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Environmental monitoring is essential for safeguarding the health of our planet and protecting human health and well-being. Without trust, the effectiveness of environmental monitoring and the ability to address environmental challenges are significantly compromised. In this paper, we present a sensor platform capable of performing authenticated and trustworthy measurements, together with a lightweight security protocol for sending the data from the sensor to a central server anonymously. Besides presenting a new and very efficient symmetric-key-based protocol, we also demonstrate on real hardware how existing embedded security modules can be utilized for this purpose. We provide an in-depth evaluation of the performance and a detailed security analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Environmental monitoring is essential for safeguarding the health of our planet and protecting human health and well-being. Without trust, the effectiveness of environmental monitoring and the ability to address environmental challenges are significantly compromised. In this paper, we present a sensor platform capable of performing authenticated and trustworthy measurements, together with a lightweight security protocol for sending the data from the sensor to a central server anonymously. Besides presenting a new and very efficient symmetric-key-based protocol, we also demonstrate on real hardware how existing embedded security modules can be utilized for this purpose. We provide an in-depth evaluation of the performance and a detailed security analysis.

To ensure the security of network data transmission, a network data encryption method based on TrustZone was analyzed. The hardware layer was used to provide hardware support for network data encryption. The framework layer was provided with a trusted operating kernel and a common kernel with a rich execution environment through the kernel layer. The framework layer used the key security management unit on the client-application-side to create, write, read, and delete the security key file. The network data encryption and decryption unit on the client-application-side constructed a session connection between the client application side and the trusted application side under the kernel provided by the kernel layer by calling the hardware of the hardware layer. Moreover, the network data encryption and decryption instructions were transmitted to the trusted-application-side network data encryption and decryption unit. The encryption of the memristor neural network and the cubic chaotic map were employed. The network data encryption and decryption results were presented to the user through the application layer. Experiments results prove that, the interval of the optimal key chaotic sequence must be controlled between [-1,1]. The ASCII code value of the network data character sequence before encryption has an obvious distribution pattern to encrypt the network data to be transmitted under the wireless sensor network scenario. The value of the 0-1 balance index of the encrypted network data of this study's method is the closest to 0, and the highest values are approximately 0.0088, 0.0079, and 0.0067. The method in this study can effectively encrypt and decrypt network data. Under different attack types, this method has high integrity of encrypted network data and a high value of avalanche effect. Thus, it has effective anti-attack performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The growing use of deep neural networks (DNNs) in various applications has raised concerns about the security and privacy of model parameters and runtime execution. To address these concerns, researchers have proposed using trusted execution environments (TEEs) to build trustworthy neural network execution. This paper comprehensively surveys the literature on trusted neural networks, viz., answering how to efficiently execute neural models inside trusted enclaves. We review the various TEE architectures and techniques employed to achieve secure neural network execution and provide a classification of existing work. Additionally, we discuss the challenges and present a few open issues. We intend that this review will assist researchers and practitioners in understanding the state-of-the-art and identifying research problems.

Hyperledger Fabric is a distributed ledger solution platform based on a modular architecture. The cryptographic algorithm is the core of the platform to ensure the security and tamper-resistant of the data on the chain. However, the original Fabric platform lacks the protection of user's keys and cryptographic operations. To this end, this paper proposes a data privacy protection method for Hyperledger Fabric based on Trustzone technology, which places the user's key and the cryptographic operation process of private data in the trusted execution environment for protection. The experimental results based on the existing blockchain network show that the scheme can effectively ensure the security of data encryption process and key static storage, greatly reduce the trusted computing base and the attack surface. The performance loss is within an acceptable range. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Combating the OS-level malware is a very challenging problem as this type of malware can compromise the operating system, obtaining the kernel privilege and subverting almost all the existing anti-malware tools. This work aims to address this problem in the context of mobile devices. As real-world malware is very heterogeneous, we narrow down the scope of our work by especially focusing on a special type of OS-level malware that always corrupts user data. We have designed mobiDOM, the first framework that can combat the OS-level data corruption malware for mobile computing devices. Our mobiDOM contains two components, a malware detector and a data repairer. The malware detector can securely and timely detect the presence of OS-level malware by fully utilizing the existing hardware features of a mobile device, namely, flash memory and Arm TrustZone. Specifically, we integrate the malware detection into the flash translation layer (FTL), a firmware layer embedded into the flash storage hardware, which is inaccessible to the OS; in addition, we run a trusted application in the Arm TrustZone secure world, which acts as a user-level manager of the malware detector. The FTL-based malware detection and the TrustZone-based manager can communicate with each other stealthily via steganography. The data repairer can allow restoring the external storage to a healthy historical state by taking advantage of the out-of-place-update feature of flash memory and our malware-aware garbage collection in the FTL. Security analysis and experimental evaluation on a real-world testbed confirm the effectiveness of mobiDOM.

