIBOR) for 11 different currencies. The results suggest that the behavior of LIBOR for five currencies: the US Dollar, Euro, Japanese Yen, Swiss Franc, and German Mark is consistent with year-end or quarter-end preferred habitats for liquidity. Other currencies do not demonstrate consistently distinct patterns in turn-of-the-year and turn-of-the-quarter yields. None of the results provides any support for risk-shifting window dressing.

We examine the impact on the settlement Wednesday effect in daily fed funds rates following the change from contemporaneous reserve requirements (CRR) to lagged reserve requirements (LRR). The Federal Reserve changed from CRR to LRR, in part, to make it easier for banks to settle their reserve accounts. Our hypothesis is that the switch to LRR will reduce the demand for reserves on settlement Wednesdays, thus reducing the settlement Wednesday effect in fed funds rates. Our empirical results provide strong support for our hypothesis.

Allen and Saunders [Allen, A., and A. Saunders. “Bank Window Dressing: Theory and Evidence.” Journal of Banking and Finance 16 (1992), 583–623.] document abnormal behavior of bank assets and liabilities at the turn-of-the-quarter and attribute it to window dressing by banks. Using different methods we re-visit bank turn-of-the-quarter balance sheet activity. We also examine quarter-end changes in the effective fed funds rates and fed funds rate standard deviations. We confirm the presence of turn-of-the-quarter activity on bank balance sheets and in the fed funds market. However, we conclude that the turn-of-the-quarter effects are more consistent with customer preferred habitats than window dressing.

There is a large and growing body of literature on the benefits of established lending relationships with banks, which is an intermediated debt market. We extend that literature by testing for benefits from direct lending relationships in the commercial paper market, which is a public debt market. Diamond (1991) suggests that firms access public debt markets when they have enough reputation to no longer require the close monitoring by banks. Using daily rate data for dealer-placed and directly placed commercial paper, we find that the year-end liquidity squeeze is less pronounced in the directly place commercial paper than in the dealer-placed commercial paper, consistent with the existence of benefits from direct lending relationships in this public debt market.

Erzurumlu, Yaman Ömer (Dogus Author) The federal funds market is highly competitive, has uniform information, and does not have most order-processing cost components of equity markets. Hence, it provides an opportunity to study the effect of inventory management on the bid-ask spread in an isolated fashion. Using a unique data set of daily borrowing and lending federal funds quotes posted by a large commercial bank, we find that the bank maintains a fairly constant bid-ask spread throughout a two-week reserve maintenance period. It acts similarly to a market maker facilitating flow of funds between depository institutions throughout the reserve maintenance period. The bank becomes more active toward the end of the period. In particular, on settlement Wednesday it increases the bid and ask quotes relative to the effective federal funds rate in an apparent attempt to manage its reserve inventory and satisfy its own reserve requirements.