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Résumé Objectif: Mesurer l'effet de la stratégie de lutte contre la pandémie de la Covid-19, basée sur le confinement, sur la pratique de la chirurgie orthopédique et traumatologique en Tunisie. Méthodes: Il s'agit d'une étude comparative, concernant l'impact de la Covid-19 sur le flux des patients opérés en urgence, aux services d'orthopédie et de traumatologie, durant la période de confinement du 12 Mars 2020 au 30 Avril 2020, en la comparant à la même période de l'année 2019, dans la région du Centre-Est Tunisien (Kairouan, Sousse, Mahdia, Monastir). Résultats: Une baisse significative de 27% du flux des patients admis aux services de chirurgie orthopédique du Centre-Est Tunisien, a été documentée au cours de la période du confinement de 2020, comparativement à la même période de l'année antérieure. Cette baisse a été globalement généralisée, notifiée dans trois services d'orthopédie: Sousse (39%; p < 10-3), Monastir (29%; p

It is argued in literature that transparency may be detrimental to welfare. Morris and Shin (2002) suggest reducing the precision of public information or withholding it. The latter seems to be unrealistic. Thus, the issue is not whether central bank should disclose or not its information, but how the central bank should disclose it. We consider a static coordination game in which the private sector receives n semi-public information plus their specific information, and we analyse the impact on the private sector's welfare. The paper consists of three parts: (1) By making assumption that no costs are attached to the provision of private information, we determined the conditions under which the central bank faces a trade-o_ between enhancing commonality and the use of more precise, but fragmented information. Such intermediate transparent strategies may prevent the bad side of public information from overpowering the good side of it. (2) The latter result is found even in presence of positive externalities. (3) Introducing costs to that framework in equilibrium shows that strategic substitutability between semi-public and private precisions is a very likely outcome.

A recent theoretical literature highlighted the potential dangers of further increasing information disclosure by central banks. This paper gives a continuous empirical investigation of the existence of an optimal degree of transparency in the lines of van der Cruijsen et al. We test a quadratic relationship between central bank transparency and the inflation persistence by introducing some technical and economic modifications. Particularly, we used three new measures of transparency. An appropriate U shape test that was made through a Stata routine, recently developed by Lind and Mehlum, indicates a robust optimal intermediate degree of transparency, but its level is not. These results were obtained using a panel of 11 OECD central banks under the period 1999-2009. The estimations were run using a bias corrected LSDVC, a newly recent technique developed by Bruno for short dynamic panels with fixed effects, extended to accommodate unbalanced data.

This paper aims at establishing a relationship between disparity of information and the probability of speculative attack in explaining the Asian crisis. We apply the general framework of Markov-Switching models to the differential of interest rates (DIR), subsequently in Indonesia and Malaysia. We allow dependency of the transition probabilities over the asymmetric information indicators. The Maximum Likelihood estimators results (MLE) are twofold: (1) an increase of information dispersion among speculators leads to a higher probability of a currency crisis (2) there is a significant asymmetric impact of information disparity as measured by difference between fund price and Net Asset Value (NAV) on the transition probability in the case of Indonesia, while the hypothesis is rejected for Malaysia’s case.

In earlier theoretical framework, Morris and Shin (2002) highlight the potential dangers of transparency policy. In particular, public announcements may be detrimental to social welfare. Later, Morris and Shin (2005) uphold that more precise communication can degrade the signal value of prices. Researchers suggest reducing the precision of public information or withholding it. Cornand and Heinemann (2008) suggest rather limiting the publicity degree. We found that the same effect can be reached by establishing fragmented public information, but in presence of private signal.

This paper outlines the implications of central bank transparency coupled with economic globalization on the effectiveness of monetary policy at achieving low and stable inflation, through a two-step empirical analysis on a sample of 34 OECD countries. Our results are fourfold: (i) There is a highly significant negative impact of economic globalization (measured by the composite sub-index of Dreher et al., 2008) on inflation (ii) An appropriate and efficient U shape test proposed by Lind and Mehlum (2010), indicates a robust optimal intermediate degree of transparency under the first estimation period (1998-2010), but suggests new evidence as to its level differently from van der Cruijsen et al. (2010). (iii) Although our findings are generally confirmed by a wide set of robustness tests, some caveats associated with the length of time period and the characteristics of inflation pattern observed under the second estimation period (2006-2015) should be taken into account. The estimations were run using a bias corrected Least Square Dummy variable (hereafter, LSDVC), developed by Bruno (2005) for short dynamic panels with fixed effects, and extended to accommodate unbalanced data. Alternative results using Generalized Method of Moments (hereafter GMM) estimators: (Arellano and Bond, 1991, hereafter AB; Blundell and Bond, 1998, hereafter BB) are also provided. (iv) Overall, we find that LSDVC estimator outperforms GMM estimators as it exhibits a satisfactory fit of our hypotheses.

This paper aims at establishing a relationship between disparity of information and the probability of speculative attack in explaining the Asian crisis. We apply the general framework of Markov-Switching models to the differential of interest rates (DIR), subsequently in Indonesia and Malaysia. We allow dependency of the transition probabilities over the asymmetric information indicators. The Maximum Likelihood estimators results (MLE) are twofold: (1) an increase of information dispersion among speculators leads to a higher probability of a currency crisis (2) there is a significant asymmetric impact of information disparity as measured by the difference between fund price and Net Asset Value (NAV) on the transition probability in the case of Indonesia, while the hypothesis is rejected for Malaysia's case.