Security is one of the main challenges of the Internet of Things (IoT). IoT devices are mainly powered by low-cost microcontrollers (MCUs) that typically lack basic hardware security mechanisms to separate security-critical applications from less critical components. Recently, Arm has started to release Cortex-M MCUs enhanced with TrustZone technology (i.e., TrustZone-M), a system-wide security solution aiming at providing robust protection for IoT devices. Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) relying on TrustZone hardware have been perceived as safe havens for securing mobile devices. However, for the past few years, considerable effort has gone into unveiling hundreds of vulnerabilities and proposing a collection of relevant defense techniques to address several issues. While new TEE solutions built on TrustZone-M start flourishing, the lessons gathered from the research community appear to be falling short, as these new systems are trapping into the same pitfalls of the past. In this paper, we present uTango, the first multi-world TEE for modern IoT devices. uTango proposes a novel architecture aiming at tackling the major architectural deficiencies currently affecting TrustZone(-M)-assisted TEEs. In particular, we leverage the very same TrustZone hardware primitives used by dual-world implementations to create multiple and equally secure execution environments within the normal world. We demonstrate the benefits of uTango by conducting an extensive evaluation on a real TrustZone-M hardware platform, i.e., Arm Musca-B1. uTango will be open-sourced and freely available on GitHub in hopes of engaging academia and industry on securing the foreseeable trillion IoT devices.

The TrustZone technology is incorporated in a majority of recent ARM Cortex A and Cortex M processors widely deployed in the IoT world. Security critical code execution inside a so-called secure world is isolated from the rest of the application execution within a normal world. It provides hardware-isolated area called a trusted execution environment (TEE) in the processor for sensitive data and code. This paper demonstrates a vulnerability in the secure world in the form of a cross-world, secure world to normal world, covert channel. Performance counters or Performance Monitoring Unit (PMU) events are used to convey the information from the secure world to the normal world. An encoding program generates appropriate PMU event footprint given a secret S. A corresponding decoding program reads the PMU footprint and infers S using machine learning (ML). The machine learning model can be trained entirely from the data collected from the PMU in user space. Lack of synchronization between PMU start and PMU read adds noise to the encoding/decoding ML models. In order to account for this noise, this study proposes three different synchronization capabilities between the client and trusted applications in the covert channel. These are synchronous, semi-synchronous, and asynchronous. Previously proposed PMU based covert channels deploy L1 and LLC cache PMU events. The latency of these events tends to be 100–1000 cycles limiting the bandwidth of these covert channels. We propose to use microarchitecture level events with latency of 10–100 cycles captured through PMU for covert channel encoding leading to a potential 100× higher bandwidth. This study conducts a series of experiments to evaluate the proposed covert channels under various synchronization models on a TrustZone supported Cortex-A processor using OP-TEE framework. As stated earlier, switch from signaling based on PMU cache events to PMU microarchitectural events leads to approximately 15× higher covert channel bandwidth. This proposed finer-grained microarchitecture event encoding covert channel can achieve throughput of the order of 11 Kbits/s as opposed to previous work's throughput of the order of 760 bits/s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Combating the OS-level malware is a very challenging problem as this type of malware can compromise the operating system, obtaining the kernel privilege and subverting almost all the existing anti-malware tools. This work aims to address this problem in the context of mobile devices. As real-world malware is very heterogeneous, we narrow down the scope of our work by especially focusing on a special type of OS-level malware that always corrupts user data. We have designed mobiDOM, the first framework that can combat the OS-level data corruption malware for mobile computing devices. Our mobiDOM contains two components, a malware detector and a data repairer. The malware detector can securely and timely detect the presence of OS-level malware by fully utilizing the existing hardware features of a mobile device, namely, flash memory and Arm TrustZone. Specifically, we integrate the malware detection into the flash translation layer (FTL), a firmware layer embedded into the flash storage hardware, which is inaccessible to the OS; in addition, we run a trusted application in the Arm TrustZone secure world, which acts as a user-level manager of the malware detector. The FTL-based malware detection and the TrustZone-based manager can communicate with each other stealthily via steganography. The data repairer can allow restoring the external storage to a healthy historical state by taking advantage of the out-of-place-update feature of flash memory and our malware-aware garbage collection in the FTL. Security analysis and experimental evaluation on a real-world testbed confirm the effectiveness of mobiDOM. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hyperledger Fabric is a distributed ledger solution platform based on a modular architecture. The cryptographic algorithm is the core of the platform to ensure the security and tamper-resistant of the data on the chain. However, the original Fabric platform lacks the protection of user’s keys and cryptographic operations. To this end, this paper proposes a data privacy protection method for Hyperledger Fabric based on Trustzone technology, which places the user‘s key and the cryptographic operation process of private data in the trusted execution environment for protection. The experimental results based on the existing blockchain network show that the scheme can effectively ensure the security of data encryption process and key static storage, greatly reduce the trusted computing base and the attack surface. The performance loss is within an acceptable range.

