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TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION 1332 II. THE FAT 1332 III. AVOIDING LABELING ERRORS AND OTHER GROUNDWORK 1336 IV. TASIOULAS'S RECIPE FOR CARVING DOMAINS 1340 V. Two DEVIATIONS FROM THE [...], According to John Tasioulas, the formative aim of international human rights law is to give effect to moral human rights (insofar as it is appropriate for international law to do so, through the technique of assigning a uniform set of individual legal rights to all humans). In cases of pure human rights inflation, an international legal human right fails to give effect to any moral human right. Tasioulas regards international legal human rights that fit this criterion as morally unjustified. This Article scrutinises various bases on which the inference underlying his conclusion might be validated and argues that none of them succeeds. It concludes that international legal human rights are morally independent of moral human rights. To evaluate them properly, there is no alternative to a detailed case by case analysis. While this analysis may include reference to moral human rights, it is by no means limited to them and need not include them either. Even pure cases of human rights inflation may be morally justified.

In the ten healthiest counties in the United States, white men have a life expectancy above 76.4 years. By contrast, in the ten least healthy counties, African-American men have a [...]

Anthropologists often claim to have understood an ethical outlook that they nevertheless believe is largely false. Some moral philosophers--for example, Susan Hurley--argue that this claim is incoherent because understanding an [...]

It seems to be a commonplace of the philosophical literature that there is no such thing as moral expertise. Or perhaps, more narrowly, that there is no such thing as justified deference to moral expertise, when there is moral expertise. On the other hand, a warrant for moral deference seems to have a secure place in everyday moral experience. It is illustrated, for example, by the ubiquitous phenomenon of taking moral advice (this includes a role for exemplars of individual moral virtues, but is not limited to exemplars of virtue). In this paper, I shall defend moral deference against overblown philosophical skepticism. I hope to contribute to rehabilitating the notion for some role in moral theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]