This paper presents an improvement of control flow attestation (C-FLAT) for Linux. C-FLAT is a control attestation system for embedded devices. It was implemented as a software executing in ARM's TrustZone on bare-metal devices. We extend the design and implementation of C-FLAT through the use of a type 2 Nanovisor in the Linux operating system. We call our improved system "C-FLAT Linux". Compared to the original C-FLAT, C-FLAT Linux reduces processing overheads and is able to detect the SlowLoris attack. We describe the architecture of C-FLAT Linux and provide extensive measurements of its performance in benchmarks and real-world scenarios. In addition, we demonstrate the detection of the SlowLoris attack on the Apache web server. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hardware support for isolated execution (e.g., ARM TrustZone) enables the development of a trusted execution environment (TEE) that ensures the security of the code and data while communicating with a compromised rich execution environment (REE). The ability to satisfy various security services is complicated and usually consists of trusted applications, a trusted kernel and a secure monitor. However, formally verifying the security of an entire TEE security remains challenging. We present a methodology for designing a TEE in a way that enables verification of its security properties. Our methodology consists of forcing a trusted application and kernel to communicate with an REE via a narrow interface and compile and link them with a small secure monitor that implements the interface and runs at the highest privilege level. We provide functional verification of the secure monitor to ensure that it correctly switches the TEE/REE, communicates with the REE at a pre-defined memory space and has no integer overflow vulnerability. We also perform a verification of the secure monitor's scheduler to ensure that it satisfies information flow noninterference. We present a modular verification framework that can prove an end-to-end security property for cross-language programmes (e.g., C and assembly languages). Our evaluation suggests that the methodology scales to real-world TEE applications.

The TrustZone technology is incorporated in a majority of recent ARM Cortex A and Cortex M processors widely deployed in the IoT world. Security critical code execution inside a so-called secure world is isolated from the rest of the application execution within a normal world. It provides hardware-isolated area called a trusted execution environment (TEE) in the processor for sensitive data and code. This paper demonstrates a vulnerability in the secure world in the form of a cross-world, secure world to normal world, covert channel. Performance counters or Performance Monitoring Unit (PMU) events are used to convey the information from the secure world to the normal world. An encoding program generates appropriate PMU event footprint given a secret S. A corresponding decoding program reads the PMU footprint and infers S using machine learning (ML). The machine learning model can be trained entirely from the data collected from the PMU in user space. Lack of synchronization between PMU start and PMU read adds noise to the encoding/decoding ML models. In order to account for this noise, this study proposes three different synchronization capabilities between the client and trusted applications in the covert channel. These are synchronous, semi-synchronous, and asynchronous. Previously proposed PMU based covert channels deploy L1 and LLC cache PMU events. The latency of these events tends to be 100–1000 cycles limiting the bandwidth of these covert channels. We propose to use microarchitecture level events with latency of 10–100 cycles captured through PMU for covert channel encoding leading to a potential 100× higher bandwidth. This study conducts a series of experiments to evaluate the proposed covert channels under various synchronization models on a TrustZone supported Cortex-A processor using OP-TEE framework. As stated earlier, switch from signaling based on PMU cache events to PMU microarchitectural events leads to approximately 15× higher covert channel bandwidth. This proposed finer-grained microarchitecture event encoding covert channel can achieve throughput of the order of 11 Kbits/s as opposed to previous work’s throughput of the order of 760 bits/s.

Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) is a class of defensive techniques against control-flow attacks such as Return-Oriented Programming. We propose a light-weight CFI scheme for RTOS-based applications, TZmCFI, which utilizes TrustZone for Armv8-M, a hardware-assisted security feature for embedded systems with tight resource constraints. TZmCFI embodies several existing CFI techniques to provide a comprehensive protection. The traditional shadow stack technique is used to ensure stack integrity and validate function returns. To protect exception handlers, TZmCFI extends shadow exception stacks, which are a variant of the traditional shadow stack technique we proposed in our previous work, for RTOS integration and performance improvement. We conducted an experiment on Arm Versatile Express Cortex-M Prototyping System (V2M-MPS2+) to evaluate the run-time overhead of the proposed system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the development of blockchain-based digital currencies, the security of digital wallets becomes more and more important. As far as we know, there is no safe lightweight wallet in hyperledger fabric. To solve the problem, we proposed a T rustzone-based S ecure L ightweight W allet for H yperledger F abric (hereafter referred to as TSLWHF). Firstly, we designed an Unspent Transaction Output (UTXO) set of transactions under blockchain and a signature verification mechanism for transactions, which made it possible to implement the lightweight wallet in hyperledger fabric. Then, we implemented a reliable protection mechanism for private keys and wallet's address, which solved the problem that users' information might be stolen or replaced. Meanwhile, the transaction verification results are guaranteed not to be tampered by hackers through verifying transactions in Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) and encrypting local block headers. Finally, to demonstrate utility, we deployed the system in hyperledger fabric and trustzone. Experiments showed that the wallet reduces the size of locally stored data while protecting the security of user's assets. The time spent on TSLWHF to execute a transaction is 0.589s, which improves transaction's performance compared to Bitcoin wallet. • In hyperledger fabric, we implemented a digital currency system based on the UTXO model, which supports the Simple Payment Verification (SPV). • We designed a secure trustzone-based lightweight wallet for hyperledger fabric, which can protect users' digital assets. • We conducted abundant evaluations, and our proposed system is secure and brings less overheads. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents an improvement of control flow attestation (C-FLAT) for Linux. C-FLAT is a control attestation system for embedded devices. It was implemented as a software executing in ARM’s TrustZone on bare-metal devices. We extend the design and implementation of C-FLAT through the use of a type 2 Nanovisor in the Linux operating system. We call our improved system “C-FLAT Linux”. Compared to the original C-FLAT, C-FLAT Linux reduces processing overheads and is able to detect the SlowLoris attack. We describe the architecture of C-FLAT Linux and provide extensive measurements of its performance in benchmarks and real-world scenarios. In addition, we demonstrate the detection of the SlowLoris attack on the Apache web server.

Abstract Third-party IME (Input Method Editor) apps are often the preference means of interaction for Android users’ input. In this paper, we first discuss the insecurity of IME apps, including the Potentially Harmful Apps (PHAs) and malicious IME apps, which may leak users’ sensitive keystrokes. The current defense system, such as I-BOX, is vulnerable to the prefix substitution attack and the colluding attack due to the post-IME nature. We provide a deeper understanding that all the designs with the post-IME nature are subject to the prefix-substitution and colluding attacks. To remedy the above post-IME system’s flaws, we propose a new idea, pre-IME, which guarantees that “Is this touch event a sensitive keystroke?” analysis will always access user touch events prior to the execution of any IME app code. We design an innovative TrustZone-based framework named IM-Visor which has the pre-IME nature. Specifically, IM-Visor creates the isolation environment named STIE as soon as a user intends to type on a soft keyboard, then the STIE intercepts,Android event sub translates and analyzes the user’s touch input. If the input is sensitive, the translation of keystrokes will be delivered to user apps through a trusted path. Otherwise, IM-Visor replays non-sensitive keystroke touch events for IME apps or replays non-keystroke touch events for other apps. A prototype of IM-Visor has been implemented and tested with several most popular IMEs. The experimental results show that IM-Visor has small runtime overheads.

Due to the increasing total value of the digital currency, the security of encryption wallet is becoming more and more important. The hardware-based wallet is safe, but it is inconvenient because users need to carry an additional physical device, the software-based wallet is convenient, but the safety cannot be guaranteed. All these wallets need to synchronize the blockchain, while most current mobile devices do not have the capability to store all blocks. To solve these problems, mobile devices can use simplified payment verification (SPV). Nevertheless, in existing methods, there is no good way to protect the verification process of the transaction. In this paper, we design a secure blockchain lightweight wallet based on Trustzone to protect SPV. It is more portable compared with the hardware wallet, and safer than the software wallet. Through the isolation, it can also protect the private key and the wallet's address from being stolen by the attackers no matter whether the Rich OS is malicious or not. Meanwhile, it can protect the verification process by verifying transactions in the secure execution environment (SEE), and keep the local block headers unreadable directly from the Rich OS through encryption. We deploy it on the RASPBERRY PI 3 MODEL B development board. The result of the experiment shows that it has little impact on the system.

Side-channel power analysis is a powerful method of breaking secure cryptographic algorithms, but typically power analysis is considered to require specialized measurement equipment on or near the device. Assuming an attacker first gained the ability to run code on the unsecure side of a device, they could trigger encryptions and use the on-board ADC to capture power traces of that hardware encryption engine. This is demonstrated on a SAML11 which contains a M23 core with a TrustZone-M implementation as the hardware security barrier. This attack requires 160 × 106 traces, or approximately 5 GByte of data. This attack does not use any external measurement equipment, entirely performing the power analysis using the ADC on-board the microcontroller under attack. The attack is demonstrated to work both from the non-secure and secure environment on the chip, being a demonstration of a cross-domain power analysis attack. To understand the effect of noise and sample rate reduction, an attack is mounted on the SAML11 hardware AES peripheral using classic external equipment, and results are compared for various sample rates and hardware setups. A discussion on how users of this device can help prevent such remote attacks is also presented, along with metrics that can be used in evaluating other devices. Complete copies of all recorded power traces and scripts used by the authors are publicly presented.

The world is undergoing an unprecedented technological transformation, evolving into a state where ubiquitous Internet-enabled "things" will be able to generate and share large amounts of security- and privacysensitive data. To cope with the security threats that are thus foreseeable, system designers can find in Arm TrustZone hardware technology a most valuable resource. TrustZone is a System-on-Chip and CPU systemwide security solution, available on today's Arm application processors and present in the new generation Arm microcontrollers, which are expected to dominate the market of smart "things." Although this technology has remained relatively underground since its inception in 2004, over the past years, numerous initiatives have significantly advanced the state of the art involving Arm TrustZone. Motivated by this revival of interest, this paper presents an in-depth study of TrustZone technology. We provide a comprehensive survey of relevant work from academia and industry, presenting existing systems into two main areas, namely, Trusted Execution Environments and hardware-assisted virtualization. Furthermore, we analyze the most relevant weaknesses of existing systems and propose new research directions within the realm of tiniest devices and the Internet of Things, which we believe to have potential to yield high-impact contributions in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

TrustZone-based Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) have been utilized extensively for the implementation of security-oriented solutions for several smart intra and inter-connected devices. Although TEEs have been promoted as the starting point for establishing a device root of trust, a number of published attacks against the most broadly utilized TEE implementations request a second view on their security. The aim of this research is to provide an analytical and educational exploration of TrustZone-based TEE vulnerabilities with the goal of pinpointing design and implementation flaws. To this end, we provide a taxonomy of TrustZone attacks, analyze them, and more importantly derive a set of critical observations regarding their nature. We perform a critical appraisal of the vulnerabilities to shed light on their underlying causes and we deduce that their manifestation is the joint effect of several parameters that lead to this situation. The most important ones are the closed implementations, the lack of security mechanisms, the shared resource architecture, and the absence of tools to audit trusted applications. Finally, given the severity of the identified issues, we propose possible improvements that could be adopted by TEE implementers to remedy and improve the security posture of TrustZone and future research directions.

Virtualization has been deployed as a key enabling technology for coping with the ever growing complexity and heterogeneity of modern computing systems. However, on its own, classical virtualization is a poor match for modern endpoint embedded system requirements such as safety, security and real-time, which are our main target. Microkernel-based approaches to virtualization have been shown to bridge the gap between traditional and embedded virtualization. This notwithstanding, existent microkernel-based solutions follow a highly para-virtualized approach, which inherently requires a significant software engineering effort to adapt guest operating systems (OSes) to run as userland components. In this paper, we present mRTZVisor as a new TrustZone-assisted hypervisor that distinguishes itself from state-of-the-art TrustZone solutions by implementing a microkernel-like architecture while following an object-oriented approach. Contrarily to existing microkernel-based solutions, mRTZVisor is able to run nearly unmodified guest OSes, while, contrarily to existing TrustZone-assisted solutions, it provides a high degree of functionality and configurability, placing strong emphasis on the real-time support. Our hypervisor was deployed and evaluated on a Xilinx Zynq-based platform. Experiments demonstrate that the hypervisor presents a small trusted computing base size (approximately 60KB), and a performance overhead of less than 2% for a 10 ms guest-switching rate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The widespread use of mobile devices has allowed the development of participatory sensing systems that capture various types of data using the existing or external sensors attached to mobile devices. Gathering data from such anonymous sources requires a mechanism to establish the integrity of sensor readings. In many cases, sensor data need to be preprocessed on the device itself before being uploaded to the target server while ensuring the chain of trust from capture to the delivery of the data. This can be achieved by a framework that provides a means to implement arbitrary operations to be performed on trusted sensor data, while guaranteeing the security and integrity of the data. This paper presents the design and implementation of a framework that allows the capture of trusted sensor data from both external and internal sensors on a mobile phone along with the development of trusted operations on sensor data while providing a mechanism for performing predefined operations on the data such that the chain of trust is maintained. The evaluation shows that the proposed system ensures the security and integrity of sensor data with minimal performance overhead.

In mixed-criticality systems, components often have different criticality requirements that must be met. Components with different criticality requirements must be partitioned into independent execution domains with robust inter-domain isolation, in order to prevent interference between domains of different criticality. For the most critical components, timing-predictability and performance/efficiency are key in ensuring the correct execution of critical components. Existing approaches achieve the required inter-domain isolation using either virtualisation technology or a hardware isolation environment. However, these approaches often conflict with the required timing-predictability and performance/efficiency of components with the highest criticality, which originates from (i) the introduction of complicated system architectures; (ii) the neglection of partitioning and multiplexing of I/Os; (iii) the lack of bounded worst-case timing. In this article, we propose a new mixed-criticality system architecture based on ARM TrustZone technology, termed P arallel Sp ace Sys tem (PSpSys), which is a timing-predictable system architecture with hardware-level isolation and predictable inter-domain shared I/O management. In addition, an alternative co-processor is also proposed for PSpSys , which significantly improves performance with reduced system complexity. PSpSys therefore can be applied to safety-critical mechatronic systems (e.g. unmanned autonomous systems, field robotics) which perform tasks on different critical levels. Finally, we demonstrate how PSpSys can be exploited to achieve all the required features in real hardware platform (Xilinx ZC706 evaluation board). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the extensive application of IoT techniques, IoT devices have become ubiquitous in daily lives. Meanwhile, attacks against IoT devices have emerged to compromise IoT devices by tampering with system pre-installed programs or injecting new malware. To mitigate these attacks, integrity enforcement of IoT systems has been proposed. The integrity of an IoT device system includes load-time integrity and runtime integrity. In this paper, we design an IoT system based on ARM TrustZone to enforce the system integrity. First, we establish the root of trust and propose a hybrid booting approach consisting of both secure boot and trusted boot to enforce the system load-time integrity. Second, we investigate a paging-based process integrity measurement method to measure the NW processes and conduct remote attestation based on the measurement results ensuring the NW runtime process integrity. We implement an IoT prototype system on a NXP i.MX6Q SABRE SD development board to assess its feasibility. Real-world experiment results demonstrate that our prototype introduces negligible performance overhead to the original system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]